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# Free Will Problem #
Under this heading I mean to separate off those issues of
[[Freedom]] that have to do with the *metaphysical* problem of free
will and determinism. As opposed to political or theological
freedom. This is also distinct from the problem of the compatibility
of free will and divine foreknowledge.
According to [[Peter van Inwagen]]'s proposal we should understand
the "problem of free will" as (I am glossing):
(1) It seems that free will and determinism are
incompatible.
(2) It seems that free will and indeterminism are
incompatible.
(3) If (1) and (2) are correct, then *free will* is
incoherent.
(4) Moral responsibility seems to necessitate free will.
(5) If (3) and (4) are correct, then no one is morally
responsible.
(6) People *are* morally responsible.
(7) Therefore, *at least one* of the "seems" in (1), (2), or (4)
is incorrect.
[@inwagen08 [page 327--328](sk://inwagen08#1)] similar analysis of
the problem in [@de-caro04].
## Topics ##
- [[Free Will Thesis]]
- [[Determinism]]
- [[Compatibilism]]
- [[Libertarianism]]
- [[Hard Determinism]]
- [[Soft Determinism]]
- [[PAP]]
- [[Aseity]]
- [[Mind Argument]]
## Philosophers ##
- [[Manuel Vargas]] Compatiblist
- [[Christopher Franklin]] Libertarian
- [[Robert Kane]] Libertarian (event causal)
- [[Peter van Inwagen]]
- [[Timothy O'Connor]]
- [[Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples]]
- [John Lemos][coe] Kane supporter
- [Randolph Clarke][fsu]
- [Laura Ekstrom][wm]
- [Jonathan Jacobs][slu]
- [Timothy O'Connor][indiana]
- [Derek Pereboom][derek] Hard Determinist
- Mario De Caro
[coe]: http://www.coe.edu/academics/philosophyreligion/philosophyreligion_faculty
[fsu]: http://philosophy.fsu.edu/content/view/full/35619
[slu]: http://www.slu.edu/department-of-philosophy/people/faculty-by-area-of-interest/jonathan-jacobs_
[wm]: http://www.wm.edu/as/philosophy/people/faculty/ekstrom_l.php
[indiana]: http://www.indiana.edu/~scotus/
[derek]: http://derk-pereboom.net/
## Connections ##
- [[Freedom]]: Whether we are free may depend on the truth
of the [[Free Will Thesis]].
- [[The Will]]: The problem is somewhat misnamed, because we
may have "free will" in the sense required even if there
is no "will" as a distinct aspect of our constitution.
- [[Responsibility]]: The primary reason to think we have
free will is that we are morally responsible for our
actions.
## References ##
#### van Inwagen ####
> Therefore, "free will," "incompatibilist free will,"
> "compatibilist free will" and "libertarian free will" are
> four names for one and the same thing. If this thing is a
> property, they are four names for the property *is on some
> occasions able to do otherwise*. If this thing is a power
> or ability, they are four names for the power or ability
> to do otherwise than one in fact does.
> [@inwagen08 [page 333](sk://inwagen08#7)]
[[PAP]]
[[Peter van Inwagen]]'s restatement of the problem:
> The following two theses are *prima facie* incompatible:
>
> (1) We are sometimes in the following position with respect
> to a contemplated future act: we simultaneously have
> both the following abilities: the ability to perform
> that act and the ability to refrain from performing that
> act.
> (2) The past and the laws of nature together determine, at
> every moment, a unique future.
> [@inwagen08 [page 337](sk://inwagen08#11)]
#### De Caro ####
Mario De Caro argues that the very concept of an agent and agency
implies a notion of freedom because being an agent involves acting
on the basis of reasons and this involves both self-determination
(an efficient cause is not a reason) and the ability to do otherwise
(the reason selects among alternatives). If there is no freedom then
there are no agents. If free will is a total mystery then the
mystery will propagate to all fields that rely on explanations in
terms of intentional action (history, psychology, sociology). [@de-
caro04 196--197]
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