1. | Moral Judgement express beliefs and are truth-apt (cognitivism) |
2. | There are no moral properties (non-realism) |
c. | All moral judgement fails to correspond to a certain reality and therefore false |
If we are adopting emotivism and moral non-cognitivism
- Why care about others moral feeling specifically? If we don't think we should care about how doing something makes someone unrelated angry, what makes us care for others moral judgement ?
- Frege-Geach problem
Moral realism is the beliefs that there are some moral properties in the world
If morality is objective then why is there so many different moral codes ?
Mackie not saying we can reject realism just because of this, this is just a weak challenge
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Possible reply:
Science have disputes too but that doesn't mean there is no objective science facts. e.g: Existence of strings and exotic matters
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Failure
However this analogy fails because we think that if we knew the same set of facts and resoned correctly then they would agree but moral claims seems to be not
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What will moral values be like if they existed ?
e.g: If I say there is a man that will have red skin today and green skin tomorrow. Then it is improbable(but possible) this person exist.
Mackie claims that moral values are utterly different than anything in the universe therefore it is highly improbable that it exists
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Independent from our beliefs
if vegan is right that eating meats are wrong then even if all people in the world believes that it is ok to eat meat doesn't mean they are right.
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Accessible
If we cannot access it then it is impossible for us to talk about it.
This is not the problem of how we can access it but our strange ability to access something independent from our beliefs
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Moral values gives reason for us to not do it/do it
This is not the same as motivational internalism. This reason are independent to the agent's psychological state.
Example: No matter how much you want to kill all Jews, there will be a reason for you to not do it.
How can moral values be accessible ? If morality is this strange than we need to have a special faculty to capture it.
(N]one of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer [to how we might access moral values]. (1977: 39)
Then Mackie thinks that if we need to use this special faculty then no philosophical dicussion can be made about the captured info (WHY ?)
Morality serves as a purpose. It can regulates relationships and controls people's behaviour
Mackie rejects cognitivism because it doesn't fit with our daily life. But it is also apparent that error theory doesn't appeal to common senses.
People usually say "It is true that killing is wrong". To say that everyone is usually wrong doesn't capture daily life at all.
If I have depression but I promised a friend to go to a party ? It seems that I don't have a moral reason to abide to this.
Then it is shown that moral reason is not completely independent but only have less depedents than other reason.
If you truly believes in Platonism, that forms of Good really exists. Then what can Mackie do about it ?
"It is utterly different from anything in the universe" "Duh I know." said Plato.
We can respond to the queerness questions by saying this uniqueness of morality is what makes moral values respectable, cherishable.
- Maybe error theory presuppose naturalism
Mackie thinks thats if moral realism is true then moral properties have to be mind independent. But think it is very strange. Then rejects realism.
But something real doesn't mean it is mind-indepedent. eg. color.
- How to distinguish real and not real (when they can both be mind-dependent)?
To argue against scepticism, Moore made a valid argument yet not very sound. To copy its form we can use it against error theory
- "Killing people is wrong" is true
- If error theory is correct, then "killing people is wrong" is not true.
Therefore:
- Error theory is not correct
This argument of course sounds begging the question, but if we wholeheartedly believes that the first premise is true then it remains a valid argument.