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iflowfor8hours / nastyerror.txt
Created Sep 2, 2018
I thougth you would enjoy the condesencion in the tone of this error message.
View nastyerror.txt
matt@laststand:~$ usermod -aG sudo matt
Command 'usermod' is available in '/usr/sbin/usermod'
The command could not be located because '/usr/sbin' is not included in the PATH environment variable.
This is most likely caused by the lack of administrative privileges associated with your user account.
usermod: command not found
matt@laststand:~$ sudo usermod -aG su
iflowfor8hours /
Created Jul 13, 2018 — forked from pwnsdx/
Disable bunch of #$!@ in Sierra (Version 2.1)
# IMPORTANT: You will need to disable SIP aka Rootless in order to fully execute this script, you can reenable it after.
# WARNING: It might disable things that you may not like. Please double check the services in the TODISABLE vars.
# Get active services: launchctl list | grep -v "\-\t0"
# Find a service: grep -lR [service] /System/Library/Launch* /Library/Launch* ~/Library/LaunchAgents
# Agents to disable
TODISABLE=('' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '
iflowfor8hours / default.conf
Last active May 8, 2018
Nginx config for prometheus
View default.conf
server {
listen 80;
server_name localhost;
location / {
sub_filter_types text/html;
sub_filter_once off;
sub_filter '="/' '="/bnr/dev/service/prometheus/';
sub_filter 'var PATH_PREFIX = "";' 'var PATH_PREFIX = "/bnr/dev/service/prometheus";';
iflowfor8hours / default.conf
Last active May 8, 2018
default.conf for Nginx on mesos
View default.conf
server {
listen 3000;
server_name localhost;
location / {
# curl -o
# chmod +x
# ./termux-themer base16-monokai-dark
function jsonValue() {
iflowfor8hours /
Created Jan 18, 2018
Shell output from getting the pro micro to go to bootstrap mode
slide ~/src/6112884-pro-micro-controller $ virtualenv venv
New python executable in /home/matt/src/6112884-pro-micro-controller/venv/bin/python2.7
Also creating executable in /home/matt/src/6112884-pro-micro-controller/venv/bin/python
Installing setuptools, pip, wheel...done.
slide ~/src/6112884-pro-micro-controller $ python --version
Python 2.7.14
slide ~/src/6112884-pro-micro-controller $ pip install -r requirements.txt
Collecting pyserial==2.7 (from -r requirements.txt (line 1))
Installing collected packages: pyserial
Found existing installation: pyserial 3.4
iflowfor8hours / ingress-and-service.yaml
Created May 8, 2017
external services using k8s and traefik
View ingress-and-service.yaml
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
kind: Ingress
name: testlanding
namespace: landingpages
annotations: traefik
traefik.frontend.passHostHeader: "false"

Keybase proof

I hereby claim:

  • I am iflowfor8hours on github.
  • I am iflowfor8hours ( on keybase.
  • I have a public key whose fingerprint is C5C7 1FA8 104A A6D1 1C97 850B 40DA F6FD DF8A AEA5

To claim this, I am signing this object:

View gist:e140d142855ad465b1f6
notify { $app_artifact_name: }
thing::install_app { $app_artifact_name:
config_filename => $app_artifact_name,
"config_artifact_url": "",
"artifact_repository_base_url": "",
"app_artifact_name": "webservice",
View gist:5faaf0891f5853f06b34
Over the last week or so the community has been a bit worried about the security of Tor. The reason for this is Operation Onymous that in a concentrated crackdown took down a number of illegal or problematic dark web sites, all of which were hidden behind Tor Hidden Services. In this article I want to quickly talk about whether Tor is broken or not.
First the facts. As far as we know, only 17 persons have been arrested or indicted in this action. The amount of Dark sites taken down were first reported as around 400, but later we have seen that it is more in the range of 27 actual web sites that were taken control of - but many more hidden service addresses, since these sites all presumably ran a large number of hidden services.
The big question is whether it is possible that law enforcement agencies have used a weakness in Tor to find the real location of these servers and taking them down. This is of course not at all impossible. There are some known weaknesses that could have been used for this, althoug
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