tialaramex

## gist:7c78e677fd58ebde4dea9296ddea17d2
I've seen more than one "security researcher" arguing basically along the following lines:

1. Prior to TLS 1.3 the Certificate message was plaintext. (True)
2. So a middlebox could see this message without participating (Fine so far)
3. The middlebox could use the contents of this message to reason about the connection (Hmm?)
4. But in TLS 1.3 only SNI is visible not Certificate, and we can't trust that (Oh dear)

Here's the problem: Certificate is largely useless on its own

Certificate is just one or more concatenated X.509 certificates. Those are public documents.
	I've seen more than one "security researcher" arguing basically along the following lines:

	1. Prior to TLS 1.3 the Certificate message was plaintext. (True)
	2. So a middlebox could see this message without participating (Fine so far)
	3. The middlebox could use the contents of this message to reason about the connection (Hmm?)
	4. But in TLS 1.3 only SNI is visible not Certificate, and we can't trust that (Oh dear)

	Here's the problem: Certificate is largely useless on its own

	Certificate is just one or more concatenated X.509 certificates. Those are public documents.