CaledoniaProject

//
// Ref = src
// https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf
//
// Credits:
//  Vyacheslav Rusakov @swwwolf
//  Tom Bonner @thomas_bonner
//

#include <Windows.h>

CaledoniaProject

function Get-PublicKey
{
    [OutputType([byte[]])]
    PARAM (
        [Uri]$Uri
    )

    if (-Not ($uri.Scheme -eq "https"))
    {
        Write-Error "You can only get keys for https addresses"

CaledoniaProject

admin account info" filetype:log
!Host=*.* intext:enc_UserPassword=* ext:pcf
"# -FrontPage-" ext:pwd inurl:(service | authors | administrators | users) "# -FrontPage-" inurl:service.pwd
"AutoCreate=TRUE password=*"
"http://*:*@www” domainname
"index of/" "ws_ftp.ini" "parent directory"
"liveice configuration file" ext:cfg -site:sourceforge.net
"parent directory" +proftpdpasswd
Duclassified" -site:duware.com "DUware All Rights reserved"
duclassmate" -site:duware.com

CaledoniaProject

Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicRedTeam.1.00]
@="AtomicRedTeam"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicRedTeam.1.00\CLSID]
@="{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicRedTeam]
@="AtomicRedTeam"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\AtomicRedTeam\CLSID]
@="{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}]

CaledoniaProject

PyExZ3 Example with HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver

TL;DR: Using symbolic execution to recover driver IOCTL codes that are computed at runtime.

The goal here is to find valid IOCTL codes for the HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver by analyzing the binary. The control flow varies between the binary and source due to compiler optimizations. This results in a situation where only a few IOCTL codes in the assembly are represented as a constant with the remaining being computed at runtime.

The code in hevd_ioctl.py is a approximation of the control flow of the compiled IrpDeviceIoCtlHandler function. The effects of the compiler optimization are more pronounced when comparing this code to the original C function. To comply with requirements of the PyExZ3 module, the target function is named after the script's filename, and the `ex

CaledoniaProject

#region Scriptblocks that will execute upon alert trigger
$LateralMovementDetected = {
    $Event = $EventArgs.NewEvent

    $EventTime = [DateTime]::FromFileTime($Event.TIME_CREATED)

    $MethodName = $Event.MethodName
    $Namespace = $Event.Namespace
    $Object = $Event.ObjectPath
    $User = $Event.User

CaledoniaProject

# This idea originated from this blog post on Invoke DSC Resources directly:
# https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/2015/02/27/invoking-powershell-dsc-resources-directly/

<#
$MOFContents = @'
instance of MSFT_ScriptResource as $MSFT_ScriptResource1ref
{
    ResourceID = "[Script]ScriptExample";
    GetScript = "\"$(Get-Date): I am being GET\"     | Out-File C:\\Windows\\Temp\\ScriptRun.txt -Append; return $True";
    TestScript = "\"$(Get-Date): I am being TESTED\" | Out-File C:\\Windows\\Temp\\ScriptRun.txt -Append; return $True";

CaledoniaProject

using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Windows.Forms;
using System.Configuration.Install;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
//KeyStroke Mouse Clicks Code
/* 
 * https://code.google.com/p/klog-sharp/
*/

CaledoniaProject

function Get-SecureBootPolicy {
<#
.SYNOPSIS

Parses a Secure Boot policy.

.DESCRIPTION

Get-SecureBootPolicy parses either the default, system Secure Boot policy or a policy passed as a byte array. The byte array must be a raw, unsigned policy.

CaledoniaProject

RDP Eavesdropping and Hijacking
*******************************
I spent some time this evening looking at ways to eavesdrop and hijack RDP sessions.  Here is a gist of (semi) interesting findings
that is not very new...

===========
Inspiration
===========
As you may already know...