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FIREEYE ISIGHT INTELLIGENCE | |
APT28: | |
AT THE CENTER | |
OF THE STORIE | |
RUSSIA STRATEGICALLY EVOLVES | |
ITS CYBER OPERATIONS : | |
SPECIAL REPORT / JANUARY 2017 | |
CONTENTS | |
Introduction | |
Overview | |
APT28 Targeting And Intrusion Activity | |
Table 1- APT28 Targeting of Political Entities and Intrusion Activity | |
Table 2 - APT28 Network Activity Has Likely Supported | |
Information Operations | |
From Olympic Slight to Data Leak: | |
Investigating APT28 at the World Anti-Doping Agency | |
Conclusion | |
Appendix | |
INTRODUCTION | |
The Democratic National Committee's (DNC) June | |
2016 announcement attributing its network breach | |
to the Russian Government triggered an international | |
debate over Russia's sponsorship of information | |
operations against the U.S. | |
At issue is the question of proof: did the Russian Government direct the group | |
responsible for the breaches and related data leaks? If so, is this simply a matter | |
of accepted state espionage, or did it cross a line? Was the DNC breach part | |
of a concerted effort by the Russian Government to interfere with the U.S. | |
presidential election? | |
Unfortunately, we have failed to ask the most consequential question: how will | |
Russia continue to employ a variety of methods, including hacks and leaks, | |
to undermine the institutions, policies, and actors that the Russian Government | |
perceives as constricting and condemning its forceful pursuit of its state aims? | |
Our visibility into the operations of APT28 - a group we belie | |
Government sponsors - has given us insight into some © | |
targets, as well as its objectives and the activities ¢ | |
We have tracked and profiled this group through | |
and network detections, and continuous monitori | |
operations, which date to at least 2007, has allowed us tc | |
malware, operational changes, and motivations. This intelligence 5 | |
to protecting and informing our clients, exposing this threat, and strengthening | |
our confidence in attributing APT28 to the Russian Government. | |
OVERVIEW | |
On December 29, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) | |
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a Joint Analysis | |
Report confirming FireEye’s long held public assessment that the Russian | |
Government sponsors APT28. Since at least 2007, APT28 has engaged | |
in extensive operations in support of Russian strategic interests. | |
The group, almost certainly compromised of a sophisticated and prolific | |
set of developers and operators, has historically collected intelligence on | |
defense and geopolitical issues. APT28 espionage activity has primarily | |
targeted entities in the U.S., Europe, and the countries of the former | |
Soviet Union, including governments and militaries, defense attaches, | |
media entities, and dissidents and figures opposed to the current Russian | |
Government. | |
Over the past two years, Russia appears to have increasingly leveraged | |
APT28 to conduct information operations commensurate with broader | |
strategic military doctrine. After compromising a victim organization, | |
APT28 will steal internal data that is then leaked to further political | |
narratives aligned with Russian interests. To date these have included | |
the conflict in Syria, NATO-Ukraine relations, the European Union refugee | |
and migrant crisis, the 2016 Olympics and Paralympics Russian athlete | |
doping scandal, public accusations regarding Russian state-sponsored | |
hacking, and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. | |
This report details our observations of APT28’s | |
targeting, and our investigation into a related | |
breach. We also provide an update on shifts in the y, | |
group's tool development and use, and summarize : | |
the tactics APT28 employs to compromise its victims. | |
SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM 2 | |
APT28 TARGETING AND | |
INTRUSION ACTIVITY | |
In October 2014, FireEye released APT28: A Window into | |
Russia's Cyber Espionage Operations? and characterized | |
APT28's activity as aligning with the Russian Government's | |
strategic intelligence requirements. While tracking APT28, | |
we noted the group's interest in foreign governments and | |
militaries, particularly those of European and Eastern | |
European nations, as well as regional security organizations, | |
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) | |
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation | |
in Europe (OSCE), among others. Table 1 highlights | |
some recent examples of this activity. | |
SPECIAL REPORT / Al | |
AT THE CENTER OF THE S | |
TABLE 1: APT28 TARGETING OF POLITICAL ENTITIES AND INTRUSION ACTIVITY | |
ENTITY | |
OSCE | |
TIMEFRAME | |
NOVEMBER 2016 | |
APT28 TARGETING AND INTRUSION ACTIVITY | |
The OSCE confirmed that it had suffered an intrusion, | |
which a Western intelligence service attributed to APT28.! | |
Germany's Christian | |
Democratic Union (CDU) | |
APRIL - MAY 2016 | |
Researchers at Trend Micro observed APT28 establish a fake | |
CDU email server and launch phishing emails against CDU | |
members in an attempt to obtain their email credentials and access | |
their accounts.?® | |
Pussy Riot | |
AUGUST 2015 | |
APT28 targets Russian rockers and dissidents Pussy Riot via | |
spear-phishing emails.“ | |
NATO, Afghan Ministry | |
APT28 used two domains (nato-news.com and bbc-news.org) to host | |
of Foreign Affairs, Pakistani JULY 2015 an Adobe Flash zero-day exploit to target NATO, the Afghan Ministry | |
Military of Foreign Affairs, and the Pakistani military. | |
Germany's Federal Office for Security in Information Technology (BSI) | |
announced that APT28 was likely responsible for the spear phishing | |
German Bundestag JUNE 2015 emails sent to members of several German political parties. The head | |
& Political Parties | |
of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, Bundesamt fur Ver- | |
fassungsschutz (BfV), also attributed the June 2015 compromise of | |
the Bundestag’s networks to APT28.5¢ | |
Kyrgyzstan Ministry | |
of Foreign Affairs | |
OCTOBER 2014 | |
THROUGH | |
SEPTEMBER 2015 | |
FireEye iSight Intelligence identified changes made to domain name | |
server (DNS) records that suggest that APT28 intercepted email traf- | |
fic from the Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs after maliciously | |
modifying DNS records of the ministry’s authoritative DNS servers. | |
Polish Government & Power | |
Exchange websites | |
JUNE AND | |
SEPTEMBER 2014 | |
APT28 employed “Sedkit” in conjunction with strategic web compro- | |
mises to deliver “Sofacy” malware on Polish Government websites, | |
and the websites of Polish energy company Power Exchange.” | |
Gauquelin, Blaise. “La Russie soupconnée détre responsable d'un piratage informatique contre OSCE.” Le Monde. 28 Dec. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
Trend Micro refers to activity corresponding to Fire Eye's APT28 as “Pawn Storm.” | |
Hacquebord Feike. "Pawn Storm Targets German Christian Democratic Union.” Trend Micro. 11 May 2016. Web. 28 Dec. 2016. | |
Hacquebord Feike. "Pawn Storm's Domestic Spying Campaign Revealed; Ukraine and US Top Global Targets.” TrendLabs Security Intelligence Blog, Trend Micro. 18 August 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2016 | |
“Neuer Hackerangriff auf Bundespolitiker / BSI warnt Parteien vor Cyberangriffen.” Westdeutscher Rundfunk. 20 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
“Russia ‘was Behind German Parliament Hack.” The BBC. 13 May 2016. Web. 28 Dec. 2016 | |
Kharouni, Loucif. et al. “Operation Pawn Storm: Using Decoys to Evade Detection.” Trend Micro. 22 Oct. 2014. Web. 3 Jan. 2017. | |
SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM 4 | |
Since 2014, APT28 network activity has likely supported | |
information operations designed to influence the domestic | |
politics of foreign nations. Some of these operations have | |
involved the disruption and defacement of websites, false flag | |
operations using false hacktivist personas, and the theft of | |
data that was later leaked publicly online. | |
Table 2 highlights incidents in which victims suffered | |
a compromise that FireEye ISIGHT Intelligence, other | |
authorities, or the victims themselves later attributed to the | |
group we track as APT28. All of these operations have aimed | |
to achieve a similar objective: securing a political outcome | |
beneficial to Russia. | |
TABLE 2: APT28 NETWORK ACTIVITY HAS LIKELY SUPPORTED INFORMATION OPERATIONS | |
VICTIM | |
TIMEFRAME | |
APT28 NETWORK ACTIVITY | |
ASSOCIATED INFORMATION OPERATIONS | |
ACTIVITY | |
World Anti-Doping | |
Agency (WADA) | |
SEPTEMBER 2016 | |
On September 13, WADA confirmed that APT28 | |
had compromised its networks and accessed | |
athlete medical data.® | |
On September 12, 2016, the “Fancy Bears’ Hack Team” persona | |
claimed to have compromised WADA and released athletes’ | |
medical records as “proof of American athletes taking dop- | |
ing.”® | |
U.S. Democratic National | |
Committee (DNC) | |
APRIL - | |
SEPTEMBER 2016 | |
The DNC announced it had suffered a network | |
compromise and that a subsequent investigation | |
found evidence of two breaches, attributed to | |
APT28 and APT29. FireEye analyzed the mal- | |
ware found on DNC networks and determined | |
that it was consistent with our previous cbserva- | |
tions of APT28 tools" | |
In June 2016, shortly after the DNC’s announcement, the Gu- | |
ccifer 2.0 persona claimed responsibility for the DNC breach | |
and leaked documents taken from the organization's network | |
Guccifer 2.0 continued to leak batches of DNC documents | |
through September 21 | |
John Podesta | |
MARCH - | |
NOVEMBER 2016 | |
Investigators found that John Podesta, Hillary | |
Clinton's presidential campaign chairman, was | |
one of thousands of individuals targeted in a | |
mass phishing scheme using shortened URLS | |
that security researchers attributed to APT28.¢ | |
Throughout October and into early November, WikiLeaks pub- | |
lished 34 batches of email correspondence stolen from John | |
Podesta’s personal email account. Correspondence of other | |
individuals targeted in the same phishing campaign, including | |
former Secretary of State Colin Powell and Clinton campaign | |
staffer William Rinehart, were published on the | |
“DC Leaks” website's | |
U.S. Democratic | |
Congressional Campaign | |
Committee (DCCC) | |
MARCH - | |
OCTOBER 2016 | |
In July, the DCCC announced that it was investi- | |
gating an ongoing “cybersecurity incident” that | |
the FBI believed was linked to the compromise | |
of the DNC. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi | |
later confirmed that the DCCC had suffered a | |
network compromise. Investigators indicated | |
that the actors may have gained access to DCCC | |
systems as early as March, 8718 | |
In August, the Guccifer 2.0 persona contacted reporters cov- | |
ering U.S. House of Representative races to announce newly | |
leaked documents from the DCCC pertaining to Democratic | |
candidates. From August tc October, Guccifer 2.0 posted sev- | |
eral additional installments of what appear to be internal DCCC | |
documents on “his” WordPress site.'®2° | |
TV5Monde | |
FEBRUARY 2015, | |
APRIL 2015 | |
In February, FireEye identified CORESHELL | |
traffic beaconing from TV5Maonde’s network, | |
confirming that APT28 had compromised TV- | |
SMonde’s network | |
In April 2015, alleged pro-1SIS hacktivist group CyberCaliphate | |
defaced TV5Monde’s websites and social media profiles and | |
forced the company’s 11 broadcast channels offline. FireEye | |
identified overlaps between the domain registration details of | |
CyberCaliphate’s website and APT28 infrastructure 2 | |
Ukrainian Central | |
Election Commission | |
(CEC) | |
MAY 2014 | |
Ukrainian officials revealed that the investigation | |
into the compromise of the CEC’s internal net- | |
work identified malware traced to APT28 22 | |
During the May 2014 Ukrainian presidential election, purported | |
pro-Russian hacktivists CyberBerkut conducted a series of mali- | |
cious activities against the CEC including a system compromise, | |
data destruction, a data leak, a distributed denial-of-service | |
(DDoS) attack, and an attempted defacement of the CEC web- | |
site with fake election results. | |
“WADA Confirms Attack by Russian Cyber Espionage Group.” World Anti-Doping Agency. 13 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016 | |
Fancy Bears’ HT (fancybears). "@AnonPress Greetings. We hacked #WADA. We have Proof of American Athletes taking doping. Fancybear.net.” 12 Sept. 2016, 412 PM. Tweet | |
Crowdstrike refers to activity corresponding to FireEye's APT28 and APT29 as “Fancy Bear” and “Cozy Bear,” respectively. | |
“Nakashima, Ellen. “Cyber Researchers Confirm Russian Government Hack of Democratic National Committee.” The Washington Post. 20 June 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016 | |
“Rid, Thomas. “All Signs Point to Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack.” Motherboard, Vice. 25 July 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016 | |
“Bennett, Cory. “Guccifer 2.0 Drops More DNC Docs.” Politico. 13 Sept. 2016. Web. 2 Jan. 2017. <> | |
Perlroth, Nicole. Shear, Michael D. “Private Security Group Says Russia was Behind John Podesta’s Email Hack” The New York Times. 21 Oct. 2016. Web. 2 Jan. 2017. | |
“Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. "How Hackers Broke Into John Podesta and Colin Powell's Gmail Accounts.” 20 Oct. 2016. Web. 2 Jan. 2017. | |
“Nakashima, Ellen. “FBI Probes Suspected Breach of Another Democratic Organization by Russian Hackers.” The Washington Post. 29 July 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
“Pelosi, Nancy. “DCCC Cyber Breach.” 13 August 2016. Email. U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, DC. Politico. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
“Lipton, Eric. Shane, Scott. “Democratic House Candidates Were Also Targets of Russian Hacking.” The New York Times. 13 Dec. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
Ibid. | |
SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM 5 | |
FROM OLYMPIC SLIGHT TO DATA LEAK: | |
Investigating APT28 at the World Anti-Doping Agency | |
As news of the DNC breach spread, APT28 was preparing for another set | |
of operations: countering the condemnation that Russia was facing after | |
doping allegations and a threatened blanket ban of the Russian team | |
from the upcoming Rio Games. Russia, like many nations, has long viewed | |
success in the Olympic Games as a source of national prestige and soft | |
power on the world stage. The doping allegations and prospective ban | |
from the Games further ostracized Russia, and likely provided motivation | |
to actively counter the allegations by attempting to discredit anti-doping | |
agencies and policies. Our investigation of APT28’s compromise of | |
WADA's network, and our observations of the surrounding events reveal | |
how Russia sought to counteract a damaging narrative and delegitimize | |
the institutions leveling criticism. | |
ALLEGATIONS OF RUSSIAN ATHLETES’ WIDESPREAD DOPING | |
NOV (2015) | |
WADA declares the | |
Russian Anti-Doping | |
Agency (RUSADA) non- | |
compliant.24 | |
JULY 18 | |
WADA-commissioned | |
report documents | |
evidence of Russian | |
athletes’ widespread | |
doping.?® | |
APT28 COMPROMISES WADA | |
EARLY AUG | |
APT28 sends spear | |
phishing emails to | |
WADA employees. ? | |
AUG 10 | |
APT28 uses a legitimate | |
user account belonging | |
to a Russian athlete to | |
log into WADA’s Anti- | |
Doping Administration | |
and Management | |
System (ADAMS) | |
database. ® | |
AUG 4 | |
Russian athletes were | |
barred from competing | |
in the Olympic Games.?® | |
AUG 25-SEP 12 | |
APT28 gains access | |
to an International | |
Olympic Committee | |
account created | |
specifically for the 2016 | |
Olympic Games, and | |
views and downloads | |
athlete data.?® | |
FALSE HACKTIVIST PERSONAS CLAIM TO TARGET WADA, LEAK ATHLETE DATA | |
AUG 9 | |
The actor | |
@anpoland, | |
purporting to | |
represent | |
“Anonymous Poland, | |
claims to have | |
defaced the | |
WADA website. © | |
Based on this timeline of leak and threatened leak | |
activity, as well as strikingly similar characteristics and | |
distribution methods shared between @anpoland and | |
“Fancy Bears’ Hack Team,” the same operators are highly | |
likely behind the two personas. WADA officials, citing | |
evidence provided by law enforcement, stated that the | |
AUG | |
On August 11 | |
@anpoland threatens | |
to conduct a DDoS | |
attack against and | |
leak data from WADA, | |
but fails to follow | |
through on the | |
threats.s!s2 | |
SEP 12 | |
“Fancy Bears Hack | |
Team”, a previously | |
unknown group | |
purporting to | |
be affiliated with | |
Anonymous, claims | |
via Twitter to have | |
compromised WADA, | |
and directs readers | |
to a website hosting | |
stolen documents.*3 | |
In tweets to | |
international | |
journalists and | |
Twitter accounts | |
that disseminate | |
hacktivist and | |
information security | |
news, “Fancy Bears’ | |
Hack Team” claims | |
to have "proof of | |
American athletes | |
taking doping.”** | |
threat activity originated in Russia, possibly in retaliation | |
SERRE! | |
WADA releases a | |
statement confirming | |
the breach and | |
attributes the | |
compromise and | |
theft of athlete | |
medical data | |
to APT28.%5 | |
SEP 15-30 | |
“Fancy Bears’ Hack | |
Team” releases five | |
additional batches | |
of medical files for | |
high-profile athletes | |
from multiple nations, | |
including the U.S, | |
which had applied | |
for and received | |
Therapeutic Use | |
Exemptions (TUES) | |
for medications | |
otherwise banned | |
from competition .3® | |
Claiming to support | |
“fair play and clean | |
sport,” Fancy Bears’ | |
Hack team calls TUEs | |
“licenses for doping.”?” | |
for WADA's exposure of Russia's expansive, state-run | |
doping.*® The statement prompted denials from the | |
Russian Government, with Russian sports minister | |
Vitaly Mutko asking, “How can you prove that the | |
hackers are Russian? You blame Russia for everything, | |
itis very in fashion now.”*? | |
Gallagher, Sean. “Guccifer 20 Posts DCCC Docs, Says They're From Clinton Foundation.” Ars Technica. 4 Oct. 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2017. | |
“Russian Hackers Suspected in French TV Cyberattack” Deutsche Welle. 6 Oct. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
Joselow, Gabe. “Election Cyberattacks: Pro-Russia Hackers Have Been Accused in Past.” NBC News. 3 Nov. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
Clayton, Mark. “Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided "Wanton Destruction’ From Hackers (+Video).” The Christian Science Monitor. 17 June 2014. Web. 2 Jan. 2017. | |
“Foundation Board Media Release: WADA Strengthens Anti-Doping Worldwide.” World Anti-Doping Agency. 18 November 2015. | |
“Russia State-Sponsored Doping Across Majority of Olympic Sports, Claims Report.” The BBC. 18 July 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016 | |
Macguire, Eoghan. Almasy, Steve. “271 Russian Athletes Cleared for Rio Games.” CNN. 5 August 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
“Cyber Security Update: WADA's Incident Response.” World Anti-Doping Agency. 5 Oct. 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2017. | |
“WADA Confirms Attack by Russian Cyber Espionage Group.” World Anti-Doping Agency. 13 Sept. 2016 | |
“WADA Confirms Another Batch of Athlete Data Leaked by Russian Cyber Hackers ‘Fancy Bear” World Anti-Doping Agency. 14 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. <> | |
[OP PLI "wwwi.tas-cas.org.” Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 9 Aug. 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2017. | |
Anonymous Poland (@anpoland). "@Cryptomeorg @ben_rumsby @PogoWasRight @Jason_A_Murdock @Cyber_War_News @kevincollier Tomorrow will ddos WADA and publish some secret dosc.” 11 Aug 2016 10:10 | |
AM. Tweet. | |
Anonymous Poland (@an poland). “@JoeUchill within a few days will be new attack on the WADA/Climpic” 5 Sept. 2016 519 AM. Tweet. | |
Fancy Bears’ HT (fancybears). "@AnonPress Greetings. We hacked #WADA. We have Proof of American Athletes taking doping. Fancybear.net.” | |
Ibid. | |
“WADA Confirms Attack by Russian Cyber Espionage Group." World Anti-Doping Agency]3 Sept. 2016 | |
Russian Hackers Leak Simone Biles and Serena Williams Files.” The BBC. 13 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016 | |
Rumsby, Ben. “US Superstars Serena and Venus Williams and Simone Biles Given Drugs Exemption, Russian Hackers Reveal.” The Telegraph. 14 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
Luhn, Alec’Fancy Bears Crigins Unclear But Russia Seizes Chance to Put Boot into Wada.” 15 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
Gibson, Owen. “Russian Sports Minister Vitaly Mutko Denies Link to Wada Hackers.” The Guardian. 14 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. | |
CONCLUSION | |
Since releasing our 2014 report, we continue to assess that | |
APT28 is sponsored by the Russian Government. We further | |
assess that APT28 is the group responsible for the network | |
compromises of WADA and the DNC and other entities | |
related to the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle. These | |
breaches involved the theft of internal data - mostly emails | |
- that was later strategically leaked through multiple forums | |
and propagated in a calculated manner almost certainly | |
intended to advance particular Russian Government aims. In | |
a report released on January 7 2017, the U.S. Directorate of | |
National Intelligence described this activity as an “influence | |
campaign.” | |
This influence campaign - a combination of network | |
compromises and subsequent data leaks - aligns closely | |
with the Russian military's publicly stated intentions and | |
capabilities. Influence operations, also frequently called | |
“information operations,” have a long history of inclusion | |
in Russian strategic doctrine, and have been intentionally | |
developed, deployed, and modernized with the advent of | |
the internet. The recent activity in the U.S. is but one of | |
many instances of Russian Government influence operations | |
conducted in support of strategic political objectives, and it | |
will not be the last. As the 2017 elections in Europe approach | |
- most notably in Germany, France, and the Netherlands - we | |
are already seeing the makings of similarly concerted efforts. | |
SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM | |
APPENDIX: | |
APT28’s Tools, Tactics, and Operational Changes | |
In our 2014 report, we identified APT28 as a suspected Russian | |
government-sponsored espionage actor. We came to this conclusion | |
in part based on forensic details left in the malware that APT28 had | |
employed since at least 2007. We have provided an updated version of | |
those conclusions, a layout of the tactics that they generally employ, | |
as well as observations of apparent tactical shifts. For full details, | |
please reference our 2014 report, APT28: A Window into Russia's Cyber | |
Espionage Operations? | |
APT28 employs a suite of malware with features indicative of the group's | |
plans for continued operations, as well as the group's access to resources | |
and skilled developers. | |
Key characteristics of APT28’s toolset include: | |
* A flexible, modular framework that has allowed APT28 | |
to consistently evolve its toolset since at least 2007. | |
Use of a formal coding environment in which to develop | |
tools, allowing the group to create and deploy custom | |
modules within its backdoors. | |
Incorporation of counter-analysis capabilities including | |
runtime checks to identify an analysis environment, obfuscated | |
strings unpacked at runtime, and the inclusion of unused | |
machine instructions to slow analysis. | |
Code compiled during the normal working day in the Moscow | |
time zone and within a Russian language build environment. | |
OVER | |
97% | |
88% | |
IN ADDITION, | |
APT28’S DEVELOPERS | |
APT28’S MALWARE SAMPLES COMPILED CONSISTENTLY BUILT | |
SAMPLES WERE BETWEEN 8AM AND 6PM MALWARE IN RUSSIAN | |
COMPILED DURING IN THE TIMEZONE THAT LANGUAGE SETTINGS UNTIL | |
THE WORKING WEEK INCLUDES MAJOR RUSSIAN | |
CITIES SUCH AS MOSCOW | |
AND ST. PETERSBURG | |
SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM 1 | |
APT28’S MALWARE SUITE | |
TOOL ROLE AKA | |
CHOPSTICK | backdoor Xagent, webhp, SPLM, (v2 fysbis) | |
EVILTOSS backdoor Sedreco, AZZY, Xagent, ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI | |
GAMEFISH backdoor Sednit, Seduploader, JHUHUGIT, Sofacy | |
SOURFACE downloader Older version of CORESHELL, Sofacy | |
OLDBAIT credential | ogo | |
harvester | |
CORESHELL | downloader Newer version of SOURFACE, Sofacy | |
APT28’S OPERATIONAL CHANGES SINCE 2014 | |
APT28 continues to evolve its toolkit and refine its tactics | |
in what is almost certainly an effort to protect its operational | |
effectiveness in the face of heightened public exposure and | |
scrutiny. In addition to the continued evolution of the group's | |
first stage tools, we have also noted APT28: | |
Leveraging zero-day vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player, | |
Java, and Windows, including CVE-2015-1701, CVE-2015-2424, | |
CVE-2015-2590, CVE-2015-3043, CVE-2015-5119, and CVE- | |
2015-7645. | |
Using a profiling script to deploy zero-days and other | |
tools more selectively, decreasing the chance that researchers | |
and others will gain access to the group's tools. | |
Increasing reliance on public code depositories, such | |
as Carberp, PowerShell Empire, P.A.S. webshell, Metasploit | |
modules, and others in a likely effort to accelerate their | |
development cycle and provide plausible deniability. | |
Obtaining credentials through fabricated Google | |
App authorization and Oauth access requests that allow | |
the group to bypass two-factor authentication and other | |
security measures. | |
Moving laterally through a network relying only | |
on legitimate tools that already exist within the victims’ | |
systems, at times forgoing their traditional toolset for the | |
duration of the compromise. | |
These changes are not only indicative of APT28's skills, | |
resourcefulness, and desire to maintain operational | |
effectiveness, but also highlight the longevity of the | |
group’s mission and its intent to continue its activities | |
for the foreseeable future. | |
SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM | |
APT28 TACTICS | |
We have observed APT28 rely on four key tactics when attempting | |
to compromise intended targets. These include sending spear-phishing | |
emails that either deliver exploit documents that deploy malware onto | |
a user's systems, or contain a malicious URL designed to harvest the | |
recipients’ email credentials and provide access to the their accounts. | |
APT28 has also compromised and placed malware on legitimate websites | |
intending to infect site visitors, and has gained access to organizations by | |
compromising their web-facing servers | |
TACTIC | |
INFECTION WITH MALWARE VIA SPEAR PHISH | |
Craft exploit document | |
with enticing lure content. | |
Send exploit document | |
to victim. | |
Victim opens document, | |
and malware is installed by | |
exploiting a vulnerability | |
(e.g., ARM-NATO_ | |
ENGLISH_30_NOV_2016. | |
doc leveraged an Adobe Flash | |
exploit, CVE-2016-7855, | |
to install GAMEFISH | |
targeted machine). | |
Register a domain spoofing | |
that of a legitimate | |
organization (e.g. | |
theguardiannews[.Jorg). | |
Send link mirroring structure | |
of legitimate organization's | |
site that is designed to | |
expire once users clickit. | |
Victim goes to link and | |
retrieves malicious | |
document or is served a | |
web-based exploit that | |
installs malware. | |
(Flash Vulnerability CVE- | |
2016-7855 and Windows | |
Vulnerability CVE-2016-7255 | |
were exploited as zero days to | |
install malware on victims who | |
visited a malicious URL). | |
APT28 1S IN YOUR NETWORK. | |
TACTIC | |
WEBMAIL ACCESS VIA SPEAR-PHISH | |
Register a domain spoofing a webmail service | |
or an organization’s webmail portal | |
(e.g., Onedrive-Office365[Jcom) | |
Send email to targets | |
instructing them | |
to reset their passwords. | |
Recipient visits fake login page | |
and enters credentials. | |
APT28 uses stolen | |
credentials to access | |
mailbox and read email. | |
Send email to victims | |
warning of security risk | |
and asking them to enable | |
security service. | |
Person is asked to authorize | |
application to view mail | |
and gives access. | |
APT28 leverages OAuth | |
privileges given to malicious | |
application to read email. | |
TACTIC | |
INFECTION WITH MALWARE VIA STRATEGIC | |
WEB COMPROMISE (SWC) | |
Compromise a legitimate site and set up | |
malicious iFrame. | |
Users of the site are redirected using malicious | |
iFrame and profiled | |
(e.g, this technique was used | |
to compromise and infect visitors to numerous | |
Polish Government websites in 2014). | |
Exploit is served to users matching the target profile | |
and malware is installed on their system. | |
APT28 IS IN YOUR NETWORK. | |
TACTIC | |
ACCESS THROUGH INTERNET-FACING SERVERS | |
Network reconnaissance to find vulnerable software. | |
Exploitation of previously known vulnerabilities | |
present on unpatched systems. | |
Leverage initial compromise to access other systems | |
and move deeper into the victim network. | |
APT28 IS IN YOUR NETWORK. | |
SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM 12 | |
To download this or other | |
FireEye ISIGHT Intelligence reports, | |
visit: www.fireeye.com/reports.html | |
FireEye, Inc. | |
1440 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 | |
408.321.6300 / 877.FIREEYE (347.3393) / info@FireEye.com | |
www.FireEye.com | |
© 2076 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc ) - . | |
All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks <© FireEye | |
or service marks of their respective owners. GRAF-60 |
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