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- Classi
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- CyberZ
hi, i'm daniel. i'm a 15-year-old high school junior. in my free time, i hack billion dollar companies and build cool stuff.
3 months ago, I discovered a unique 0-click deanonymization attack that allows an attacker to grab the location of any target within a 250 mile radius. With a vulnerable app installed on a target's phone (or as a background application on their laptop), an attacker can send a malicious payload and deanonymize you within seconds--and you wouldn't even know.
I'm publishing this writeup and research as a warning, especially for journalists, activists, and hackers, about this type of undetectable attack. Hundreds of applications are vulnerable, including some of the most popular apps in the world: Signal, Discord, Twitter/X, and others. Here's how it works:
By the numbers, Cloudflare is easily the most popular CDN on the market. It beats out competitors such as Sucuri, Amazon CloudFront, Akamai, and Fastly. In 2019, a major Cloudflare outage k
2020/5/31追記:
自分用のメモに書いていたつもりだったのですが、たくさんのスターを頂けてとても嬉しいです。
と同時に、書きかけで中途半端な状態のドキュメントをご覧いただくことになっており、大変心苦しく思っています。
このドキュメントを完成させるために、今後以下のような更新を予定しています。
- TODO部分を埋める
- 書籍を基にした理論・原則パートと、実装例パートを分割
- 現在は4層のレイヤそれぞれごとに原則の確認→実装時の課題リスト→実装例という構成ですが、同じリポジトリへの言及箇所がバラバラになってしまう問題がありました。更新後は、実装時の課題リストを全て洗い出した後にまとめて実装を確認する構成とする予定です。
2021/1/22追記:
As a security professional, it is important to conduct a thorough reconnaissance. With the increasing use of APIs nowadays, it has become paramount to keep access tokens and other API-related secrets secure in order to prevent leaks. However, despite technological advances, human error remains a factor, and many developers still unknowingly hardcode their API secrets into source code and commit them to public repositories. GitHub, being a widely popular platform for public code repositories, may inadvertently host such leaked secrets. To help identify these vulnerabilities, I have created a comprehensive search list using powerful search syntax that enables the search of thousands of leaked keys and secrets in a single search.
(path:*.{File_extension1} OR path:*.{File_extension-N}) AND ({Keyname1} OR {Keyname-N}) AND (({Signature/pattern1} OR {Signature/pattern-N}) AND ({PlatformTag1} OR {PlatformTag-N}))
**1.
| POST / HTTP/1.1 | |
| Host: localhost | |
| User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/142.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 | |
| Next-Action: x | |
| Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryx8jO2oVc6SWP3Sad | |
| Content-Length: 459 | |
| ------WebKitFormBoundaryx8jO2oVc6SWP3Sad | |
| Content-Disposition: form-data; name="0" |
I recently happened upon a very interesting implementation of popen() (different API, same idea) called popen-noshell using clone(2), and so I opened an issue requesting use of vfork(2) or posix_spawn() for portability. It turns out that on Linux there's an important advantage to using clone(2). I think I should capture the things I wrote there in a better place. A gist, a blog, whatever.
This is not a paper. I assume reader familiarity with
fork()in particular and Unix in general, though, of course, I link to relevant wiki pages, so if the unfamiliar reader is willing to go down the rabbit hole, they should be able to come ou
| (?i)((access_key|access_token|admin_pass|admin_user|algolia_admin_key|algolia_api_key|alias_pass|alicloud_access_key|amazon_secret_access_key|amazonaws|ansible_vault_password|aos_key|api_key|api_key_secret|api_key_sid|api_secret|api.googlemaps AIza|apidocs|apikey|apiSecret|app_debug|app_id|app_key|app_log_level|app_secret|appkey|appkeysecret|application_key|appsecret|appspot|auth_token|authorizationToken|authsecret|aws_access|aws_access_key_id|aws_bucket|aws_key|aws_secret|aws_secret_key|aws_token|AWSSecretKey|b2_app_key|bashrc password|bintray_apikey|bintray_gpg_password|bintray_key|bintraykey|bluemix_api_key|bluemix_pass|browserstack_access_key|bucket_password|bucketeer_aws_access_key_id|bucketeer_aws_secret_access_key|built_branch_deploy_key|bx_password|cache_driver|cache_s3_secret_key|cattle_access_key|cattle_secret_key|certificate_password|ci_deploy_password|client_secret|client_zpk_secret_key|clojars_password|cloud_api_key|cloud_watch_aws_access_key|cloudant_password|cloudflare_api_key|cloudflare_auth_k |
Original report
- Affected Vendor: OpenPrinting
- Affected Product: Several components of the CUPS printing system: cups-browsed, libppd, libcupsfilters and cups-filters.
- Affected Version: All versions <= 2.0.1 (latest release) and master.
- Significant ICS/OT impact? no
- Reporter: Simone Margaritelli [evilsocket@gmail.com]
- Vendor contacted? yes The vendor has been notified trough Github Advisories and all bugs have been confirmed:
