Skip to content

Instantly share code, notes, and snippets.

View Chaz6's full-sized avatar

Chris Hills Chaz6

View GitHub Profile
@MSAdministrator
MSAdministrator / mitre_att&ck_json_data_format_explanation.md
Created March 1, 2020 03:53
Explanation of the MITRE ATT&CK Data Format

MITRE ATT&CK Data Format

The MITRE ATT&CK JSON file is a flat JSON structure which is difficult to parse. To parse this JSON file, there are several different approaches but the type key is the, well, key!

The types within this JSON are the following (as well as the common wording used for this type):

  • attack-pattern (Techniques)
  • relationship (This is a unique type that contains relationships between types)
  • course-of-action (Mitigations)
  • identity (unused)
@njh
njh / _README.md
Last active October 7, 2023 20:25
Dual-stack VyOS Zone based Firewall Generator

Dual-stack VyOS Zone based Firewall Generator

A ruby script to generate the boilerplate for a dual-stack VyOS zone based firewall.

Zones:

  • PRIVATE: contains the LAN and WAN modem admin interface
  • PUBLIC: The Internet - contains the PPPoE interface
@IanColdwater
IanColdwater / twittermute.txt
Last active April 22, 2024 17:26
Here are some terms to mute on Twitter to clean your timeline up a bit.
Mute these words in your settings here: https://twitter.com/settings/muted_keywords
ActivityTweet
generic_activity_highlights
generic_activity_momentsbreaking
RankedOrganicTweet
suggest_activity
suggest_activity_feed
suggest_activity_highlights
suggest_activity_tweet
@thomaspatzke
thomaspatzke / mitre_attack_oneliners.sh
Created December 17, 2019 00:10
MITRE ATT&CK oneliners
# Requires: curl, jq
# Download MITRE ATT&CK data from GitHub repository
curl -o enterprise-attack.json https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre/cti/master/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack.json
# List all ATT&CK object types
jq -r '[ .objects[].type ] | unique | .[]' enterprise-attack.json
# List all ATT&CK technique identifiers
jq -r '[ .objects[] | select(.type == "attack-pattern") | .external_references[] | select(.source_name == "mitre-attack") | .external_id ] | sort | .[]' enterprise-attack.json
import itertools
import os
import adaptive
import holoviews.plotting.mpl
import matplotlib
import matplotlib.cm
import matplotlib.tri as mtri
import numpy as np
from matplotlib import animation
@lizthegrey
lizthegrey / attributes.rb
Last active February 24, 2024 14:11
Hardening SSH with 2fa
default['sshd']['sshd_config']['AuthenticationMethods'] = 'publickey,keyboard-interactive:pam'
default['sshd']['sshd_config']['ChallengeResponseAuthentication'] = 'yes'
default['sshd']['sshd_config']['PasswordAuthentication'] = 'no'
@lisawolderiksen
lisawolderiksen / git-commit-template.md
Last active May 12, 2024 19:40
Use a Git commit message template to write better commit messages

Using Git Commit Message Templates to Write Better Commit Messages

The always enthusiastic and knowledgeable mr. @jasaltvik shared with our team an article on writing (good) Git commit messages: How to Write a Git Commit Message. This excellent article explains why good Git commit messages are important, and explains what constitutes a good commit message. I wholeheartedly agree with what @cbeams writes in his article. (Have you read it yet? If not, go read it now. I'll wait.) It's sensible stuff. So I decided to start following the

Recon and Attack Vectors from My Logs

This document contains excerpts from my web server logs collected over a period of 7 years that shows various kinds of recon and attack vectors.

There were a total of 37.2 million lines of logs out of which 1.1 million unique HTTP requests (Method + URI) were found.

$ sed 's/^.* - - \[.*\] "\(.*\) HTTP\/.*" .*/\1/' access.log > requests.txt
@roycewilliams
roycewilliams / clientside-software-update-verification-failures.md
Last active December 16, 2021 16:05
Exploitable vulnerabilities in client-side software update mechanisms that could have been mitigated by secure transport (TLS).

Client-side software update verification failures

Exploitable vulnerabilities in client-side software update mechanisms that could have been mitigated by secure transport (TLS). Contributions welcome. All text taken from the vulnerability descriptions themselves, with additional emphasis mine.

In scope:

  • I consider exploitation or privilege escalation of the package tool/system itself (that would have been mitigated by secure transport) to be in scope.
  • Issues only described as being triggered by malicious mirrors are assumed to also be vulnerable to MITM.
  • Failure to verify the software update at all is currently provisionally in scope if it could have been mitigated by secure transport, but I'm waffling about it. Most of these are actual signature verification failures, and my original purpose was to highlight cases where claims of "It's OK to be HTTP because verification!" seem to me to be specious.
  • Software components regularly used to verify integrity in other software pipelines are
@dominictarr
dominictarr / readme.md
Created November 26, 2018 22:39
statement on event-stream compromise

Hey everyone - this is not just a one off thing, there are likely to be many other modules in your dependency trees that are now a burden to their authors. I didn't create this code for altruistic motivations, I created it for fun. I was learning, and learning is fun. I gave it away because it was easy to do so, and because sharing helps learning too. I think most of the small modules on npm were created for reasons like this. However, that was a long time ago. I've since moved on from this module and moved on from that thing too and in the process of moving on from that as well. I've written way better modules than this, the internet just hasn't fully caught up.

@broros

otherwise why would he hand over a popular package to a stranger?

If it's not fun anymore, you get literally nothing from maintaining a popular package.

One time, I was working as a dishwasher in a restu