Researched by Robert Quattlebaum darco@deepdarc.com.
Last updated 2020-02-03.
IMPORTANT NOTE: The information in this document does NOT enable anyone to clone official Tesla Key Cards or otherwise unlock or start a vehicle that they didn't already have the ability to unlock or start.
This document describes the current understanding of the Tesla Key Card Protocol, as used on the Tesla Model 3. This protocol was determined from observing the pairing and authentication interactions between the Tesla Key Card (TKC) and the vehicle, as well as probing the TKC with various commands to see what would happen.
The basic working subset of commands necessary to pair and authenticate are well understood and documented here. There are several other commands that we know are present, but they are not yet well understood.
The NFC protocol for the Tesla Model 3 Key Fob (TM3KF) and Tesla smartphone app (TPK) is also covered. In general, any reference to a TKC also applies to the TM3KF and TPK unless an explicit exception is noted.
The information presented here was used to implement GaussKeyCard, an open-source Java Card applet that allows you to use a supported Java Card to unlock and start vehicles in the same way that you would with an official Tesla Key Card.
ATS: Answer To Select. This is a short string of bytes that describe to the reader how to communicate with the card.
APDU: Application Protocol Data Unit, name for commands sent to a smart card.
ECDH: Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman, a key-agreement protocol.
FSCI: The part of the ATS that describes the maximum supported frame size. Tesla vehicles require an FSCI value of at least 6 (96 bytes).
TPK: Tesla Phone Key (NFC, only available on Android)
TKC: Tesla Key Card
TM3KF: Tesla Model 3 Key Fob
Token: A secure device used for authentication that is resistant to cloning.
UID: Unique Identifier
When it comes to access control, there are two related but distinct concepts: identification and authentication.
Identification simply means knowing who/what you are interacting with. With NFC, the 7-byte unique identifier is often used for identification purposes since it is defined to be unique. Sometimes even the older 4-byte UID is used for this purpose.
But this identifier is easily spoofed with easy-to-obtain and inexpensive hardware. The UID alone offers no cryptographic assurances that it the authentic, original token.
Authentication is an additional step where you cryptographically verify the identity of the token in a way that only the original token could satisfy.
TKCs use 256-bit Elliptic-Curve Cryptography to authenticate to the
vehicle. The specific elliptic curve being used is the NIST P-256
curve, otherwise known as secp256r1.
The specific algorithm being used to authenticate the card is a simple challenge-response using a shared key derived using Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH).
When pairing a TKC to a car, the vehicle asks the card for its public key and then performs a test authentication.
While the TKC protocol does support an attestation certificate, it does not appear to currently be used. Note that the TPK does NOT have an attestation certificate.
Each Tesla Key Card has a NFC UID, which in recent vehicle firmware
versions is ignored. Testing has confirmed
that two TKCs with the same ECDH key but different NFC UIDs will
appear to the vehicle as two separate cards. However, testing has also
confirmed that two cards with different ECDH keys but the same UID
will also appear as two separate cards. Thus, it would appear that
the vehicle identifies each card by both its UID and ECDH key.
Note that the vehicle does not fetch the ECDH public key from the card
when authenticating, so it must be comparing the response from the TKC
against the expected response from all paired TKCs with the same UID.
This is pretty strange, but there isn't a lot of room for alternative
explanations given the observed behavior.
UPDATE: Recent versions of the vehicle firmware now fetch the public key from the card before sending the challenge, and seem to use ONLY this information for identifying a credential. This means that it is now MUCH easier to make cloned card pairs. Note that cloning an existing card remains mostly impossible, but prior to this change it was very difficult for your average hacker to make two new key cards that would work as clones (becuase it is generally difficult to arbitrarilly change the UID of a javacard). That is now no longer the case.
The vehicle will apparently refuse to read 14443 Type-B cards. Only Type-A cards are compatible.
The vehicle will ignore the FSCI field of the ATS, which means that it will not attempt to break up larger frames if the indicated FSCI is small (<6). Specifically, the card MUST be able to properly handle receiving the authenticate command (86 bytes) in a single frame. If a card advertises an FSCI smaller than 6 then it is unlikely to be able to satisfy this requirement.
For example, smart cards with DESFire EV1 emulation support have an FSCI of 5, and will unfortunately choke if they receive a frame larger than 64 bytes. Such cards are not able to be used as Tesla Key Cards.
NOTE: In earlier versions of this document, this behavior was confused with the NFC UID length. It just happened to be the case that most of the 4-byte UID cards the author tested also had an FCI of 5. There is no limitation of the length of the UID on the card imposed by the vehicle.
The Tesla Key Card, as currently sold by Tesla, has the following potentially relevant properties:
- IEEE 14443 Type A
- UID: 7 bytes (except TPK, which may be
01020304or a randomly selected UID starting with the value08) - ATQA: 0x4800
- SAK: 0x20
- ATS:
057877910200- FSCI: 8 (256 bytes)
The secure element itself is a chip made by NXP (P60) running a Java Card OS of some sort. It is NOT a DESFire chip, it is a real secure element.
The vehicle will go through the authentication steps for TKCs it hasn't been paired with.
The primary interface that the vehicle uses to pair and authenticate
TKCs is the AID 7465736c614c6f676963, or teslaLogic. This is the
default selected application on official TKCs.
Note that, strictly speaking, this isn't a valid ISO 7816-5 AID, since
it is not registered
and it doesn't start with the nibble 0xf to indicate that it is a
proprietary and unregistered AID. This is likely why the vehicle
actually tries to use f465736c614c6f676963 first, which is the AID for
the TPK. In any case, the use of the AID 7465736c614c6f676963 is
sufficiently unique that it is unlikely to cause problems in practice.
The TPK AID f465736c614c6f676963 appears to be treated the same way as
its non-7816-5-compilant cousin.
The full teslaLogic AID on official TKCs is 7465736C614C6F67696330303201,
or teslaLogic002 followed by the byte 0x01. 002 is assumed to be the version.
On the TM3KF, the full AID is teslaLogic005 with no trailing bytes.
No FCI is returned when the application is selected on an official TKC or TM3KF. In some cases having an FCI present causes the car to reject the card. In other cases it seems to accept the card. Additional research is needed to figure out more details.
There is also a teslaStore applet (teslaStore002 for TKC, teslaStore003
for TM3KF). However, it does not appear to be selectable.
- Select
teslaLogicAID- Cards/Fobs:
00a404000a 7465736c614c6f676963 - Alternate:
00a404000a f465736c614c6f676963
- Cards/Fobs:
- Get Public ECDH Key (secp256r1)
8004000000
- Authentication Challenge (ECDH)
8011000051 [VEHICLE-PUBLIC-KEY] [16B-CHALLENGE]
- Get Form Factor
80140000
- Get Version Info
80170000
- Self Test?
80010000
The following proprietary (CLA=0x80) APDU instructions are used by the vehicle during authentication or pairing, or were discovered by probing:
| Field | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CLA | 0x80 | |
| INS | 0x04 | |
| P1 | 0x00-0x03 | Key Identifier |
| P2 | 0x00 | |
| Lc | — | |
| Data | — | |
| Le | 0x00 |
This command returns a public key for one of the keys in the TKC/TM3KF. The TPK currently only supports KeyID 0.
The KeyID is a number between 0 and 3. Only 0x00 appears
to be currently used by the vehicle.
No other arguments are currently known.
The observed format of the response (not including success code 9000) is:
| byte 1 | bytes 2-33 | bytes 34-65 |
|---|---|---|
| 0x04 | EC Point X | EC Point Y |
| Field | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CLA | 0x80 | |
| INS | 0x06 | |
| P1 | 0x00-0x04 | Certificate Identifier |
| P2 | 0x00 | |
| Lc | — | |
| Data | — | |
| Le | 0x000000 | Extended-lenth response |
This command returns one of (up to) five X.509 certificates,
one for each KeyID and one "root".
This command is not currently supported on the TPK. This command is not currently used by the vehicle during pairing or authentication.
On the Tesla Key Card, only two certificates are available via this command: 0x00 and 0x04. All five certificates are available on the Tesla Model 3 Key Fob. You can see examples of the certificates section at the end of this document.
Each certificate is larger than 256 bytes, so support for extended APDUs is required to get the entire certificate. Because support for chaining does not appear to be implemented and not all readers support extended APDUs, the full certificate may be impossible to extract on hardware that doesn't support extended APDUs.
The CertID is a value between 0 and 4. Values 0-3 presumably
refer to KeyIDs 0-3. Typically only KeyID 0 has a certificate.
| CertID | TKC (teslaLogic002) |
TM3KF (teslaLogic005) |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | KeyID 0 Cert | KeyID 0 Cert |
| 0x01 | Err 6F17 | KeyID 1 Cert |
| 0x02 | Err 6F17 | KeyID 2 Cert |
| 0x03 | Err 6F17 | Fob Issuing CA |
| 0x04 | root.tesla.com CA | Fob Command CA |
| ≥ 0x05 | Err 6B00 | Err |
On the TKC, CertID 4 is some sort of root certificate, but
doesn't appear to be the certificate that signed
KeyID 0. You can see it and an example of a non-root
certificate at the end of this document.
On the TKC, The first two bytes of the returned result represent the length of the certificate in bytes. There is no leading length word for the certificates on the TM3KF.
| Field | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CLA | 0x80 | |
| INS | 0x07 | |
| P1 | 0x00 | |
| P2 | 0x00 | |
| Lc | — | |
| Data | — | |
| Le | 0x00 |
Appears to return the version numbers for the teslaLogic and teslaStore, along
with an additional version to an unknown component.
This command is not currently supported on the TPK.
The versions are encoded as three 16-bit big-endian numbers. The first
corresponds with teslaLogic and the second corresponds with teslaStore. It
is unclear what the third corresponds with.
| Order | TKC | TM3KF |
|---|---|---|
| 1st | 0x0002 | 0x0005 |
| 2nd | 0x0002 | 0x0003 |
| 3nd | 0x0002 | 0x0003 |
| Field | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CLA | 0x80 | |
| INS | 0x11 | |
| P1 | 0x00-0x03 | Key Identifier |
| P2 | 0x00 | |
| Lc | 0x51 | 71 bytes in data field |
| Data | 0x04 ... | 65-byte NIST P.256 Vehicle Public Key |
| ... | 16-byte Challenge | |
| Le | 0x00 |
This is the command the vehicle uses to authenticate the TKC. The returned value is a 16-byte response.
The KeyID is a number between 0 and 3. Only 0x00 appears to be currently used by the vehicle. It is assumed that this field corresponds to the KeyID parameter from INS 0x04.
The 16-byte response is calculated as follows:
- Calculate the ECDH shared secret.
- Calculate the SHA-1 hash of the X parameter of the shared secret.
- Truncate the SHA-1 hash to the most significant 128 bits. The result is
KEY. - OPTIONAL: (TM3KF and TPK ONLY) The card writes over the first 4
bytes of the challenge with random values.
CHAL[0..3] = RANDDATA(4)
- Perform a single block encrypt operation on the provided 16-byte challenge.
RESP = AES_ENC(KEY,CHAL)
To verify the credential, the car does the following:
- Calculate the ECDH shared secret.
- Calculate the SHA-1 hash of the X parameter of the shared secret.
- Truncate the SHA-1 hash to the most significant 128 bits. The result is
KEY. - Send a random challenge to the credential.
CHAL[0..15] = RANDDATA(16)
- Decrypt the response (
RESP) when received.CHECK = AES__DEC(KEY,RESP)
- If the last 12 bytes of the challenge match the last 12 bytes of
the decrypted response, the credential is authentic.
ASSERT CHAL[4..15] == CHECK[4..15]
| Field | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CLA | 0x80 | |
| INS | 0x14 | |
| P1 | 0x00 | |
| P2 | 0x00 | |
| Lc | — | |
| Data | — | |
| Le | 0x00 |
This command returns a two-byte form factor identifier. This command is always used by the vehicle after the authentication challenge response.
The value doesn't appear to currently change the behavior of the vehicle UI.
| Description | Return Value |
|---|---|
| Tesla Key Card (TKC) | 0x0001 |
| Tesla Key Fob (TM3KF) | 0x0022 |
| Tesla Phone Key (TPK) | 0x0031 |
| Field | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CLA | 0x80 | |
| INS | 0x1B | |
| P1 | 0x00 | |
| P2 | 0x00 | |
| Lc | 0x15 | 4 byte header + 17 byte VIN |
| Data | 0x2a130a11 | ASN.1 Header |
| ... | 17-digit VIN (ASCII) | |
| Le | — | No response data expected |
This command is issued to the TPK after the normal pairing exchange. It is only issued at pairing. The exact purpose of this command is unknown, but the data sent from the vehicle is TLV-encoded (ASN.1?) and includes the 17-digit VIN:
2a130a11 + <ASCII-ENCODED-VIN>
[2a] {
[0a] <ASCII-ENCODED-VIN>
}
It seems that the TPK does not actually parse this data as ASN.1: it simply ignores the first 3 bytes and assumes the fourth byte is the VIN length and that the VIN starts at byte 5. That behavior may change, though.
Through probing, we know the teslaLogic AID also supports
the following APDU instructions, but we don't yet know what they do:
- INS 0x00 -> Error 0x6f05
- INS 0x01 -> Success? 0x9000 (Takes a long time to complete, possibly a self-test)
- INS 0x02 -> Error 0x6f12
- INS 0x03 -> Error 0x6f12
- INS 0x05 -> Error 0x6f16
- INS 0x08 -> Success? 0x9000
- INS 0x12 -> Success? 0x9000
- INS 0x13 -> Error 0x6f1b
- INS 0x15 -> Error 0x6f1d
- INS 0xA4 -> Success? 0x9000 (Tesla Phone Key Only)
None of the above commands (except INS 0xA4) are implemented on the TPK.
- Vehicle attempts to select AID
f465736c614c6f676963- TKC indicates no such AID.
- Vehicle attempts to select AID
7465736c614c6f676963, which succeeds.- TKC indicates success
- NEW: Vehicle requests the public key of the TKC using INS 4 APDU.
- TKC responds with its public key.
- Vehicle sends INS 0x11 APDU with vehicle public key and a random challenge.
- TKC verifies public key is on curve P-256
- TKC calculates and returns the response to the challenge
- Vehicle sends INS 0x14 APDU.
- TKC responds with the value 0x0001 and a successful response code.
- Vehicle repeatedly sends junk APDUs to determine when TKC is removed.
- Steps 1-5 of the authentication process are performed, presumably to ensure the presented card isn't one that is already known.
- Vehicle sends INS 0x11 APDU with vehicle public key and challenge of all zeros.
- TKC verifies public key is on curve P-256
- TKC calculates and returns the response to the challenge
- Vehicle repeatedly sends junk APDUs to determine when TKC is removed.
The Tesla Key Fob also has an NFC interface. It kinda seems to implement the same protocol, but there are some differences:
- INS 0x11 (Authenticate) doesn't seem to work the same way: the 16-byte response is different each time, due to it replacing the first four bytes of the challenge with random "salt". The documentation for INS 0x11 has been updated to reflect the changes.
- Three of the four ECDH keys has a certificate. The CN of each
of these certificates has a suffix indcating which KeyID they are
associated with:
- 0/- 1/- 2. - CertID3 seems to contain an intermediate CA: "Fob Issuing CA". It is independent of KeyID3, which seems to not have an associated certificate. The "Fob Issuing CA" is the issuing CA for CertID0, CertID1, and CertID2.
- CertID4 has a different intermediate CA: "Fob Command CA". It is unclear what this certificate is for.
- Both CertID3 and CertID4 are signed by a "Fob Root CA", which does not appear to be availble.
- The certificates don't appear to be prefixed with a length, so heuristics will be required to read certificates in an automated way.
- INS 0x07 returns
0005 0003 0003instead of0002 0002 0002like on the TKC. This makes it seem likely that this command returns version information (TM3KF:teslaLogic005/teslaStore003vs TKC:teslaLogic002/teslaStore002). - INS 0x14 (Get Form Factor) returns
0022instead of0001. - The
80ca2f00trick yields the following AIDs:A000000151000000-> Global Platform ISD5465736C61444150->TeslaDAP7465736C6153746F7265303033->teslaStore0037465736C614C6F676963303035->teslaLogic005
The pairing process, despite the additional BTLE pairing, is exactly the same.
The latest version of the Tesla App on Android provides a NFC key interface (Tesla Phone Key, or TPK), allowing you to use the phone just like a TKC. Pairing works the exact same way. The protocol implemented by the TPK is a limited subset of what is available on a TKC or TM3KF. Here are the differences:
- INS (Authenticate) 0x11 includes random card-generated salt, just like the TM3KF.
- Has only one ECDH key instead of four like the TKC and TM3KF.
- There are no certificates.
- The command INS 0x14 returns
0x0031instead of0x0001or0x0022. - It includes a new command, INS 0x1B, which the vehicle uses to tell the phone its VIN. This command seems to only be sent to the TPK and not the TKC or TM3KF, so it may be introspecting into the UID to gate the issuing of this command.
- You must be logged into a Tesla account on the phone in order to use the NFC TPK functionality, so you can't use this feature to give someone access to your car unless they have a Tesla account. It is unclear what happens if you try to pair a phone with a vehicle on a different account. Command INS 0x1B implies that the phone might take notice and behave differently.
- If you explicltly sign out of the app and then sign back in, the public key is preserved—so NFC key access to any vehicles that was lost when you signed out should be restored when you sign back in. It is unclear if this is true if you sign in with a different account, but seems likely. In other words, signing out doesn't wipe the NFC credential.
- The vehicle was able to determine the name of the phone for its internal UI after pairing. This seems to imply either an in-band interaction that I missed or an out-of-band (BLE?) interaction. The vehicle seems to remember this sort of metadata even for deleted cards.
Tesla Key Cards/Fobs have X.509 certificates which can be retrieved via INS 0x06. Below are real examples of the certificates that were extracted from a TKC and a TM3KF:
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 72515 (0x11b43)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: CN=Key Card CA, O=Selp
Validity
Not Before: Oct 11 16:48:35 2017 GMT
Not After : Oct 11 16:48:35 2117 GMT
Subject: CN=7179009621072316, OU=KEY CARD, O=Selp
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:68:0e:ad:81:7c:38:77:b7:ec:be:1e:0b:52:fb:
8c:93:17:92:37:7e:e9:57:57:c4:f8:6a:e7:55:ae:
cb:d6:28:66:9a:4a:2a:ac:97:7e:e2:29:e8:62:c3:
a3:c5:1b:3f:ec:18:90:3f:7b:e0:47:00:be:0c:e0:
6d:ae:aa:08:e4
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
05:FE:FD:EB:27:A6:2C:C3:70:C4:08:9C:5F:31:1F:B1:43:D7:4D:55
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:30:A1:05:FA:1D:23:E2:80:F3:73:4F:7A:E6:E1:7C:37:5D:01:F9:B2
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Client Authentication
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:45:02:20:15:74:40:b6:d4:05:92:d1:53:33:96:d4:cd:5e:
97:a4:0f:00:4c:52:8e:a0:93:3a:a3:ed:50:fd:88:9f:8e:38:
02:21:00:dd:87:44:45:94:36:53:fe:b9:ae:84:aa:eb:94:22:
70:d9:a6:97:fc:69:53:91:86:9e:4f:3a:6e:8f:61:1f:21
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Observations:
- Certificate serial number appears sequential. The other card in the same two-card pack had a certificate serial number of 72513.
- Tesla is not mentioned anywhere in the subject or issuer. Instead, the organization is listed as "Selp"; which likely referrs to the French smart-card/identity solution company Selp.
- The CN of the subject is a 16-digit decimal number. Unlike the certificate serial number, this number appears to be randomly assigned.
- The certificate expires a hundred years after its issue date, which isn't necessarilly bad, but there is a way to indicate that a certificate should not have an enforcable expiration date, and using an expiration date of "today + 100years" isn't it. But really I'm just splitting hairs here.
- The key usage parameters are quite broad. It isn't clear how the current implementation of a TKC could actually perform any of them. I assume these fields are simply a misconfiguration.
- The CA that signed this certificate (Issuer
CN=Key Card CA, O=Selp) is not the root certificate that is present on the card (see below). Because we don't have a copy of the theCN=Key Card CA, O=Selpcertificate, we have no way to determine if the certificate is actually valid, which seems unfortunate.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 2 (0x2)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: CN=root.tesla.com
Validity
Not Before: Jan 9 15:37:10 2017 GMT
Not After : Jan 9 15:37:10 2018 GMT
Subject: CN=root.tesla.com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:ba:05:a4:c5:58:5d:5f:f8:52:0f:1c:3b:c8:b3:
02:48:04:56:7c:b0:d2:fe:a3:0d:23:62:51:5e:6a:
ad:51:86:3c:3c:b6:24:49:3e:c6:f6:b9:e2:00:43:
11:83:eb:bd:64:bb:95:f3:82:f5:14:b7:ff:3b:d7:
e5:20:5c:7f:60
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:TRUE
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:46:02:21:00:9c:b1:0d:dd:a8:30:b8:7e:ca:aa:d1:39:e3:
98:76:6c:6e:23:44:78:23:35:be:bb:76:d8:26:7b:d8:1a:05:
26:02:21:00:8d:6e:00:05:fc:4e:46:3b:80:43:9c:fb:f5:c2:
18:3c:58:ce:e3:86:7d:89:69:a7:71:62:4b:5a:99:cb:1f:53
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBMTCB16ADAgECAgECMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMTDnJvb3QudGVz
bGEuY29tMB4XDTE3MDEwOTE1MzcxMFoXDTE4MDEwOTE1MzcxMFowGTEXMBUGA1UE
AxMOcm9vdC50ZXNsYS5jb20wWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAS6BaTF
WF1f+FIPHDvIswJIBFZ8sNL+ow0jYlFeaq1Rhjw8tiRJPsb2ueIAQxGD671ku5Xz
gvUUt/871+UgXH9goxAwDjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0kAMEYC
IQCcsQ3dqDC4fsqq0TnjmHZsbiNEeCM1vrt22CZ72BoFJgIhAI1uAAX8TkY7gEOc
+/XCGDxYzuOGfYlpp3FiS1qZyx9T
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Observations:
- This is not the root certificate that signed the card certificate.
- This certificate has expired.
- Missing "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier" field, which seems unfortunate.
- Feels bogus, like this was a test certificate that someone forgot
to replace with the real root certificate. Not sure what the story
is here. Maybe this is the legit root, and
CN=Key Card CA, O=Selpis just an intermediate CA?
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 1 (0x0)
Serial Number: 81646 (0x13eee)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=US, O=Tesla, CN=Fob Issuing CA 001
Validity
Not Before: Sep 28 02:59:05 2019 GMT
Not After : Sep 25 02:59:05 2029 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=California, O=Tesla, OU=Model3 Fobs, CN=JBL19268KBH53F - 0
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:01:6d:fd:d2:de:7f:1f:96:91:f6:15:19:16:62:
1b:be:98:a2:a7:40:66:fc:71:91:9d:99:68:b6:03:
51:a5:68:ba:5f:13:9e:30:3d:e3:ff:bb:c4:10:1e:
dd:9d:bf:3a:47:cd:33:fc:47:1f:04:6b:ac:20:db:
f1:3e:54:11:58
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:45:02:21:00:97:f7:ea:b4:6d:9d:f4:09:1d:35:b1:25:32:
6d:53:0b:8b:c4:07:c9:7c:b4:23:7e:52:ff:db:0b:e3:dd:06:
5c:02:20:4b:bc:6f:ac:20:12:12:19:59:66:c6:dc:a8:3b:ad:
f7:1a:02:ec:db:74:e1:b1:e4:6c:47:9f:be:a7:15:bb:41
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Observations:
- Subject and issuer clearly indicate Tesla, not Selp.
- Subject and issuer have fields reversed compared to card certificates.
- Missing both "Subject Key Identifier" and "Authority Key Idenifier".
- Fob is clearly indicated as being intended for Model 3.
- Expiration date is only 10 years in the future.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 4096 (0x1000)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=US, ST=California, O=Tesla, OU=Tesla Motors, CN=Fob Root CA
Validity
Not Before: Jul 13 01:26:07 2018 GMT
Not After : Jan 24 01:26:07 2039 GMT
Subject: C=US, O=Tesla, CN=Fob Issuing CA 001
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:26:ed:2b:8c:57:89:71:03:58:94:fe:6a:70:84:
99:a5:e6:29:47:a3:8e:7b:e2:8b:18:d3:63:27:9e:
39:6f:d6:3a:f5:b1:b3:42:af:df:97:07:42:99:29:
3c:8a:39:8a:8e:14:f1:44:79:91:74:8e:95:ad:20:
71:67:07:59:f7
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
8B:BC:81:95:D0:5F:9F:5C:EF:C0:61:ED:A1:DB:A1:49:86:0B:E6:72
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:FB:27:C7:61:4A:3B:19:CC:47:EE:D4:95:80:99:28:8A:2E:E8:58:8E
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:81:87:02:42:01:ee:21:17:06:81:25:b8:20:e5:3f:4e:4b:
a7:29:be:54:d1:c8:6e:aa:75:1a:7d:18:67:f5:9a:6b:ef:9d:
db:73:2f:00:d5:da:a2:93:6b:fb:1d:ae:c0:d5:1a:5c:11:5f:
ef:ac:4d:40:85:a4:35:65:47:ce:8e:72:8b:f3:29:90:ab:02:
41:6d:79:cc:21:27:6a:8c:4c:18:ed:b0:ae:71:6b:eb:60:ce:
5e:1e:4b:85:25:72:e4:1f:de:65:83:bf:38:de:62:72:9b:1d:
e7:5f:94:da:da:ec:20:34:e2:b1:f2:09:cc:14:ba:aa:0b:ca:
ae:7e:7d:b8:d3:0d:11:03:e8:6c:7e:00
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIICMzCCAZWgAwIBAgICEAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwXzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzAR
BgNVBAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExDjAMBgNVBAoMBVRlc2xhMRUwEwYDVQQLDAxUZXNs
YSBNb3RvcnMxFDASBgNVBAMMC0ZvYiBSb290IENBMB4XDTE4MDcxMzAxMjYwN1oX
DTM5MDEyNDAxMjYwN1owOjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxDjAMBgNVBAoMBVRlc2xhMRsw
GQYDVQQDDBJGb2IgSXNzdWluZyBDQSAwMDEwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMB
BwNCAAQm7SuMV4lxA1iU/mpwhJml5ilHo4574osY02Mnnjlv1jr1sbNCr9+XB0KZ
KTyKOYqOFPFEeZF0jpWtIHFnB1n3o2YwZDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUi7yBldBfn1zvwGHt
oduhSYYL5nIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU+yfHYUo7GcxH7tSVgJkoii7oWI4wEgYDVR0T
AQH/BAgwBgEB/wIBADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAYYwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDgYsAMIGH
AkIB7iEXBoEluCDlP05Lpym+VNHIbqp1Gn0YZ/Waa++d23MvANXaopNr+x2uwNUa
XBFf76xNQIWkNWVHzo5yi/MpkKsCQW15zCEnaoxMGO2wrnFr62DOXh5LhSVy5B/e
ZYO/ON5icpsd51+U2trsIDTisfIJzBS6qgvKrn59uNMNEQPobH4A
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 4098 (0x1002)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=US, ST=California, O=Tesla, OU=Tesla Motors, CN=Fob Root CA
Validity
Not Before: Sep 22 00:06:06 2018 GMT
Not After : Apr 5 00:06:06 2039 GMT
Subject: C=US, O=Tesla, CN=Fob Command CA
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (521 bit)
pub:
04:01:50:79:90:b9:2a:10:00:1b:c9:07:bd:f2:3c:
05:a2:47:d5:2c:ea:e7:3e:d4:ec:20:54:18:90:fd:
04:af:71:21:21:40:5b:0c:8e:46:19:3c:9b:63:89:
9e:25:25:39:fb:b6:65:8f:a3:3a:d8:75:f5:d8:10:
d3:17:04:ef:05:74:ce:01:f8:9a:8d:9e:c1:57:17:
b3:15:be:4d:ca:61:a6:15:49:71:8e:9a:67:2d:98:
03:f1:5e:ea:d3:b6:0a:3d:d2:c3:1a:4d:c8:41:b6:
3f:95:e5:61:93:ba:38:e4:99:3d:9b:7a:4f:d5:63:
2b:4c:e9:0b:3c:cd:f9:ec:ce:5b:7f:ca:e9
ASN1 OID: secp521r1
NIST CURVE: P-521
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
38:2C:EC:B4:E6:2C:B8:F6:6E:74:35:56:75:55:05:A0:B4:2E:92:F2
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:FB:27:C7:61:4A:3B:19:CC:47:EE:D4:95:80:99:28:8A:2E:E8:58:8E
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:81:88:02:42:01:fb:04:7c:ae:bd:f7:ea:0b:ee:d0:7b:45:
54:ab:f6:d7:9e:89:21:32:cf:7a:d5:f5:57:4f:b7:aa:91:b6:
f7:04:e6:99:ce:a2:5e:01:10:71:e8:a3:e4:07:dd:67:54:5f:
48:3f:90:62:73:c0:25:0c:a1:2a:d8:a0:b3:bf:ee:f4:c7:02:
42:01:f9:f2:c7:1c:90:a5:0f:9e:db:73:e2:1d:cb:f0:82:89:
4d:2e:6a:03:0e:09:bc:3a:c1:20:75:5b:e7:00:e8:1a:3f:13:
91:dc:d0:73:66:3b:9d:df:28:ff:47:a9:06:02:ab:e2:16:79:
82:4a:c5:1a:cc:e4:61:48:64:fb:56:3a:8c
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
u/rad_example, for pointing out thatO=Selplikely referrs to selp.fr.- Martin Paljack for both GlobalPlatformPro and ant-javacard, both of which I find indespensible.
- Jonathan Westhues, for creating the Proxmark3, along with everyone else maintaining the software for this indespensible tool.
- Tesla, for making such a great vehicle
OH HAI!
Wow! Looks like @RedYu got the goods on some of the extra commands!
I will have to give some of these a try. The descriptions are a little terse. I'm guessing INS
0x02,0x03, and0x05are locked out—or at least I would hope they would be. All I ended up getting back was errors when I tried a while back, although 0x02 likely needs a private key. I'm especially interested in if INS0x10works.Even with a description of the command, I have no idea what
0x00and0x01do.Can you provide any additional details?