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<title type="text">AFPC Almanac Updates for France(12-Mar-2013 pm31 13:23:40)</title>
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<EmailContent>&lt;html&gt;&lt;body&gt;&lt;p&gt;The following changes have been made to &lt;a
href="http://afpc-almanac.dev2nsw.newsig.com/France"&gt;France&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span
style="background:yellow"&gt;Added and modified content is highlighted in yellow&lt;/span&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Overview&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;France houses a large Muslim minority, primarily of North African provenance. While many
immigrants are non-observant (in line with a general French tendency toward secularism and a de-emphasis of
religious affiliation), Islamist organizations actively promote a resurgence of a politicized and ideological
Muslim identity. Target groups include youth, especially in the ethnic ghettos of cities where immigrant
populations are concentrated. There is considerable tension within the Muslim leadership between advocates of
secular French identity and proponents of the Islamist goal of a communitarian cultural separatism. In addition,
the transparent migration patterns and historical French colonial ties to North Africa contribute to a
spill-over of Islamist terrorist activity from Algeria into France. Jihadist activists with links to al-Qaeda
move between Algeria and France, as well as other European countries. French Islamism, in turn, has become part
of global jihadist networks.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#13;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Adding text here so it can be seen&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Islamic Activity&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Union des organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF)&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br&gt;Founded in 1983 as a
small circle of foreign student activists with Islamist leanings, the Union of Islamic Organizations in France
has grown into an umbrella organization claiming to represent between one to two hundred Muslim groupings in
France. It plays a role in coordinating activities among its member associations, and is the owner of some
mosques in the major cities of France.&lt;sup&gt;1 &lt;/sup&gt;The UOIF is the French member of the London-based
Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, active in promoting the study of Islam through its European
Institute for the Human Sciences, dedicated to Islamic theology and related studies, with two campuses in
France.&lt;sup&gt;2 &lt;/sup&gt;The UOIF has also established several specialized organizations, including the
Young Muslims of France (JMF), the Muslim Students of France (EMF), and the French League of the Muslim Woman
(LFFM).&lt;sup&gt;3 &lt;/sup&gt;These organizations contribute to the dissemination of Islamist positions and
the construction of separatist communitarian identity politics. While the UOIF presents itself simply as an
advocate of Muslim interests, critics point out that it engages in a "double discourse," paying lip service in
public to the priority of tolerance for secular French values, while at the same time promoting Islamist content
(replete with intolerance, misogyny, homophobia and anti-Semitism) to its target populations.&lt;sup&gt;4 &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;While
the UOIF's explicit goals include the religious, cultural, educational, social and humanitarian needs of the
Muslim population of France, with priority given to facilitating religious practice, critics allege that it is
close to the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and pursues a goal of communitarian separatism.&lt;sup&gt;8
&lt;/sup&gt;This agenda involves two aspects: transforming France into a safe haven for radicals engaged in
militant Islamist politics in North Africa or elsewhere, especially in the Arab world, while also exercising
political identity pressure on the Muslims in France to conform to increasingly repressive interpretations of
Islam: a sort of "reactionary and paternalist populism."&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt; "The UOIF tries to rein in the
Muslims of France. Some associations affiliated with the movement claim the right to say who is a good Muslim
and who is, therefore, an apostate," observes Islam expert Fiametta Venner. "This is all the more alarming since
these people are not theologians-almost none of the directors of the UOIF pursued studies in this area-and they
have a very narrow vision of Islam. They are satisfied with instrumentalizing the religion to pursue a
reactionary political project of separatism."&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;br&gt;Front
Islamique Francais Armé &lt;/em&gt;(FIFA)&lt;br&gt;The Armed French Islamic Front is a violent organization that
claimed responsibility for the October 2004 bombing of the Indonesian embassy in Paris. In that incident, it
demanded the release of two members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a terrorist organization considered close
to al-Qaeda which has as its goal an Islamist transformation of Algeria.&lt;sup&gt;11 &lt;/sup&gt;The FIFA also
called for French support for the admission of Turkey into the European Union and a rollback of France's stance
on secularization.&lt;sup&gt;12 &lt;/sup&gt;In addition, it demanded the censorship of all anti-Muslim
publications, singling out in particular the novel &lt;em&gt;Platform &lt;/em&gt;by the French author Michel
Houllebecq, which addresses questions of immigration and global terrorism.&lt;sup&gt;13 &lt;/sup&gt;(In 2002
Houllebecq was brought to court for statements critical of Islam, but he was acquitted of the hate speech
charge.) There is no up-to-date information readily available on FIFA, however, and the organization appears to
be dormant and/or inactive.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;em&gt;Al-Qaeda au pays du Maghreb Islamique&lt;/em&gt; (AQIM)&lt;br&gt;Al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb is a terrorist group based primarily in Algeria. Over time, however, it has transformed
from an organization committed to a local Islamist insurgency into a wider network pursuing a program of global
&lt;em&gt;jihad&lt;/em&gt;. As a result, AQIM has begun to be recognized as a threat in Europe, especially (but
not exclusively) in France. As the State Department's 2008 &lt;em&gt;Country Reports on Terrorism &lt;/em&gt;noted,
"France remained a target for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which posed a considerable threat to
French interests, underscored in statements made by al-Qaeda (AQ) senior leadership or AQIM itself."&lt;sup&gt;14
&lt;/sup&gt;Similarly, Europol's &lt;em&gt;EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report&lt;/em&gt; for that year
asserts that "France, Italy, Spain and Portugal consider that the increasing activities of al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) aiming at international targets have an impact on the threat level in their member
states."&lt;sup&gt;15 &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Given the long history of French colonialism in Algeria,
the large North African population in France, and trans-Mediterranean cultural contacts, politics in Algeria
have often spilled over into France. Yet the recent emergence of AQIM as a threat in Europe derives from
important shifts in the character of Islamist radicalism in Algeria itself. In 1992, the Algerian military
government cancelled elections in which an Islamist coalition, the Islamic Salvation Front, was likely to come
to power. A violent civil war erupted, during which the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) became notorious for its
brutality against civilians in Algeria. However, the GIA also carried out attacks in France, most notoriously a
1995 bombing in Paris at the Saint-Michel underground station, causing eight deaths and wounding more than 100.&lt;sup&gt;16
&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Fearing that the GIA strategy was undermining the Islamist cause, a splinter
group known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was formed. The GSPC was similarly dedicated
to Islamist militancy, but embraced alternative tactics that would not endanger civilians. While this tactical
moderation led initially to a surge in popular support and a growth in the GSPC's membership (peaking at around
28,000 in the late 1990s), a successful counter-terrorism campaign by Algerian forces eroded the group's numbers
significantly.&lt;sup&gt;17 &lt;/sup&gt;However, in 2004, GSPC leader Abdelmalek Droukdal reached out to
al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia leader Abu Musaf al-Zarqawi, and the GSPC, with its Algeria focus, was reinvented as
AQIM. Just as Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia was compelled to relocate into marginal territories (in their case, the
mountainous tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan), so too did AQIM develop operational skills in desert
regions, especially Chad, as well as the Algerian hills outside of Algiers. Its aspirations grew from local
insurgency to a pan-Maghreb transformation and finally to global &lt;em&gt;jihadism&lt;/em&gt;, leading to a
series of attacks, kidnappings and murder, targeting Europeans in North Africa and international organizations,
including a UN site in Algiers.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;AQIM has also turned its sights on Europe. In September 2005,
Droukdal designated France as "our No. 1 enemy, the enemy of our religion and of our community."&lt;sup&gt;18
&lt;/sup&gt;While the threat has not yet resulted in major attacks in France on the scale of Madrid (2004) or
London (2005), this may be due to the success of French counterterrorism efforts; over the years since, a number
of Algerians and French-Algerians plotting terrorist attacks have been arrested in France.&lt;sup&gt;19 &lt;/sup&gt;AQIM,
meanwhile, remains active outside of Europe. In the words of EUROPOL, "In 2007, AQIM further adapted its tactics
and propaganda to the model of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Iraq. It committed several suicide attacks with high
numbers of causalities. AQIM demonstrated the threat it poses to Europe by specifically targeting European
citizens and international bodies in Algeria. In April 2007, AQIM claimed an attack, which … targeted the
Interpol office in Algiers."&lt;sup&gt;20 &lt;/sup&gt;While the preponderance of AQIM activity remains in North
Africa, its victims increasingly include Europeans, as well as North Africans, and there are strong indications
that it is trying to develop the capacity to carry out attacks in France and possibly other European countries
as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Islam &amp; Society&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The French tradition of secularism derives from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the revolution of
1789, and the firm establishment of the separation of religion and state through the conflicts between the
French state and the Catholic Church in the late nineteenth century. A core value of the French republic is &lt;em&gt;laicité&lt;/em&gt;,
meaning a commitment to the non-confessional character of public life. Historically, the French population was,
in terms of religious affiliation, extensively Catholic, with small Protestant and Jewish minorities. During the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the processes of secularization took root in earnest, contributing to a
widespread decline in the importance of religious affiliation as a feature of cultural modernity. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Since
1872, French law has prohibited any census of religious affiliation. According to one recent poll, 64 percent of
French citizens described themselves as Catholic in 2009 (in contrast to 81 percent in 1965). However only 4.5
percent of those same respondents reported attending Mass on a weekly basis.&lt;sup&gt;21 &lt;/sup&gt;In
contrast, the 2003 &lt;em&gt;CIA World Factbook&lt;/em&gt; counts 88 percent of the French as Catholic, 2
percent as Protestant, and 1 percent as Jewish. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Islam, barely present in France before 1945,
arrived along with a wave of immigrant labor, primarily from North Africa, and has become the second largest
religious affiliation in France. It now claims five to ten percent of the population, and is the religion of
two-thirds of all immigrants. According to an Interior Ministry report in the year 2000, there are approximately
four million Muslims in France, of which 1,550,000 have an Algerian background and 1,000,000 are Moroccan. The
report likewise estimates that 40,000 French citizens have become converts to Islam.&lt;sup&gt;22 &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Of
the French Muslim population, about a third describes itself as "observant." An extensive secularization of the
Muslim population is consistent with the decline of observant practices in other religious traditions. The rise
of a minority Islamism within the Muslim community can therefore be viewed in part as a reaction against the
modernization of lifestyles within immigrant communities. The mobilization of Islamist identity frequently
involves younger generations rebelling against the aspirations for integration harbored by older generations of
immigrants.&lt;sup&gt;23 &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Islamist recruitment in France has multiple dimensions.
Of the estimated 1,500 mosques or prayer halls in France, about 80 are considered to be at risk of
radicalization and 20 are under close government surveillance.&lt;sup&gt;24 &lt;/sup&gt;In some cases, the
mosque &lt;em&gt;imam&lt;/em&gt; provides the radical ideology, but in others &lt;em&gt;jihadist &lt;/em&gt;recruiters
may be active without the knowledge of the &lt;em&gt;imam&lt;/em&gt;. Significant recruitment, including
proselytization, likewise takes place in prisons; French prison populations are often more than 50 percent
Muslim, at times reaching 80 percent in certain areas.&lt;sup&gt;25 &lt;/sup&gt;Activists reach out both to
non-observant Muslim inmates, as well as to non-Muslims who are prospects for conversion. A third avenue of
recruitment involves contact with French &lt;em&gt;jihadis&lt;/em&gt;, i.e., veterans of the conflicts in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq, who have returned to France and who may form &lt;em&gt;ad hoc&lt;/em&gt;
groups to support or carry out terrorist attacks.&lt;sup&gt;26 &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The conflict
between modernizing pressure and Muslim identity underlies the controversy regarding the headscarf, or &lt;em&gt;hijab&lt;/em&gt;.
Islamist pressure to establish separatist communitarian identity focuses on symbols and practices to separate
Muslims from secular French society. In 2004, facing a growing Muslim population in public schools with
increasing numbers of women wearing the headscarf, the French government promulgated a law banning ostentatious
religious symbols in the schools, in the spirit of &lt;em&gt;laicité&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;sup&gt;27 &lt;/sup&gt;While
the law also pertains to Christian and Jewish symbols, the key issue was the Muslim headscarf or veil. The
controversy underscored the gap between French norms of secular modernity and the neo-traditionalism of Islamist
behavior. (It should be noted, as a point of comparison, that until recently headscarves were similarly banned
in Turkish universities, a legacy of the secularist foundations of the modern Turkish state.&lt;sup&gt;28 &lt;/sup&gt;)
A primary goal of Islamism involves the assertion of patriarchal norms and the resistance to the spread of equal
rights to Muslim women.&lt;sup&gt;29 &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Muslim immigrant populations are frequently
concentrated in the ethnic ghettos of the &lt;em&gt;banlieues&lt;/em&gt;, the working-class suburbs surrounding
French urban centers, where they remain marginalized, facing discrimination and weathering high unemployment
rates. This concentration of social problems has led repeatedly to outbreaks of mass violence. In 2005, in
response to the deaths of two teenagers in Clichy-sous-Bois, near Paris, local rioting erupted, spreading
rapidly across the country. A state of emergency was declared, resulting in three thousand arrests. Damage to
property totaled 200 million Euros.&lt;sup&gt;30 &lt;/sup&gt;Another series of riots broke out in 2009.&lt;sup&gt;31
&lt;/sup&gt;Such unrest has contributed to a profound social anxiety about &lt;em&gt;sécurité&lt;/em&gt;, a term
which has implications stretching from crime-in-the-streets to terrorism.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Youth in the
ghettos are viewed as susceptible to the radical ideologies purveyed by Islamist organizations. Particular
violence has erupted toward Jewish communities-the French Jewish community is the largest in Europe, and
includes significant numbers of immigrants from North Africa. However, some Muslim leaders (among them the&lt;em&gt;
imam&lt;/em&gt; of the Mosque of Drancy) have been vocal critics of anti-Semitic words and deeds, in turn facing
attacks themselves.&lt;sup&gt;32 &lt;/sup&gt;An especially grisly crime involved the kidnapping of Ilan Halimi,
the son of Moroccan Jewish immigrants, in Bagneux, a suburb south of Paris, by a group of Muslim delinquents
that dubbed itself the "gang of barbarians." The group held Halimi for ransom because he was Jewish, subjecting
him to torture before abandoning him outdoors in the winter; he succumbed to his wounds.&lt;sup&gt;33 &lt;/sup&gt;The
ensuing 2009 trial attracted widespread attention. While the perpetrators were not directly involved in
political Islamist ideological movements, they operated in a milieu in which Islamist predispositions, including
a cult of violence and anti-Semitism, were commonplace. However, within the larger Muslim population in
France-including the two-thirds which is not observant-such radicalism is rare. There are vocal criticisms of
Islamism articulated by Muslims who advocate the ideal of the modern, tolerant republic.&lt;sup&gt;34 &lt;/sup&gt;However,
the alienated fringe of the ghettoes provides fertile ground for the spread of Islamist beliefs and
organizations. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The circulation of Islamist ideas in parts of the Muslim community in France
results from multiple sources: the connection to foreign organs of global &lt;em&gt;jihadism &lt;/em&gt;(such as
AQIM), the domestic advocacy of proponents of Islamist identity (like UOIF) as well as certain aspects of the
larger context of French politics. In the wake of the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks, including the invasion
of Afghanistan and Iraq, then-President of France Jacques Chirac became a vocal opponent of U.S. foreign policy.
The resulting trans-Atlantic tension between France and the United States amplified some long-standing
differences, and contributed to a wave of anti-Americanism. Suspicion toward American culture and foreign policy
became widespread in the French public, and that milieu in turn contributed to the incubation of anti-modern and
anti-American Islamist sentiments in the Muslim subculture. For example, Thierry Meyssan's 2002 book &lt;em&gt;9/11-The
Big Lie&lt;/em&gt;-with its fringe allegation that the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington were the
result of a U.S. government conspiracy-became quite popular. Meyssan himself is hardly mainstream, and his
positions have been denounced in the country's centrist press, yet his volume won wide distribution-a telling
indicator of the anti-American currents in French culture. Islamist radicalization in France, therefore, can
represent simultaneously a rejection of French secular modernism and an imitation of some widely held French
animosities toward the U.S. The anti-Americanism of the Chirac presidency has subsided only comparatively
recently, with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in France in 2007 and Barack Obama in the U.S. in 2008.&lt;sup&gt;35
&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Islamisim &amp; Government&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A modern liberal democracy with a tradition of secularism dating back to the eighteenth century, France
is also a key ally of the United States, despite occasional foreign policy differences. French troops have
played an important role in the war in Afghanistan, while the French state opposes Islamist developments and is
actively engaged in resisting Islamism, both domestically and internationally.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Nonetheless,
some policies of the French state have contributed to the growth of Islamism in France-most notably the official
encouragement of Muslim immigration, especially from North Africa, into France. As noted earlier, Islamists
represent only a small minority within the French Muslim population; yet it is also the case that Islamism in
France is inseparable from the history of immigration and the associated policies that have failed to integrate
the immigrant communities into French society. Pro-immigration policies to attract low-wage labor without
effective integration have created the social problems of the &lt;em&gt;banlieues&lt;/em&gt;, where Islamism has
been able to fester.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Building on its history of colonialism, France, especially under Charles
de Gaulle, aspired to become the European gateway to the Arab world through a systematic courting of the
post-colonial regimes of North Africa. Public discourse in France, therefore, tended to be more pro-Arab than
elsewhere in the West. However the rise of an emphatically religious Islamism ran counter to French commitments
to &lt;em&gt;laicité&lt;/em&gt;, generating policy shifts under Sarkozy, in particular an open promotion of
French national identity. In October 2009, Eric Besson, the Minister of Immigration, called for public debate
over "the theme of what it is to be French, what are the values we share, what are the relations that make us
French and of which we should be proud." He insisted on a particular valorization of Frenchness: "We must
reaffirm the values of French national identity and the pride in being French."&lt;sup&gt;36 &lt;/sup&gt;This
effort by the state to mobilize a focus on nationality was intended as an effort to overcome immigrant (and
especially Islamist) separatism, and in the years since, this discussion has shifted increasingly toward
secularism. To question the role of religion in the public sphere in France is, above all, a vehicle to inquire
about the status of politicized Islam. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Yet the conflict between the republican secularism of
the state and the politicization of religion inherent in Islamism continues. In 2009, a new debate began over
prospective legislation to ban full-length cloaks, the &lt;em&gt;burqa &lt;/em&gt;and the &lt;em&gt;niqab &lt;/em&gt;(the
latter leaves the eyes uncovered). Taking the longer view, however, it is clear that there has been a profound
shift in France from the era of emphatic trans-Mediterranean cooperation to the current state promotion of
French national identity and integration over multicultural separatism. The traditional French value of
secularism serves as the basis for public criticism and legislative action against symbols of Islamist
allegiance.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;This cultural-ideological resistance to Islamism on the part of the state
accompanies a muscular set of policing and counterterrorism practices that distinguish the current French
response to Islamist violence. French counterterrorism has matured over the past three decades. During the
1980s, Middle Eastern terrorist organizations carried out repeated attacks in France, exposing the inadequacy of
French intelligence services. France gained the unenviable reputation as a terrorist haven, in part as a
corollary to its pro-Arab foreign policy. Nonetheless, counterterrorist capacities grew during the 1990s, and
French forces successfully interrupted plots to carry out attacks at the World Cup (1998), the Strasbourg
Cathedral (2000) and the American Embassy (2001).&lt;sup&gt;37 &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;In 1986,
legislation centralized the French counter-terrorism strategy by locating all judicial proceedings in the Trial
Court of Paris. This organizational strategy has allowed the development of specialized expertise relevant to
terrorism cases. Rather than leaving the sophisticated and security-sensitive cases in the hands of potentially
inexperienced provincial magistrates, the 1986 law mandates the priority of the Parisian venue to maximize the
utilization of specialist expertise. These judges, the &lt;em&gt;juges d'instruction&lt;/em&gt;, combine
judicial and police functions, insofar as they are charged with conducting inquiries, authorizing searches and
overseeing wiretaps and other related matters-all of which in the U.S. would be dependent on independent
judicial control. The &lt;em&gt;juges d'instruction&lt;/em&gt; regularly collaborate with the &lt;em&gt;Direction
de la Surveillance du Territoire&lt;/em&gt; (DST), the domestic security service that is part of the Ministry of
the Interior. This sort of cooperation between judicial and executive powers is less controversial within French
political culture than it would be in the U.S.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Nevertheless, French counterterrorism
practices have faced criticism on civil rights and human rights grounds. The promulgation of laws criminalizing
terrorist conspiracies (rather than simply terrorist attacks themselves) has elicited denunciations on the
grounds that it represents an ominous expansion of state power. However, this pursuit of conspiracies has been
defended as the only way to prevent catastrophic attacks, such as the successful disruption of the plans for
terrorist violence at the World Cup at the &lt;em&gt;Stade de France&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;sup&gt;38 &lt;/sup&gt;Still,
Amnesty International and other watchdogs continue to criticize France for its prosecution of conspiracy charges
as a "criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking."&lt;sup&gt;39 &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;For
civil rights activists, the situation was exacerbated by 2008 legislation that authorized preventive detention
in certain cases. After the completion of a sentence, an individual whom a judge deems to be dangerous may face
an extended sentence for renewable periods of one year. In addition, the police were granted the authority to
develop intelligence files on all individuals over the age of thirteen who are deemed to represent a threat to
public order. While criticisms of this counterterrorism regime continue, to date France has been successful in
thwarting domestic attacks; there has as yet been no return to the violence of the 1980s, when terrorists seemed
able to act in France with impunity and little fear of sanctions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Citations&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[1] Fiametta Venner, &lt;em&gt;OPA sur l'Islam de France: Les Ambitions de l'UOIF&lt;/em&gt; [OPA
within French Islam: the Ambitions of the UOIF] (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 2005).&lt;br&gt;[2] The online home of the
Institute is http://www.ieshdeparis.fr/. &lt;br&gt;[3] Venner, &lt;em&gt;OPA sur l'Islam de France, 133-153;
Michàle Vianàs, Silence, on Manipule: les Islamistes en Manoeuvre&lt;/em&gt; [Exploiting the Silence: Islamists
in Action] (Paris: Editions Hors Commerce, 2004), 58.&lt;br&gt;[4] Venner, &lt;em&gt;OPA sur l'Islam de France&lt;/em&gt;,
158.&lt;br&gt;[5] Representation in the CFCM depends on the size of mosque space controlled by an organization.
See Vianàs, &lt;em&gt;Silence, on Manipule&lt;/em&gt;, 18-19.&lt;br&gt;[6] Lorenzo Vidino, "The Muslim
Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe," &lt;em&gt;Middle East Quarterly&lt;/em&gt; 12, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 25-34.
&lt;br&gt;[7] Stéphanie Le Bars, "'Pour la Majorité des Musulmans, la Séperation du Religieux et du Politique
est Acquise'" [For the Majority of Muslims, the Seperation of Religion and Politics is Artificial], &lt;em&gt;Le
Monde&lt;/em&gt; (Paris), April 4, 2011,
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/chat/2011/04/04/l-islam-est-il-soluble-dans-la-laicite_1502963_3224.html#ens_id=1460876.
&lt;br&gt;[8] For the objectives of the UOIF, see its official website at
http://www.uoif-online.com/v3/spip.php?article20; On the radicalism of UOIF, see the interview with Fiametta
Venner, "La Face Cachée de l'UOIF et des Fràres Musulmans en France," [The Hidden Side of the UOIF and the
Muslim Brothers in France], &lt;em&gt;Le Post&lt;/em&gt;, March 12, 2009,
http://www.lepost.fr/article/2009/12/03/1822346_la-face-cachee-de-l-uoif-et-des-freres-musulmans-en-france.html;
on the influence of the Muslim Brothers, see Brigitte Maréchal, &lt;em&gt;The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots
and Discourse&lt;/em&gt; (Leiden: Brill, 2008).&lt;br&gt;[9] Xavier Raufer, ed., &lt;em&gt;Atlas de l'Islam
Radical&lt;/em&gt; [Atlas of Radical Islam] (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2007), 13.&lt;br&gt;[10] "La Face Cachée de
l'UOIF et des Fràres Musulmans en France."&lt;br&gt;[11] Lauren Vriens, "Armed Islamic Group (Algeria,
Islamists)," Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.,
http://www.cfr.org/algeria/armed-islamic-group-algeria-islamists/p9154. &lt;br&gt;[12] "Front Islamique Francais
Arme," Wikipedia.fr, n.d., http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Front_islamique_franÇais_armé. &lt;br&gt;[13] Raufer,
&lt;em&gt;Atlas de l'Islam Radical&lt;/em&gt;, 71.&lt;br&gt;[14] U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, &lt;em&gt;Country Reports on Terrorism 2008&lt;/em&gt; (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State, April 2009), 71, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf.&lt;br&gt;[15]
EUROPOL, &lt;em&gt;TE-SAT 2008: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report&lt;/em&gt; (Brussels: European Police
Office, 2008), 19,
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2008.pdf.&lt;br&gt;[16]
Raufer, &lt;em&gt;Atlas de l'Islam Radical&lt;/em&gt;, 55-58. &lt;br&gt;[17] Andrew Hansen and Lauren Vriens,
"Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)", Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.,
http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717.&lt;br&gt;[18] Souad Mekhennet et al.,
"Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from Al Qaeda," &lt;em&gt;New York Times&lt;/em&gt;, July 1, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01algeria.html?pagewanted=1&amp;_r=2&amp;sq=ragtag&amp;st=cse&amp;scp=1;
Raufer, &lt;em&gt;Atlas de l'Islam Radical&lt;/em&gt;, 73.&lt;br&gt;[19] EUROPOL, &lt;em&gt;TE-SAT 2008&lt;/em&gt;,
22.&lt;br&gt;[20] Ibid., 26.&lt;br&gt;[21] "The Collapse of the Church in France," Rorate Caeli blog, January
2011, http://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2010/01/collapse-of-church-in-france.html. &lt;br&gt;[22] &lt;em&gt;L'Islam
dans la République&lt;/em&gt; [Islam in the Republic] (Paris: Haut Conseil à l'intégration, 2000), 26.&lt;br&gt;[23]
Valérie Amiraux, "From Empire to Republic: the French Muslim Dilemma," in Anna Triandafyllidou, &lt;em&gt;Muslims
in 21st Century Europe: Structural and Cultural Perspectives&lt;/em&gt; (London: Routledge, 2010), 137-159.&lt;br&gt;[24]
Raufer, &lt;em&gt;Atlas de l'Islam Radical&lt;/em&gt;, 45.&lt;br&gt;[25] Ibid.&lt;br&gt;[26] Ibidem, 48-53.&lt;br&gt;[27]
Alain Houziaux, &lt;em&gt;Le Voile, que Cache-t-Il&lt;/em&gt;? [The Veil: What Does it Hide?] (Paris: Editions
ouvriàres, 2004).&lt;br&gt;[28] Ibid.&lt;br&gt;[29] Vianàs, &lt;em&gt;Silence, on Manipule&lt;/em&gt;, 51-73.&lt;br&gt;[30]
Centre d'Analyse Stratégique, &lt;em&gt;Enquêtes sur les Violences Urbaines: Comprendre les Émeutes de November
2005&lt;/em&gt; [Investigations into Urban Violence: Understanding the Riots of November 2005] (Paris: La
Documentation FranÇaise, 2006).&lt;br&gt;[31] Angelique Chrisalfis, "Three Nights of Riots in French Town After
21-Year-Old Dies in Police Custody," &lt;em&gt;Guardian&lt;/em&gt; (London), July 10, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/10/french-police-fight-rioting-youths. &lt;br&gt;[32] "L'Imam FranÇais
Agressé par les Fràres Musulmans et le Hamas!" [French Imam Attacked by the Muslim Brothers and Hamas!],
JSSnews.com, January 26, 2010,
http://jssnews.com/2010/01/26/limam-modere-agresse-par-mes-freres-musulmans-et-le-hamas-en-france/&lt;br&gt;[33]
Ruth Halimi and Emilie Fràche, &lt;em&gt;24 Jours: La Vérité sur la mort d'Ilan Halimi&lt;/em&gt; [Twenty-four
Days: The Truth Behind the Death of Ilan Halimi] (Paris: Seuil, 2009); Alexandre Lévy, &lt;em&gt;Le Gang des
Barbares: L'Affaire Ilan Halimi&lt;/em&gt; [Gang of Barbarians: The Ilan Halimi Affair] (Paris: Hachette, 2009).&lt;br&gt;[34]
Vianàs, &lt;em&gt;Silence, on&lt;/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;Manipule&lt;/em&gt;, 47.&lt;br&gt;[35] Russell A. Berman,
&lt;em&gt;Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem&lt;/em&gt; (Stanford: Hoover Press, 2008).&lt;br&gt;[36]
"Besson Relance le Débat sur l'Identité Nationale" [Besson Relaunches the Debate over National Identity],&lt;em&gt;
Le Monde&lt;/em&gt; (Paris), October 25, 2009.&lt;br&gt;[37] Jeremy Shapiro and Bénédicte Suzan, "The French
Experience of Counter-terrorism," &lt;em&gt;Survival&lt;/em&gt; 45, iss. 1 (Spring 2003), 68.&lt;br&gt;[38]
Ibid., 85-86.&lt;br&gt;[39] See, for example, Human Rights Watch, "In the Name of Prevention: Insufficient
Safeguards in National Security Removals," June 5, 2007,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/05/name-prevention-0; Human Rights Watch, &lt;em&gt;Preempting Justice:
Counterterrorism Laws and Procedures in France&lt;/em&gt; (New York: HRW, 2008),
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/01/preempting-justice; "France," in &lt;em&gt;Amnesty International Report
2009: State of the World's Human Rights&lt;/em&gt; (London: Amnesty International, 2010),
http://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/europe-central-asia/france.&lt;/p&gt;
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