bshastry

Keybase proof

I hereby claim:

• I am bshastry on github.
• I am shastry (https://keybase.io/shastry) on keybase.
• I have a public key whose fingerprint is 724A D7B9 9CC5 E904 A184 B298 BCC7 B7AF 2A03 C0E7

To claim this, I am signing this object:

bshastry

INFO: found LLVMFuzzerCustomMutator (0x64f5d0). Disabling -len_control by default.
INFO: Running with entropic power schedule (0xFF, 100).
INFO: Seed: 1979826077
INFO: Loaded 1 modules   (404663 inline 8-bit counters): 404663 [0x2a9eb70, 0x2b01827), 
INFO: Loaded 1 PC tables (404663 PCs): 404663 [0x2b01828,0x312e398), 
./solc_mutator_ossfuzz: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
Running: crash-5e4272982726d507f4720ed8c158601c692d35a6
No library names found in the input.
Setting Name: language
Setting Value: yul

bshastry

==== Source: su0.yul ====
{
  let al0 := verbatim_1i_1o(hex"31", 8)
  function af0(ai0, ai1, ai2) -> ao0
  {
    let al1, al2, al3, al4, al5, al6, al7, al8, al9, al10, al11 := verbatim_10i_11o(hex"89", eq(verbatim_2i_1o(hex"10", ai1, 544), lt(192, 384)), af0(create2(196, 384, 193, 992), byte(832, 288), exp(256, 960)), call(gas(), 7, 247, 320, 24, 384, 135), byte(tload(320), delegatecall(gas(), 6, 320, 173, 192, 163)), mload(224), byte(mload(128), or(448, 832)), blobbasefee(), sload(160), shr(mload(128), eq(480, 128)), ai2)
    let al12 := verbatim_1i_1o(hex"40", gt(verbatim_0i_1o(hex"64ddeb13295d"), verbatim_0i_1o(hex"7641c62b293953bb6d76d01a758b807b442ced6cd35d82d9")))
    {
    }
    let al13 := af0(mload(256), create2(226, 352, 99, tload(288)), create(176, 320, 98))

bshastry

pragma experimental solidity;

type uint256 = __builtin("word");

instantiation uint256: + {
    function add(x, y) -> uint256 {
        let a = uint256.rep(x);
        let b = uint256.rep(y);
        assembly {
            a := add(a,b)

bshastry

contract C0 {
  fallback() external payable
  {
  }
  function f1() public virtual
  {
    if ((bytes8(bytes27(bytes10(0x3f0802b2966e365aa0e3))) != bytes8(0x1dcb7a3da18e91f4)))
    {
      return;
    }

bshastry

/usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86_64-linux-gnu/10/../../../../include/c++/10/bits/unique_ptr.h:85:2: runtime error: member call on address 0x00000b752de0 which does not point to an object of type 'solidity::frontend::Type'
0x00000b752de0: note: object has invalid vptr
 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  10 40 71 0b 00 00 00 00  30 30 66 30 30 66 66 30  66 66 66 30
              ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
              invalid vptr
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior /usr/bin/../lib/gcc/x86_64-linux-gnu/10/../../../../include/c++/10/bits/unique_ptr.h:85:2 in 
UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
==164551==ERROR: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000008 (pc 0x00000153d4c4 bp 0x7ffc7054d7f0 sp 0x7ffc7054d7c0 T164551)
==164551==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==164551==Hint: address points to the zero page.

bshastry

   Compiling fe-test-runner v0.26.0 (/home/bhargava/work/github/fe/crates/test-runner)
   Compiling libfuzzer-sys v0.4.7
error[E0432]: unresolved import `revm::primitives::B160`
 --> /home/bhargava/work/github/fe/crates/test-runner/src/lib.rs:5:81
  |
5 | use revm::primitives::{AccountInfo, Bytecode, Env, ExecutionResult, TransactTo, B160, U256};
  |                                                                                 ^^^^ no `B160` in the root

error[E0308]: mismatched types
   --> /home/bhargava/work/github/fe/crates/test-runner/src/lib.rs:116:38

bshastry

pragma solidity >=0.0;
pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
contract C {

	int224 sv_0;


	function test() public returns (uint) {
		return test_calldata_coding();
		

bshastry

The passage introduces the concept of Single Secret Leader Election (SSLE), where a group aims to randomly select one leader without revealing their identity. It presents three constructions of SSLE schemes with varying security and performance properties. The first construction utilizes indistinguishability obfuscation, the second relies on low-depth threshold fully homomorphic encryption (TFHE), and the third is based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and random shuffles.

The passage discusses the practical requirements and restrictions for SSLE schemes, the syntax and security properties of an SSLE scheme, and the algorithms and protocols involved in the leader election process. It also mentions the importance of security, fairness, and unpredictability in SSLE schemes.

One of the constructions presented is a TFHE-based SSLE scheme that uses a weak pseudorandom function (PRF), a threshold FHE scheme, and a random oracle. It explains the expansion of random bits into a vector, the leader sel

bshastry

{let x for{ }calldataload(0){ }{{ {{ {  { for {}calldataload(0){}
 {if callvalue() {break}
mstore(x,0x42)for{ }calldataload(0) { } { {x := 1
for {} calldataload(0) {}
{{{if callvalue(){{ {{
 x :=2 for{ } calldataload(0){}{
 if callvalue() { {{{ { {if callvalue(){x := 2{
{sstore(4, exp(0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe, 1))sstore(6,exp(not(0), 1))sstore(7,exp(0xffffafffffffffffffffffffffffffff, 2))sstore(8, exp(0xffffffffffffffff,2))sstore(9,exp(0xf,3)) sstore(13, exp(0xffffffffffffffff0000000000000000, 3))
 sstore(14, exp(2, 6)) sstore(15, exp(2, 255)) {
{