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Introducer: |
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0:00:09.700,0:00:16.250 |
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Anyway, I believe I've killed enough time |
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... so, ladies and gentlemen, a person who |
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0:00:16.250,0:00:22.169 |
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in this crowd needs absolutely no introduction, |
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Cory Doctorow! |
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0:00:22.169,0:00:24.660 |
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[Audience applauds.] |
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Doctorow: |
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Thank you. |
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0:00:29.640,0:00:36.640 |
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So, when I speak in places where |
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the first language of the nation is not English, |
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0:00:37.640,0:00:44.269 |
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there is a disclaimer and an apology, because |
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I'm one of nature's fast talkers. When I was |
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0:00:44.269,0:00:49.679 |
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at the United Nations at the World Intellectual |
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Property Organization, I was known as the |
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0:00:49.679,0:00:55.550 |
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"scourge" of the simultaneous translation |
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corps; I would stand up and speak, and turn |
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0:00:55.550,0:00:59.679 |
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around, and there would be window after window |
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of translator, and every one of them would |
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0:00:59.679,0:01:06.520 |
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be doing this [Doctorow facepalms]. [Audience |
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laughs] So in advance, I give you permission |
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when I start talking quickly to do this [Doctorow |
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makes SOS motion] and I will slow down. |
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So, tonight's talk -- wah, wah, waaah |
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[Doctorow makes 'fail horn' sound, apparently |
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0:01:17.060,0:01:22.060 |
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in response to audience making SOS motion; |
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audience laughs]] -- tonight's talk is not |
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0:01:22.060,0:01:28.600 |
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a copyright talk. I do copyright talks all |
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the time; questions about culture and creativity |
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0:01:28.600,0:01:33.909 |
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are interesting enough, but to be honest, |
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I'm quite sick of them. If you want to hear |
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freelancer writers like me bang on about what's |
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happening to the way we earn our living, by |
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all means, go and find one of the many talks |
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I've done on this subject on YouTube. But, |
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tonight, I want to talk about something more |
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important -- I want talk to talk about general |
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purpose computers. |
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0:01:52.689,0:01:57.689 |
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Because general purpose computers are, in |
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fact, astounding -- so astounding that our |
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society is still struggling to come to grips |
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with them: to figure out what they're for, |
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0:02:03.189,0:02:09.729 |
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to figure out how to accommodate them, and |
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how to cope with them. Which, unfortunately, |
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0:02:09.729,0:02:12.319 |
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brings me back to copyright. |
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0:02:12.319,0:02:17.800 |
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Because the general shape of the |
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copyright wars and the lessons they can teach |
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0:02:17.800,0:02:23.310 |
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us about the upcoming fights over the destiny |
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of the general purpose computer are important. |
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0:02:23.310,0:02:30.310 |
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In the beginning, we had packaged software, |
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and the attendant industry, and we had sneakernet. |
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0:02:31.690,0:02:38.100 |
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So, we had floppy disks in ziplock bags, or |
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in cardboard boxes, hung on pegs in shops, |
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and sold like candy bars and magazines. And |
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they were eminently susceptible to duplication, |
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0:02:43.780,0:02:49.500 |
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and so they were duplicated quickly, and widely, |
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and this was to the great chagrin of people |
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0:02:49.500,0:02:51.680 |
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who made and sold software. |
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0:02:51.680,0:02:58.680 |
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Enter DRM 0.96. They started to |
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introduce physical defects to the disks or |
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0:02:59.430,0:03:05.770 |
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started to insist on other physical indicia |
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which the software could check for -- dongles, |
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hidden sectors, challenge/response protocols |
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that required that you had physical possession |
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0:03:10.660,0:03:17.330 |
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of large, unwieldy manuals that were difficult |
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to copy, and of course these failed, for two |
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0:03:17.330,0:03:23.090 |
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reasons. First, they were commercially unpopular, |
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of course, because they reduced the usefulness |
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0:03:23.090,0:03:27.600 |
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of the software to the legitimate purchasers, |
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while leaving the people who took the software |
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0:03:27.600,0:03:32.790 |
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without paying for it untouched. The legitimate |
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purchasers resented the non-functionality |
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0:03:32.790,0:03:38.240 |
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of their backups, they hated the loss of scarce |
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ports to the authentication dongles, and they |
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0:03:38.240,0:03:43.620 |
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resented the inconvenience of having to transport |
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large manuals when they wanted to run their |
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0:03:43.620,0:03:49.260 |
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software. And second, these didn't stop pirates, |
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who found it trivial to patch the software |
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0:03:49.260,0:03:55.080 |
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and bypass authentication. Typically, the |
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way that happened is some expert who had possession |
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0:03:55.080,0:04:00.680 |
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of technology and expertise of equivalent |
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sophistication to the software vendor itself, |
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0:04:00.680,0:04:05.820 |
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would reverse engineer the software and release |
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cracked versions that quickly became widely |
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0:04:05.820,0:04:11.630 |
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circulated. While this kind of expertise and |
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technology sounded highly specialized, it |
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0:04:11.630,0:04:16.750 |
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really wasn't; figuring out what recalcitrant |
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programs were doing, and routing around the |
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0:04:16.750,0:04:22.639 |
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defects in shitty floppy disk media were both |
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core skills for computer programmers, and |
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0:04:22.639,0:04:27.300 |
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were even more so in the era of fragile floppy |
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disks and the rough-and-ready early days of |
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0:04:27.300,0:04:33.660 |
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software development. Anti-copying strategies |
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only became more fraught as networks spread; |
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0:04:33.660,0:04:38.840 |
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once we had BBSes, online services, USENET |
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newsgroups, and mailing lists, the expertise |
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0:04:38.840,0:04:43.240 |
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of people who figured out how to defeat these |
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authentication systems could be packaged up |
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0:04:43.240,0:04:49.640 |
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in software as little crack files, or, as |
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the network capacity increased, the cracked |
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0:04:49.640,0:04:53.420 |
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disk images or executables themselves could |
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be spread on their own. |
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0:04:53.420,0:05:00.420 |
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Which gave us DRM 1.0. By 1996, |
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it became clear to everyone in the halls of |
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0:05:00.480,0:05:06.130 |
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power that there was something important about |
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to happen. We were about to have an information |
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0:05:06.130,0:05:13.070 |
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economy, whatever the hell that was. They |
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assumed it meant an economy where we bought |
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0:05:13.070,0:05:19.960 |
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and sold information. Now, information technology |
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makes things efficient, so imagine the markets |
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0:05:19.960,0:05:25.150 |
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that an information economy would have. You |
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could buy a book for a day, you could sell |
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0:05:25.150,0:05:29.740 |
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the right to watch the movie for one Euro, |
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and then you could rent out the pause button |
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0:05:29.740,0:05:35.210 |
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at one penny per second. You could sell movies |
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for one price in one country, and another |
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0:05:35.210,0:05:41.230 |
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price in another, and so on, and so on; the |
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fantasies of those days were a little like |
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0:05:41.230,0:05:46.880 |
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a boring science fiction adaptation of the |
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Old Testament book of Numbers, a kind of tedious |
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0:05:46.880,0:05:52.080 |
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enumeration of every permutation of things |
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people do with information and the ways we |
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0:05:52.080,0:05:54.020 |
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could charge them for it. |
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0:05:54.020,0:05:58.870 |
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But none of this would be possible |
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unless we could control how people use their |
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0:05:58.870,0:06:04.419 |
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computers and the files we transfer to them. |
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After all, it was well and good to talk about |
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0:06:04.419,0:06:10.090 |
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selling someone the 24 hour right to a video, |
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or the right to move music onto an iPod, but |
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0:06:10.090,0:06:15.220 |
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not the right to move music from the iPod |
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onto another device, but how the Hell could |
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0:06:15.220,0:06:19.850 |
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you do that once you'd given them the file? |
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In order to do that, to make this work, you |
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0:06:19.850,0:06:24.340 |
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needed to figure out how to stop computers |
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from running certain programs and inspecting |
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0:06:24.340,0:06:29.669 |
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certain files and processes. For example, |
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you could encrypt the file, and then require |
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0:06:29.669,0:06:34.000 |
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the user to run a program that only unlocked |
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the file under certain circumstances. |
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0:06:34.000,0:06:40.990 |
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But as they say on the Internet, |
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"now you have two problems". You also, now, |
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0:06:40.990,0:06:45.050 |
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have to stop the user from saving the file |
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while it's in the clear, and you have to stop |
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0:06:45.050,0:06:49.639 |
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the user from figuring out where the unlocking |
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program stores its keys, because if the user |
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0:06:49.639,0:06:53.820 |
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finds the keys, she'll just decrypt the file |
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and throw away that stupid player app. |
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0:06:53.820,0:06:58.370 |
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And now you have three problems |
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[audience laughs], because now you have to |
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0:06:58.370,0:07:02.020 |
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stop the users who figure out how to render |
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the file in the clear from sharing it with |
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0:07:02.020,0:07:07.060 |
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other users, and now you've got four! problems, |
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because now you have to stop the users who |
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0:07:07.060,0:07:11.710 |
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figure out how to extract secrets from unlocking |
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programs from telling other users how to do |
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0:07:11.710,0:07:16.830 |
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it too, and now you've got five! problems, |
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because now you have to stop users who figure |
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0:07:16.830,0:07:20.680 |
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out how to extract secrets from unlocking |
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programs from telling other users what the |
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0:07:20.680,0:07:22.070 |
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secrets were! |
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0:07:22.070,0:07:28.910 |
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That's a lot of problems. But by |
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1996, we had a solution. We had the WIPO Copyright |
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0:07:28.910,0:07:32.990 |
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Treaty, passed by the United Nations World |
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Intellectual Property Organization, which |
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0:07:32.990,0:07:37.930 |
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created laws that made it illegal to extract |
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secrets from unlocking programs, and it created |
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0:07:37.930,0:07:42.250 |
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laws that made it illegal to extract media |
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cleartexts from the unlocking programs while |
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0:07:42.250,0:07:46.580 |
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they were running, and it created laws that |
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made it illegal to tell people how to extract |
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0:07:46.580,0:07:51.720 |
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secrets from unlocking programs, and created |
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laws that made it illegal to host copyrighted |
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0:07:51.720,0:07:58.120 |
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works and secrets and all with a handy streamlined |
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process that let you remove stuff from the |
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0:07:58.120,0:08:02.729 |
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internet without having to screw around with |
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lawyers, and judges, and all that crap. And |
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0:08:02.729,0:08:09.729 |
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with that, illegal copying ended forever [audience |
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laughs very hard, applauds], the information |
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0:08:18.710,0:08:23.490 |
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economy blossomed into a beautiful flower |
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that brought prosperity to the whole wide |
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0:08:23.490,0:08:29.630 |
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world; as they say on the aircraft carriers, |
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"Mission Accomplished". [audience laughs] |
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0:08:29.630,0:08:34.490 |
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Well, of course that's not how the |
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story ends because pretty much anyone who |
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0:08:34.490,0:08:39.630 |
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understood computers and networks understood |
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that while these laws would create more problems |
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0:08:39.630,0:08:44.180 |
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than they could possibly solve; after all, |
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these were laws that made it illegal to look |
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0:08:44.180,0:08:49.149 |
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inside your computer when it was running certain |
|
programs, they made it illegal to tell people |
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0:08:49.149,0:08:53.550 |
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what you found when you looked inside your |
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computer, they made it easy to censor material |
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0:08:53.550,0:08:57.769 |
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on the internet without having to prove that |
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anything wrong had happened; in short, they |
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0:08:57.769,0:09:04.420 |
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made unrealistic demands on reality and reality |
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did not oblige them. After all, copying only |
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0:09:04.420,0:09:09.050 |
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got easier following the passage of these |
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laws -- copying will only ever get easier! |
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0:09:09.050,0:09:14.329 |
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Here, 2011, this is as hard as copying will |
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get! Your grandchildren will turn to you around |
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0:09:14.329,0:09:18.420 |
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the Christmas table and say "Tell me again, |
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Grandpa, tell me again, Grandma, about when |
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0:09:18.420,0:09:23.550 |
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it was hard to copy things in 2011, when you |
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couldn't get a drive the size of your fingernail |
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0:09:23.550,0:09:27.860 |
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that could hold every song ever recorded, |
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every movie ever made, every word ever spoken, |
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0:09:27.860,0:09:31.920 |
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every picture ever taken, everything, and |
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transfer it in such a short period of time |
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0:09:31.920,0:09:36.300 |
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you didn't even notice it was doing it, tell |
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us again when it was so stupidly hard to copy |
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0:09:36.300,0:09:43.300 |
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things back in 2011". And so, reality asserted |
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itself, and everyone had a good laugh over |
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0:09:43.490,0:09:47.970 |
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how funny our misconceptions were when we |
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entered the 21st century, and then a lasting |
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0:09:47.970,0:09:52.759 |
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peace was reached with freedom and prosperity |
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for all. [audience chuckles] |
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0:09:52.759,0:09:57.949 |
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Well, not really. Because, like |
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the nursery rhyme lady who swallows a spider |
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|
0:09:57.949,0:10:02.329 |
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to catch a fly, and has to swallow a bird |
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to catch the spider, and a cat to catch the |
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0:10:02.329,0:10:08.850 |
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bird, and so on, so must a regulation that |
|
has broad general appeal but is disastrous |
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|
0:10:08.850,0:10:13.929 |
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in its implementation beget a new regulation |
|
aimed at shoring up the failure of the old |
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|
0:10:13.929,0:10:18.110 |
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one. Now, it's tempting to stop the story |
|
here and conclude that the problem is that |
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|
0:10:18.110,0:10:23.470 |
|
lawmakers are either clueless or evil, or |
|
possibly evilly clueless, and just leave it |
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|
0:10:23.470,0:10:28.730 |
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there, which is not a very satisfying place |
|
to go, because it's fundamentally a council |
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0:10:28.730,0:10:33.350 |
|
of despair; it suggests that our problems |
|
cannot be solved for so long as stupidity |
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|
0:10:33.350,0:10:38.660 |
|
and evilness are present in the halls of power, |
|
which is to say they will never be solved. |
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|
|
0:10:38.660,0:10:41.100 |
|
But I have another theory about what's happened. |
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|
0:10:41.100,0:10:46.220 |
|
It's not that regulators don't understand |
|
information technology, because it should |
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|
|
0:10:46.220,0:10:52.819 |
|
be possible to be a non-expert and still make |
|
a good law! M.P.s and Congressmen and so on |
|
|
|
0:10:52.819,0:10:58.129 |
|
are elected to represent districts and people, |
|
not disciplines and issues. We don't have |
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|
0:10:58.129,0:11:02.490 |
|
a Member of Parliament for biochemistry, and |
|
we don't have a Senator from the great state |
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|
0:11:02.490,0:11:09.240 |
|
of urban planning, and we don't have an M.E.P. |
|
from child welfare. (But perhaps we should.) |
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|
0:11:09.240,0:11:14.610 |
|
And yet those people who are experts in policy |
|
and politics, not technical disciplines, nevertheless, |
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|
0:11:14.610,0:11:20.029 |
|
often do manage to pass good rules that make |
|
sense, and that's because government relies |
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|
0:11:20.029,0:11:24.850 |
|
on heuristics -- rules of thumbs about how |
|
to balance expert input from different sides |
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|
0:11:24.850,0:11:25.790 |
|
of an issue. |
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|
0:11:25.790,0:11:30.269 |
|
But information technology confounds |
|
these heuristics -- it kicks the crap out |
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|
0:11:30.269,0:11:36.170 |
|
of them -- in one important way, and this |
|
is it. One important test of whether or not |
|
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|
0:11:36.170,0:11:40.540 |
|
a regulation is fit for a purpose is first, |
|
of course, whether it will work, but second |
|
|
|
0:11:40.540,0:11:45.249 |
|
of all, whether or not in the course of doing |
|
its work, it will have lots of effects on |
|
|
|
0:11:45.249,0:11:51.619 |
|
everything else. If I wanted Congress to write, |
|
or Parliament to write, or the E.U. to regulate |
|
|
|
0:11:51.619,0:11:56.769 |
|
a wheel, it's unlikely I'd succeed. If I turned |
|
up and said "well, everyone knows that wheels |
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|
0:11:56.769,0:12:01.980 |
|
are good and right, but have you noticed that |
|
every single bank robber has four wheels on |
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|
0:12:01.980,0:12:06.449 |
|
his car when he drives away from the bank |
|
robbery? Can't we do something about this?", |
|
|
|
0:12:06.449,0:12:11.189 |
|
the answer would of course be "no". Because |
|
we don't know how to make a wheel that is |
|
|
|
0:12:11.189,0:12:16.800 |
|
still generally useful for legitimate wheel |
|
applications but useless to bad guys. And |
|
|
|
0:12:16.800,0:12:20.959 |
|
we can all see that the general benefits of |
|
wheels are so profound that we'd be foolish |
|
|
|
0:12:20.959,0:12:26.470 |
|
to risk them in a foolish errand to stop bank |
|
robberies by changing wheels. Even if there |
|
|
|
0:12:26.470,0:12:31.050 |
|
were an /epidemic/ of bank robberies, even |
|
if society were on the verge of collapse thanks |
|
|
|
0:12:31.050,0:12:34.999 |
|
to bank robberies, no-one would think that |
|
wheels were the right place to start solving |
|
|
|
0:12:34.999,0:12:36.149 |
|
our problems. |
|
|
|
0:12:36.149,0:12:42.470 |
|
But. If I were to show up in that |
|
same body to say that I had absolute proof |
|
|
|
0:12:42.470,0:12:48.300 |
|
that hands-free phones were making cars dangerous, |
|
and I said, "I would like you to pass a law |
|
|
|
0:12:48.300,0:12:52.619 |
|
that says it's illegal to put a hands-free |
|
phone in a car", the regulator might say "Yeah, |
|
|
|
0:12:52.619,0:12:56.499 |
|
I'd take your point, we'd do that". And we |
|
might disagree about whether or not this is |
|
|
|
0:12:56.499,0:13:00.809 |
|
a good idea, or whether or not my evidence |
|
made sense, but very few of us would say "well, |
|
|
|
0:13:00.809,0:13:06.519 |
|
once you take the hands-free phones out of |
|
the car, they stop being cars". We understand |
|
|
|
0:13:06.519,0:13:12.100 |
|
that we can keep cars cars even if we remove |
|
features from them. Cars are special purpose, |
|
|
|
0:13:12.100,0:13:16.860 |
|
at least in comparison to wheels, and all |
|
that the addition of a hands-free phone does |
|
|
|
0:13:16.860,0:13:22.829 |
|
is add one more feature to an already-specialized |
|
technology. In fact, there's that heuristic |
|
|
|
0:13:22.829,0:13:27.480 |
|
that we can apply here -- special-purpose |
|
technologies are complex. And you can remove |
|
|
|
0:13:27.480,0:13:32.569 |
|
features from them without doing fundamental |
|
disfiguring violence to their underlying utility. |
|
|
|
0:13:32.569,0:13:38.309 |
|
This rule of thumb serves regulators |
|
well, by and large, but it is rendered null |
|
|
|
0:13:38.309,0:13:42.869 |
|
and void by the general-purpose computer and |
|
the general-purpose network -- the PC and |
|
|
|
0:13:42.869,0:13:48.230 |
|
the Internet. Because if you think of computer |
|
software as a feature, that is a computer |
|
|
|
0:13:48.230,0:13:52.649 |
|
with spreadsheets running on it has a spreadsheet |
|
feature, and one that's running World of Warcraft |
|
|
|
0:13:52.649,0:13:57.899 |
|
has an MMORPG feature, then this heuristic |
|
leads you to think that you could reasonably |
|
|
|
0:13:57.899,0:14:02.319 |
|
say, "make me a computer that doesn't run |
|
spreadsheets", and that it would be no more |
|
|
|
0:14:02.319,0:14:07.029 |
|
of an attack on computing than "make me a |
|
car without a hands-free phone" is an attack |
|
|
|
0:14:07.029,0:14:12.610 |
|
on cars. And if you think of protocols and |
|
sites as features of the network, then saying |
|
|
|
0:14:12.610,0:14:18.939 |
|
"fix the Internet so that it doesn't run BitTorrent", |
|
or "fix the Internet so that thepiratebay.org |
|
|
|
0:14:18.939,0:14:23.709 |
|
no longer resolves", then it sounds a lot |
|
like "change the sound of busy signals", or |
|
|
|
0:14:23.709,0:14:28.439 |
|
"take that pizzeria on the corner off the |
|
phone network", and not like an attack on |
|
|
|
0:14:28.439,0:14:30.899 |
|
the fundamental principles of internetworking. |
|
|
|
0:14:30.899,0:14:36.420 |
|
Not realizing that this rule of |
|
thumb that works for cars and for houses and |
|
|
|
0:14:36.420,0:14:41.189 |
|
for every other substantial area of technological |
|
regulation fails for the Internet does not |
|
|
|
0:14:41.189,0:14:45.059 |
|
make you evil and it does not make you an |
|
ignoramus. It just makes you part of that |
|
|
|
0:14:45.059,0:14:50.679 |
|
vast majority of the world for whom ideas |
|
like "Turing complete" and "end-to-end" are |
|
|
|
0:14:50.679,0:14:56.839 |
|
meaningless. So, our regulators go off, and |
|
they blithely pass these laws, and they become |
|
|
|
0:14:56.839,0:15:01.439 |
|
part of the reality of our technological world. |
|
There are suddenly numbers that we aren't |
|
|
|
0:15:01.439,0:15:06.290 |
|
allowed to write down on the Internet, programs |
|
we're not allowed to publish, and all it takes |
|
|
|
0:15:06.290,0:15:11.489 |
|
to make legitimate material disappear from |
|
the Internet is to say "that? That infringes |
|
|
|
0:15:11.489,0:15:15.809 |
|
copyright.". It fails to attain the actual |
|
goal of the regulation; it doesn't stop people |
|
|
|
0:15:15.809,0:15:21.119 |
|
from violating copyright, but it bears a kind |
|
of superficial resemblance to copyright enforcement |
|
|
|
0:15:21.119,0:15:26.959 |
|
-- it satisfies the security syllogism: "something |
|
must be done, I am doing something, something |
|
|
|
0:15:26.959,0:15:32.790 |
|
has been done." And thus any failures that |
|
arise can be blamed on the idea that the regulation |
|
|
|
0:15:32.790,0:15:37.859 |
|
doesn't go far enough, rather than the idea |
|
that it was flawed from the outset. |
|
|
|
0:15:37.859,0:15:42.399 |
|
This kind of superficial resemblance |
|
and underlying divergence happens in other |
|
|
|
0:15:42.399,0:15:46.999 |
|
engineering contexts. I've a friend who was |
|
once a senior executive at a big consumer |
|
|
|
0:15:46.999,0:15:50.929 |
|
packaged goods company who told me about what |
|
happened when the marketing department told |
|
|
|
0:15:50.929,0:15:55.199 |
|
the engineers that they'd thought up a great |
|
idea for detergent: from now on, they were |
|
|
|
0:15:55.199,0:16:00.059 |
|
going to make detergent that made your clothes |
|
newer every time you washed them! Well after |
|
|
|
0:16:00.059,0:16:04.869 |
|
the engineers had tried unsuccessfully to |
|
convey the concept of "entropy" to the marketing |
|
|
|
0:16:04.869,0:16:10.100 |
|
department [audience laughs], they arrived |
|
at another solution -- "solution" -- they'd |
|
|
|
0:16:10.100,0:16:15.959 |
|
develop a detergent that used enzymes that |
|
attacked loose fiber ends, the kind that you |
|
|
|
0:16:15.959,0:16:20.259 |
|
get with broken fibers that make your clothes |
|
look old. So every time you washed your clothes |
|
|
|
0:16:20.259,0:16:25.100 |
|
in the detergent, they would look newer. But |
|
that was because the detergent was literally |
|
|
|
0:16:25.100,0:16:31.100 |
|
digesting your clothes! Using it would literally |
|
cause your clothes to dissolve in the washing |
|
|
|
0:16:31.100,0:16:36.949 |
|
machine! This was the opposite of making clothes |
|
newer; instead, you were artificially aging |
|
|
|
0:16:36.949,0:16:42.829 |
|
your clothes every time you washed them, and |
|
as the user, the more you deployed the "solution", |
|
|
|
0:16:42.829,0:16:47.489 |
|
the more drastic your measures had to be to |
|
keep your clothes up to date -- you actually |
|
|
|
0:16:47.489,0:16:50.720 |
|
had to go buy new clothes because the old |
|
ones fell apart. |
|
|
|
0:16:50.720,0:16:55.129 |
|
So today we have marketing departments |
|
who say things like "we don't need computers, |
|
|
|
0:16:55.129,0:17:00.540 |
|
we need... appliances. Make me a computer |
|
that doesn't run every program, just a program |
|
|
|
0:17:00.540,0:17:05.920 |
|
that does this specialized task, like streaming |
|
audio, or routing packets, or playing Xbox |
|
|
|
0:17:05.920,0:17:10.429 |
|
games, and make sure it doesn't run programs |
|
that I haven't authorized that might undermine |
|
|
|
0:17:10.429,0:17:16.019 |
|
our profits". And on the surface, this seems |
|
like a reasonable idea -- just a program that |
|
|
|
0:17:16.019,0:17:22.679 |
|
does one specialized task -- after all, we |
|
can put an electric motor in a blender, and |
|
|
|
0:17:22.679,0:17:27.059 |
|
we can install a motor in a dishwasher, and |
|
we don't worry if it's still possible to run |
|
|
|
0:17:27.059,0:17:33.490 |
|
a dishwashing program in a blender. But that's |
|
not what we do when we turn a computer into |
|
|
|
0:17:33.490,0:17:38.380 |
|
an appliance. We're not making a computer |
|
that runs only the "appliance" app; we're |
|
|
|
0:17:38.380,0:17:43.870 |
|
making a computer that can run every program, |
|
but which uses some combination of rootkits, |
|
|
|
0:17:43.870,0:17:48.409 |
|
spyware, and code-signing to prevent the user |
|
from knowing which processes are running, |
|
|
|
0:17:48.409,0:17:53.049 |
|
from installing her own software, and from |
|
terminating processes that she doesn't want. |
|
|
|
0:17:53.049,0:17:58.870 |
|
In other words, an appliance is not a stripped-down |
|
computer -- it is a fully functional computer |
|
|
|
0:17:58.870,0:18:02.299 |
|
with spyware on it out of the box. |
|
|
|
0:18:02.299,0:18:08.750 |
|
[audience applauds loudly] Thanks. |
|
|
|
0:18:08.750,0:18:14.190 |
|
Because we don't know how to build |
|
the general purpose computer that is capable |
|
|
|
0:18:14.190,0:18:18.539 |
|
of running any program we can compile except |
|
for some program that we don't like, or that |
|
|
|
0:18:18.539,0:18:23.549 |
|
we prohibit by law, or that loses us money. |
|
The closest approximation that we have to |
|
|
|
0:18:23.549,0:18:29.220 |
|
this is a computer with spyware -- a computer |
|
on which remote parties set policies without |
|
|
|
0:18:29.220,0:18:34.220 |
|
the computer user's knowledge, over the objection |
|
of the computer's owner. And so it is that |
|
|
|
0:18:34.220,0:18:37.450 |
|
digital rights management always converges |
|
on malware. |
|
|
|
0:18:37.450,0:18:41.200 |
|
There was, of course, this famous |
|
incident, a kind of gift to people who have |
|
|
|
0:18:41.200,0:18:47.130 |
|
this hypothesis, in which Sony loaded covert |
|
rootkit installers on 6 million audio CDs, |
|
|
|
0:18:47.130,0:18:52.399 |
|
which secretly executed programs that watched |
|
for attempts to read the sound files on CDs, |
|
|
|
0:18:52.399,0:18:56.269 |
|
and terminated them, and which also hid the |
|
rootkit's existence by causing the kernel |
|
|
|
0:18:56.269,0:19:00.820 |
|
to lie about which processes were running, |
|
and which files were present on the drive. |
|
|
|
0:19:00.820,0:19:05.960 |
|
But it's not the only example; just recently, |
|
Nintendo shipped the 3DS, which opportunistically |
|
|
|
0:19:05.960,0:19:10.130 |
|
updates its firmware, and does an integrity |
|
check to make sure that you haven't altered |
|
|
|
0:19:10.130,0:19:15.299 |
|
the old firmware in any way, and if it detects |
|
signs of tampering, it bricks itself. |
|
|
|
0:19:15.299,0:19:20.389 |
|
Human rights activists have raised |
|
alarms over U-EFI, the new PC bootloader, |
|
|
|
0:19:20.389,0:19:25.179 |
|
which restricts your computer so it runs signed |
|
operating systems, noting that repressive |
|
|
|
0:19:25.179,0:19:30.279 |
|
governments will likely withhold signatures |
|
from OSes unless they have covert surveillance |
|
|
|
0:19:30.279,0:19:30.850 |
|
operations. |
|
|
|
0:19:30.850,0:19:35.179 |
|
And on the network side, attempts |
|
to make a network that can't be used for copyright |
|
|
|
0:19:35.179,0:19:40.710 |
|
infringement always converges with the surveillance |
|
measures that we know from repressive governments. |
|
|
|
0:19:40.710,0:19:47.700 |
|
So, SOPA, the U.S. Stop Online Piracy Act, |
|
bans tools like DNSSec because they can be |
|
|
|
0:19:47.700,0:19:52.519 |
|
used to defeat DNS blocking measures. And |
|
it blocks tools like Tor, because they can |
|
|
|
0:19:52.519,0:19:57.760 |
|
be used to circumvent IP blocking measures. |
|
In fact, the proponents of SOPA, the Motion |
|
|
|
0:19:57.760,0:20:03.120 |
|
Picture Association of America, circulated |
|
a memo, citing research that SOPA would probably |
|
|
|
0:20:03.120,0:20:08.600 |
|
work, because it uses the same measures as |
|
are used in Syria, China, and Uzbekistan, |
|
|
|
0:20:08.600,0:20:12.389 |
|
and they argued that these measures are effective |
|
in those countries, and so they would work |
|
|
|
0:20:12.389,0:20:13.880 |
|
in America, too! |
|
|
|
0:20:13.880,0:20:20.279 |
|
[audience laughs and applauds] Don't applaud |
|
me, applaud the MPAA! |
|
|
|
0:20:20.279,0:20:26.039 |
|
Now, it may seem like SOPA is the |
|
end game in a long fight over copyright, and |
|
|
|
0:20:26.039,0:20:30.639 |
|
the internet, and it may seem like if we defeat |
|
SOPA, we'll be well on our way to securing |
|
|
|
0:20:30.639,0:20:36.320 |
|
the freedom of PCs and networks. But as I |
|
said at the beginning of this talk, this isn't |
|
|
|
0:20:36.320,0:20:42.649 |
|
about copyright, because the copyright wars |
|
are just the 0.9 beta version of the long |
|
|
|
0:20:42.649,0:20:47.490 |
|
coming war on computation. The entertainment |
|
industry were just the first belligerents |
|
|
|
0:20:47.490,0:20:52.340 |
|
in this coming century-long conflict. We tend |
|
to think of them as particularly successful |
|
|
|
0:20:52.340,0:20:58.610 |
|
-- after all, here is SOPA, trembling on the |
|
verge of passage, and breaking the internet |
|
|
|
0:20:58.610,0:21:04.519 |
|
on this fundamental level in the name of preserving |
|
Top 40 music, reality TV shows, and Ashton |
|
|
|
0:21:04.519,0:21:06.929 |
|
Kutcher movies! [laughs, scattered applause] |
|
|
|
0:21:06.929,0:21:13.100 |
|
But the reality is, copyright legislation |
|
gets as far as it does precisely because it's |
|
|
|
0:21:13.100,0:21:18.980 |
|
not taken seriously, which is why on one hand, |
|
Canada has had Parliament after Parliament |
|
|
|
0:21:18.980,0:21:23.940 |
|
introduce one stupid copyright bill after |
|
another, but on the other hand, Parliament |
|
|
|
0:21:23.940,0:21:29.639 |
|
after Parliament has failed to actually vote |
|
on the bill. It's why we got SOPA, a bill |
|
|
|
0:21:29.639,0:21:36.639 |
|
composed of pure stupid, pieced together molecule-by-molecule, |
|
into a kind of "Stupidite 250", which is normally |
|
|
|
0:21:37.509,0:21:44.110 |
|
only found in the heart of newborn star, and |
|
it's why these rushed-through SOPA hearings |
|
|
|
0:21:44.110,0:21:48.679 |
|
had to be adjourned midway through the Christmas |
|
break, so that lawmakers could get into a |
|
|
|
0:21:48.679,0:21:55.029 |
|
real vicious nationally-infamous debate over |
|
an important issue, unemployment insurance. |
|
|
|
0:21:55.029,0:22:01.840 |
|
It's why the World Intellectual Property Organization |
|
is gulled time and again into enacting crazed, |
|
|
|
0:22:01.840,0:22:07.090 |
|
pig-ignorant copyright proposals because when |
|
the nations of the world send their U.N. missions |
|
|
|
0:22:07.090,0:22:13.070 |
|
to Geneva, they send water experts, not copyright |
|
experts; they send health experts, not copyright |
|
|
|
0:22:13.070,0:22:17.730 |
|
experts; they send agriculture experts, not |
|
copyright experts, because copyright is just |
|
|
|
0:22:17.730,0:22:24.730 |
|
not important to pretty much everyone! [applause] |
|
|
|
0:22:27.179,0:22:34.179 |
|
Canada's Parliament didn't vote |
|
on its copyright bills because, of all the |
|
|
|
0:22:34.490,0:22:40.169 |
|
things that Canada needs to do, fixing copyright |
|
ranks well below health emergencies on first |
|
|
|
0:22:40.169,0:22:45.440 |
|
nations reservations, exploiting the oil patch |
|
in Alberta, interceding in sectarian resentments |
|
|
|
0:22:45.440,0:22:49.799 |
|
among French- and English-speakers, solving |
|
resources crises in the nation's fisheries, |
|
|
|
0:22:49.799,0:22:54.929 |
|
and thousand other issues! The triviality |
|
of copyright tells you that when other sectors |
|
|
|
0:22:54.929,0:23:00.559 |
|
of the economy start to evince concerns about |
|
the internet and the PC, that copyright will |
|
|
|
0:23:00.559,0:23:06.630 |
|
be revealed for a minor skirmish, and not |
|
a war. Why would other sectors nurse grudges |
|
|
|
0:23:06.630,0:23:11.659 |
|
against computers? Well, because the world |
|
we live in today is /made/ of computers. We |
|
|
|
0:23:11.659,0:23:15.899 |
|
don't have cars anymore, we have computers |
|
we ride in; we don't have airplanes anymore, |
|
|
|
0:23:15.899,0:23:22.899 |
|
we have flying Solaris boxes with a big bucketful |
|
of SCADA controllers [laughter]; a 3D printer |
|
|
|
0:23:24.409,0:23:30.380 |
|
is not a device, it's a peripheral, and it |
|
only works connected to a computer; a radio |
|
|
|
0:23:30.380,0:23:36.200 |
|
is no longer a crystal, it's a general-purpose |
|
computer with a fast ADC and a fast DAC and |
|
|
|
0:23:36.200,0:23:37.269 |
|
some software. |
|
|
|
0:23:37.269,0:23:43.200 |
|
The grievances that arose from |
|
unauthorized copying are trivial, when compared |
|
|
|
0:23:43.200,0:23:49.269 |
|
to the calls for action that our new computer-embroidered |
|
reality will create. Think of radio for a |
|
|
|
0:23:49.269,0:23:54.149 |
|
minute. The entire basis for radio regulation |
|
up until today was based on the idea that |
|
|
|
0:23:54.149,0:23:59.179 |
|
the properties of a radio are fixed at the |
|
time of manufacture, and can't be easily altered. |
|
|
|
0:23:59.179,0:24:03.389 |
|
You can't just flip a switch on your baby |
|
monitor, and turn it into something that interferes |
|
|
|
0:24:03.389,0:24:08.610 |
|
with air traffic control signals. But powerful |
|
software-defined radios can change from baby |
|
|
|
0:24:08.610,0:24:13.720 |
|
monitor to emergency services dispatcher to |
|
air traffic controller just by loading and |
|
|
|
0:24:13.720,0:24:18.590 |
|
executing different software, which is why |
|
the first time the American telecoms regulator |
|
|
|
0:24:18.590,0:24:23.879 |
|
(the FCC) considered what would happen when |
|
we put SDRs in the field, they asked for comment |
|
|
|
0:24:23.879,0:24:29.200 |
|
on whether it should mandate that all software-defined |
|
radios should be embedded in trusted computing |
|
|
|
0:24:29.200,0:24:34.779 |
|
machines. Ultimately, whether every PC should |
|
be locked, so that the programs they run are |
|
|
|
0:24:34.779,0:24:37.330 |
|
strictly regulated by central authorities. |
|
|
|
0:24:37.330,0:24:42.259 |
|
And even this is a shadow of what |
|
is to come. After all, this was the year in |
|
|
|
0:24:42.259,0:24:48.370 |
|
which we saw the debut of open sourced shape |
|
files for converting AR-15s to full automatic. |
|
|
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0:24:48.370,0:24:53.629 |
|
This was the year of crowd-funded open-sourced |
|
hardware for gene sequencing. And while 3D |
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|
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0:24:53.629,0:24:57.750 |
|
printing will give rise to plenty of trivial |
|
complaints, there will be judges in the American |
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|
|
0:24:57.750,0:25:02.730 |
|
South and Mullahs in Iran who will lose their |
|
minds over people in their jurisdiction printing |
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|
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0:25:02.730,0:25:09.509 |
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out sex toys. [guffaw from audience] The trajectory |
|
of 3D printing will most certainly raise real |
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|
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0:25:09.509,0:25:13.409 |
|
grievances, from solid state meth labs, to |
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ceramic knives. |
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|
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0:25:13.409,0:25:17.950 |
|
And it doesn't take a science fiction |
|
writer to understand why regulators might |
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|
|
0:25:17.950,0:25:23.889 |
|
be nervous about the user-modifiable firmware |
|
on self-driving cars, or limiting interoperability |
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|
|
0:25:23.889,0:25:28.789 |
|
for aviation controllers, or the kind of thing |
|
you could do with bio-scale assemblers and |
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|
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0:25:28.789,0:25:34.240 |
|
sequencers. Imagine what will happen the day |
|
that Monsanto determines that it's really... |
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|
|
0:25:34.240,0:25:39.000 |
|
really... important to make sure that computers |
|
can't execute programs that cause specialized |
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|
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0:25:39.000,0:25:44.940 |
|
peripherals to output organisms that eat their |
|
lunch... literally. Regardless of whether |
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0:25:44.940,0:25:50.070 |
|
you think these are real problems or merely |
|
hysterical fears, they are nevertheless the |
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|
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0:25:50.070,0:25:54.440 |
|
province of lobbies and interest groups that |
|
are far more influential than Hollywood and |
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|
|
0:25:54.440,0:25:59.600 |
|
big content are on their best days, and every |
|
one of them will arrive at the same place |
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|
|
0:25:59.600,0:26:04.929 |
|
-- "can't you just make us a general purpose |
|
computer that runs all the programs, except |
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|
0:26:04.929,0:26:10.019 |
|
the ones that scare and anger us? Can't you |
|
just make us an Internet that transmits any |
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|
0:26:10.019,0:26:14.929 |
|
message over any protocol between any two |
|
points, unless it upsets us?" |
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|
0:26:14.929,0:26:18.879 |
|
And personally, I can see that |
|
there will be programs that run on general |
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|
|
0:26:18.879,0:26:24.100 |
|
purpose computers and peripherals that will |
|
even freak me out. So I can believe that people |
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|
|
0:26:24.100,0:26:28.370 |
|
who advocate for limiting general purpose |
|
computers will find receptive audience for |
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|
|
0:26:28.370,0:26:33.740 |
|
their positions. But just as we saw with the |
|
copyright wars, banning certain instructions, |
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|
|
0:26:33.740,0:26:39.470 |
|
or protocols, or messages, will be wholly |
|
ineffective as a means of prevention and remedy; |
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|
|
0:26:39.470,0:26:45.590 |
|
and as we saw in the copyright wars, all attempts |
|
at controlling PCs will converge on rootkits; |
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|
|
0:26:45.590,0:26:51.480 |
|
all attempts at controlling the Internet will |
|
converge on surveillance and censorship, which |
|
|
|
0:26:51.480,0:26:57.179 |
|
is why all this stuff matters. Because we've |
|
spent the last 10+ years as a body sending |
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|
|
0:26:57.179,0:27:01.639 |
|
our best players out to fight what we thought |
|
was the final boss at the end of the game, |
|
|
|
0:27:01.639,0:27:06.100 |
|
but it turns out it's just been the mini-boss |
|
at the end of the level, and the stakes are |
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|
|
0:27:06.100,0:27:07.340 |
|
only going to get higher. |
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|
|
0:27:07.340,0:27:11.509 |
|
As a member of the Walkman generation, |
|
I have made peace with the fact that I will |
|
|
|
0:27:11.509,0:27:17.090 |
|
require a hearing aid long before I die, and |
|
of course, it won't be a hearing aid, it will |
|
|
|
0:27:17.090,0:27:22.480 |
|
be a computer I put in my body. So when I |
|
get into a car -- a computer I put my body |
|
|
|
0:27:22.480,0:27:27.580 |
|
into -- with my hearing aid -- a computer |
|
I put inside my body -- I want to know that |
|
|
|
0:27:27.580,0:27:32.399 |
|
these technologies are not designed to keep |
|
secrets from me, and to prevent me from terminating |
|
|
|
0:27:32.399,0:27:39.399 |
|
processes on them that work against my interests. |
|
[vigorous applause from audience] Thank you. |
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|
|
0:27:43.139,0:27:50.139 |
|
Thank you. So, last year, the Lower |
|
Merion School District, in a middle-class, |
|
|
|
0:27:53.450,0:27:57.539 |
|
affluent suburb of Philadelphia found itself |
|
in a great deal of trouble, because it was |
|
|
|
0:27:57.539,0:28:02.570 |
|
caught distributing PCs to its students, equipped |
|
with rootkits that allowed for remote covert |
|
|
|
0:28:02.570,0:28:07.059 |
|
surveillance through the computer's camera |
|
and network connection. It transpired that |
|
|
|
0:28:07.059,0:28:12.549 |
|
they had been photographing students thousands |
|
of times, at home and at school, awake and |
|
|
|
0:28:12.549,0:28:17.990 |
|
asleep, dressed and naked. Meanwhile, the |
|
latest generation of lawful intercept technology |
|
|
|
0:28:17.990,0:28:23.990 |
|
can covertly operate cameras, mics, and GPSes |
|
on PCs, tablets, and mobile devices. |
|
|
|
0:28:23.990,0:28:30.039 |
|
Freedom in the future will require |
|
us to have the capacity to monitor our devices |
|
|
|
0:28:30.039,0:28:36.419 |
|
and set meaningful policy on them, to examine |
|
and terminate the processes that run on them, |
|
|
|
0:28:36.419,0:28:41.590 |
|
to maintain them as honest servants to our |
|
will, and not as traitors and spies working |
|
|
|
0:28:41.590,0:28:47.179 |
|
for criminals, thugs, and control freaks. |
|
And we haven't lost yet, but we have to win |
|
|
|
0:28:47.179,0:28:52.669 |
|
the copyright wars to keep the Internet and |
|
the PC free and open. Because these are the |
|
|
|
0:28:52.669,0:28:58.299 |
|
materiel in the wars that are to come, we |
|
won't be able to fight on without them. And |
|
|
|
0:28:58.299,0:29:04.299 |
|
I know this sounds like a council of despair, |
|
but as I said, these are early days. We have |
|
|
|
0:29:04.299,0:29:08.710 |
|
been fighting the mini-boss, and that means |
|
that great challenges are yet to come, but |
|
|
|
0:29:08.710,0:29:15.580 |
|
like all good level designers, fate has sent |
|
us a soft target to train ourselves on -- we |
|
|
|
0:29:15.580,0:29:21.360 |
|
have a chance, a real chance, and if we support |
|
open and free systems, and the organizations |
|
|
|
0:29:21.360,0:29:28.360 |
|
that fight for them -- EFF, Bits of Freedom |
|
[?], Edrie [?], [?], Nets Politique [?], La |
|
|
|
0:29:28.740,0:29:33.450 |
|
Quadrature du Net, and all the others, who |
|
are thankfully, too numerous to name here |
|
|
|
0:29:33.450,0:29:38.440 |
|
-- we may yet win the battle, and secure the |
|
ammunition we'll need for the war. |
|
|
|
0:29:38.440,0:29:45.440 |
|
Thank you. |
|
|
|
0:37:48.880,0:37:55.880 |
|
[sustained applause] |
|
|