An Integrated Perspective Based on Hobbes, Schmitt, and Luhmann
Fear is one of the most effective and persistent instruments in the history of politics. Throughout different epochs, rulers and movements have deliberately created images of fear to legitimize rule, consolidate loyalty, or construct enemy images. At the same time, fear can also reflect real dangers—a distinction that remains politically contested to this day.
The following considerations incorporate three significant theoretical impulses that illuminate the relationship between fear, power, and the state:
- Thomas Hobbes (1651) argues that people, fearing the "war of all against all," are willing to transfer their freedom to a strong Leviathan-state.
- Carl Schmitt (1932) emphasizes that politics is fundamentally based on the friend-enemy distinction, where the construction of a hostile "other" mobilizes existential fear.
- Niklas Luhmann (1984) views fear primarily as a systemic resource: Political systems reproduce (autopoietically) threat scenarios to ensure their own stability and reduce complexity.
The goal of this text is to examine the historical manifestations of fear narratives (from antiquity to the present) from multiple perspectives and to demonstrate how the ideas of Hobbes, Schmitt, and Luhmann complement each other in helping us to better understand politics as fear-based governance.
- Hobbes’ main thesis (Leviathan, 1651):
The state of nature is characterized by insecurity and the danger that anyone can kill anyone else ("war of all against all"). The central motivation of humans is the fear of this chaos. - Political implication:
To achieve security, people transfer their power to an absolute sovereign. This fear thus legitimizes the state—the more threatening the situation, the greater the acceptance of state authority. - Modern relevance:
This perspective still explains why societies welcome strong authority in times of crisis (such as terrorist attacks, pandemics), even at the cost of restricting civil liberties.
- Schmitt’s central concept (The Concept of the Political, 1932):
Politics is based on the friend-enemy dichotomy. An enemy is portrayed as an existential threat that necessitates total internal solidarity. - Function of fear:
The common enemy creates identity and mobilization—whoever is declared a threat (e.g., "heretics," "communists," "migrants") unites the community through fear. - Contemporary relevance:
Authoritarian regimes and populist parties frequently use Schmitt’s principle: opponents are defined as fundamentally "other," and fear is employed as a mechanism of power.
- Self-reference and autopoiesis:
Politics is a system that reproduces itself by communicating about problems and crises (Luhmann, 1984). The "creation" or emphasis on threats stabilizes its own necessity. - Reduction of complexity:
Complex social crises are depicted in simplified dichotomies (e.g., "enemy vs. savior"). Fear thus facilitates orientation—making the political system appear indispensable. - Fear as a systemic resource:
Luhmann’s explanation fits well with modern democracies and media societies: for instance, diffuse fear of terrorism can serve as a basis for legitimizing surveillance programs.
Interim conclusion:
Hobbes provides the fear that legitimizes the state ("Leviathan"), Schmitt demonstrates the polarizing determination of the enemy, and Luhmann shows the dynamic self-reinforcement of fear narratives in complex societies. Together, they offer a rich framework for deciphering historical and contemporary phenomena.
- Roman Republic:
After the sack of Rome (387 BC), there was an intense fear of the Gauls (Metus Gallicus). Politicians used this to justify increased military spending and expansion (Meier, 1995).- Hobbes reference: The insecurity regarding "barbarian hordes" reinforced the desire for strong leadership.
- Schmitt reference: An external enemy (Gauls) unified the Romans and concealed internal conflicts.
- Catilinarian Conspiracy (63 BC):
Cicero portrayed Catiline as an internal enemy to obtain emergency powers.- Luhmann perspective: The creation of an internal threat narrative stabilized the existing order (selective perception, self-reference).
- Heresy and Crusades:
Fear of "infidels" or heretics legitimized large military campaigns (Crusades, Albigensian Crusade), church inquisition, and feudal structures (Cohn, 1975).- Schmitt: The "infidel enemy" created collective unity among the Crusader states.
- Luhmann: The communication of threats (heretics, Muslims) reduced complexity and mobilized resources.
- Witch hunts (15th–17th century):
Political and religious elites used the fear of the supernatural to eliminate undesirable individuals; the Malleus Maleficarum (1487) depicted witches as an existential threat. - Absolutism and Hobbes:
After religious wars, the fear of anarchic chaos seemed to confirm Hobbes’ thesis: a strong sovereign (e.g., Louis XIV) spared citizens renewed wars.
- French Revolution (1789):
Fear of counterrevolution led to the Reign of Terror (1793–1794); Robespierre depicted enemies as traitors, legitimizing mass executions (Hobsbawm, 1989).- Schmitt: "Enemies of the people" fulfilled the enemy role; collective fear united revolutionaries.
- Napoleon (1799–1815):
He presented himself as the savior from monarchical restoration and chaos. Here, he gained a quasi-Hobbesian legitimacy: only he could guarantee security. - Nation-state formation (19th century):
Social unrest (workers’ movements) and enemy images (e.g., Slavic peoples, foreign enemies) were used to transform feudal orders, expand armies, and forge national identities.
- World War I:
War propaganda demonized the enemy; domestic pressure was placed on opposition groups (Gellately, 2001).- Hobbes: Widespread war panic justified extensive government powers.
- Schmitt: A clear enemy (other great powers) increased national cohesion.
- World War II:
Nazi propaganda fueled fear of a "Jewish world conspiracy," while the Allies feared total annihilation by the Nazi regime.
- Ideological fear: Communism vs. capitalism, fear of a nuclear first strike (MAD doctrine, Westad, 2007).
- Schmitt: A global friend-enemy division emerges. Each system opponent ("Red enemy," "imperialist enemy") justified harsh repression.
- Luhmann: The constant threat level (arms race, McCarthy era) legitimized political systems (both in the USA and the USSR) and high security expenditures.
After 9/11, many governments established extensive surveillance structures (Patriot Act).
- Hobbes: Society accepts infringements on civil liberties as long as security is promised.
- Schmitt: "The terrorist" as an enemy justifies global military operations and national states of emergency.
- Luhmann: The generation of fear about a diffuse "network of terror" ties up resources in the long term (Robin, 2004).
In Europe and the USA, populist parties (AfD, Rassemblement National, Brexit proponents, Trump) use fear of "overforeignization" for mobilization (Mudde, 2019).
- Schmitt: Clear friend-enemy scheme ("We, the people" vs. "The foreigners").
- Hobbes: Many citizens demand a strong state due to perceived insecurity (crime, jobs).
- Luhmann: Media "simplify" complex causes of migration and create fear-inducing scenarios that drive engagement and clicks.
- China legitimizes an extensive surveillance network through its Social Credit System, allegedly to protect against "unreliable elements."
- Conspiracy movements (QAnon, "Deep State") claim that invisible elites control everything; fear motivates protests and distrust of institutions.
- System-theoretically: Digital filter bubbles amplify the autopoiesis of fear narratives in real time (Zuboff, 2019; Smith, 2020).
-
Hobbes’ Fear of Chaos
- In crises or uncertainty (war, terror, pandemic), we can observe how citizens delegate far-reaching powers to governments.
-
Schmitt’s Friend-Enemy Thinking
- This is particularly evident where a clear opponent ("infidel," "terrorist," "illegal migrant") is identified to unify the collective.
-
Luhmann’s Communication of Fear
- Modern societies (and media) reproduce threats as a permanent state; complexity is reduced, and political systems gain legitimacy.
Conclusion:
In many cases, these approaches merge. A crisis can Hobbesianly promote strong authority, Schmittianly create a common enemy image, and Luhmannianly be permanently reproduced to consolidate the status quo.
- Polarization: Those defined as enemies often face social exclusion (Moral Panic).
- Mass Loyalty: Under the impression of a threat, criticism of governments decreases.
- Long-term damage: Trust can erode when fear narratives prove to be exaggerated or instrumentalized.
- Realistic Threat Analysis
- Fact-based communication instead of sensationalism.
- Transparent integration of scientific expertise.
- Media Literacy and Open Debate
- Understanding how sensationalism and filter bubbles work.
- Conscious inclusion of diverse perspectives (including critical ones).
- Social Security and Participation
- Hobbes, Schmitt, and Luhmann share the view that uncertainty fosters fear. Social security and democratic participation counteract fear-based governance.
Fear is a powerful driving force in political order. Thomas Hobbes uses it to justify the strong state against chaos, Carl Schmitt demonstrates how fear defines the enemy and unites communities, while Niklas Luhmann explains how political systems generate and reproduce threats communicatively to sustain themselves.
Historically, this pattern extends from the sack of Rome to today’s digital conspiracy theories and populism. In every era, people have been influenced, sometimes willingly giving up freedoms or tolerating drastic measures as long as an existentially presented danger loomed.
Nevertheless, despite all manipulation, real crises do exist. This raises the key question: Where does real danger end, and where does panic-mongering for power preservation begin? At this point, Hobbes, Schmitt, and Luhmann become relevant again, as they explain the mechanisms and limits of politically generated fear. A conscious and critical approach to fear narratives is thus democratically indispensable—only in this way can fear be prevented from becoming a permanent instrument of rule.
- Cohn, Norman (1975): The Pursuit of the Millennium. Oxford University Press.
- Gellately, Robert (2001): Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany. Oxford University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric (1989): The Age of Revolution: 1789–1848. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1651): Leviathan. (Reprint) Oxford University Press.
- Luhmann, Niklas (1981): Political Theory in the Welfare State. Fischer.
- Luhmann, Niklas (1984): Social Systems. Suhrkamp.
- Luhmann, Niklas (1991): The Society of Society. Suhrkamp.
- Meier, Christian (1995): Caesar and His Rome. Beck.
- Mudde, Cas (2019): The Far Right Today. Polity Press.
- Robin, Corey (2004): Fear: The History of a Political Idea. Oxford University Press.
- Schmitt, Carl (1932): The Concept of the Political. Duncker & Humblot.
- Smith, John (2020): Digital Dynamics and Global Fear: The Role of Social Media in Modern Politics. Journal of Political Communication, 35(2), 210–230.
- Westad, Odd Arne (2007): The Global Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
- Zuboff, Shoshana (2019): The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. PublicAffairs.