YanTheFawn/gist:e5ad6a233c64e10865609fcfc05d4fca

## gistfile1.txt
 rough draft idea for a crypto weapon that uses game theory to overthrow Putin.

Assuming Putin doesn’t want to negotiate - the next least catastrophic solution to ending the war would arguably be an internal majority uprising. Why this isn’t already happening could be modeled in the following game theory game:

Take a game of 101 participants that models an autocracy. Let’s say these are the rules:
* You have two actor types: 1) a king 2) the subjects
* The game goes in rounds - first the subjects act, then the king acts.
* The subjects are allowed to object, but cannot coordinate in advance. If 50 or more of the subjects object the king “loses”, and the subjects “win”, and the game is over.
* The subjects have to write their choice on a private card, and then show their cards all at once. The collective utility points gained from the objecting subjects is (n^2), where n is the number of objecting subjects. Each individual experience the collective utility points. So if 50 subjects object, they all experience (50^2) or 2500 utility points.
* If the king is not defeated, he, on his turn, gets the power to respond with -2500 points of damage towards each objecting actor.
* If an individual subject doesn’t object on their turn, they take a only hit of -50 points, representing a shitty life under tyranny, but not a life in jail or death.

When there are no assurances of how the other subjects will act (say on average, a given subject feels 90% confidence that they won’t get 50 objectors needed), then the expected value of objecting is .90 * -2,500 = - 2,250 utility points.In this scenario, the rational strategy is to not object, since by not objecting, they can confidently only take a -50 point hit.
But in crypto, there is now an easier way to coordinate in advance amongst strangers thanks to the existence of a public blockchain database, and programmatic law-creating through smart contract technology. What if you could have the subjects put up a bond (i.e. lock up a certain amount of ether as collateral) with a commitment to object. If, on the subjects’ turn, they don’t object, the bond is forfeited to those who did object. This both incentivizes all subjects to object by creating reliable assurances, and decreases the disutility that comes with objecting. Tweaking the parameter of the amount of the bond high enough could potentially change incentives such that it turns the tables against the king. You could even globally crowd-fund the bonds to build objection incentives.

crypto is still too young to actually implement this solution today, because it’s missing pieces such as zero-knowledge identity infrastructure (knowing you are coordinating with a fellow Russian subject without them revealing their identity to protect them from being killed by the government in advance), and decentralized arbitration (verifying in a decentralized way that the subjects did in fact show up and protest). But I think that there is real potential here.

^ as for decentralized arbitration, there is a such thing as weather prediction markets in crypto, where the reported weather outcomes (on which the bets are being placed) are decentralized data feeds from several different weather api's.
	rough draft idea for a crypto weapon that uses game theory to overthrow Putin.

	Assuming Putin doesn’t want to negotiate - the next least catastrophic solution to ending the war would arguably be an internal majority uprising. Why this isn’t already happening could be modeled in the following game theory game:

	Take a game of 101 participants that models an autocracy. Let’s say these are the rules:
	* You have two actor types: 1) a king 2) the subjects
	* The game goes in rounds - first the subjects act, then the king acts.
	* The subjects are allowed to object, but cannot coordinate in advance. If 50 or more of the subjects object the king “loses”, and the subjects “win”, and the game is over.
	* The subjects have to write their choice on a private card, and then show their cards all at once. The collective utility points gained from the objecting subjects is (n^2), where n is the number of objecting subjects. Each individual experience the collective utility points. So if 50 subjects object, they all experience (50^2) or 2500 utility points.
	* If the king is not defeated, he, on his turn, gets the power to respond with -2500 points of damage towards each objecting actor.
	* If an individual subject doesn’t object on their turn, they take a only hit of -50 points, representing a shitty life under tyranny, but not a life in jail or death.

	When there are no assurances of how the other subjects will act (say on average, a given subject feels 90% confidence that they won’t get 50 objectors needed), then the expected value of objecting is .90 * -2,500 = - 2,250 utility points.In this scenario, the rational strategy is to not object, since by not objecting, they can confidently only take a -50 point hit.
	But in crypto, there is now an easier way to coordinate in advance amongst strangers thanks to the existence of a public blockchain database, and programmatic law-creating through smart contract technology. What if you could have the subjects put up a bond (i.e. lock up a certain amount of ether as collateral) with a commitment to object. If, on the subjects’ turn, they don’t object, the bond is forfeited to those who did object. This both incentivizes all subjects to object by creating reliable assurances, and decreases the disutility that comes with objecting. Tweaking the parameter of the amount of the bond high enough could potentially change incentives such that it turns the tables against the king. You could even globally crowd-fund the bonds to build objection incentives.

	crypto is still too young to actually implement this solution today, because it’s missing pieces such as zero-knowledge identity infrastructure (knowing you are coordinating with a fellow Russian subject without them revealing their identity to protect them from being killed by the government in advance), and decentralized arbitration (verifying in a decentralized way that the subjects did in fact show up and protest). But I think that there is real potential here.

	^ as for decentralized arbitration, there is a such thing as weather prediction markets in crypto, where the reported weather outcomes (on which the bets are being placed) are decentralized data feeds from several different weather api's.