# Free Will Problem # | |
Under this heading I mean to separate off those issues of | |
[[Freedom]] that have to do with the *metaphysical* problem of free | |
will and determinism. As opposed to political or theological | |
freedom. This is also distinct from the problem of the compatibility | |
of free will and divine foreknowledge. | |
According to [[Peter van Inwagen]]'s proposal we should understand | |
the "problem of free will" as (I am glossing): | |
(1) It seems that free will and determinism are | |
incompatible. | |
(2) It seems that free will and indeterminism are | |
incompatible. | |
(3) If (1) and (2) are correct, then *free will* is | |
incoherent. | |
(4) Moral responsibility seems to necessitate free will. | |
(5) If (3) and (4) are correct, then no one is morally | |
responsible. | |
(6) People *are* morally responsible. | |
(7) Therefore, *at least one* of the "seems" in (1), (2), or (4) | |
is incorrect. | |
[@inwagen08 [page 327--328](sk://inwagen08#1)] similar analysis of | |
the problem in [@de-caro04]. | |
## Topics ## | |
- [[Free Will Thesis]] | |
- [[Determinism]] | |
- [[Compatibilism]] | |
- [[Libertarianism]] | |
- [[Hard Determinism]] | |
- [[Soft Determinism]] | |
- [[PAP]] | |
- [[Aseity]] | |
- [[Mind Argument]] | |
## Philosophers ## | |
- [[Manuel Vargas]] Compatiblist | |
- [[Christopher Franklin]] Libertarian | |
- [[Robert Kane]] Libertarian (event causal) | |
- [[Peter van Inwagen]] | |
- [[Timothy O'Connor]] | |
- [[Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples]] | |
- [John Lemos][coe] Kane supporter | |
- [Randolph Clarke][fsu] | |
- [Laura Ekstrom][wm] | |
- [Jonathan Jacobs][slu] | |
- [Timothy O'Connor][indiana] | |
- [Derek Pereboom][derek] Hard Determinist | |
- Mario De Caro | |
[coe]: http://www.coe.edu/academics/philosophyreligion/philosophyreligion_faculty | |
[fsu]: http://philosophy.fsu.edu/content/view/full/35619 | |
[slu]: http://www.slu.edu/department-of-philosophy/people/faculty-by-area-of-interest/jonathan-jacobs_ | |
[wm]: http://www.wm.edu/as/philosophy/people/faculty/ekstrom_l.php | |
[indiana]: http://www.indiana.edu/~scotus/ | |
[derek]: http://derk-pereboom.net/ | |
## Connections ## | |
- [[Freedom]]: Whether we are free may depend on the truth | |
of the [[Free Will Thesis]]. | |
- [[The Will]]: The problem is somewhat misnamed, because we | |
may have "free will" in the sense required even if there | |
is no "will" as a distinct aspect of our constitution. | |
- [[Responsibility]]: The primary reason to think we have | |
free will is that we are morally responsible for our | |
actions. | |
## References ## | |
#### van Inwagen #### | |
> Therefore, "free will," "incompatibilist free will," | |
> "compatibilist free will" and "libertarian free will" are | |
> four names for one and the same thing. If this thing is a | |
> property, they are four names for the property *is on some | |
> occasions able to do otherwise*. If this thing is a power | |
> or ability, they are four names for the power or ability | |
> to do otherwise than one in fact does. | |
> [@inwagen08 [page 333](sk://inwagen08#7)] | |
[[PAP]] | |
[[Peter van Inwagen]]'s restatement of the problem: | |
> The following two theses are *prima facie* incompatible: | |
> | |
> (1) We are sometimes in the following position with respect | |
> to a contemplated future act: we simultaneously have | |
> both the following abilities: the ability to perform | |
> that act and the ability to refrain from performing that | |
> act. | |
> (2) The past and the laws of nature together determine, at | |
> every moment, a unique future. | |
> [@inwagen08 [page 337](sk://inwagen08#11)] | |
#### De Caro #### | |
Mario De Caro argues that the very concept of an agent and agency | |
implies a notion of freedom because being an agent involves acting | |
on the basis of reasons and this involves both self-determination | |
(an efficient cause is not a reason) and the ability to do otherwise | |
(the reason selects among alternatives). If there is no freedom then | |
there are no agents. If free will is a total mystery then the | |
mystery will propagate to all fields that rely on explanations in | |
terms of intentional action (history, psychology, sociology). [@de- | |
caro04 196--197] |
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment