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chris-belcher / design-for-improving-joinmarkets-resistance-to-sybil-attacks-using-fidelity-bonds.md
Last active Apr 26, 2021
Design for improving JoinMarket's resistance to sybil attacks using fidelity bonds
View design-for-improving-joinmarkets-resistance-to-sybil-attacks-using-fidelity-bonds.md

Design for improving JoinMarket's resistance to sybil attacks using fidelity bonds

13/7/2019

tl;dr

JoinMarket can be sybil attacked today at relatively low cost which can destroy its privacy. Bitcoins can be sacrificed with burner outputs and time-locked addresses (also called fidelity bonds), and this can be used to greatly improve JoinMarket's resistance to sybil attacks.

With real-world data and realistic assumptions we calculate that under such a fidelity bond system an adversary would need to lock up 30,000-80,000 bitcoins for months, or send 45-120 bitcoins to burner addresses to have a good chance of sybil attacking the system if it were added to JoinMarket.

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chris-belcher / work-diary
Last active May 17, 2021
Chris Belcher work diary
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I keep a diary of all the work I do on bitcoin privacy.
It may also be interesting to my collaborators and donors, and anyone who wants to follow
how my projects are going (these days I'm almost exclusively working on developing
CoinSwap, see https://gist.github.com/chris-belcher/9144bd57a91c194e332fb5ca371d0964).
Support this work with a donation: https://bitcoinprivacy.me/coinswap-donations
(Note: I use the datetime format YYYY-MM-DD)
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chris-belcher / coinswap-design.md
Last active May 17, 2021
Design for a CoinSwap Implementation for Massively Improving Bitcoin Privacy and Fungibility
View coinswap-design.md

Design for a CoinSwap Implementation for Massively Improving Bitcoin Privacy and Fungibility

25/5/2020

Abstract

Imagine a future where a user Alice has bitcoins and wants to send them with maximal privacy, so she creates a special kind of transaction. For anyone looking at the blockchain her transaction appears completely normal with her coins seemingly going from address A to address B. But in reality her coins end up in address Z which is entirely unconnected to either A or B.

Now imagine another user, Carol, who isn't too bothered by privacy and sends her bitcoin using a regular wallet which exists today. But because Carol's transaction looks exactly the same as Alice's, anybody analyzing the blockchain must now deal with the possibility that Carol's transaction actually sent her coins to a totally unconnected address. So Carol's privacy is improved even though she didn't change her behaviour, and perhaps had never even heard of this software.

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chris-belcher / rust-bitcoin-play.rs
Created Apr 22, 2021
rust bitcoin play teleport coinswap
View rust-bitcoin-play.rs
// 22/4/2021
// random various unrelated functions coded to help me figure out how to use rust-bitcoin
// should be useful for figuring out why certain things in teleport are coded the way they are
extern crate bitcoincore_rpc;
use bitcoincore_rpc::{Client, Error, RpcApi, Auth};
extern crate bitcoin_wallet;
use bitcoin_wallet::account::{
MasterAccount, Unlocker, Account, AccountAddressType