Okay, this is a large codebase. Here's a breakdown of potential issues and bugs, focusing on areas that stand out:
cmd/signaling/main.go
- Error Handling: The error handling in
main.go
is a bit aggressive.logger.Panic
will terminate the application, which might not be desirable in a production environment. Consider usinglogger.Fatal
or logging the error and attempting to recover. - Random Seed: While the code seeds the random number generator, seeding with
time.Now().UnixNano()
isn't ideal for security-sensitive applications. If the generated random numbers are used for any kind of security purpose (unlikely in this code, but worth noting), a more secure random source should be used. - Potential resource leak: I can't see a close DB connection anywhere. While the server has
defer logger.Sync()
, I can't see the DB connection to postgres closed correctly. While the cloudflare credentials client does have adefer cancel()
, I can't see anydefer cancel()
for the DB connection in thismain.go
or in thestores
package.
cmd/testproxy/main.go
- Error Handling: Similar to
cmd/signaling/main.go
, thepanic
calls are not ideal for a production-like application. - Security Vulnerability in
/sql
Handler: The/sql
handler executes arbitrary SQL queries from the request body. This is a major security vulnerability and should never be exposed outside of a tightly controlled testing environment. There's a comment saying "This process is only ran during tests." but the code doesn't enforce this. A compromised test environment could potentially escalate to a production database breach if misconfigured. - Resource Leaks in
/create
Handler: There are severalpanic
calls, which will notdefer conn.Close()
. So, a lot of UDP connections may stay open if something goes wrong. - Race Condition in
/create
handler: Theinterrupts
map and theconnections
map is mutated by multiple HTTP request handlers. This means that multiple HTTP requests may operate and mutate the maps at the same time. This is a race condition, which may cause undefined behavior. - Missing input validation on
/create
handler: theport
argument is not validated, so the testproxy may try to listen to a restricted port. - Missing checks for
io.ReadAll(r.Body)
on/sql
handler: If an attacker sends a very large request body, this can DoS the server. - **
/create
handler usesaddr.Port != raddr.Port
as a check to determine who to send the UDP packet to. This assumption is wrong. UDP source ports are often random and can be the same.
internal/cloudflare/credentials.go
- Race Condition on
HasFetchedFirstCredentials
: There is a race condition that happens becauseHasFetchedFirstCredentials
is never used and it's only written to. - Error Handling: The retry mechanism for fetching credentials could benefit from exponential backoff with jitter for better resilience and to avoid thundering herd problems.
- Missing check for non-production environments: There is an early return in the Run function that returns if the appID is empty and the environment is not production. However, there is nothing stopping a user from setting
ENV=production
when running locally, thus bypassing the check.
internal/metrics/client.go
- Data Validation: The
Record
function panics if thedata
slice doesn't have an even length. This should be handled more gracefully (e.g., logging an error and returning). - Idempotency Key Generation: The
xid
library is used for idempotency key generation. Whilexid
is generally good, consider using UUIDs directly for broader compatibility and potentially better collision resistance if needed. - Error on metrics.RecordEvent: The logger calls
return
instead ofcontinue
in the retry loop. This will prevent retries and cause the metrics endpoint to be unreliable. - Nil dereference on
remote
: In the/create
handler, theremote
variable is nil, so a nil-dereference will happen hereif addr.Port == remote.Port {
internal/signaling/stores/postgres.go
- SQL Injection Vulnerability in
ListLobbies
: TheListLobbies
function uses string concatenation to build the SQL query with thewhere
clause. Even though thefilterConverter
attempts to sanitize the input, there's still a risk of SQL injection if the filter conversion logic has any flaws or if unexpected input makes its way through. Prepared statements should be used instead. - Topic Length Validation: The
Publish
function checks the topic length, but the check is insufficient given that the total length of the message isbase64.StdEncoding.EncodedLen(len(data)) + len(topic) + 1
and that length is checked later. - "Leader" Column Default Value in Migrations: The
1718348556_leader.up.sql
migration adds a "leader" column with a default value of ''. This could be problematic if the application relies onNULL
to indicate no leader, and needs to have a default value ofNULL
instead. - Race Condition in
Subscribe
: Thes.nextCallbackIndex
is incremented, but the whole function is locked with a mutex, but not all variables within the function. - Possible DoS in Publish method: The publish method does a
NOTIFY lobbies, '
+payload+`'`` which is passed as a string, which is then SQL injected directly. An attacker could exploit this to cause DoS by flooding the connection. - Hardcoded value on
ListLobbies
In the SQL query, limit is hardcoded to 50. There is no way to increase the upper limit.
internal/signaling/handler.go
- No Origin Validation: The code skips origin validation.
- Potential DoS via uncontrolled memory growth: There is a risk of uncontrolled memory growth due to unbounded channel buffering or map sizes within the signaling handler.
internal/signaling/peer.go
- Too permissive password checking: Code does not validate password for special characters.
- Error on uninitialized lobby or peers: There is a potential risk of logic errors, such as null pointer dereferences, if
Lobby
orID
are not initialized correctly before use.
lib/*.ts
Credentials.ts
- Potential infinite loop / race condition: TherunningPromise
is set toundefined
after theawait this.runningPromise
. This could lead to a race condition if multiple components simultaneously request credentials. One component will setrunningPromise
toundefined
while others are still waiting for the original promise, potentially triggering a new (unnecessary) credential fetch and a loop, in certain circumstances.Network.ts
- Error Handling onsetLobbySettings
: ReturnsError
object but the callsite has no type checks for handling Error vs true
manifest/*.yaml
- Missing Resource Limits: The deployment manifest lacks resource limits (CPU, memory). This could lead to resource exhaustion and instability if the application experiences high load.
- Health Probe: The health probe is missing.
General
- Consistent Error Handling: The code mixes different error handling strategies (panics,
ErrorAndAbort
, returning errors). A consistent approach should be adopted throughout the codebase. - Logging: There are a lot of logging.Info and logging.Debug messages that get executed in a loop. Consider reducing the amount of logging and adding metrics instead, as logging has overhead.
- Missing tests: The codebase has very few tests, such as no unit tests for the
lib
directory. - Missing input validation: there is no input sanitization before arguments are used.
- Testproxy SQL injection still exists: The testproxy can still be SQL injected, which puts the real production Postgres database at risk.
Recommendations
- Prioritize Security: Address the SQL injection vulnerability in
stores/postgres.go
and the arbitrary SQL execution in the testproxy. - Improve Error Handling: Replace
panic
calls with more graceful error handling and logging. - Resource Management: Add resource limits to the deployment manifest and fix the potential resource leaks.
- Thorough Testing: Implement unit tests for the
lib
directory and integration tests to verify the behavior of different components. - Review and Refactor: Consider refactoring the code to improve readability, maintainability, and overall design.
This analysis highlights potential areas for improvement. A deeper dive and more specific testing are recommended to confirm and fully address these issues.