is_violence_gt_resistance.py 2015 [edit 2019: does this RAND data show that one party has strategic gain by hurting themselves?]

v_gt_r.py

#!/usr/bin/env python
"""
 http://www.rand.org/international/cmepp/costs-of-conflict/calculator.html
 (archive: https://cypherpoet.com/rand.org_costs-of-conflict/)
 Numbers based on defaults provided in rand.org scenarios. They intended
 to show what Israel or PA have to gain from peace, but did not notice how
 their data makes violence appear even closer.

 Addition 2019: for a more verbose description and interpretation of this
 data see the comment at end of file.

 Results:
                                   GAINS OR LOSSES
                               ISRAEL           PALESTINE    
rand.org scenarios          in $   GDP %      GDP %    in $   advantage

two_state_solution         22.8b   10.4% : :  97.0%    9.7b      936%
withdrawal_coordinated     -0.2b   -0.1% : :  15.0%    1.5b    16500%
withdrawal_uncoordinated   -4.0b   -1.8% : :  -1.0%   -0.1b       55%
resistance_nonviolent     -15.0b   -6.8% : : -24.0%   -2.4b     -352%
resistance_violent        -45.1b  -20.5% : : -91.0%   -9.1b     -444%
(base nominal GDP: Isr 220.0b, Pal 10.0b)

 This shows how rational the step from nonviolent to violent resistance 
 is because of all scenarios rand.org describe the step that provides the 
 least obstruction to change is the step between non-violent and violent. 
 Policy makers should be encouraged to increase the distance between the 
 two (violent, non-violent). If making violence more-costly isn't possible 
 (-91% to PA GDP is rather extreme already) then we may do better making 
 nonviolent resistance less-costly.
"""

#                                         Isr    Pal
gdpgainloss=(
        ('two_state_solution',          [ 22.8,  9.7]),
        ('withdrawal_coordinated',      [ -0.2,  1.5]),
        ('withdrawal_uncoordinated',    [ -4.0, -0.1]),
        ('resistance_nonviolent',       [-15.0, -2.4]),
        ('resistance_violent',          [-45.1, -9.1])
)

#      Isr Pal
gdp = [220,10] # Wikipedia
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Israel
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_Palestinian_territories
#gdp = [257.2,11.26] # World Bank 2012
# http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
#gdp = [439,13.9] # Rand.org 2024 projected GDP
# https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR740/RAND_RR740.pdf page 23

print "                                   GAINS OR LOSSES"
print "                               ISRAEL           PALESTINE    "
print "rand.org scenarios          in $   GDP %      GDP %    in $   advantage"
print ""
import math
for i in gdpgainloss:
        gdpmul_isr = i[1][0]/gdp[0]
        gdpmul_pal = i[1][1]/gdp[1]
        print "%-24s  %5sb  %5s%% : : %5s%%  %5sb"%(i[0], i[1][0], "%2.1f"%(gdpmul_isr*100), "%2.1f"%(gdpmul_pal*100), i[1][1]),
        advantage_pal =  gdpmul_pal / gdpmul_isr
        if gdpmul_pal >= gdpmul_isr:
                advantage_pal = math.copysign(advantage_pal, 1)
        else:
                advantage_pal = math.copysign(advantage_pal, gdpmul_isr)
        print "  %6s%%"%("%5.0f"%(advantage_pal*100))
print "(base nominal GDP: Isr %.1fb, Pal %.1fb)"%(gdp[0],gdp[1])

"""
 I originally wrote this in response to what I felt was Randian neivity 
 that ignored the stratigic impitus that can cause violence to be seen,
 among some, as a valid tool, while entirely discounting the value
 of non-violent protest as a form to prevent that violence. I will try 
 to clarify what I was thinking at the time.
 
 If the Isr and Pal entities are assumed to be playing "against" 
 eachother then the stratigic advantage or disadvantage should be 
 considered. The "advantage" column shows what Pal has to gain or lose 
 in *comparison* to what Isr has to gain or lose.
  
 The RAND message was that both parties gain the most, in real GDP, from
 a two state solution. The data does not dispute this. In that scenerio 
 Pal GDP increases 936% more from base GDP in comparison to Isr increase 
 from their own base GDP. But the data tells other stories too.
 
 In the scenerios of two state solution, withdrawal coordinated, and 
 withdrawal uncoordinated, Isr is stratigically disadvantaged. Does this 
 incentivise Isr to avoid persuing these scenerios?
 
 The original statement, that the step to violence provides the least 
 resistance with greatest possible stratigic advantage, has to do with
 the assumption that a scenerio where nothing happens cannot be held 
 infinitely. I think that the scenerio resistance_nonviolent is 
 currently in progress. If so then of all of the remaining scenerios, 
 violence provides the lowest barrier, and is one that extremests and
 militants could be convinced would provide an increased stratigic 
 advantage. Having lived through the 2nd Intifada I think this 
 reasoning has been realized before and worry it would again. 
 
 I fear that non-violent protest may be the only thing standing in the 
 way of violence. And I am worried that the step from non-violence
 to violence is so small. I think too many ignore that, for some,
 turning the stick into a weapon can seem more plausible then 
 obtaining the carrot on it. My belief is that to further reduce the
 strategic value of violence the distance between its advantage and
 that of non-violence should be increased. This would mean making 
 non-violence less-costly for Pal.
"""