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Sc00bz/cpace.txt

Created Jan 21, 2020
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CPace is a balanced PAKE
CPace
CPace is the best balanced PAKE that I know of.
Costs per step
A: - fH**[ii]
B: H*i f*i
-: Negligible work
*: Scalar point multiply
H: Hash to point which is Elligator or SWU (depending on implementation this may
require a field invert if scalar point multiply needs affine points)
i: Field invert
f: From bytes (field square root or free for Montgomery curves)
[ii...]: Field inverts that can be combined. Cost is 1 field invert and 3*(n-1)
field multiplications.
Properties
Forward secrecy: Yes
Not fragile: Yes
Quantum annoying: Yes
Both have:
hashToPoint() is Elligator or SWU
User A has:
idA = User A's identity
User B has:
idB = User B's identity
A: x = random()
A->B: idA, x
B: y = random()
B: salt = H(x, y)
B: b = random()
B: B = b * hashToPoint(pwKdf(pw, salt, idA, idB))
A<-B: idB, y, B
A: salt = H(x, y)
A: a = random()
A: A = a * hashToPoint(pwKdf(pw, salt, idA, idB))
A: K_a = H(salt, a * B)
A: verifierA = H(K_a, verifyAModifier)
A->B: A, verifierA[, encryptedDataA]
B: K_b = H(salt, b * A)
B: Checks verifierA == H(K_b, verifyAModifier)
B: verifierB = H(K_b, verifyBModifier)
A<-B: verifierB[, encryptedDataB]
A: Checks verifierB == H(K_a, verifyBModifier)
On success K_a == K_b, thus derived verifiers and encryption keys are the same.
When receiving a point, you must check it is valid and not a low order point.
When using random() to generate a scalar, you should generate a larger value and
modulo by one less than the order then add 1 or generate a value [1, order) with
rejection sampling. This makes sure it is uniformly distributed and not zero.
Similar should be done for H() when generating fields to avoid bad values. For
generating a scalar for X25519 you could just use X25519's clamping.
Note "pwKdf()" does not need to be a password KDF as nothing is stored or
encrypted with said key. Thus there are no offline password cracking attacks.
Unless you have a quantum computer. Since CPace is quantum annoying, one would
need to solve a DLP per password guess, and the cost of the password KDF will
likely be negligible in comparison. One benefit to using a password KDF is it
will make timing attacks harder, but why not add password KDFs to all crypto?
Exactly.
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