Exported Items.rdf

<rdf:RDF
 xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
 xmlns:z="http://www.zotero.org/namespaces/export#"
 xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
 xmlns:bib="http://purl.org/net/biblio#"
 xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
 xmlns:link="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/link/"
 xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
 xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/">
    <bib:Article rdf:about="http://www.jstor.org/stable/4126771">
        <z:itemType>journalArticle</z:itemType>
        <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="urn:issn:0022-1090"/>
        <bib:authors>
            <rdf:Seq>
                <rdf:li>
                    <foaf:Person>
                        <foaf:surname>Gibson</foaf:surname>
                        <foaf:givenname>Michael S.</foaf:givenname>
                    </foaf:Person>
                </rdf:li>
            </rdf:Seq>
        </bib:authors>
        <link:link rdf:resource="#item_13317"/>
        <dc:title>Is corporate governance ineffective in emerging markets?</dc:title>
        <dcterms:abstract>I test whether corporate governance is ineffective in emerging markets by estimating the link between CEO turnover and firm performance for over 1,200 firms in eight emerging markets. I find two main results. First, CEOs of emerging market firms are more likely to lose their jobs when their firm's performance is poor, suggesting that corporate governance is not ineffective in emerging markets. Second, for the subset of firms with a large domestic shareholder, there is no link between CEO turnover and firm performance. For this subset of emerging market firms, corporate governance appears to be ineffective.</dcterms:abstract>
        <bib:pages>231-250</bib:pages>
        <dc:date>March 1, 2003</dc:date>
        <dc:identifier>
            <dcterms:URI>
               <rdf:value>http://www.jstor.org/stable/4126771</rdf:value>
            </dcterms:URI>
        </dc:identifier>
        <dcterms:dateSubmitted>2012-11-26 08:34:02</dcterms:dateSubmitted>
        <z:libraryCatalog>JSTOR</z:libraryCatalog>
        <dc:rights>Copyright © 2003 University of Washington School of Business Administration</dc:rights>
        <dc:description>ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: Mar., 2003 / Copyright © 2003 University of Washington School of Business Administration</dc:description>
    </bib:Article>
    <bib:Journal rdf:about="urn:issn:0022-1090">
        <dc:title>Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis</dc:title>
        <prism:volume>38</prism:volume>
        <prism:number>1</prism:number>
        <dc:identifier>DOI 10.2307/4126771</dc:identifier>
        <dc:identifier>ISSN 0022-1090</dc:identifier>
    </bib:Journal>
    <z:Attachment rdf:about="#item_13317">
        <z:itemType>attachment</z:itemType>
        <dc:title>Gibson - 2003 - Is Corporate Governance Ineffective in Emerging Markets.pdf</dc:title>
        <dcterms:dateSubmitted>2012-11-26 08:34:02</dcterms:dateSubmitted>
        <dc:identifier>
            <dcterms:URI>
                <rdf:value>http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.utdallas.edu/stable/pdfplus/4126771.pdf?acceptTC=true</rdf:value>
            </dcterms:URI>
        </dc:identifier>
        <link:type>application/pdf</link:type>
    </z:Attachment>
</rdf:RDF>