This document highlights some common fallacies often repeated by proponents of the 'op_cat' proposal. My goal isn't to argue for or against op_cat, but to debunk these misconceptions and steer the discussion toward a more fact-based, rational analysis.
Some proponents claim that op_cat would enable quantum-resistant signatures. This is misleading because op_cat functions only within Tapscripts, which rely on a Taptweak for security. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could potentially break the Taptweak, bypassing the op_cat script and rendering any quantum-resistant signatures useless. Thus, op_cat alone cannot enable a post-quantum signature scheme.
Proponents often argue that we should activate op_cat because it would enable covenants. However, op_cat only allows for a convoluted workaround to mimic covenants, and this emulation is both complex to implement and inefficient in terms of block space and transaction fees. If the goal is to enable covenants, it would be more prudent to consider well-designed covenant proposals such as TXHASH or introspection opcodes.
A frequent argument is that op_cat is "just 10 lines of code." This is a fallacy because even minimal code changes can have catastrophic consequences. The fact that you might not immediately exploit these 10 lines does not mean that op_cat won't interfere with the broader system and its incentive structures.
In fact, one of the strongest arguments against op_cat is the difficulty in fully understanding its potential implications. It could represent one of the most significant consensus changes of any Bitcoin Improvement Proposal, radically expanding Bitcoin's smart contract capabilities. Since it's impossible to predict all the consequences of activating op_cat, we cannot confidently assert its safety.
Some proponents argue that op_cat wouldn't affect miner incentives because Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are incompatible with current token standards. This, however, is a narrow view. AMMs are just one of many potential developments that could disrupt Bitcoin's incentive structure. Moreover, the design space for op_cat-based token standards and DeFi applications is largely unexplored, and we cannot foresee all the innovations that might emerge and how they affect MEV.
Item 4 may be better phrased as "It doesn't introduce MEV!"
AMMs in particular are an argument against CAT, and "You can't build an AMM!" is a retort to that criticism rather than a core argument for CAT. The overall absence-of-MEV claim is more valid here than the specific AMM framing is