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February 23, 2012 13:57
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paramiko fix for bees with machine guns
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# Copyright (C) 2003-2007 Robey Pointer <robeypointer@gmail.com> | |
# | |
# This file is part of paramiko. | |
# | |
# Paramiko is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the | |
# terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free | |
# Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) | |
# any later version. | |
# | |
# Paramiko is distrubuted in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY | |
# WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR | |
# A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Lesser General Public License for more | |
# details. | |
# | |
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License | |
# along with Paramiko; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., | |
# 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA. | |
""" | |
L{Transport} handles the core SSH2 protocol. | |
""" | |
import os | |
import socket | |
import string | |
import struct | |
import sys | |
import threading | |
import time | |
import weakref | |
from paramiko import util | |
from paramiko.auth_handler import AuthHandler | |
from paramiko.channel import Channel | |
from paramiko.common import * | |
from paramiko.compress import ZlibCompressor, ZlibDecompressor | |
from paramiko.dsskey import DSSKey | |
from paramiko.kex_gex import KexGex | |
from paramiko.kex_group1 import KexGroup1 | |
from paramiko.message import Message | |
from paramiko.packet import Packetizer, NeedRekeyException | |
from paramiko.primes import ModulusPack | |
from paramiko.rsakey import RSAKey | |
from paramiko.server import ServerInterface | |
from paramiko.sftp_client import SFTPClient | |
from paramiko.ssh_exception import SSHException, BadAuthenticationType, ChannelException | |
from Crypto import Random | |
from Crypto.Cipher import Blowfish, AES, DES3, ARC4 | |
from Crypto.Hash import SHA, MD5 | |
from Crypto.Random import atfork | |
try: | |
from Crypto.Util import Counter | |
except ImportError: | |
from paramiko.util import Counter | |
# for thread cleanup | |
_active_threads = [] | |
def _join_lingering_threads(): | |
for thr in _active_threads: | |
thr.stop_thread() | |
import atexit | |
atexit.register(_join_lingering_threads) | |
class SecurityOptions (object): | |
""" | |
Simple object containing the security preferences of an ssh transport. | |
These are tuples of acceptable ciphers, digests, key types, and key | |
exchange algorithms, listed in order of preference. | |
Changing the contents and/or order of these fields affects the underlying | |
L{Transport} (but only if you change them before starting the session). | |
If you try to add an algorithm that paramiko doesn't recognize, | |
C{ValueError} will be raised. If you try to assign something besides a | |
tuple to one of the fields, C{TypeError} will be raised. | |
""" | |
__slots__ = [ 'ciphers', 'digests', 'key_types', 'kex', 'compression', '_transport' ] | |
def __init__(self, transport): | |
self._transport = transport | |
def __repr__(self): | |
""" | |
Returns a string representation of this object, for debugging. | |
@rtype: str | |
""" | |
return '<paramiko.SecurityOptions for %s>' % repr(self._transport) | |
def _get_ciphers(self): | |
return self._transport._preferred_ciphers | |
def _get_digests(self): | |
return self._transport._preferred_macs | |
def _get_key_types(self): | |
return self._transport._preferred_keys | |
def _get_kex(self): | |
return self._transport._preferred_kex | |
def _get_compression(self): | |
return self._transport._preferred_compression | |
def _set(self, name, orig, x): | |
if type(x) is list: | |
x = tuple(x) | |
if type(x) is not tuple: | |
raise TypeError('expected tuple or list') | |
possible = getattr(self._transport, orig).keys() | |
forbidden = filter(lambda n: n not in possible, x) | |
if len(forbidden) > 0: | |
raise ValueError('unknown cipher') | |
setattr(self._transport, name, x) | |
def _set_ciphers(self, x): | |
self._set('_preferred_ciphers', '_cipher_info', x) | |
def _set_digests(self, x): | |
self._set('_preferred_macs', '_mac_info', x) | |
def _set_key_types(self, x): | |
self._set('_preferred_keys', '_key_info', x) | |
def _set_kex(self, x): | |
self._set('_preferred_kex', '_kex_info', x) | |
def _set_compression(self, x): | |
self._set('_preferred_compression', '_compression_info', x) | |
ciphers = property(_get_ciphers, _set_ciphers, None, | |
"Symmetric encryption ciphers") | |
digests = property(_get_digests, _set_digests, None, | |
"Digest (one-way hash) algorithms") | |
key_types = property(_get_key_types, _set_key_types, None, | |
"Public-key algorithms") | |
kex = property(_get_kex, _set_kex, None, "Key exchange algorithms") | |
compression = property(_get_compression, _set_compression, None, | |
"Compression algorithms") | |
class ChannelMap (object): | |
def __init__(self): | |
# (id -> Channel) | |
self._map = weakref.WeakValueDictionary() | |
self._lock = threading.Lock() | |
def put(self, chanid, chan): | |
self._lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
self._map[chanid] = chan | |
finally: | |
self._lock.release() | |
def get(self, chanid): | |
self._lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
return self._map.get(chanid, None) | |
finally: | |
self._lock.release() | |
def delete(self, chanid): | |
self._lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
try: | |
del self._map[chanid] | |
except KeyError: | |
pass | |
finally: | |
self._lock.release() | |
def values(self): | |
self._lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
return self._map.values() | |
finally: | |
self._lock.release() | |
def __len__(self): | |
self._lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
return len(self._map) | |
finally: | |
self._lock.release() | |
class Transport (threading.Thread): | |
""" | |
An SSH Transport attaches to a stream (usually a socket), negotiates an | |
encrypted session, authenticates, and then creates stream tunnels, called | |
L{Channel}s, across the session. Multiple channels can be multiplexed | |
across a single session (and often are, in the case of port forwardings). | |
""" | |
_PROTO_ID = '2.0' | |
_CLIENT_ID = 'paramiko_1.7.7.1' | |
_preferred_ciphers = ( 'aes128-ctr', 'aes256-ctr', 'aes128-cbc', 'blowfish-cbc', 'aes256-cbc', '3des-cbc', | |
'arcfour128', 'arcfour256' ) | |
_preferred_macs = ( 'hmac-sha1', 'hmac-md5', 'hmac-sha1-96', 'hmac-md5-96' ) | |
_preferred_keys = ( 'ssh-rsa', 'ssh-dss' ) | |
_preferred_kex = ( 'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1', 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1' ) | |
_preferred_compression = ( 'none', ) | |
_cipher_info = { | |
'aes128-ctr': { 'class': AES, 'mode': AES.MODE_CTR, 'block-size': 16, 'key-size': 16 }, | |
'aes256-ctr': { 'class': AES, 'mode': AES.MODE_CTR, 'block-size': 16, 'key-size': 32 }, | |
'blowfish-cbc': { 'class': Blowfish, 'mode': Blowfish.MODE_CBC, 'block-size': 8, 'key-size': 16 }, | |
'aes128-cbc': { 'class': AES, 'mode': AES.MODE_CBC, 'block-size': 16, 'key-size': 16 }, | |
'aes256-cbc': { 'class': AES, 'mode': AES.MODE_CBC, 'block-size': 16, 'key-size': 32 }, | |
'3des-cbc': { 'class': DES3, 'mode': DES3.MODE_CBC, 'block-size': 8, 'key-size': 24 }, | |
'arcfour128': { 'class': ARC4, 'mode': None, 'block-size': 8, 'key-size': 16 }, | |
'arcfour256': { 'class': ARC4, 'mode': None, 'block-size': 8, 'key-size': 32 }, | |
} | |
_mac_info = { | |
'hmac-sha1': { 'class': SHA, 'size': 20 }, | |
'hmac-sha1-96': { 'class': SHA, 'size': 12 }, | |
'hmac-md5': { 'class': MD5, 'size': 16 }, | |
'hmac-md5-96': { 'class': MD5, 'size': 12 }, | |
} | |
_key_info = { | |
'ssh-rsa': RSAKey, | |
'ssh-dss': DSSKey, | |
} | |
_kex_info = { | |
'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1': KexGroup1, | |
'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1': KexGex, | |
} | |
_compression_info = { | |
# zlib@openssh.com is just zlib, but only turned on after a successful | |
# authentication. openssh servers may only offer this type because | |
# they've had troubles with security holes in zlib in the past. | |
'zlib@openssh.com': ( ZlibCompressor, ZlibDecompressor ), | |
'zlib': ( ZlibCompressor, ZlibDecompressor ), | |
'none': ( None, None ), | |
} | |
_modulus_pack = None | |
def __init__(self, sock): | |
""" | |
Create a new SSH session over an existing socket, or socket-like | |
object. This only creates the Transport object; it doesn't begin the | |
SSH session yet. Use L{connect} or L{start_client} to begin a client | |
session, or L{start_server} to begin a server session. | |
If the object is not actually a socket, it must have the following | |
methods: | |
- C{send(str)}: Writes from 1 to C{len(str)} bytes, and | |
returns an int representing the number of bytes written. Returns | |
0 or raises C{EOFError} if the stream has been closed. | |
- C{recv(int)}: Reads from 1 to C{int} bytes and returns them as a | |
string. Returns 0 or raises C{EOFError} if the stream has been | |
closed. | |
- C{close()}: Closes the socket. | |
- C{settimeout(n)}: Sets a (float) timeout on I/O operations. | |
For ease of use, you may also pass in an address (as a tuple) or a host | |
string as the C{sock} argument. (A host string is a hostname with an | |
optional port (separated by C{":"}) which will be converted into a | |
tuple of C{(hostname, port)}.) A socket will be connected to this | |
address and used for communication. Exceptions from the C{socket} call | |
may be thrown in this case. | |
@param sock: a socket or socket-like object to create the session over. | |
@type sock: socket | |
""" | |
if isinstance(sock, (str, unicode)): | |
# convert "host:port" into (host, port) | |
hl = sock.split(':', 1) | |
if len(hl) == 1: | |
sock = (hl[0], 22) | |
else: | |
sock = (hl[0], int(hl[1])) | |
if type(sock) is tuple: | |
# connect to the given (host, port) | |
hostname, port = sock | |
reason = 'No suitable address family' | |
for (family, socktype, proto, canonname, sockaddr) in socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, port, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM): | |
if socktype == socket.SOCK_STREAM: | |
af = family | |
addr = sockaddr | |
sock = socket.socket(af, socket.SOCK_STREAM) | |
try: | |
sock.connect((hostname, port)) | |
except socket.error, e: | |
reason = str(e) | |
else: | |
break | |
else: | |
raise SSHException( | |
'Unable to connect to %s: %s' % (hostname, reason)) | |
# okay, normal socket-ish flow here... | |
threading.Thread.__init__(self) | |
self.setDaemon(True) | |
self.rng = rng | |
self.sock = sock | |
# Python < 2.3 doesn't have the settimeout method - RogerB | |
try: | |
# we set the timeout so we can check self.active periodically to | |
# see if we should bail. socket.timeout exception is never | |
# propagated. | |
self.sock.settimeout(0.1) | |
except AttributeError: | |
pass | |
# negotiated crypto parameters | |
self.packetizer = Packetizer(sock) | |
self.local_version = 'SSH-' + self._PROTO_ID + '-' + self._CLIENT_ID | |
self.remote_version = '' | |
self.local_cipher = self.remote_cipher = '' | |
self.local_kex_init = self.remote_kex_init = None | |
self.local_mac = self.remote_mac = None | |
self.local_compression = self.remote_compression = None | |
self.session_id = None | |
self.host_key_type = None | |
self.host_key = None | |
# state used during negotiation | |
self.kex_engine = None | |
self.H = None | |
self.K = None | |
self.active = False | |
self.initial_kex_done = False | |
self.in_kex = False | |
self.authenticated = False | |
self._expected_packet = tuple() | |
self.lock = threading.Lock() # synchronization (always higher level than write_lock) | |
# tracking open channels | |
self._channels = ChannelMap() | |
self.channel_events = { } # (id -> Event) | |
self.channels_seen = { } # (id -> True) | |
self._channel_counter = 1 | |
self.window_size = 65536 | |
self.max_packet_size = 34816 | |
self._x11_handler = None | |
self._tcp_handler = None | |
self.saved_exception = None | |
self.clear_to_send = threading.Event() | |
self.clear_to_send_lock = threading.Lock() | |
self.clear_to_send_timeout = 30.0 | |
self.log_name = 'paramiko.transport' | |
self.logger = util.get_logger(self.log_name) | |
self.packetizer.set_log(self.logger) | |
self.auth_handler = None | |
self.global_response = None # response Message from an arbitrary global request | |
self.completion_event = None # user-defined event callbacks | |
self.banner_timeout = 15 # how long (seconds) to wait for the SSH banner | |
# server mode: | |
self.server_mode = False | |
self.server_object = None | |
self.server_key_dict = { } | |
self.server_accepts = [ ] | |
self.server_accept_cv = threading.Condition(self.lock) | |
self.subsystem_table = { } | |
def __repr__(self): | |
""" | |
Returns a string representation of this object, for debugging. | |
@rtype: str | |
""" | |
out = '<paramiko.Transport at %s' % hex(long(id(self)) & 0xffffffffL) | |
if not self.active: | |
out += ' (unconnected)' | |
else: | |
if self.local_cipher != '': | |
out += ' (cipher %s, %d bits)' % (self.local_cipher, | |
self._cipher_info[self.local_cipher]['key-size'] * 8) | |
if self.is_authenticated(): | |
out += ' (active; %d open channel(s))' % len(self._channels) | |
elif self.initial_kex_done: | |
out += ' (connected; awaiting auth)' | |
else: | |
out += ' (connecting)' | |
out += '>' | |
return out | |
def atfork(self): | |
""" | |
Terminate this Transport without closing the session. On posix | |
systems, if a Transport is open during process forking, both parent | |
and child will share the underlying socket, but only one process can | |
use the connection (without corrupting the session). Use this method | |
to clean up a Transport object without disrupting the other process. | |
@since: 1.5.3 | |
""" | |
self.sock.close() | |
self.close() | |
def get_security_options(self): | |
""" | |
Return a L{SecurityOptions} object which can be used to tweak the | |
encryption algorithms this transport will permit, and the order of | |
preference for them. | |
@return: an object that can be used to change the preferred algorithms | |
for encryption, digest (hash), public key, and key exchange. | |
@rtype: L{SecurityOptions} | |
""" | |
return SecurityOptions(self) | |
def start_client(self, event=None): | |
""" | |
Negotiate a new SSH2 session as a client. This is the first step after | |
creating a new L{Transport}. A separate thread is created for protocol | |
negotiation. | |
If an event is passed in, this method returns immediately. When | |
negotiation is done (successful or not), the given C{Event} will | |
be triggered. On failure, L{is_active} will return C{False}. | |
(Since 1.4) If C{event} is C{None}, this method will not return until | |
negotation is done. On success, the method returns normally. | |
Otherwise an SSHException is raised. | |
After a successful negotiation, you will usually want to authenticate, | |
calling L{auth_password <Transport.auth_password>} or | |
L{auth_publickey <Transport.auth_publickey>}. | |
@note: L{connect} is a simpler method for connecting as a client. | |
@note: After calling this method (or L{start_server} or L{connect}), | |
you should no longer directly read from or write to the original | |
socket object. | |
@param event: an event to trigger when negotiation is complete | |
(optional) | |
@type event: threading.Event | |
@raise SSHException: if negotiation fails (and no C{event} was passed | |
in) | |
""" | |
self.active = True | |
if event is not None: | |
# async, return immediately and let the app poll for completion | |
self.completion_event = event | |
self.start() | |
return | |
# synchronous, wait for a result | |
self.completion_event = event = threading.Event() | |
self.start() | |
Random.atfork() | |
while True: | |
event.wait(0.1) | |
if not self.active: | |
e = self.get_exception() | |
if e is not None: | |
raise e | |
raise SSHException('Negotiation failed.') | |
if event.isSet(): | |
break | |
def start_server(self, event=None, server=None): | |
""" | |
Negotiate a new SSH2 session as a server. This is the first step after | |
creating a new L{Transport} and setting up your server host key(s). A | |
separate thread is created for protocol negotiation. | |
If an event is passed in, this method returns immediately. When | |
negotiation is done (successful or not), the given C{Event} will | |
be triggered. On failure, L{is_active} will return C{False}. | |
(Since 1.4) If C{event} is C{None}, this method will not return until | |
negotation is done. On success, the method returns normally. | |
Otherwise an SSHException is raised. | |
After a successful negotiation, the client will need to authenticate. | |
Override the methods | |
L{get_allowed_auths <ServerInterface.get_allowed_auths>}, | |
L{check_auth_none <ServerInterface.check_auth_none>}, | |
L{check_auth_password <ServerInterface.check_auth_password>}, and | |
L{check_auth_publickey <ServerInterface.check_auth_publickey>} in the | |
given C{server} object to control the authentication process. | |
After a successful authentication, the client should request to open | |
a channel. Override | |
L{check_channel_request <ServerInterface.check_channel_request>} in the | |
given C{server} object to allow channels to be opened. | |
@note: After calling this method (or L{start_client} or L{connect}), | |
you should no longer directly read from or write to the original | |
socket object. | |
@param event: an event to trigger when negotiation is complete. | |
@type event: threading.Event | |
@param server: an object used to perform authentication and create | |
L{Channel}s. | |
@type server: L{server.ServerInterface} | |
@raise SSHException: if negotiation fails (and no C{event} was passed | |
in) | |
""" | |
if server is None: | |
server = ServerInterface() | |
self.server_mode = True | |
self.server_object = server | |
self.active = True | |
if event is not None: | |
# async, return immediately and let the app poll for completion | |
self.completion_event = event | |
self.start() | |
return | |
# synchronous, wait for a result | |
self.completion_event = event = threading.Event() | |
self.start() | |
while True: | |
event.wait(0.1) | |
if not self.active: | |
e = self.get_exception() | |
if e is not None: | |
raise e | |
raise SSHException('Negotiation failed.') | |
if event.isSet(): | |
break | |
def add_server_key(self, key): | |
""" | |
Add a host key to the list of keys used for server mode. When behaving | |
as a server, the host key is used to sign certain packets during the | |
SSH2 negotiation, so that the client can trust that we are who we say | |
we are. Because this is used for signing, the key must contain private | |
key info, not just the public half. Only one key of each type (RSA or | |
DSS) is kept. | |
@param key: the host key to add, usually an L{RSAKey <rsakey.RSAKey>} or | |
L{DSSKey <dsskey.DSSKey>}. | |
@type key: L{PKey <pkey.PKey>} | |
""" | |
self.server_key_dict[key.get_name()] = key | |
def get_server_key(self): | |
""" | |
Return the active host key, in server mode. After negotiating with the | |
client, this method will return the negotiated host key. If only one | |
type of host key was set with L{add_server_key}, that's the only key | |
that will ever be returned. But in cases where you have set more than | |
one type of host key (for example, an RSA key and a DSS key), the key | |
type will be negotiated by the client, and this method will return the | |
key of the type agreed on. If the host key has not been negotiated | |
yet, C{None} is returned. In client mode, the behavior is undefined. | |
@return: host key of the type negotiated by the client, or C{None}. | |
@rtype: L{PKey <pkey.PKey>} | |
""" | |
try: | |
return self.server_key_dict[self.host_key_type] | |
except KeyError: | |
pass | |
return None | |
def load_server_moduli(filename=None): | |
""" | |
I{(optional)} | |
Load a file of prime moduli for use in doing group-exchange key | |
negotiation in server mode. It's a rather obscure option and can be | |
safely ignored. | |
In server mode, the remote client may request "group-exchange" key | |
negotiation, which asks the server to send a random prime number that | |
fits certain criteria. These primes are pretty difficult to compute, | |
so they can't be generated on demand. But many systems contain a file | |
of suitable primes (usually named something like C{/etc/ssh/moduli}). | |
If you call C{load_server_moduli} and it returns C{True}, then this | |
file of primes has been loaded and we will support "group-exchange" in | |
server mode. Otherwise server mode will just claim that it doesn't | |
support that method of key negotiation. | |
@param filename: optional path to the moduli file, if you happen to | |
know that it's not in a standard location. | |
@type filename: str | |
@return: True if a moduli file was successfully loaded; False | |
otherwise. | |
@rtype: bool | |
@note: This has no effect when used in client mode. | |
""" | |
Transport._modulus_pack = ModulusPack(rng) | |
# places to look for the openssh "moduli" file | |
file_list = [ '/etc/ssh/moduli', '/usr/local/etc/moduli' ] | |
if filename is not None: | |
file_list.insert(0, filename) | |
for fn in file_list: | |
try: | |
Transport._modulus_pack.read_file(fn) | |
return True | |
except IOError: | |
pass | |
# none succeeded | |
Transport._modulus_pack = None | |
return False | |
load_server_moduli = staticmethod(load_server_moduli) | |
def close(self): | |
""" | |
Close this session, and any open channels that are tied to it. | |
""" | |
if not self.active: | |
return | |
self.active = False | |
self.packetizer.close() | |
self.join() | |
for chan in self._channels.values(): | |
chan._unlink() | |
def get_remote_server_key(self): | |
""" | |
Return the host key of the server (in client mode). | |
@note: Previously this call returned a tuple of (key type, key string). | |
You can get the same effect by calling | |
L{PKey.get_name <pkey.PKey.get_name>} for the key type, and | |
C{str(key)} for the key string. | |
@raise SSHException: if no session is currently active. | |
@return: public key of the remote server | |
@rtype: L{PKey <pkey.PKey>} | |
""" | |
if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done): | |
raise SSHException('No existing session') | |
return self.host_key | |
def is_active(self): | |
""" | |
Return true if this session is active (open). | |
@return: True if the session is still active (open); False if the | |
session is closed | |
@rtype: bool | |
""" | |
return self.active | |
def open_session(self): | |
""" | |
Request a new channel to the server, of type C{"session"}. This | |
is just an alias for C{open_channel('session')}. | |
@return: a new L{Channel} | |
@rtype: L{Channel} | |
@raise SSHException: if the request is rejected or the session ends | |
prematurely | |
""" | |
return self.open_channel('session') | |
def open_x11_channel(self, src_addr=None): | |
""" | |
Request a new channel to the client, of type C{"x11"}. This | |
is just an alias for C{open_channel('x11', src_addr=src_addr)}. | |
@param src_addr: the source address of the x11 server (port is the | |
x11 port, ie. 6010) | |
@type src_addr: (str, int) | |
@return: a new L{Channel} | |
@rtype: L{Channel} | |
@raise SSHException: if the request is rejected or the session ends | |
prematurely | |
""" | |
return self.open_channel('x11', src_addr=src_addr) | |
def open_forwarded_tcpip_channel(self, (src_addr, src_port), (dest_addr, dest_port)): | |
""" | |
Request a new channel back to the client, of type C{"forwarded-tcpip"}. | |
This is used after a client has requested port forwarding, for sending | |
incoming connections back to the client. | |
@param src_addr: originator's address | |
@param src_port: originator's port | |
@param dest_addr: local (server) connected address | |
@param dest_port: local (server) connected port | |
""" | |
return self.open_channel('forwarded-tcpip', (dest_addr, dest_port), (src_addr, src_port)) | |
def open_channel(self, kind, dest_addr=None, src_addr=None): | |
""" | |
Request a new channel to the server. L{Channel}s are socket-like | |
objects used for the actual transfer of data across the session. | |
You may only request a channel after negotiating encryption (using | |
L{connect} or L{start_client}) and authenticating. | |
@param kind: the kind of channel requested (usually C{"session"}, | |
C{"forwarded-tcpip"}, C{"direct-tcpip"}, or C{"x11"}) | |
@type kind: str | |
@param dest_addr: the destination address of this port forwarding, | |
if C{kind} is C{"forwarded-tcpip"} or C{"direct-tcpip"} (ignored | |
for other channel types) | |
@type dest_addr: (str, int) | |
@param src_addr: the source address of this port forwarding, if | |
C{kind} is C{"forwarded-tcpip"}, C{"direct-tcpip"}, or C{"x11"} | |
@type src_addr: (str, int) | |
@return: a new L{Channel} on success | |
@rtype: L{Channel} | |
@raise SSHException: if the request is rejected or the session ends | |
prematurely | |
""" | |
if not self.active: | |
raise SSHException('SSH session not active') | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
chanid = self._next_channel() | |
m = Message() | |
m.add_byte(chr(MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) | |
m.add_string(kind) | |
m.add_int(chanid) | |
m.add_int(self.window_size) | |
m.add_int(self.max_packet_size) | |
if (kind == 'forwarded-tcpip') or (kind == 'direct-tcpip'): | |
m.add_string(dest_addr[0]) | |
m.add_int(dest_addr[1]) | |
m.add_string(src_addr[0]) | |
m.add_int(src_addr[1]) | |
elif kind == 'x11': | |
m.add_string(src_addr[0]) | |
m.add_int(src_addr[1]) | |
chan = Channel(chanid) | |
self._channels.put(chanid, chan) | |
self.channel_events[chanid] = event = threading.Event() | |
self.channels_seen[chanid] = True | |
chan._set_transport(self) | |
chan._set_window(self.window_size, self.max_packet_size) | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
self._send_user_message(m) | |
while True: | |
event.wait(0.1); | |
if not self.active: | |
e = self.get_exception() | |
if e is None: | |
e = SSHException('Unable to open channel.') | |
raise e | |
if event.isSet(): | |
break | |
chan = self._channels.get(chanid) | |
if chan is not None: | |
return chan | |
e = self.get_exception() | |
if e is None: | |
e = SSHException('Unable to open channel.') | |
raise e | |
def request_port_forward(self, address, port, handler=None): | |
""" | |
Ask the server to forward TCP connections from a listening port on | |
the server, across this SSH session. | |
If a handler is given, that handler is called from a different thread | |
whenever a forwarded connection arrives. The handler parameters are:: | |
handler(channel, (origin_addr, origin_port), (server_addr, server_port)) | |
where C{server_addr} and C{server_port} are the address and port that | |
the server was listening on. | |
If no handler is set, the default behavior is to send new incoming | |
forwarded connections into the accept queue, to be picked up via | |
L{accept}. | |
@param address: the address to bind when forwarding | |
@type address: str | |
@param port: the port to forward, or 0 to ask the server to allocate | |
any port | |
@type port: int | |
@param handler: optional handler for incoming forwarded connections | |
@type handler: function(Channel, (str, int), (str, int)) | |
@return: the port # allocated by the server | |
@rtype: int | |
@raise SSHException: if the server refused the TCP forward request | |
""" | |
if not self.active: | |
raise SSHException('SSH session not active') | |
address = str(address) | |
port = int(port) | |
response = self.global_request('tcpip-forward', (address, port), wait=True) | |
if response is None: | |
raise SSHException('TCP forwarding request denied') | |
if port == 0: | |
port = response.get_int() | |
if handler is None: | |
def default_handler(channel, (src_addr, src_port), (dest_addr, dest_port)): | |
self._queue_incoming_channel(channel) | |
handler = default_handler | |
self._tcp_handler = handler | |
return port | |
def cancel_port_forward(self, address, port): | |
""" | |
Ask the server to cancel a previous port-forwarding request. No more | |
connections to the given address & port will be forwarded across this | |
ssh connection. | |
@param address: the address to stop forwarding | |
@type address: str | |
@param port: the port to stop forwarding | |
@type port: int | |
""" | |
if not self.active: | |
return | |
self._tcp_handler = None | |
self.global_request('cancel-tcpip-forward', (address, port), wait=True) | |
def open_sftp_client(self): | |
""" | |
Create an SFTP client channel from an open transport. On success, | |
an SFTP session will be opened with the remote host, and a new | |
SFTPClient object will be returned. | |
@return: a new L{SFTPClient} object, referring to an sftp session | |
(channel) across this transport | |
@rtype: L{SFTPClient} | |
""" | |
return SFTPClient.from_transport(self) | |
def send_ignore(self, bytes=None): | |
""" | |
Send a junk packet across the encrypted link. This is sometimes used | |
to add "noise" to a connection to confuse would-be attackers. It can | |
also be used as a keep-alive for long lived connections traversing | |
firewalls. | |
@param bytes: the number of random bytes to send in the payload of the | |
ignored packet -- defaults to a random number from 10 to 41. | |
@type bytes: int | |
""" | |
m = Message() | |
m.add_byte(chr(MSG_IGNORE)) | |
if bytes is None: | |
bytes = (ord(rng.read(1)) % 32) + 10 | |
m.add_bytes(rng.read(bytes)) | |
self._send_user_message(m) | |
def renegotiate_keys(self): | |
""" | |
Force this session to switch to new keys. Normally this is done | |
automatically after the session hits a certain number of packets or | |
bytes sent or received, but this method gives you the option of forcing | |
new keys whenever you want. Negotiating new keys causes a pause in | |
traffic both ways as the two sides swap keys and do computations. This | |
method returns when the session has switched to new keys. | |
@raise SSHException: if the key renegotiation failed (which causes the | |
session to end) | |
""" | |
self.completion_event = threading.Event() | |
self._send_kex_init() | |
while True: | |
self.completion_event.wait(0.1) | |
if not self.active: | |
e = self.get_exception() | |
if e is not None: | |
raise e | |
raise SSHException('Negotiation failed.') | |
if self.completion_event.isSet(): | |
break | |
return | |
def set_keepalive(self, interval): | |
""" | |
Turn on/off keepalive packets (default is off). If this is set, after | |
C{interval} seconds without sending any data over the connection, a | |
"keepalive" packet will be sent (and ignored by the remote host). This | |
can be useful to keep connections alive over a NAT, for example. | |
@param interval: seconds to wait before sending a keepalive packet (or | |
0 to disable keepalives). | |
@type interval: int | |
""" | |
self.packetizer.set_keepalive(interval, | |
lambda x=weakref.proxy(self): x.global_request('keepalive@lag.net', wait=False)) | |
def global_request(self, kind, data=None, wait=True): | |
""" | |
Make a global request to the remote host. These are normally | |
extensions to the SSH2 protocol. | |
@param kind: name of the request. | |
@type kind: str | |
@param data: an optional tuple containing additional data to attach | |
to the request. | |
@type data: tuple | |
@param wait: C{True} if this method should not return until a response | |
is received; C{False} otherwise. | |
@type wait: bool | |
@return: a L{Message} containing possible additional data if the | |
request was successful (or an empty L{Message} if C{wait} was | |
C{False}); C{None} if the request was denied. | |
@rtype: L{Message} | |
""" | |
if wait: | |
self.completion_event = threading.Event() | |
m = Message() | |
m.add_byte(chr(MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) | |
m.add_string(kind) | |
m.add_boolean(wait) | |
if data is not None: | |
m.add(*data) | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Sending global request "%s"' % kind) | |
self._send_user_message(m) | |
if not wait: | |
return None | |
while True: | |
self.completion_event.wait(0.1) | |
if not self.active: | |
return None | |
if self.completion_event.isSet(): | |
break | |
return self.global_response | |
def accept(self, timeout=None): | |
""" | |
Return the next channel opened by the client over this transport, in | |
server mode. If no channel is opened before the given timeout, C{None} | |
is returned. | |
@param timeout: seconds to wait for a channel, or C{None} to wait | |
forever | |
@type timeout: int | |
@return: a new Channel opened by the client | |
@rtype: L{Channel} | |
""" | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
if len(self.server_accepts) > 0: | |
chan = self.server_accepts.pop(0) | |
else: | |
self.server_accept_cv.wait(timeout) | |
if len(self.server_accepts) > 0: | |
chan = self.server_accepts.pop(0) | |
else: | |
# timeout | |
chan = None | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
return chan | |
def connect(self, hostkey=None, username='', password=None, pkey=None): | |
""" | |
Negotiate an SSH2 session, and optionally verify the server's host key | |
and authenticate using a password or private key. This is a shortcut | |
for L{start_client}, L{get_remote_server_key}, and | |
L{Transport.auth_password} or L{Transport.auth_publickey}. Use those | |
methods if you want more control. | |
You can use this method immediately after creating a Transport to | |
negotiate encryption with a server. If it fails, an exception will be | |
thrown. On success, the method will return cleanly, and an encrypted | |
session exists. You may immediately call L{open_channel} or | |
L{open_session} to get a L{Channel} object, which is used for data | |
transfer. | |
@note: If you fail to supply a password or private key, this method may | |
succeed, but a subsequent L{open_channel} or L{open_session} call may | |
fail because you haven't authenticated yet. | |
@param hostkey: the host key expected from the server, or C{None} if | |
you don't want to do host key verification. | |
@type hostkey: L{PKey<pkey.PKey>} | |
@param username: the username to authenticate as. | |
@type username: str | |
@param password: a password to use for authentication, if you want to | |
use password authentication; otherwise C{None}. | |
@type password: str | |
@param pkey: a private key to use for authentication, if you want to | |
use private key authentication; otherwise C{None}. | |
@type pkey: L{PKey<pkey.PKey>} | |
@raise SSHException: if the SSH2 negotiation fails, the host key | |
supplied by the server is incorrect, or authentication fails. | |
""" | |
if hostkey is not None: | |
self._preferred_keys = [ hostkey.get_name() ] | |
self.start_client() | |
# check host key if we were given one | |
if (hostkey is not None): | |
key = self.get_remote_server_key() | |
if (key.get_name() != hostkey.get_name()) or (str(key) != str(hostkey)): | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Bad host key from server') | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Expected: %s: %s' % (hostkey.get_name(), repr(str(hostkey)))) | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Got : %s: %s' % (key.get_name(), repr(str(key)))) | |
raise SSHException('Bad host key from server') | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Host key verified (%s)' % hostkey.get_name()) | |
if (pkey is not None) or (password is not None): | |
if password is not None: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Attempting password auth...') | |
self.auth_password(username, password) | |
else: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Attempting public-key auth...') | |
self.auth_publickey(username, pkey) | |
return | |
def get_exception(self): | |
""" | |
Return any exception that happened during the last server request. | |
This can be used to fetch more specific error information after using | |
calls like L{start_client}. The exception (if any) is cleared after | |
this call. | |
@return: an exception, or C{None} if there is no stored exception. | |
@rtype: Exception | |
@since: 1.1 | |
""" | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
e = self.saved_exception | |
self.saved_exception = None | |
return e | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
def set_subsystem_handler(self, name, handler, *larg, **kwarg): | |
""" | |
Set the handler class for a subsystem in server mode. If a request | |
for this subsystem is made on an open ssh channel later, this handler | |
will be constructed and called -- see L{SubsystemHandler} for more | |
detailed documentation. | |
Any extra parameters (including keyword arguments) are saved and | |
passed to the L{SubsystemHandler} constructor later. | |
@param name: name of the subsystem. | |
@type name: str | |
@param handler: subclass of L{SubsystemHandler} that handles this | |
subsystem. | |
@type handler: class | |
""" | |
try: | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
self.subsystem_table[name] = (handler, larg, kwarg) | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
def is_authenticated(self): | |
""" | |
Return true if this session is active and authenticated. | |
@return: True if the session is still open and has been authenticated | |
successfully; False if authentication failed and/or the session is | |
closed. | |
@rtype: bool | |
""" | |
return self.active and (self.auth_handler is not None) and self.auth_handler.is_authenticated() | |
def get_username(self): | |
""" | |
Return the username this connection is authenticated for. If the | |
session is not authenticated (or authentication failed), this method | |
returns C{None}. | |
@return: username that was authenticated, or C{None}. | |
@rtype: string | |
""" | |
if not self.active or (self.auth_handler is None): | |
return None | |
return self.auth_handler.get_username() | |
def auth_none(self, username): | |
""" | |
Try to authenticate to the server using no authentication at all. | |
This will almost always fail. It may be useful for determining the | |
list of authentication types supported by the server, by catching the | |
L{BadAuthenticationType} exception raised. | |
@param username: the username to authenticate as | |
@type username: string | |
@return: list of auth types permissible for the next stage of | |
authentication (normally empty) | |
@rtype: list | |
@raise BadAuthenticationType: if "none" authentication isn't allowed | |
by the server for this user | |
@raise SSHException: if the authentication failed due to a network | |
error | |
@since: 1.5 | |
""" | |
if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done): | |
raise SSHException('No existing session') | |
my_event = threading.Event() | |
self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self) | |
self.auth_handler.auth_none(username, my_event) | |
return self.auth_handler.wait_for_response(my_event) | |
def auth_password(self, username, password, event=None, fallback=True): | |
""" | |
Authenticate to the server using a password. The username and password | |
are sent over an encrypted link. | |
If an C{event} is passed in, this method will return immediately, and | |
the event will be triggered once authentication succeeds or fails. On | |
success, L{is_authenticated} will return C{True}. On failure, you may | |
use L{get_exception} to get more detailed error information. | |
Since 1.1, if no event is passed, this method will block until the | |
authentication succeeds or fails. On failure, an exception is raised. | |
Otherwise, the method simply returns. | |
Since 1.5, if no event is passed and C{fallback} is C{True} (the | |
default), if the server doesn't support plain password authentication | |
but does support so-called "keyboard-interactive" mode, an attempt | |
will be made to authenticate using this interactive mode. If it fails, | |
the normal exception will be thrown as if the attempt had never been | |
made. This is useful for some recent Gentoo and Debian distributions, | |
which turn off plain password authentication in a misguided belief | |
that interactive authentication is "more secure". (It's not.) | |
If the server requires multi-step authentication (which is very rare), | |
this method will return a list of auth types permissible for the next | |
step. Otherwise, in the normal case, an empty list is returned. | |
@param username: the username to authenticate as | |
@type username: str | |
@param password: the password to authenticate with | |
@type password: str or unicode | |
@param event: an event to trigger when the authentication attempt is | |
complete (whether it was successful or not) | |
@type event: threading.Event | |
@param fallback: C{True} if an attempt at an automated "interactive" | |
password auth should be made if the server doesn't support normal | |
password auth | |
@type fallback: bool | |
@return: list of auth types permissible for the next stage of | |
authentication (normally empty) | |
@rtype: list | |
@raise BadAuthenticationType: if password authentication isn't | |
allowed by the server for this user (and no event was passed in) | |
@raise AuthenticationException: if the authentication failed (and no | |
event was passed in) | |
@raise SSHException: if there was a network error | |
""" | |
if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done): | |
# we should never try to send the password unless we're on a secure link | |
raise SSHException('No existing session') | |
if event is None: | |
my_event = threading.Event() | |
else: | |
my_event = event | |
self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self) | |
self.auth_handler.auth_password(username, password, my_event) | |
if event is not None: | |
# caller wants to wait for event themselves | |
return [] | |
try: | |
return self.auth_handler.wait_for_response(my_event) | |
except BadAuthenticationType, x: | |
# if password auth isn't allowed, but keyboard-interactive *is*, try to fudge it | |
if not fallback or ('keyboard-interactive' not in x.allowed_types): | |
raise | |
try: | |
def handler(title, instructions, fields): | |
if len(fields) > 1: | |
raise SSHException('Fallback authentication failed.') | |
if len(fields) == 0: | |
# for some reason, at least on os x, a 2nd request will | |
# be made with zero fields requested. maybe it's just | |
# to try to fake out automated scripting of the exact | |
# type we're doing here. *shrug* :) | |
return [] | |
return [ password ] | |
return self.auth_interactive(username, handler) | |
except SSHException, ignored: | |
# attempt failed; just raise the original exception | |
raise x | |
return None | |
def auth_publickey(self, username, key, event=None): | |
""" | |
Authenticate to the server using a private key. The key is used to | |
sign data from the server, so it must include the private part. | |
If an C{event} is passed in, this method will return immediately, and | |
the event will be triggered once authentication succeeds or fails. On | |
success, L{is_authenticated} will return C{True}. On failure, you may | |
use L{get_exception} to get more detailed error information. | |
Since 1.1, if no event is passed, this method will block until the | |
authentication succeeds or fails. On failure, an exception is raised. | |
Otherwise, the method simply returns. | |
If the server requires multi-step authentication (which is very rare), | |
this method will return a list of auth types permissible for the next | |
step. Otherwise, in the normal case, an empty list is returned. | |
@param username: the username to authenticate as | |
@type username: string | |
@param key: the private key to authenticate with | |
@type key: L{PKey <pkey.PKey>} | |
@param event: an event to trigger when the authentication attempt is | |
complete (whether it was successful or not) | |
@type event: threading.Event | |
@return: list of auth types permissible for the next stage of | |
authentication (normally empty) | |
@rtype: list | |
@raise BadAuthenticationType: if public-key authentication isn't | |
allowed by the server for this user (and no event was passed in) | |
@raise AuthenticationException: if the authentication failed (and no | |
event was passed in) | |
@raise SSHException: if there was a network error | |
""" | |
if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done): | |
# we should never try to authenticate unless we're on a secure link | |
raise SSHException('No existing session') | |
if event is None: | |
my_event = threading.Event() | |
else: | |
my_event = event | |
self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self) | |
self.auth_handler.auth_publickey(username, key, my_event) | |
if event is not None: | |
# caller wants to wait for event themselves | |
return [] | |
return self.auth_handler.wait_for_response(my_event) | |
def auth_interactive(self, username, handler, submethods=''): | |
""" | |
Authenticate to the server interactively. A handler is used to answer | |
arbitrary questions from the server. On many servers, this is just a | |
dumb wrapper around PAM. | |
This method will block until the authentication succeeds or fails, | |
peroidically calling the handler asynchronously to get answers to | |
authentication questions. The handler may be called more than once | |
if the server continues to ask questions. | |
The handler is expected to be a callable that will handle calls of the | |
form: C{handler(title, instructions, prompt_list)}. The C{title} is | |
meant to be a dialog-window title, and the C{instructions} are user | |
instructions (both are strings). C{prompt_list} will be a list of | |
prompts, each prompt being a tuple of C{(str, bool)}. The string is | |
the prompt and the boolean indicates whether the user text should be | |
echoed. | |
A sample call would thus be: | |
C{handler('title', 'instructions', [('Password:', False)])}. | |
The handler should return a list or tuple of answers to the server's | |
questions. | |
If the server requires multi-step authentication (which is very rare), | |
this method will return a list of auth types permissible for the next | |
step. Otherwise, in the normal case, an empty list is returned. | |
@param username: the username to authenticate as | |
@type username: string | |
@param handler: a handler for responding to server questions | |
@type handler: callable | |
@param submethods: a string list of desired submethods (optional) | |
@type submethods: str | |
@return: list of auth types permissible for the next stage of | |
authentication (normally empty). | |
@rtype: list | |
@raise BadAuthenticationType: if public-key authentication isn't | |
allowed by the server for this user | |
@raise AuthenticationException: if the authentication failed | |
@raise SSHException: if there was a network error | |
@since: 1.5 | |
""" | |
if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done): | |
# we should never try to authenticate unless we're on a secure link | |
raise SSHException('No existing session') | |
my_event = threading.Event() | |
self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self) | |
self.auth_handler.auth_interactive(username, handler, my_event, submethods) | |
return self.auth_handler.wait_for_response(my_event) | |
def set_log_channel(self, name): | |
""" | |
Set the channel for this transport's logging. The default is | |
C{"paramiko.transport"} but it can be set to anything you want. | |
(See the C{logging} module for more info.) SSH Channels will log | |
to a sub-channel of the one specified. | |
@param name: new channel name for logging | |
@type name: str | |
@since: 1.1 | |
""" | |
self.log_name = name | |
self.logger = util.get_logger(name) | |
self.packetizer.set_log(self.logger) | |
def get_log_channel(self): | |
""" | |
Return the channel name used for this transport's logging. | |
@return: channel name. | |
@rtype: str | |
@since: 1.2 | |
""" | |
return self.log_name | |
def set_hexdump(self, hexdump): | |
""" | |
Turn on/off logging a hex dump of protocol traffic at DEBUG level in | |
the logs. Normally you would want this off (which is the default), | |
but if you are debugging something, it may be useful. | |
@param hexdump: C{True} to log protocol traffix (in hex) to the log; | |
C{False} otherwise. | |
@type hexdump: bool | |
""" | |
self.packetizer.set_hexdump(hexdump) | |
def get_hexdump(self): | |
""" | |
Return C{True} if the transport is currently logging hex dumps of | |
protocol traffic. | |
@return: C{True} if hex dumps are being logged | |
@rtype: bool | |
@since: 1.4 | |
""" | |
return self.packetizer.get_hexdump() | |
def use_compression(self, compress=True): | |
""" | |
Turn on/off compression. This will only have an affect before starting | |
the transport (ie before calling L{connect}, etc). By default, | |
compression is off since it negatively affects interactive sessions. | |
@param compress: C{True} to ask the remote client/server to compress | |
traffic; C{False} to refuse compression | |
@type compress: bool | |
@since: 1.5.2 | |
""" | |
if compress: | |
self._preferred_compression = ( 'zlib@openssh.com', 'zlib', 'none' ) | |
else: | |
self._preferred_compression = ( 'none', ) | |
def getpeername(self): | |
""" | |
Return the address of the remote side of this Transport, if possible. | |
This is effectively a wrapper around C{'getpeername'} on the underlying | |
socket. If the socket-like object has no C{'getpeername'} method, | |
then C{("unknown", 0)} is returned. | |
@return: the address if the remote host, if known | |
@rtype: tuple(str, int) | |
""" | |
gp = getattr(self.sock, 'getpeername', None) | |
if gp is None: | |
return ('unknown', 0) | |
return gp() | |
def stop_thread(self): | |
self.active = False | |
self.packetizer.close() | |
### internals... | |
def _log(self, level, msg, *args): | |
if issubclass(type(msg), list): | |
for m in msg: | |
self.logger.log(level, m) | |
else: | |
self.logger.log(level, msg, *args) | |
def _get_modulus_pack(self): | |
"used by KexGex to find primes for group exchange" | |
return self._modulus_pack | |
def _next_channel(self): | |
"you are holding the lock" | |
chanid = self._channel_counter | |
while self._channels.get(chanid) is not None: | |
self._channel_counter = (self._channel_counter + 1) & 0xffffff | |
chanid = self._channel_counter | |
self._channel_counter = (self._channel_counter + 1) & 0xffffff | |
return chanid | |
def _unlink_channel(self, chanid): | |
"used by a Channel to remove itself from the active channel list" | |
self._channels.delete(chanid) | |
def _send_message(self, data): | |
self.packetizer.send_message(data) | |
def _send_user_message(self, data): | |
""" | |
send a message, but block if we're in key negotiation. this is used | |
for user-initiated requests. | |
""" | |
start = time.time() | |
while True: | |
self.clear_to_send.wait(0.1) | |
if not self.active: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Dropping user packet because connection is dead.') | |
return | |
self.clear_to_send_lock.acquire() | |
if self.clear_to_send.isSet(): | |
break | |
self.clear_to_send_lock.release() | |
if time.time() > start + self.clear_to_send_timeout: | |
raise SSHException('Key-exchange timed out waiting for key negotiation') | |
try: | |
self._send_message(data) | |
finally: | |
self.clear_to_send_lock.release() | |
def _set_K_H(self, k, h): | |
"used by a kex object to set the K (root key) and H (exchange hash)" | |
self.K = k | |
self.H = h | |
if self.session_id == None: | |
self.session_id = h | |
def _expect_packet(self, *ptypes): | |
"used by a kex object to register the next packet type it expects to see" | |
self._expected_packet = tuple(ptypes) | |
def _verify_key(self, host_key, sig): | |
key = self._key_info[self.host_key_type](Message(host_key)) | |
if key is None: | |
raise SSHException('Unknown host key type') | |
if not key.verify_ssh_sig(self.H, Message(sig)): | |
raise SSHException('Signature verification (%s) failed.' % self.host_key_type) | |
self.host_key = key | |
def _compute_key(self, id, nbytes): | |
"id is 'A' - 'F' for the various keys used by ssh" | |
m = Message() | |
m.add_mpint(self.K) | |
m.add_bytes(self.H) | |
m.add_byte(id) | |
m.add_bytes(self.session_id) | |
out = sofar = SHA.new(str(m)).digest() | |
while len(out) < nbytes: | |
m = Message() | |
m.add_mpint(self.K) | |
m.add_bytes(self.H) | |
m.add_bytes(sofar) | |
digest = SHA.new(str(m)).digest() | |
out += digest | |
sofar += digest | |
return out[:nbytes] | |
def _get_cipher(self, name, key, iv): | |
if name not in self._cipher_info: | |
raise SSHException('Unknown client cipher ' + name) | |
if name in ('arcfour128', 'arcfour256'): | |
# arcfour cipher | |
cipher = self._cipher_info[name]['class'].new(key) | |
# as per RFC 4345, the first 1536 bytes of keystream | |
# generated by the cipher MUST be discarded | |
cipher.encrypt(" " * 1536) | |
return cipher | |
elif name.endswith("-ctr"): | |
# CTR modes, we need a counter | |
counter = Counter.new(nbits=self._cipher_info[name]['block-size'] * 8, initial_value=util.inflate_long(iv, True)) | |
return self._cipher_info[name]['class'].new(key, self._cipher_info[name]['mode'], iv, counter) | |
else: | |
return self._cipher_info[name]['class'].new(key, self._cipher_info[name]['mode'], iv) | |
def _set_x11_handler(self, handler): | |
# only called if a channel has turned on x11 forwarding | |
if handler is None: | |
# by default, use the same mechanism as accept() | |
def default_handler(channel, (src_addr, src_port)): | |
self._queue_incoming_channel(channel) | |
self._x11_handler = default_handler | |
else: | |
self._x11_handler = handler | |
def _queue_incoming_channel(self, channel): | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
self.server_accepts.append(channel) | |
self.server_accept_cv.notify() | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
def run(self): | |
# (use the exposed "run" method, because if we specify a thread target | |
# of a private method, threading.Thread will keep a reference to it | |
# indefinitely, creating a GC cycle and not letting Transport ever be | |
# GC'd. it's a bug in Thread.) | |
atfork() | |
# active=True occurs before the thread is launched, to avoid a race | |
_active_threads.append(self) | |
if self.server_mode: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'starting thread (server mode): %s' % hex(long(id(self)) & 0xffffffffL)) | |
else: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'starting thread (client mode): %s' % hex(long(id(self)) & 0xffffffffL)) | |
try: | |
self.packetizer.write_all(self.local_version + '\r\n') | |
self._check_banner() | |
self._send_kex_init() | |
self._expect_packet(MSG_KEXINIT) | |
while self.active: | |
if self.packetizer.need_rekey() and not self.in_kex: | |
self._send_kex_init() | |
try: | |
ptype, m = self.packetizer.read_message() | |
except NeedRekeyException: | |
continue | |
if ptype == MSG_IGNORE: | |
continue | |
elif ptype == MSG_DISCONNECT: | |
self._parse_disconnect(m) | |
self.active = False | |
self.packetizer.close() | |
break | |
elif ptype == MSG_DEBUG: | |
self._parse_debug(m) | |
continue | |
if len(self._expected_packet) > 0: | |
if ptype not in self._expected_packet: | |
raise SSHException('Expecting packet from %r, got %d' % (self._expected_packet, ptype)) | |
self._expected_packet = tuple() | |
if (ptype >= 30) and (ptype <= 39): | |
self.kex_engine.parse_next(ptype, m) | |
continue | |
if ptype in self._handler_table: | |
self._handler_table[ptype](self, m) | |
elif ptype in self._channel_handler_table: | |
chanid = m.get_int() | |
chan = self._channels.get(chanid) | |
if chan is not None: | |
self._channel_handler_table[ptype](chan, m) | |
elif chanid in self.channels_seen: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Ignoring message for dead channel %d' % chanid) | |
else: | |
self._log(ERROR, 'Channel request for unknown channel %d' % chanid) | |
self.active = False | |
self.packetizer.close() | |
elif (self.auth_handler is not None) and (ptype in self.auth_handler._handler_table): | |
self.auth_handler._handler_table[ptype](self.auth_handler, m) | |
else: | |
self._log(WARNING, 'Oops, unhandled type %d' % ptype) | |
msg = Message() | |
msg.add_byte(chr(MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) | |
msg.add_int(m.seqno) | |
self._send_message(msg) | |
except SSHException, e: | |
self._log(ERROR, 'Exception: ' + str(e)) | |
self._log(ERROR, util.tb_strings()) | |
self.saved_exception = e | |
except EOFError, e: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'EOF in transport thread') | |
#self._log(DEBUG, util.tb_strings()) | |
self.saved_exception = e | |
except socket.error, e: | |
if type(e.args) is tuple: | |
emsg = '%s (%d)' % (e.args[1], e.args[0]) | |
else: | |
emsg = e.args | |
self._log(ERROR, 'Socket exception: ' + emsg) | |
self.saved_exception = e | |
except Exception, e: | |
self._log(ERROR, 'Unknown exception: ' + str(e)) | |
self._log(ERROR, util.tb_strings()) | |
self.saved_exception = e | |
_active_threads.remove(self) | |
for chan in self._channels.values(): | |
chan._unlink() | |
if self.active: | |
self.active = False | |
self.packetizer.close() | |
if self.completion_event != None: | |
self.completion_event.set() | |
if self.auth_handler is not None: | |
self.auth_handler.abort() | |
for event in self.channel_events.values(): | |
event.set() | |
try: | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
self.server_accept_cv.notify() | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
self.sock.close() | |
### protocol stages | |
def _negotiate_keys(self, m): | |
# throws SSHException on anything unusual | |
self.clear_to_send_lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
self.clear_to_send.clear() | |
finally: | |
self.clear_to_send_lock.release() | |
if self.local_kex_init == None: | |
# remote side wants to renegotiate | |
self._send_kex_init() | |
self._parse_kex_init(m) | |
self.kex_engine.start_kex() | |
def _check_banner(self): | |
# this is slow, but we only have to do it once | |
for i in range(100): | |
# give them 15 seconds for the first line, then just 2 seconds | |
# each additional line. (some sites have very high latency.) | |
if i == 0: | |
timeout = self.banner_timeout | |
else: | |
timeout = 2 | |
try: | |
buf = self.packetizer.readline(timeout) | |
except Exception, x: | |
raise SSHException('Error reading SSH protocol banner' + str(x)) | |
if buf[:4] == 'SSH-': | |
break | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Banner: ' + buf) | |
if buf[:4] != 'SSH-': | |
raise SSHException('Indecipherable protocol version "' + buf + '"') | |
# save this server version string for later | |
self.remote_version = buf | |
# pull off any attached comment | |
comment = '' | |
i = string.find(buf, ' ') | |
if i >= 0: | |
comment = buf[i+1:] | |
buf = buf[:i] | |
# parse out version string and make sure it matches | |
segs = buf.split('-', 2) | |
if len(segs) < 3: | |
raise SSHException('Invalid SSH banner') | |
version = segs[1] | |
client = segs[2] | |
if version != '1.99' and version != '2.0': | |
raise SSHException('Incompatible version (%s instead of 2.0)' % (version,)) | |
self._log(INFO, 'Connected (version %s, client %s)' % (version, client)) | |
def _send_kex_init(self): | |
""" | |
announce to the other side that we'd like to negotiate keys, and what | |
kind of key negotiation we support. | |
""" | |
self.clear_to_send_lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
self.clear_to_send.clear() | |
finally: | |
self.clear_to_send_lock.release() | |
self.in_kex = True | |
if self.server_mode: | |
if (self._modulus_pack is None) and ('diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1' in self._preferred_kex): | |
# can't do group-exchange if we don't have a pack of potential primes | |
pkex = list(self.get_security_options().kex) | |
pkex.remove('diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1') | |
self.get_security_options().kex = pkex | |
available_server_keys = filter(self.server_key_dict.keys().__contains__, | |
self._preferred_keys) | |
else: | |
available_server_keys = self._preferred_keys | |
m = Message() | |
m.add_byte(chr(MSG_KEXINIT)) | |
m.add_bytes(rng.read(16)) | |
m.add_list(self._preferred_kex) | |
m.add_list(available_server_keys) | |
m.add_list(self._preferred_ciphers) | |
m.add_list(self._preferred_ciphers) | |
m.add_list(self._preferred_macs) | |
m.add_list(self._preferred_macs) | |
m.add_list(self._preferred_compression) | |
m.add_list(self._preferred_compression) | |
m.add_string('') | |
m.add_string('') | |
m.add_boolean(False) | |
m.add_int(0) | |
# save a copy for later (needed to compute a hash) | |
self.local_kex_init = str(m) | |
self._send_message(m) | |
def _parse_kex_init(self, m): | |
cookie = m.get_bytes(16) | |
kex_algo_list = m.get_list() | |
server_key_algo_list = m.get_list() | |
client_encrypt_algo_list = m.get_list() | |
server_encrypt_algo_list = m.get_list() | |
client_mac_algo_list = m.get_list() | |
server_mac_algo_list = m.get_list() | |
client_compress_algo_list = m.get_list() | |
server_compress_algo_list = m.get_list() | |
client_lang_list = m.get_list() | |
server_lang_list = m.get_list() | |
kex_follows = m.get_boolean() | |
unused = m.get_int() | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'kex algos:' + str(kex_algo_list) + ' server key:' + str(server_key_algo_list) + \ | |
' client encrypt:' + str(client_encrypt_algo_list) + \ | |
' server encrypt:' + str(server_encrypt_algo_list) + \ | |
' client mac:' + str(client_mac_algo_list) + \ | |
' server mac:' + str(server_mac_algo_list) + \ | |
' client compress:' + str(client_compress_algo_list) + \ | |
' server compress:' + str(server_compress_algo_list) + \ | |
' client lang:' + str(client_lang_list) + \ | |
' server lang:' + str(server_lang_list) + \ | |
' kex follows?' + str(kex_follows)) | |
# as a server, we pick the first item in the client's list that we support. | |
# as a client, we pick the first item in our list that the server supports. | |
if self.server_mode: | |
agreed_kex = filter(self._preferred_kex.__contains__, kex_algo_list) | |
else: | |
agreed_kex = filter(kex_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_kex) | |
if len(agreed_kex) == 0: | |
raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh peer (no acceptable kex algorithm)') | |
self.kex_engine = self._kex_info[agreed_kex[0]](self) | |
if self.server_mode: | |
available_server_keys = filter(self.server_key_dict.keys().__contains__, | |
self._preferred_keys) | |
agreed_keys = filter(available_server_keys.__contains__, server_key_algo_list) | |
else: | |
agreed_keys = filter(server_key_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_keys) | |
if len(agreed_keys) == 0: | |
raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh peer (no acceptable host key)') | |
self.host_key_type = agreed_keys[0] | |
if self.server_mode and (self.get_server_key() is None): | |
raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh peer (can\'t match requested host key type)') | |
if self.server_mode: | |
agreed_local_ciphers = filter(self._preferred_ciphers.__contains__, | |
server_encrypt_algo_list) | |
agreed_remote_ciphers = filter(self._preferred_ciphers.__contains__, | |
client_encrypt_algo_list) | |
else: | |
agreed_local_ciphers = filter(client_encrypt_algo_list.__contains__, | |
self._preferred_ciphers) | |
agreed_remote_ciphers = filter(server_encrypt_algo_list.__contains__, | |
self._preferred_ciphers) | |
if (len(agreed_local_ciphers) == 0) or (len(agreed_remote_ciphers) == 0): | |
raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh server (no acceptable ciphers)') | |
self.local_cipher = agreed_local_ciphers[0] | |
self.remote_cipher = agreed_remote_ciphers[0] | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Ciphers agreed: local=%s, remote=%s' % (self.local_cipher, self.remote_cipher)) | |
if self.server_mode: | |
agreed_remote_macs = filter(self._preferred_macs.__contains__, client_mac_algo_list) | |
agreed_local_macs = filter(self._preferred_macs.__contains__, server_mac_algo_list) | |
else: | |
agreed_local_macs = filter(client_mac_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_macs) | |
agreed_remote_macs = filter(server_mac_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_macs) | |
if (len(agreed_local_macs) == 0) or (len(agreed_remote_macs) == 0): | |
raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh server (no acceptable macs)') | |
self.local_mac = agreed_local_macs[0] | |
self.remote_mac = agreed_remote_macs[0] | |
if self.server_mode: | |
agreed_remote_compression = filter(self._preferred_compression.__contains__, client_compress_algo_list) | |
agreed_local_compression = filter(self._preferred_compression.__contains__, server_compress_algo_list) | |
else: | |
agreed_local_compression = filter(client_compress_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_compression) | |
agreed_remote_compression = filter(server_compress_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_compression) | |
if (len(agreed_local_compression) == 0) or (len(agreed_remote_compression) == 0): | |
raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh server (no acceptable compression) %r %r %r' % (agreed_local_compression, agreed_remote_compression, self._preferred_compression)) | |
self.local_compression = agreed_local_compression[0] | |
self.remote_compression = agreed_remote_compression[0] | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'using kex %s; server key type %s; cipher: local %s, remote %s; mac: local %s, remote %s; compression: local %s, remote %s' % | |
(agreed_kex[0], self.host_key_type, self.local_cipher, self.remote_cipher, self.local_mac, | |
self.remote_mac, self.local_compression, self.remote_compression)) | |
# save for computing hash later... | |
# now wait! openssh has a bug (and others might too) where there are | |
# actually some extra bytes (one NUL byte in openssh's case) added to | |
# the end of the packet but not parsed. turns out we need to throw | |
# away those bytes because they aren't part of the hash. | |
self.remote_kex_init = chr(MSG_KEXINIT) + m.get_so_far() | |
def _activate_inbound(self): | |
"switch on newly negotiated encryption parameters for inbound traffic" | |
block_size = self._cipher_info[self.remote_cipher]['block-size'] | |
if self.server_mode: | |
IV_in = self._compute_key('A', block_size) | |
key_in = self._compute_key('C', self._cipher_info[self.remote_cipher]['key-size']) | |
else: | |
IV_in = self._compute_key('B', block_size) | |
key_in = self._compute_key('D', self._cipher_info[self.remote_cipher]['key-size']) | |
engine = self._get_cipher(self.remote_cipher, key_in, IV_in) | |
mac_size = self._mac_info[self.remote_mac]['size'] | |
mac_engine = self._mac_info[self.remote_mac]['class'] | |
# initial mac keys are done in the hash's natural size (not the potentially truncated | |
# transmission size) | |
if self.server_mode: | |
mac_key = self._compute_key('E', mac_engine.digest_size) | |
else: | |
mac_key = self._compute_key('F', mac_engine.digest_size) | |
self.packetizer.set_inbound_cipher(engine, block_size, mac_engine, mac_size, mac_key) | |
compress_in = self._compression_info[self.remote_compression][1] | |
if (compress_in is not None) and ((self.remote_compression != 'zlib@openssh.com') or self.authenticated): | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Switching on inbound compression ...') | |
self.packetizer.set_inbound_compressor(compress_in()) | |
def _activate_outbound(self): | |
"switch on newly negotiated encryption parameters for outbound traffic" | |
m = Message() | |
m.add_byte(chr(MSG_NEWKEYS)) | |
self._send_message(m) | |
block_size = self._cipher_info[self.local_cipher]['block-size'] | |
if self.server_mode: | |
IV_out = self._compute_key('B', block_size) | |
key_out = self._compute_key('D', self._cipher_info[self.local_cipher]['key-size']) | |
else: | |
IV_out = self._compute_key('A', block_size) | |
key_out = self._compute_key('C', self._cipher_info[self.local_cipher]['key-size']) | |
engine = self._get_cipher(self.local_cipher, key_out, IV_out) | |
mac_size = self._mac_info[self.local_mac]['size'] | |
mac_engine = self._mac_info[self.local_mac]['class'] | |
# initial mac keys are done in the hash's natural size (not the potentially truncated | |
# transmission size) | |
if self.server_mode: | |
mac_key = self._compute_key('F', mac_engine.digest_size) | |
else: | |
mac_key = self._compute_key('E', mac_engine.digest_size) | |
self.packetizer.set_outbound_cipher(engine, block_size, mac_engine, mac_size, mac_key) | |
compress_out = self._compression_info[self.local_compression][0] | |
if (compress_out is not None) and ((self.local_compression != 'zlib@openssh.com') or self.authenticated): | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Switching on outbound compression ...') | |
self.packetizer.set_outbound_compressor(compress_out()) | |
if not self.packetizer.need_rekey(): | |
self.in_kex = False | |
# we always expect to receive NEWKEYS now | |
self._expect_packet(MSG_NEWKEYS) | |
def _auth_trigger(self): | |
self.authenticated = True | |
# delayed initiation of compression | |
if self.local_compression == 'zlib@openssh.com': | |
compress_out = self._compression_info[self.local_compression][0] | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Switching on outbound compression ...') | |
self.packetizer.set_outbound_compressor(compress_out()) | |
if self.remote_compression == 'zlib@openssh.com': | |
compress_in = self._compression_info[self.remote_compression][1] | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Switching on inbound compression ...') | |
self.packetizer.set_inbound_compressor(compress_in()) | |
def _parse_newkeys(self, m): | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Switch to new keys ...') | |
self._activate_inbound() | |
# can also free a bunch of stuff here | |
self.local_kex_init = self.remote_kex_init = None | |
self.K = None | |
self.kex_engine = None | |
if self.server_mode and (self.auth_handler is None): | |
# create auth handler for server mode | |
self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self) | |
if not self.initial_kex_done: | |
# this was the first key exchange | |
self.initial_kex_done = True | |
# send an event? | |
if self.completion_event != None: | |
self.completion_event.set() | |
# it's now okay to send data again (if this was a re-key) | |
if not self.packetizer.need_rekey(): | |
self.in_kex = False | |
self.clear_to_send_lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
self.clear_to_send.set() | |
finally: | |
self.clear_to_send_lock.release() | |
return | |
def _parse_disconnect(self, m): | |
code = m.get_int() | |
desc = m.get_string() | |
self._log(INFO, 'Disconnect (code %d): %s' % (code, desc)) | |
def _parse_global_request(self, m): | |
kind = m.get_string() | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Received global request "%s"' % kind) | |
want_reply = m.get_boolean() | |
if not self.server_mode: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Rejecting "%s" global request from server.' % kind) | |
ok = False | |
elif kind == 'tcpip-forward': | |
address = m.get_string() | |
port = m.get_int() | |
ok = self.server_object.check_port_forward_request(address, port) | |
if ok != False: | |
ok = (ok,) | |
elif kind == 'cancel-tcpip-forward': | |
address = m.get_string() | |
port = m.get_int() | |
self.server_object.cancel_port_forward_request(address, port) | |
ok = True | |
else: | |
ok = self.server_object.check_global_request(kind, m) | |
extra = () | |
if type(ok) is tuple: | |
extra = ok | |
ok = True | |
if want_reply: | |
msg = Message() | |
if ok: | |
msg.add_byte(chr(MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS)) | |
msg.add(*extra) | |
else: | |
msg.add_byte(chr(MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) | |
self._send_message(msg) | |
def _parse_request_success(self, m): | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Global request successful.') | |
self.global_response = m | |
if self.completion_event is not None: | |
self.completion_event.set() | |
def _parse_request_failure(self, m): | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Global request denied.') | |
self.global_response = None | |
if self.completion_event is not None: | |
self.completion_event.set() | |
def _parse_channel_open_success(self, m): | |
chanid = m.get_int() | |
server_chanid = m.get_int() | |
server_window_size = m.get_int() | |
server_max_packet_size = m.get_int() | |
chan = self._channels.get(chanid) | |
if chan is None: | |
self._log(WARNING, 'Success for unrequested channel! [??]') | |
return | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
chan._set_remote_channel(server_chanid, server_window_size, server_max_packet_size) | |
self._log(INFO, 'Secsh channel %d opened.' % chanid) | |
if chanid in self.channel_events: | |
self.channel_events[chanid].set() | |
del self.channel_events[chanid] | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
return | |
def _parse_channel_open_failure(self, m): | |
chanid = m.get_int() | |
reason = m.get_int() | |
reason_str = m.get_string() | |
lang = m.get_string() | |
reason_text = CONNECTION_FAILED_CODE.get(reason, '(unknown code)') | |
self._log(INFO, 'Secsh channel %d open FAILED: %s: %s' % (chanid, reason_str, reason_text)) | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
self.saved_exception = ChannelException(reason, reason_text) | |
if chanid in self.channel_events: | |
self._channels.delete(chanid) | |
if chanid in self.channel_events: | |
self.channel_events[chanid].set() | |
del self.channel_events[chanid] | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
return | |
def _parse_channel_open(self, m): | |
kind = m.get_string() | |
chanid = m.get_int() | |
initial_window_size = m.get_int() | |
max_packet_size = m.get_int() | |
reject = False | |
if (kind == 'x11') and (self._x11_handler is not None): | |
origin_addr = m.get_string() | |
origin_port = m.get_int() | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Incoming x11 connection from %s:%d' % (origin_addr, origin_port)) | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
my_chanid = self._next_channel() | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
elif (kind == 'forwarded-tcpip') and (self._tcp_handler is not None): | |
server_addr = m.get_string() | |
server_port = m.get_int() | |
origin_addr = m.get_string() | |
origin_port = m.get_int() | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Incoming tcp forwarded connection from %s:%d' % (origin_addr, origin_port)) | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
my_chanid = self._next_channel() | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
elif not self.server_mode: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Rejecting "%s" channel request from server.' % kind) | |
reject = True | |
reason = OPEN_FAILED_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED | |
else: | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
my_chanid = self._next_channel() | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
if kind == 'direct-tcpip': | |
# handle direct-tcpip requests comming from the client | |
dest_addr = m.get_string() | |
dest_port = m.get_int() | |
origin_addr = m.get_string() | |
origin_port = m.get_int() | |
reason = self.server_object.check_channel_direct_tcpip_request( | |
my_chanid, (origin_addr, origin_port), | |
(dest_addr, dest_port)) | |
else: | |
reason = self.server_object.check_channel_request(kind, my_chanid) | |
if reason != OPEN_SUCCEEDED: | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Rejecting "%s" channel request from client.' % kind) | |
reject = True | |
if reject: | |
msg = Message() | |
msg.add_byte(chr(MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) | |
msg.add_int(chanid) | |
msg.add_int(reason) | |
msg.add_string('') | |
msg.add_string('en') | |
self._send_message(msg) | |
return | |
chan = Channel(my_chanid) | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
try: | |
self._channels.put(my_chanid, chan) | |
self.channels_seen[my_chanid] = True | |
chan._set_transport(self) | |
chan._set_window(self.window_size, self.max_packet_size) | |
chan._set_remote_channel(chanid, initial_window_size, max_packet_size) | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
m = Message() | |
m.add_byte(chr(MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS)) | |
m.add_int(chanid) | |
m.add_int(my_chanid) | |
m.add_int(self.window_size) | |
m.add_int(self.max_packet_size) | |
self._send_message(m) | |
self._log(INFO, 'Secsh channel %d (%s) opened.', my_chanid, kind) | |
if kind == 'x11': | |
self._x11_handler(chan, (origin_addr, origin_port)) | |
elif kind == 'forwarded-tcpip': | |
chan.origin_addr = (origin_addr, origin_port) | |
self._tcp_handler(chan, (origin_addr, origin_port), (server_addr, server_port)) | |
else: | |
self._queue_incoming_channel(chan) | |
def _parse_debug(self, m): | |
always_display = m.get_boolean() | |
msg = m.get_string() | |
lang = m.get_string() | |
self._log(DEBUG, 'Debug msg: ' + util.safe_string(msg)) | |
def _get_subsystem_handler(self, name): | |
try: | |
self.lock.acquire() | |
if name not in self.subsystem_table: | |
return (None, [], {}) | |
return self.subsystem_table[name] | |
finally: | |
self.lock.release() | |
_handler_table = { | |
MSG_NEWKEYS: _parse_newkeys, | |
MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST: _parse_global_request, | |
MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS: _parse_request_success, | |
MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE: _parse_request_failure, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS: _parse_channel_open_success, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE: _parse_channel_open_failure, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN: _parse_channel_open, | |
MSG_KEXINIT: _negotiate_keys, | |
} | |
_channel_handler_table = { | |
MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS: Channel._request_success, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE: Channel._request_failed, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: Channel._feed, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: Channel._feed_extended, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: Channel._window_adjust, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST: Channel._handle_request, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_EOF: Channel._handle_eof, | |
MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: Channel._handle_close, | |
} |
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Fix for bug newsapps/beeswithmachineguns#17