If I, an atheist, offend a man, let's call him Ebuka, who is a believer, a theist in the Supreme Being.
Two years later, I need a favor from Ebuka, and Ebuka decides to overlook my shortcoming and grant me the favor. He chalks it up to his belief. Ebuka says that because of God, he would go ahead and grant me the favor.
Ebuka does not believe I am now indebted to him. I, however, believe that I am indebted to Ebuka. Ebuka there has removed himself from the cause and effect, as he acts on his belief. I, on the other hand, think I am now indebted to him , or indebted to something that may not be Ebuka, since Ebuka has rejected the moral debt obligation.
In the following month, if I have the opportunity to commit the same offense against a different person, let's call him Mr. Ayo, and I suddenly find within myself a diminished moral impetus to do to Mr. Ayo what I had done earlier to Ebuka, would it be right to conclude that my ability to carry out the act has been influenced or affected by some unseen force? Can it be summed up that the resistance I feel in carrying out the supposed sinister act is a function of my interaction with God via Ebuka the conduit/proxy?
Let us define the impetus to commit this moral failing as (i), where i continuously tends to zero (0) each time I become less likely to commit the act again. When and how does one know whether their will is being exercised out of selfishness (self-love and the love of happiness) or as a sacrifice for the well-being of another?
Faith rises to emotion. Emotion often preceeds the advent of faith According to Charles Finney, for your thought, action or feeling to have moral character, it must be directly or indirectly under the control of your will.
I found this very interesting, establishing connection between will and emotion. It is a conscious subject when determining the outlook of a man's perspective. Every behavious has intention, the origin of moral judgments
