Skeleton of the patch that is being applied to projects vulnerable to CVE-2007-4559. Based off of code from pip's unpacking.py.

patch.py

import os

def is_within_directory(directory, target):
    
    abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)
    abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)

    prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])
    
    return prefix == abs_directory

def safe_extract(tar, path=".", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):

    for member in tar.getmembers():
        member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)
        if not is_within_directory(path, member_path):
            raise Exception("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File")

    tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) 

@jowagner Erm, doesn't the os.path.commonprefix() strategy have exactly the same false negative, also in @Kasimir123's (and pip's) code above? Shouldn't it rather be os.path.commonpath()?

>>> from pathlib import Path
>>> import os.path
>>> p1 = Path("/a/b/c")
>>> p2 = Path("/a/b/c2")
>>> os.path.commonprefix([p1, p2])
'/a/b/c'
>>> os.path.commonprefix([p1, p2]) == str(p1)
True
>>> os.path.commonpath([p1, p2])
'/a/b'
>>> p2.is_relative_to(p1)
False

See also PEP 706 for recent progress on this.

Here's an updated safe extraction implementation I'm now using for my projects:
https://gist.github.com/mara004/6fe0ac15d0cf303bed0aea2f22d8531f

---

And FWIW, some threads confirming my suspicion that os.path.commonprefix() is invalid in the Trellix patch:
https://stackoverflow.com/a/43613742/15547292
http://grokbase.com/t/python/python-ideas/153nyg6qt1/os-path-commonprefix-yes-that-old-chestnut