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Auth:contract-caller must be one of stacker, stacker-2, stacker-3, or stacker-4 from DAO registry (L80–86).
Effect: Writes a {height: burn-height} record into stacking-unlock-burn-height map (L90).
release-stacked-stx (Lines 219–247)
Auth: None (public).
Guards: Emergency shutdown check (L221–227), collateral token must be "xSTX" (L228), vault must be liquidated (L229), stacked tokens > 0 (L230), burn-block-height >= stored unlock height (L231–237).
Critical: Line 234 calls unwrap-panic on map-get? stacking-unlock-burn-height. If the stacker-name was never registered, map-get? returns none and unwrap-panicaborts the entire transaction — see Finding AR-04.
redeem-stx (Lines 255–267)
Auth: Public (anyone).
Effect: Burns min(stx-redeemable, ustx-amount) xSTX and redeems equivalent STX for tx-sender.
toggle-freddie-shutdown (Lines 269–275)
Auth:tx-sender must equal DAO guardian address (L271).
Effect: Flips freddie-shutdown-activated boolean.
collateralize-and-mint (Lines 288–371)
Auth: Anyone (vault owner becomes tx-sender at L299).
Guards: Shutdown checks (L305–311), authorized trait contracts (L312–320), collateral ratio floor (L322), debt ceiling (L323–329), collateral token match (L330–336).
Effect: Delegates collateral to reserve, mints USDA (L339 — via as-contract), creates vault record.
deposit (Lines 380–427)
Auth:tx-sender must equal vault owner (L412).
Note: Shutdown and authorization checks appear after computing the new collateral value (L391–394) — minor ordering inefficiency but no exploitable consequence.
withdraw (Lines 437–499)
Auth:tx-sender must equal vault owner (L466).
Guards: Not liquidated (L465), owner check (L466), amount > 0 (L467), amount <= collateral (L468), not stacking (L469), post-withdrawal ratio >= floor (L493).
mint (Lines 501–540) (not shown in full — summarized)
Auth: Vault owner via tx-sender.
Effect: Accrues stability fee, mints extra USDA, updates vault debt.
burn (Lines 542–595) (summarized)
Auth: Anyone (pays off debt for any vault).
Effect: Pays stability fees, burns USDA, decrements vault debt.
close-vault (Lines 597–650) (summarized)
Auth: Vault owner via tx-sender.
Effect: Burns full debt, withdraws all collateral, marks vault closed.
liquidate (Lines 782–840)
Auth:contract-caller must equal DAO liquidator contract (L794).
Effect: Flags vault as liquidated, mints xSTX if collateral was stacking, returns collateral/debt data.
finalize-liquidation (Lines 848–874)
Auth:contract-caller must equal auction-engine (L861).
Effect: Records leftover collateral, marks auction ended, adjusts debt totals.
redeem-tokens (Lines 975–992)
Auth: NONE — fully public. Only gate is time: block-height - block-height-last-paid > BLOCKS-PER-DAY * 31 (L977).
Effect: Resets block-height-last-paid to current block-height (L979), then transfers USDA and/or DIKO from contract to DAO payout address.
Critical: See Finding AR-01.
migrate-funds (Lines 1000–1010)
Auth:contract-caller must equal get-dao-owner (L1002).
Effect: Transfers full token balance to a new vault manager contract.
Private Functions (key)
stability-fee-helper (Lines 705–721): Computes accrued fee as number-of-blocks * (debt * fee / 10^decimals) — see Finding AR-02.
All vault mutation functions (deposit, withdraw, mint, close-vault, withdraw-leftover-collateral) compare tx-sender against the vault owner field. tx-sender is the originating EOA and never equals a contract principal. This design prevents:
Smart-contract wallet users from owning vaults
Automated vault managers / DeFi composability (e.g., a yield router that manages a user's vault)
Multi-sig treasury vaults
Vaults can only be created and managed by raw EOA keys.
BP-02: Division-before-multiplication causes stability fee precision loss (Lines 714–719)
At L716, interest = (debt * fee) / 10^decimals is computed per block before multiplying by number-of-blocks. For small debt * fee values (e.g. debt = u1000000, fee = u1, decimals = 6), integer division yields (/ 1000000 1000000) = u1. Then interest * number-of-blocks = 1 * 4320 (30-day accrual). The correct value is (debt * fee * number-of-blocks) / 10^decimals = 4320. The result is accidentally correct here, but for any debt * fee < 10^decimals, integer division produces u0 and the vault pays zero stability fees forever, breaking the protocol's revenue model.
BP-03: unwrap-panic on map lookup without guaranteed key presence (Lines 71–72, 234)
;; Line 71
(ok (getheight (unwrap-panic (map-get?stacking-unlock-burn-height { stacker-name: name }))))
;; Line 234
(getheight (unwrap-panic (map-get?stacking-unlock-burn-height { stacker-name: (getstacker-name vault) })))
Both call unwrap-panic on a map-get? result. If the stacker-name was never written by an authorized stacker contract (e.g., the vault was created pre-stacking, or the stacker-name field is malformed), map-get? returns none and unwrap-panic causes an immediate transaction abort. In release-stacked-stx (L234), this abort permanently blocks release of the stacked STX — the function can never succeed for that vault.
6. Findings Table
ID
Severity
Function
Lines
Title
Description
Recommended Fix
AR-01
High
redeem-tokens
975–992
Unrestricted Public Payout Timer Reset — Permanent DAO Revenue DoS
redeem-tokens has no caller restriction. The only gate is the time-lock at L977: (> (- block-height block-height-last-paid) (* BLOCKS-PER-DAY u31)). Any address can call redeem-tokens (u1 u0) — transferring 1 micro-USDA and 0 DIKO — which: (1) satisfies the time-lock, (2) resets block-height-last-paid to block-height (L979), and (3) restarts the 31-day (≈4,464 blocks) clock. An attacker executing this every 31 days spends negligible gas while permanently preventing the Arkadiko DAO from collecting any meaningful stability fee revenue. Since usda-amount and diko-amount are caller-supplied with no minimum, even a 1 micro-token call resets the full timer.
Restrict redeem-tokens to an authorized caller: (asserts! (is-eq contract-caller (unwrap-panic (contract-call? .arkadiko-dao get-qualified-name-by-name "payout-manager"))) (err ERR-NOT-AUTHORIZED)). Alternatively, add a minimum transfer floor so that token amounts of u0 or u1 are rejected.
AR-02
Medium
stability-fee-helper
712–719
Division-Before-Multiplication Causes Zero Stability Fee for Small Vaults
At L716: (interest (/ (* debt fee) (pow u10 decimals))). When debt * fee < 10^decimals, integer division rounds to u0. The vault then accrues zero fees for every block — indefinitely. Example:debt = u500000 (0.5 USDA), fee = u1, decimals = 6: interest = (/ 500000 1000000) = u0. This vault will never pay a stability fee regardless of time elapsed. Any position below ~1 USDA with low fee rates is permanently exempt.
Reorder the arithmetic to multiply first: (interest (/ (* (* debt fee) number-of-blocks) (pow u10 decimals))). Move the number-of-blocks multiplication inside and divide once at the end to preserve full precision.
All vault management functions compare tx-sender to the vault owner field (e.g. L412 in deposit, L466 in withdraw). tx-sender is the originating EOA and can never equal a contract principal. This blocks: multi-sig safe owners, smart-contract wallets, automated DeFi strategies, and any composability layer from managing user vaults.
Implement a delegated authorization model: add a vault-delegates map (uint → (list 10 principal)) and check both tx-sender and entries in the delegate list. Alternatively, replace tx-sender with contract-caller to support contract-based interaction patterns.
unwrap-panic on Unregistered Stacker Name Permanently Locks STX
Line 234 calls unwrap-panic on map-get? stacking-unlock-burn-height using the vault's stacker-name. If this entry was never written (race condition, upgrade path, or malformed vault state), unwrap-panic aborts the transaction. For any such vault, release-stacked-stxcan never succeed — the stacked STX collateral is permanently locked with no recovery path. The same panic exists in the get-stacking-unlock-burn-height read-only function at L71.
Replace unwrap-panic with unwrap! and an explicit error, or use default-to with a safe fallback: (default-to u0 (get height (map-get? stacking-unlock-burn-height { stacker-name: (get stacker-name vault) }))). Add a guard asserting the returned height is > u0 before proceeding.
