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SPDY: Security Consideration
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Snip from: http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-mbelshe-httpbis-spdy-00.txt | |
5. Security Considerations | |
5.1. Use of Same-origin constraints | |
This specification uses the same-origin policy [RFC6454] in all cases | |
where verification of content is required. | |
5.2. HTTP Headers and SPDY Headers | |
At the application level, HTTP uses name/value pairs in its headers. | |
Because SPDY merges the existing HTTP headers with SPDY headers, | |
there is a possibility that some HTTP applications already use a | |
particular header name. To avoid any conflicts, all headers | |
introduced for layering HTTP over SPDY are prefixed with ":". ":" is | |
not a valid sequence in HTTP header naming, preventing any possible | |
conflict. | |
5.3. Cross-Protocol Attacks | |
By utilizing TLS, we believe that SPDY introduces no new cross- | |
protocol attacks. TLS encrypts the contents of all transmission | |
(except the handshake itself), making it difficult for attackers to | |
control the data which could be used in a cross-protocol attack. | |
5.4. Server Push Implicit Headers | |
Pushed resources do not have an associated request. In order for | |
existing HTTP cache control validations (such as the Vary header) to | |
work, however, all cached resources must have a set of request | |
headers. For this reason, browsers MUST be careful to inherit | |
request headers from the associated stream for the push. This | |
includes the 'Cookie' header. |
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