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Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In the 2016 Presidential Election
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U.S. Department of Justice | |
Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Frotcctcd Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(0) | |
Report On The Investigation Into | |
Russian Interference In The | |
2016 Presidential Election | |
Volume I of II | |
Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III | |
Submitted Pursuant to 28 CFR. §600.8(c) | |
Washington, D.C. | |
March 2019 | |
U.S. Department of Justice | |
Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) | |
U.S. Department of Justice | |
Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(0) | |
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I | |
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME . . I ........................................................................................................ 1 | |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME .. .. I ........................................................................................... 4 | |
I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION ................................................................................. 11 | |
II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIG . N .................................................... 14 | |
A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency ................................................................. 15 | |
B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin ................................................. 16 | |
C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections .................................................................................. 19 | |
1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014 ...................................... 19 | |
2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts ..................... 22 | |
3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook ...................................................................... 24 | |
4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter ......................................................................... 26 | |
a. Individualized Accounts ................................................................................... 26 | |
b. IRA Botnet Activities ...................................................................................... 28 | |
5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies .......................................................... 29 | |
6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons .......................................................... 31 | |
7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign ........................................... 33 | |
a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials ................................. 33 | |
b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies ................. 35 | |
III. RUSSIAN HACKINO AND DUMPING OPERATION .. S ................................................................... 36 | |
A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign ....................................................... 36 | |
l. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign ............................................................. 36 | |
2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks ..................................................... 38 | |
a. Initial Access............................................................................................. 3 .. 8 ..... | |
b. Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Network..s............................. 3 . 8 | |
c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Network..s................................ 4 .. 0 | |
B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials.................................................................. 4 . 1 ... | |
1. DCLeaks ....................................................................................................... 4 .. 1 ...... | |
2. Guccifer 2.0 ................................................................................................... 4 .. 2 ...... | |
3. Use of WikiLeaks .......................................................................................... 4 .. 4 ..... | |
a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaig.n.............. 44 | |
b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeak.s......................... 4 . 5 | |
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c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks .................................. 45 | |
d. , WikiLeal<s Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen | |
Materials ........................................................................................................ 48 | |
C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations ............................................................................. 49 | |
1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims ............ 49 | |
2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections ................................... 50 | |
D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials .................................. 51 | |
1. .............................................................................................. 51 | |
a. Background ...................................................................................................... 51 | |
b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks ................................................ 52 | |
c. .................... 54 | |
d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails .................... 58 | |
e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks ................................................ 59 | |
2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials ......................... 61 | |
a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) .................................................... 61 | |
b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails ...................................... 62 | |
IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAI . G .. N ............. 66 | |
A. Campaign Period (September 2015 - November 8, 2016) ......................................... 66 | |
1. Trump Tower Moscow Project ............................................................................. 67 | |
a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) ............ 67 | |
b. Communications with I.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi | |
Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015) ............................................................ 69 | |
c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015- | |
January 2016) ................................................................................................ 70 | |
i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization 70 | |
ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia ......................................... 72 | |
d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump | |
(December 2015-June 2016) ......................................................................... 76 | |
i. Sater's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia ........................................ 76 | |
ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia ............................ 78 | |
2. George Papadopoulos ........................................................................................... 80 | |
a. Origins of Campaign Work .............................................................................. 81 | |
b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts ........................................................................ 82 | |
c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting ......................................................... 85 | |
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d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of | |
Clinton Emails ............................................................................................... 86 | |
e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign .................................... 89 | |
f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt" ........................................................... 93 | |
g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact ....................................................... 94 | |
3. Carter Page ............................................................................................................ 95 | |
a. Background ...................................................................................................... 96 | |
b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work ............................................................. 97 | |
c. Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow ........................................................ 98 | |
d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign ............................. 102 | |
4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest ...................................... 103 | |
a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign ......................... 103 | |
b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel | |
..................................................................................................................... 105 | |
C. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI ....................................... 107 | |
d. Jared Kushner's Continuing Contacts with Simes ......................................... 108 | |
5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower ............................................................... 110 | |
a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting ....................................................................... 110 | |
i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr .................................................................. 110 | |
ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign ................................... 114 | |
b. The Events of June 9, 2016 ............................................................................ 116 | |
i. Arrangements for the Meeting ................................................................ 116 | |
ii. Conduct of the Meeting .......................................................................... 117 | |
c. Post-June 9 Events ......................................................................................... 120 | |
6. Events at the Republican National Convention .................................................. 123 | |
a. Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. | |
Gordon the Week of the RNC ..................................................................... 123 | |
b. Change to Republican Party Platform ............................................................ 124 | |
7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak ............................................................. 127 | |
a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the | |
Ambassador's Residence ............................................................................. 127 | |
b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak...... 127 | |
8. Paul Manafoit ...................................................................................................... 129 | |
a. Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine .................................................. 131 | |
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i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work ......................................................... 131 | |
ii. Political Consulting Work ..................................................................... 132 | |
iii. Konstantin Kilimnik .............................................................................. 132 | |
b. Contacts during Paul Manaflort's Time with the Trump Campaign .............. 134 | |
i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign ......................................................... 134 | |
ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts .......................................... 135 | |
iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin | |
Kilimnik in the United States' ................................................................ 138 | |
c. Post-Resignation Activities ............................................................................ 141 | |
B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts .......................................................... 144 | |
l. Immediate Post-Election Activity ....................................................................... 144 | |
a. Outreach from the Russian Government ........................................................ 145 | |
b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels ....... 146 | |
2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration...... 147 | |
a. Background .................................................................................................... 147 | |
b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming | |
Administration ............................................................................................. 149 | |
c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles ................................ 151 | |
i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with | |
Dmitriev ................................................................................................. 151 | |
ii. The Seychelles Meetings ........................................................................ 153 | |
iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Barron after the Seychelles Trip.... 155 | |
d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding | |
U.S.-Russia Relations .................................................................................. 156 | |
3. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in | |
Trump Tower Following the Election ................................................................. 159 | |
4. Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov ................................................... 161 | |
5. Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team ........................................ 163 | |
6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich ............. 166 | |
7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn ................................................... 167 | |
a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements ................................................... 167 | |
b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia ....................................................................... 168 | |
V. PROSECUTION AND DECL1NAT1ON DECISIONS ........................................................................ 174 | |
A. Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign ............................................... 174 | |
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B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations .............................................................. 175 | |
I. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy .................................................... 175 | |
a. Background .................................................................................................... 175 | |
b. Charging Decision As to ....... 176 | |
2. Potential Section 1030 Violation By .............................. 179 | |
C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts ............................................................. 180 | |
l. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion ............................................. 180 | |
2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951) 181 | |
a. Governing Law ............................................................................................... 181 | |
b. Application ..................................................................................................... 182 | |
3. Campaign Finance .............................................................................................. 183 | |
a. Overview Of Governing Law ......................................................................... 184 | |
b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting ................................................ 185 | |
i. Thing-of-Value Element ......................................................................... 186 | |
ii. Willfulness ............................................................................................. 187 | |
iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information ...................................... 188 | |
c. Application to WikiLeaks ................................................... 188 | |
i. uestions Over | |
......................................................... ' . 1 .. 8 .. 9 ......... | |
ii. Willfulness ............................................................................................. 190 | |
iii. Constitutional Considerations ................................................................ 190 | |
iv. Analysis .................................................................... 190 | |
4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation ....................................... 191 | |
a. Overview Of Governing Law ......................................................................... 191 | |
b. Application to Certain Individuals ................................................................. 192 | |
i. George Papadopoulos .............................................................................. 192 | |
ii. ............................................................................. 194 | |
iii. Michael Flynn ....................................................................................... 194 | |
iv. Michael Cohen ...................................................................................... 195 | |
v. .............................................................................. 196 | |
vi. Jeff Sessions ........................................................................................... 197 | |
vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation ....................................... 198 | |
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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I | |
This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which | |
states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he ... shall provide the Attorney | |
General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special | |
Counsel] reached." | |
The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and | |
systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In | |
June, the Democratic National Committee and its Cyber response team publicly announced that | |
Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials-hacks | |
that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government-began that same month. | |
Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in | |
October and November. | |
In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks's first release of stolen documents, a foreign | |
government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy | |
advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign | |
government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that | |
it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to | |
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July | |
31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign | |
were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities. | |
That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government "directed | |
recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political | |
organizations," and, "[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election | |
process." After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia | |
for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were | |
examining Russia's interference in the election. | |
Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017 | |
appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the Special Counsel | |
authorized him to investigate "the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 | |
presidential election," including any links or coordination between the Russian government and | |
individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. | |
As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's investigation established that | |
Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a | |
Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. | |
Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian intelligence | |
service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers | |
working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also | |
identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although | |
the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump | |
presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit | |
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electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not | |
establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian | |
government in its election interference activities. | |
* * * | |
Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the | |
results of our investigation and the Special Counsel's charging decisions, and we then provide an | |
overview of the two volumes of our report. | |
The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel's Office found to be | |
supported by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out | |
the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other | |
instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with | |
confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events | |
occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there | |
was no evidence of those facts. | |
In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted | |
a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of "collusion." In so doing, | |
the Office recognized that the word "collude]" was used in communications with the Acting | |
Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation's scope and that the term has | |
frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. But collusion is not a specific | |
offense or theory of liability found in the United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal | |
criminal law. For those reasons, the Office's focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability | |
was on conspiracy as defined in federal law. In connection with that analysis, we addressed the | |
factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign "coordinat[ed]"- -a term that appears | |
in the appointment order-with Russian election interference activities. Like collusion, | |
"coordination" does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. We understood | |
coordination to require an agreement-tacit or express-between the Trump Campaign and the | |
Russian government on election interference. That requires more than the two parties taking | |
actions that were informed by or responsive to the other's actions or interests. We applied the term | |
coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the | |
Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities. | |
* * * | |
The report on our investigation consists of two volumes: | |
Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's | |
interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign. | |
Section I describes the scope of the investigation. Sections II and III describe the principal ways | |
Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election. Section IV describes links between the RuSsian | |
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government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth the Special | |
Counsel's charging decisions. | |
Volume II addresses the President's actions towards the FBI's investigation into Russia's | |
interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the | |
Special Counsel's investigation. Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations | |
that guided that investigation. | |
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY To VOLUME I | |
RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN | |
The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference | |
operations identified by the investigation-a social media campaign designed to provoke and | |
amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, | |
Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he | |
controlled. Priaozhin is widely reported to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin | |
In mid-2014. the IRA sent emolovees to the United States on an intelligence-gatherin | |
mission with instructions | |
The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S. | |
political system through what it termed "information warfare." The campaign evolved from a | |
generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a | |
targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. | |
The IRA's operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the | |
names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United | |
States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and | |
made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The | |
investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the | |
IRA. Section II of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media | |
campaign. | |
RUSSIAN HACIQNG OPERATIONS | |
At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on supporting candidate Trump in | |
early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: Cyber intrusions | |
(hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian | |
intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian | |
Army (GRU) carried out these operations. | |
In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign | |
volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU | |
hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee | |
(DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole hundreds of thousands | |
of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks. Around the time that the DNC | |
announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government's role in hacking its network, the GRU | |
began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas "DCLeaks" and | |
"Guccifer 2.0." The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks. | |
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The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump ("Trump Campaign" or "Campaign") | |
showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases of documents and welcomed their potential et lr o o d a e m n a 1 g a e | |
candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016, forecast to | |
senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate | |
Clinton. WikiLeaks's first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate Trump | |
announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server | |
used by Clinton when she was Secretary of State (he later said that he was speaking sarcasticall | |
WikiLeaks began releasing | |
Podesta's stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released | |
video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section III of this Report details the Office's | |
investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign | |
supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails. | |
RUSS1AN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN | |
The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of | |
contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. | |
The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring | |
or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the investigation | |
established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and | |
worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from | |
information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that | |
members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its | |
election interference activities. | |
The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the | |
Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign | |
officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking | |
improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia | |
and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which | |
are summarized below in chronological order. | |
2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization | |
real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trump signed a Letter | |
of Intent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization | |
executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian | |
government press secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through | |
at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump. | |
Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact | |
with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to | |
Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told | |
Papadopoulos that the Russian government had "dirt" on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands | |
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of emails. One week later, in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a | |
representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from | |
the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of | |
information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of time and for several months | |
thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting | |
between the Campaign and the Russian government. No meeting took place. | |
Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of | |
2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President. On | |
June 9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald | |
Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email | |
proposing the meeting had described as "official documents and information that would | |
incriminate Hillary." The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as "part of Russia and its | |
government's support for Mr. Trump." The written communications setting up the meeting | |
showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist | |
candidate Trump's electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer's presentation did not provide such | |
information. | |
Days after the June 9 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC | |
announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to | |
opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents . | |
In July2016, Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity | |
to Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived and worked | |
in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returning to the United States, Page became acquainted | |
with at least two Russian intelligence officers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 with | |
conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Russia. Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow and his | |
advocacy for pro-Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaign then distanced itself | |
from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign. | |
July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the | |
DNC. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents revealing | |
information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public reporting that U.S. | |
intelligence agencies had "high confidence" that the Russian government was behind the theft of | |
emails and documents from the DNC. And within a week of the release, a foreign government | |
informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the | |
Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign | |
government reporting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the | |
Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. | |
Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York | |
City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties | |
to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for | |
Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a "backdoor" way for | |
Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine, both men believed the plan would require candidate | |
Trump's assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status of the | |
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Trump Campaign and Manali"ort's strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. | |
Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik, | |
and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting. | |
Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in | |
graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less | |
than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that | |
had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions | |
were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere | |
in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department of Homeland Security and | |
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued ajoint public statement "that the Russian | |
Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, | |
including from US political organizations." Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked | |
materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, "are intended to | |
interfere with the US election process." | |
Post-2016 Election. Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government | |
officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new | |
administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The | |
Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to congratulate the President-Elect and to | |
arrange a call with President Putin. Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there. | |
Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, was among | |
the Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early December, a | |
business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of the Trump Campaign and an | |
associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon. Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in | |
January 2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period, | |
another business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served | |
on the Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated on a short | |
written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied had been | |
cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and | |
Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. | |
On December 29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having | |
interfered in the election. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian | |
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the | |
sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in | |
response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move | |
on delay (by V. Putin)." The next day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him | |
the request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result | |
of Flynn's request. | |
* * * | |
On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump | |
on a joint assessment-drafted and coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and | |
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National Security Agency-that concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the | |
election through a variety of means to assist Trump's candidacy and harm Clinton's. A | |
declassified version of the assessment was publicly released that same day. | |
Between mid-January 2017 and early February 20 17, three congressional committees-the | |
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on | |
Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC)-announced that they would | |
conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the | |
election. Then-FBI Director James Comey later confirmed to Congress the existence of the FBI's | |
investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election. On March 20, 2017, in | |
open-session testimony before HPSCI, Comey stated: | |
I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part | |
of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts | |
to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the | |
nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and | |
the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the | |
campaign and Russia's efforts.... As with any counterintelligence investigation, | |
this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed. | |
The investigation continued under then-Director Comey for the next seven weeks until May 9, | |
2017, when President Trump fired Comey as FBI Director-an action which is analyzed in | |
Volume II of the report. | |
On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel | |
and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Comey had confirmed in his congressional | |
testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within | |
the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the | |
investigation. | |
President Trump reacted negatively to the Special Counsel's appointment. He told advisors | |
that it was the end of his presidency, sought to have Attorney General Jefferson (Jeff) Sessions | |
unrecuse from the Russia investigation and to have the Special Counsel removed, and engaged in | |
efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it, | |
including through public and private contacts with potential witnesses. Those and related actions | |
are described and analyzed in Volume II of the report. | |
* * * | |
THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S CHARGING DECISIONS | |
In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume I of the report, the Office | |
determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law | |
chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual § 9-27.000 et seq. | |
(2018), The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if | |
so, whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, | |
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and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately | |
served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual §9- | |
27220. | |
Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions, | |
which contain three main components. | |
First, the Office determined that Russia's two principal interference operations in the 2016 | |
U.S. presidential election-the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations- | |
violated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media | |
campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by | |
undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign | |
influence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. See United States v. Internet | |
Research Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). Separately, Russian intelligence officers who | |
carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of | |
individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws, | |
the federal computer-intrusion statute and they have been so charged. See United States | |
Netvksho. et al.. No. 18-cr-215 (D.D.C | |
Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to | |
the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was | |
not sufficient to support criminal charges. Among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to | |
charge any Campaign official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian | |
principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks's releases of hacked | |
materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation. Further, the evidence | |
was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with | |
representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election. | |
Third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump | |
Campaign lied to the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated | |
individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian | |
election interference. The Office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal false- | |
statements statute. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about | |
his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. George | |
Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to | |
investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the | |
professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of | |
thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to U1 | |
making false statements to Congress about the Trump Moscow Droiect | |
And in February 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that | |
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Manafort lied to the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications | |
with Konstantin Kilimnik about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine. | |
* * * | |
The Office investigated several other events that have been publicly reported to involve | |
potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigation established that interactions | |
between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign officials both at the candidate's April | |
2016 foreign policy speech in Washington, D.C., and during the week of the Republican National | |
Convention were brief, public, and non-substantive. And the investigation did not establish that | |
one Campaign official's efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing | |
assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia. The | |
investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September | |
2016 at Sessions's Senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential | |
campaign. | |
The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete | |
picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. Some individuals invoked | |
their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Office's | |
judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of other | |
witnesses and information-such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be | |
members of the media-in light of internal Department of Justice policies. See, e.g., Justice | |
Manual §§ 9-13.400, 13.410. Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was | |
presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter (or | |
"taint") team. Even when individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes | |
provided information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges | |
described above. And the Office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as | |
well-numerous witnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United | |
States. | |
Further, the Office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct | |
we investigated-including some associated with the Trump Campaign--deleted relevant | |
communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature | |
encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records. In | |
such cases, the Office was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to | |
contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared | |
inconsistent with other known facts. | |
Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Office | |
believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identified gaps, | |
the Office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional | |
light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report. | |
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I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION | |
On May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein-then serving as Acting | |
Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General | |
Jeff Sessions on March 2, 2016-appointed the Special Counsel "to investigate Russian | |
interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters." Office of the Deputy Att'y | |
Gen., Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference | |
with the 20]6 Presidential Election and Related Matters, May 17, 2017) ("Appointment Order"). | |
Relying on "the authority vested" in the Acting Attorney General, "including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, | |
510, and 515," the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel "in | |
order to discharge [the Acting Attorney General's] responsibility to provide supervision and | |
management of the Department of Justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the | |
Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election." Appointment Order | |
(introduction). "The Special Counsel," the Order stated, "is authorized to conduct the investigation | |
confirmed by then-FBI Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select | |
Committee on Intelligence on March 20, 2017," including: | |
(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals | |
associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump, and | |
(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation, and | |
(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). | |
Appointment Order 11 (b). Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel "the authority to investigate | |
and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the | |
Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, | |
and intimidation of witnesses." 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). The authority to investigate "any matters | |
that arose ... directly from the investigation," Appointment Order 11 (b)(ii), covers similar crimes | |
that may have occurred during the course of the FBI's confirmed investigation before the Special | |
Counsel's appointment. "If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate," the | |
Order further provided, "the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from | |
the investigation of these matters." Id. 11 (c). Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable | |
"Sections 600.4 through 600. 10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations." Id 11 (d). | |
The Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the Special Counsel's | |
investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda. A memorandum dated August 2, 2017, | |
explained that the Appointment Order had been "worded categorically in order to permit its public | |
release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals." It then | |
confirmed that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investigate | |
allegations that three Trump campaign officials-Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George | |
Papadopoulos-"committed a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian government officials | |
with respect to the Russian government's efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election." | |
The memorandum also confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate certain other | |
matters, including two additional sets of allegations involving Manafort (crimes arising from | |
payments he received from the Ukrainian government and crimes arising from his receipt of loans | |
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from a bank whose CEO was then seeking a position in the Trump Administration); allegations | |
that Papadopoulos committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli | |
government, and four sets of allegations involving Michael Flynn, the former National Security | |
Advisor to President Trump. | |
On October 20, 2017, the Acting Attorney General confirmed in a memorandum the | |
Special Counsel's investigative authority as to several individuals and entities. First, "as part of a | |
full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 | |
presidential election," the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate "the pertinent activities | |
of Michael Cohen, Richard Gates, , Roger Stone, and_ | |
" "Confirmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals," the memorandum | |
. • | |
stressed, "does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a determination that any of them has | |
committed a crime." Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the | |
Special Counsel's authority to investigate "leads relate[d] to Cohen's establishment and use of | |
Essential Consultants LLC to, inter alia, receive funds from Russian-backed entities." Third, the | |
memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate individuals and entities | |
who were possibly engaged in "jointly undertaken activity" with existing subjects of the | |
investigation, including Paul Manafort. Finally, the memorandum described an FBI investigation | |
opened before the Special Counsel's appointment into "allegations that [then-Attomey General | |
Jeff Sessions] made false statements to the United States Senate[,]" and confirmed the Special | |
Counsel's authority to investigate that matter. | |
The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority "to | |
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney. 95 28 C.F.R. | |
§600.6. Like a U.S. Attorney's Office, the Special Counsel's Office considered a range of | |
classified and unclassified information available to the FBI in the course of the Office's Russia | |
investigation, and the Office structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions | |
of federal crimes (assuming that one or more crimes were identified that warranted prosecution). | |
There was substantial evidence immediately available to the Special Counsel at the inception of | |
the investigation in May 2017 because the FBI had, by that time, already investigated Russian | |
election interference for nearly 10 months. The Special Counsel's Office exercised its judgment | |
regarding what to investigate and did not, for instance, investigate every public report of a contact | |
between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals and entities. | |
The Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian | |
government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain proceedings associated | |
with the Office's work remain ongoing. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney | |
General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components | |
of the Department of Justice and FBI. Appendix D lists those transfers. | |
Two district courts confirmed the breadth of the Special Counsel's authority to investigate | |
Russia election interference and links and/or coordination with the Trump Campaign. See United | |
States v. Manafort, 312 F. Supp. 3d 60, 79-83 (D.D.C. 2018), United States V. Manafort, 321 F. | |
Supp. 3d 640, 650-655 (E.D. Va. 2018). In the course of conducting that investigation, the Office | |
periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the | |
Special Counsel's authority established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with | |
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the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law | |
enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and to the FBI. | |
Appendix D summarizes those referrals. | |
* * * | |
To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him, the Special | |
Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19 attorneys-five of whom joined the | |
Office from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned from other Department of Justice | |
components. These attorneys were assisted by a filter team of Department lawyers and FBI | |
personnel who screened materials obtained via court process for privileged information before | |
turning those materials over to investigators, a support staff of three paralegals on detail from the | |
Department's Antitrust Division, and an administrative staff of nine responsible for budget, | |
finance, purchasing, human resources, records, facilities, security, information technology, and | |
administrative support. The Special Counsel attorneys and support staff were co-located with and | |
worked alongside approximately 40 FBI agents, intelligence analysts, forensic accountants, a | |
paralegal, and professional staff assigned by the FBI to assist the Special Counsel's investigation. | |
Those "assigned" FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times, the matters on | |
which they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel.' | |
During its investigation the Office issued more than 2,800 subpoenas under the auspices of | |
a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia, executed nearly 500 search-and-seizure warrants, | |
obtained more than 230 orders for communications records under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), obtained | |
almost 50 orders authorizing use of pen registers, made 13 requests to foreign governments | |
pursuant to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, and interviewed approximately 500 witnesses, | |
including almost 80 before a grand jury. | |
* * * | |
From its inception, the Office recognized that its investigation could identify foreign | |
intelligence and counterintelligence information relevant to the FBI's broader national security | |
mission. FBI personnel who assisted the Office established procedures to identify and convey | |
such information to the FBI. The FBI's Counterintelligence Division met with the Office regularly | |
for that purpose for most of the Office's tenure. For more than the past year, the FBI also | |
embedded personnel at the Office who did not work on the Special Counsel's investigation, but | |
whose purpose was to review the results of the investigation and to send-in writing-summaries | |
of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to FBIHQ and FBI Field Offices. | |
Those communications and other correspondence between the Office and the FBI contain | |
information derived from the investigation, not all of which is contained in this Volume. This | |
Volume is a summary. It contains, M the Office's judgment, that information necessary to account | |
for the Special Counsel's prosecution and declination decisions and to describe the investigation's | |
main factual results. | |
1 FBI personnel assigned to the Special Counsel's Office were required to adhere to all applicable | |
federal law and all Department and FBI regulations, guidelines, and policies. An FBI attorney worked on | |
FBI-related matters for the Office, such as FBI compliance with all FBI policies and procedures, including | |
the FBl's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). That FBI attorney worked under FBI | |
legal supervision, not the Special Counsel's supervision. | |
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II. RUSS1AN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN | |
The first form of Russian election influence came principally from the Internet Research | |
Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and | |
companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord | |
Catering (collectively "Concord").2 The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large | |
U.S. audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.3 These operations | |
constituted "active measures" (aKT14BHL1e Meponpusmasr), a term that typically refers to operations | |
conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs.4 | |
The IRA and its employees began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014. | |
Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages | |
designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed divisive U.S. | |
political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists. Over time, these | |
social media accounts became a means to reach large U.S. audiences. IRA employees travelled to | |
the United States in mid-2014 on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and | |
photographs for use in their social media posts. | |
IRA employees posted derogatory information about a number of candidates in the 2016 | |
U.S. presidential election. By early to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump | |
Campaign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry | |
out those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the names ofU.S. | |
persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their | |
Russian association, communicated electronically with individuals associated with the Trump | |
Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the | |
staging of political rallies.5 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons | |
knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA's interference operation. | |
By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U.S. | |
persons through their social media accounts. Multiple IRA-controlled Facebook groups and | |
2 The Office is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measures | |
operations targeting the United States. Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those reports, | |
and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of Justice and FBI. | |
31 | |
see also SM-2230634, serial 44 (analysis). The FBI case number cited here, and other FBI case numbers | |
identified in the report, should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given the context. The report contains | |
additional law enforcement sensitive information. | |
4 As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges | |
against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the | |
United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Volume l, Section V.A, infra, Indictment, United States | |
v. Internet Research Agency, et al., 1:18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), Doc. l ("Internet Research Agency | |
Indictment"). | |
Internet Research Agency Indictment W 52, 54, 55(a), 56, 74 | |
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Instagrarn accounts had hundreds of thousands of U.S. participants. IRA-controlled Twitter | |
accounts separately had tens of thousands of followers, including multiple U.S. political figures | |
who retweeted IRA-created content. In November 2017, a Facebook representative testified that | |
Facebook had identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that collectively made 80,000 | |
posts between January 2015 and August 2017. Facebook estimated the IRA reached as many as | |
126 million persons through its Facebook accounts.6 In January 2018, Twitter announced that it | |
had identified 3,814 [RA-controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1.4 million | |
people Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.7 | |
A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency | |
The organization auickl new | |
The growth of the organization also led to a more detailed organizational structure | |
6 Social Media Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee | |
on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colirl Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook) ("We | |
estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA's | |
80,000 posts over the two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked, and followed by people on | |
Facebook, and, as a result, three times more people may have been exposed to a story that originated from | |
the Russian operation. Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served | |
content from a Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period."). The Facebook | |
representative also testified that Facebook had identified 170 Instagram accounts that posted approximately | |
120,000 pieces of content during that time. Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via | |
Instagram. | |
7 Twitter, Update on Twister's Review of the 2016 US Election (Jan. 31, 2018). | |
8 See SM-2230634, serial 92. | |
9 | |
10 I ! lllllolol'ILI-l I I | |
I i n | |
See SM-2230634. serial 86 | |
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Two individuals headed the IRA's management: its general director, Mikhail Bystrov, and | |
its executive director. Mikhail Burchik | |
As early as the snrinsz of 2014. the IRA began to hide its funding and activities | |
The IRA's U.S. ooeratiens are Dart of a larger set of interlocking operations known as | |
Project Lakhta | |
B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin | |
Until at least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord companies | |
funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the head of Concord. | |
131 • | |
14 See, e.g., SM-2230634, serials 9, 113 & 180 l | | |
l • • • I l | |
15I_ l 1»l0l1l»1»l | |
See SM-2230634. serials | |
131 & 204 | |
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Prigozhin was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasurv Department in December 2016 | |
Numerous media | |
sources have reported on Prigozhin's ties to Putin, and the two have appeared together in public | |
photographs." | |
19 U.S. Treasury Department, "Treastuy Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with | |
Russia's Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine" (Dec. 20, 2016). | |
22 See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by US., Is Known | |
as "Putin 's Cook", New York Times (Feb. 16, 2018). | |
25 | |
I! • see also SM- | |
2230634. serial 113 130 | |
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26 I | |
271 | |
28 The term "troll" refers to internet users-in this context, paid operatives-who post inflammatory | |
or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites. | |
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IRA emolovees were aware that Pri2ozhin was involved in the IRA's U.S. operations | |
In May | |
2016, IRA employees, claiming to be U.S. social activists and administrators of Facebook groups, | |
recruited U.S. persons to hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read "Happy | |
55th Birthdav Dear Boss." as an homage to Prigozhin (whose 55th birthday was on June 1, 2016 | |
C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections | |
1. The IRA Ranlps Up U.S. Operations As Early is 2014 | |
The IRA's U.S. operations sought to influence public opinion through online media and | |
forums. By the spring of 2014, the IRA began to consolidate U.S. operations within a sin je | |
eneral department, known intemallv as the "Translator" (l`IepeBo,n=1nK) department | |
IRA subdivided the Translator Department into different | |
responsibilities, ranging from operations on different social media platforms to analytics to | |
29 See SM-2230634, | |
serials 131 & 204. | |
30 See SM-2230634, serial 156. | |
Internet Research Agency Indictment 11 l2(b b ), see also 5/26/16 Facebook acM e O es O sages, I e D | |
1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) & | |
see also SM-2230634. serial 189 | |
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graphics and IT. | |
See SM-2230634. serial 205 | |
See SM-2230634. serial 204 | |
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IRA employees also traveled to the United States on intelligence-gathering missions. In | |
June 2014, four IRA employees applied to the U.S. Department of State to enter the United States, | |
while lying about the purpose of their trip and claiming to be four friends who had met at a party." | |
Ultimately, two IRA employees-Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova-received visas and | |
entered the United States on June 4, 2014. | |
Prior to traveling. Krvlova and Boeacheva com led itineraries and instructions for the tri | |
ss See sM-2230634, serials 150 & 172 l | | |
l I 1 | |
• | |
l | l l • | |
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2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media_ Accounts | |
Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on | |
different U.S. social media platforms. The IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the | |
social media accounts as "specialists."42 Starting as early as 2014, the IRA's U.S. operations | |
included social media specialists focusing on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.43 The IRA later | |
added specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts.44 | |
Initially, the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts | |
of U.S. persons.45 By early 2015, the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public | |
social media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots | |
organizations. In certain cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations. | |
For example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, @TEN_GOP, purported to be connected to the | |
Tennessee Republican Party.'*6 More commonly, the IRA created accounts in the names of | |
fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to pose as anti- | |
immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black Lives Matter protestors, and other U.S. social and | |
political activists. | |
The IRA closely monitored the activity of its social media accounts | |
40l_ | |
See SM-2230634. serial 179 | |
45 See, e.g., Facebook ID 100011390466802 (Alex Anderson), Facebook ID 100009626173204 | |
(Andrea Hansen), Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Williams); Facebook ID 100013640043337 | |
(Lakisha Richardson). | |
46 The account claimed to be the "Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans" and made posts | |
that appeared to be endorsements of the state political party. See, e.g., @TEN_GOP, 4/3/16 Tweet | |
("Tennessee GOP backs @rea1Dona1dTrump period #makeAmericagreatagain #tngop #tennessee #gop"). | |
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ort for the Trump Campaign By February 2016, internal IRA documents referred to su | |
directions to IRA and opposition to candidate Clinton For example | |
operators | |
Main idea: Use any opportunity to criticize Hillary [Clinton] and the rest (except | |
Sanders and Trump - we suDDort them "50 | |
The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued throughout 2016. In 2016 | |
internal reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group "Secured Borders," the | |
47 | |
4s See, et-, SM-2230634 serial 131 , | |
49 The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially announced her | |
presidential campaign. IRA-controlled social media accounts criticized Clinton's record as Secretar of | |
my | |
State and promoted various critiques of her candidacy. The IRA also used other techniques | |
See SM-2230634. serial 70 | |
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author criticized the "lower number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton" and reminded | |
the Facebook specialist "it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton."5 I | |
IRA employees also acknowled ed that their work focused on influencin the U.S | |
residential election. | |
3. U.S. Operatio1;s_Through Facebook | |
Manv IRA operations used Facebook accounts created and operated by its specialists | |
IRA Facebook groups active | |
during the 2016 campaign covered a range of political issues and included purported conservative | |
53 ill lllllllllo* | |
54 I | |
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groups (with names such as "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Immigrants," "Secured Borders," and | |
"Tea Party News"), purported Black social justice groups ("Black Matters," "Blacktivist," and | |
"Don't Shoot Us"), LGBTQ groups ("LGBT United"), and religious groups ("United Muslims of | |
America"). | |
Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing number of materials supporting | |
the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign. For example, on May 31, 2016, the | |
operational account "Matt Skiber" began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook | |
groups asking them to help plan a "pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower."55 | |
To reach larger U.S. audiences, the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that | |
promoted the IRA groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience members. According to Facebook, | |
the IRA purchased over 3,500 advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately | |
$100,000.56 | |
During the U.S. presidential campaign, many IRA-purchased advertisements explicitly | |
supported or opposed a presidential candidate or promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA | |
(discussed below). As early as March 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly | |
opposed the Clinton Campaign. For example, on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an | |
advertisement depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, "If one day God lets | |
this liar enter the White House as a president - that day would be a real national tragedy."57 | |
Similarly, on April 6, 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements for its account "Black Matters" | |
calling for a "flashmob" of U.S. persons to "take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or | |
#nohillary20l6."58 IRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few | |
exceptions, negative." | |
IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely supported his | |
campaign. The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing the Trump Campaign was | |
purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought an advertisement for its Instagram account "Tea | |
Party News" asking U.S. persons to help them "make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters" | |
by uploading photos with the hashtag "#KIDS4TRUMP."6° In subsequent months, the IRA | |
purchased dozens of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the | |
Facebook groups "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Invaders," and "Secured Borders." | |
5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to 1D _ | |
55 | |
5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID | |
se Social Media Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee | |
on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (1 l/l/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook). | |
57 3/18/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505 152575. | |
58 4/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6043740225319. | |
59 See SM-2230634, serial 213 (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger | |
set provided by Facebook). | |
60 4/19/t6 Facebook Advertisement ID 604515 l094235. | |
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Collectively, the IRA's social media accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons. | |
Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. For example, | |
at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA's "United Muslims of | |
America" Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, the "Don't Shoot Us" Facebook group had | |
over 250,000 followers, the "Being Patriotic" Facebook group had over 200,000 followers, and | |
the "Secured Borders" Facebook group had over 130,000 followers.6! According to Facebook, in | |
total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, | |
and these posts reached at least 29 million U.S persons and "may have reached an estimated 126 | |
million people."62 | |
4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter | |
A number of IRA em lo ees ass ned to the Translator Department served as Twitter | |
specialists | |
I | |
The 1RA's Twitter operations involved two strafe mies. Firs lI t ° , SIRA spec s ie a c l l i a s t I s S o s p O ee r r a a t e e d | |
certain Twitter accounts to create individual U.S. Dersonas | |
Separately, the IRA operated a network of automated Twitter accounts | |
(commonly referred to as a bot network) that enabled the IRA to amplify existing content | |
on Twitter. | |
a. Individualized Accounts | |
61 See Facebook ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America); Facebook ID | |
1157233400960126 (Don't Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being Patriotic); Facebook ID | |
757183957116200 (Sacred Borders) | |
62 Social Media Influence in the 2016 US. Eleelion, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee | |
on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (1 l/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook). | |
63 I | |
64 r | |
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The IRA operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its Facebook | |
accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts while also communicating with | |
U.S. Twitter users directly (through public tweeting or Twitter's private messaging). | |
The IRA used many of these accounts to attempt to influence U.S. audiences on the | |
election. Individualized accounts used to influence the U.S. presidential election included | |
@TEN_GOP (described above); @jenn_abrams (claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with | |
70,000 followers), @Pamela_Moorel3 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000 | |
followers), and @America_l st_ (an anti-immigration person with 24,000 followers).67 In May | |
2016, the IRA created the Twitter account @march_for_trump, which promoted IRA-organized | |
rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described below).68 | |
Using these accounts and others, the IRA provoked reactions from users and the media. Multiple | |
IRA-posted tweets gained popularity.70 U.S. media outlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled | |
accounts and attributed them to the reactions of real U.S. persons. Similarly, numerous high- | |
66 I | |
67 Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNewsUS (an account with 3,800 followers | |
that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material). | |
68 See @march_for_trurnp, 5/30/16 Tweet (first post from account). | |
70 For example, one IRA account tweeted, "To those people, who hate the Confederate flag. Did | |
you know that the flag and the war wasn't about slavery, it was all about money." The tweet received over | |
40,000 responses. @Jenn_Abrams 4/24/17 (2:37 p.m.) Tweet. | |
71 Josephine Lukito & Chris Wells, Most Major Outlets Have Used Russian Tweets as Sources for | |
Partisan Opinion: Study, Columbia Journalism Review (Mar. 8, 2018), see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain | |
#New YorkValues to Ted Cruz, Washington Post (Jan. 15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet), People Are Slamming | |
the CI/lfor Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump, U.S. News & World Report (Dec. 12, 2016). | |
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profile U.S. persons, including former Ambassador Michael McFaul,72 Roger Stone," Sean | |
Hannity,74 and Michael Flynn Jr.,75 retweeted or responded to tweets posted to these IRA- | |
controlled accounts. Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA | |
tweets (discussed below). | |
b. IRA BotnetActivities | |
* | |
In January 2018, Twitter publicly identified 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the | |
IRA." According to Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these | |
accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, "approximately 8.4% of which were election- | |
72 @McFaL1l 4/30/16 Tweet (responding to tweet by @Jenn_Abrams). | |
73 @RogerJStoneJr 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moorel3), @RogerJStoneJr 4/26/16 | |
Tweet (same). | |
74 seanhannity 6/21/17 Tweet (retweetin g Pamela_Moorel3). | |
75 @mflynnJR 6/22/17 Tweet ("RT @Jenn_Abrams: This is what happens when you add the voice | |
over of an old documentary about mental illness onto video of SJWs..."). | |
76 A botnet refers to a network of private computers or accounts controlled as a group to send | |
specific automated messages. On the Twitter network, botnets can be used to promote and republish | |
("retweet") specific tweets or hashtags in order for them to gain larger audiences. | |
77 I | |
78 I | |
79 Eli Rosenberg, Twitter to Tell 677,000 Users they Were Had by the Russians. Some Signs Show | |
the Problem Continues, Washington Post (Jan. 19, 2019). | |
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related."80 Twitter also announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who | |
Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.81 | |
5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies | |
The IRA organized and promoted political rallies inside the United States while posing as | |
U.S. grassroots activists. First, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas | |
(Facebook groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. The | |
IRA then sent a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media account asking | |
them to attend the event. From those who responded with interest in attending, the IRA then sought | |
a U.S. person to serve as the event's coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would | |
tell the U.S. person that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict | |
or because they were somewhere else in the United States.82 The IRA then further promoted the | |
event by contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them to speak with the coordinator.83 | |
After the event, the IRA posted videos and photographs of the event to the IRA's social media | |
accounts.8 | |
The Office identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of | |
a rally was a "confederate rally" in November 2015.85 The IRA continued to organize rallies even | |
after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The attendance at rallies varied. Some rallies appear to | |
have drawn few (if any) participants, while others drew hundreds. The reach and success of these | |
rallies was closely monitored | |
80 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018). Twitter | |
also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected to the Russian government, which tweeted | |
more than a million times in the ten weeks before the election. | |
81 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018). | |
82 8/20/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID | |
~ | |
83 See, e.g., 7/21/16 E I mal , > . O lo S s h s m 'lt1 on 024 gmailcom to | |
, 7/21/16 Email, | |
josl1milton024@gmail.com to | |
84 @march_for_trurnp 6/25/16 Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower). | |
85 Instagram ID 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post ("Good evening buds! Well I am | |
planning to organize a confederate rally [...] in Houston on the 14 of November and I want more people | |
to attend."). ' | |
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From June 2016 until the end of the presidential campaign, | |
almost all of the U.S. rallies organized by the IRA focused on the | |
U.S. election, often promoting the Trump Campaign and opposing | |
the Clinton Campaign. Pro-Trump rallies included three in New | |
York, a series of pro-Trump rallies in Florida in August 2016; and a | |
series of pro-Trump rallies in October 2016 in Pennsylvania. The | |
Florida rallies drew the attention of the Trump Campaign, which | |
posted about the Miami rally on candidate Trump's Facebook | |
account (as discussed below).86 | |
Many of the same IRA employees who oversaw the IRA's | |
social media accounts also conducted the day-to-day recruiting for | |
olitical rallies inside the United States | |
IRA Poslerfor Pennsylvania | |
Rallies organized by the IRA | |
6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons | |
As early as 2014, the IRA instructed its employees to target U.S. persons who could be | |
used to advance its operational goals. Initiall recruitment focused on U.S ersons who could | |
amblifv the content posted by the IRA | |
IRA employees frequently used I Twitter, Facebook, and | |
Instagram to contact and recruit U.S. persons who followed the group. The IRA recruited U.S. | |
ersons from across the political spectrum For example, the IRA targeted the family of; | |
and a number of black social justice activists | |
86 The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts. | |
See, e.g., Facebook ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber), Facebook [D 1601685693432389 (Being | |
Patriotic), Twitter Account @march_for__trump, beingpatriotic@gmail.com. (Rallies were organized in | |
New York on June 25, 2016, Florida on August 20, 2016; and Pennsylvania on October 2, 2016.) | |
87 I | |
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while posing as a grassroots group called "Black Matters us."89 In February 2017, the persons | |
"Black F ist" (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when contacted | |
by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to offer classes sponsored by | |
Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of conservative social media groups to promote | |
IRA-generated content,90 as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking | |
around New York city dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask).9l | |
las the IRA's online audience became larger, the IRA tracked U.S. | |
persons with whom they communicated and had successfully tasked (with tasks ranging from | |
organizing rallies to taking pictures with certain political messages | |
B9 3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID | |
6051652423528, 10/26/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6055238604687; 10/27/16 Facebook Message, ID | |
_& ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks). | |
90 8/19/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID | |
9] 12/8/16 Email, 1'obot@craigslist.org to beingpatriotic@gmail.com (confirming Craigslist | |
advertisement). | |
92 8/18-19/16 Twitter DMS, @march_for_trump & | |
93 See 11/11-27/16 Facebook Messa ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks) & 1 | |
II (arranging to pay for plane tickets and for a | |
bull horn). | |
94 See 9/10/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) & | |
(discussing payment for rally supplies); 8/18/16 Twitter DM | |
@march_for_trump to (discussing payment for construction materials) | |
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7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign | |
The investigation identified two different forms of connections between the IRA and | |
members of the Trump Campaign. (The investigation identified no similar connections between | |
the IRA and the Clinton Campaign.) First, on multiple occasions, members and surrogates of the | |
Trump Campaign promoted-typically by linking, retweeting, or similar methods of reposting- | |
pro-Trump or anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-controlled social media | |
accounts. Additionally, in a few instances, IRA employees represented themselves as U.S. persons | |
to communicate with members of the Trump Campaign in an effort to seek assistance and | |
coordination on IRA-organized political rallies inside the United States. | |
a. Trump Campaign Promotion ofIliA Political Materials | |
Among the U.S. "leaders of public opinion" targeted by the IRA were various members | |
and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. In total, Trump Campaign affiliates promoted dozens of | |
tweets, posts, and other political content created by the IRA. | |
Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter account @TEN_GOP were cited or retweeted by | |
- multiple Trump Campaign officials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump Jr.,96 Eric | |
96 See, e.g., @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Thousands of | |
names changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police investigating #VoterFraud. #DrainTheSwamp."), | |
@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/2/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING: #VoterFraud by counting tens of | |
thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida."), | |
@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: This vet passed away last month before he could | |
vote for Trump. Here he is in his #MAGA hat. #voted #ElectionDay."). Trump Jr. retweeted additional | |
@TEN_GOP content subsequent to the election. | |
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Trump,97 Kellyann Conway," Brad Parscale," and Michael T. Flynn.I00 These posts included | |
allegations of voter fraud,l01 as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled | |
classified information.102 | |
A November 7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled | |
Twitter account @Pame1a_Moore13 was retweeted by | |
Donald J. Trump ]r.103 | |
On September 19, 2017, President Trump's personal | |
account @realDonaldTrump responded to a tweet from | |
the IRA-controlled account @l0__gop (the backup | |
account of @TEN_GOP, which had already been | |
deactivated by Twitter). The tweet read: "We love you, | |
Mr. Pres1dent1"l04 | |
IRA employees monitored the reaction of the Trump | |
Campaign and, later, Trump Administration officials to their | |
tweets. For example, on August 23, 2016, the IRA- | |
controlled persons "Matt Skiber" Facebook account sent a | |
message to a U.S. Tea Party activist, writing that "Mr. | |
Trump posted about our event in Miami! This is great!aa105 | |
The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate | |
Trump's Facebook account, which included a post about the Screenshot of Trump Facebook | |
August 20, 2016 political rallies organized by the IRA. Account 090m Mat! Skiber) | |
97 @EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press | |
conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption & #Vote1'Fraud #debatenight #TrumpB"). | |
98 @KellyannePolls 11/6/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: Mother of jailed sailor: 'Hold Hillary to | |
same standards as my son on Classified info' #hillarysemail #WeinerGate."). | |
99 @parscale 10/15/16 Tweet ("Thousands of deplorables chanting to the media: 'Tell The Truthl' | |
RT if you are also done w/ biased Media! #FridayFeeling"). | |
100 @Ger1Flynn 11/7/16 (retweeting @TEN_GOP post that included in part "@realDonaldTrump | |
& @mike_pence will be our next POTUS & VPOTUS."). | |
101 @TEN_GOP 10/11/16 Tweet ("North Carolina finds 2,214 voters over the age of l 10! !"). | |
102 @TEN_GOP 11/6/16 Tweet ("Mother of jailed sailor: 'Hold Hillary to same standards as my | |
son on classified info #hillaryemail #WeinerGate."'). | |
103 @DonaldJTrumpJr 1 1/7/16 Tweet ("RT @Pamela_Moore 13: Detroit residents speak out against | |
the failed policies of Obama, Hillary & democrats ...."). | |
104 @realDonaldTrump 9/19/17 (7:33 p.m.) Tweet ("THANK YOU for your support Miami! My | |
team just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY, yesterday! I love you - and there is no | |
question - TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!"). | |
105 8/23/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID | |
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6(©3 p. | |
I | |
b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies | |
Starting in June 2016, the IRA contacted different U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump | |
Campaign in an effort to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organized rallies inside the United States. In | |
all cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while claiming to be U.S. political activists working on | |
behalf of a conservative grassroots organization. The IRA's contacts included requests for signs | |
and other materials to use at rallies,'07 as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate | |
logistics.!08 While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for | |
example, agreeing to set aside a number of signs), the investigation has not identified evidence | |
that any Trump Campaign official understood the requests were coming from foreign nationals. | |
* * * | |
In sum, the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 20 16 presidential election | |
through the "active measures" social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization | |
funded by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled. As explained further in Volume I, Section | |
V.A, inj9*a, the Office concluded (and a grand jury has alleged) that Prigozhin, his companies, and | |
IRA employees violated U.S. law through these operations, principally by undermining through | |
deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. | |
elections. | |
.l | |
107 See, e.g., 8/16/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to @donaldtrump.com (asking for | |
T rum /Pence signs for ii Florida rally), 8/18/16 Email, ]oshmilton024@gmail.com to | |
@donaldtrump.com (a ld for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally), 8/12/16 Email, | |
]oshmilton024@gmail.com to @donaldtrump.com (asking for "contact phone numbers for Trump | |
» | |
Campaign affiliates" in various Florida cities and signs). 0 | |
108 8/15/16 Email, to joshmilton 024 mai1.com ask if to a dd to | |
locations to the "Florida Goes Trump," list), 8/16/16 Email, to | |
I | |
joshmilton024@gmail.com (volunteering to send an email blast to followers). | |
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IH. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATiQNS | |
Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation's Main Intelligence Directorate | |
of the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers and email accounts of organizations, employees, | |
and volunteers supporting the Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign | |
chairman John Podesta. Starting in April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the | |
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National | |
Committee (DNC). The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign | |
employees, advisors, and volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents | |
from the compromised email accounts and networks.l09 The GRU later released stolen Clinton | |
Campaign and DNC documents through online personas, "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0," and later | |
through the organization WikiLeaks. The release of the documents was designed and timed to | |
interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign. | |
The Trump Cam aien showed interest in the WikiLeaks releases and, in the summer and | |
fall of 2016 | |
After | |
WikiLeaks's first Clinton-related release the Trump Campaign | |
staved in contact about WikiLeaks's activities. The investigation was unable to resolve | |
WikiLeaks's release of the stolen Podesta emails on October 7 | |
2016, the same day a video from years earlier was published of Trump using graphic language | |
about women. | |
A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign | |
1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign | |
Two military units of the GRU carried out the computer intrusions into the Clinton | |
Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units 26165 and 74455910 Military Unit 26165 is a GRU | |
Cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political, governmental, and non-governmental | |
organizations outside of Russia, including in the United States.m The unit was sub-divided into | |
departments with different specialties. One department, for example, developed specialized | |
malicious software malware"), while another de a G rm €P a 3 m IT ent conducted I large-scale spearphishing | |
campaigns.ll2 a bitcoin mining operation to | |
109 As discussed in Section V below, our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from | |
the hacldng of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions, in violation of | |
18 U.S.C. §§1030 and 371. See Volume I, Section V.B, infra, Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, No. | |
1:18-cr-215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018), Doc. 1 ("Nezyksho Indictment"). | |
110 Ne tyksho Indictment 'II 1. | |
Ill Separate from this Office's indictment of GRU officers, in October 2018 a grand jury sitting in | |
the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain members of Unit 26165 with | |
hacking the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and other international sport | |
associations. United States v. Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, No. 18-263 (W.D. Pa.). | |
112. A spearphishing email is designed to appear as though it originates from a trusted source, and | |
solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or network, or causes the recipient to | |
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secure bitcoins used to purchase computer infrastructure used in hacking operations."3 | |
Military Unit 74455 is a related GRU unit with multiple departments that engaged in Cyber | |
operations. Unit 74455 assisted in the release of documents stolen by Unit 26165, the promotion | |
of those releases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by | |
the GRU. Officers from Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of | |
elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software and other technology | |
related to the administration of U.S. elections.l 14 | |
Beginning in mid-March 2016, Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the | |
DCCC and DNC, as well as email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign:"5 | |
Unit 26165 used IT to learn about | |
different Democratic websites. includinsz democ1'ats.or2. hillarvclinton.com. dnc.orQ. and | |
dccc.or | |
began before the GRU had obtained any credentials or gained access | |
to these networks, indicating that the later DCCC and DNC intrusions were not crimes of | |
opportunity but rather the result of targeting.l16 | |
GRU officers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email | |
accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers. Between March 10, 2016 and March | |
15, 2016, Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spearphishing emails to email | |
accounts at hillaryclinton.com. Starting on March 15, 2016, the GRU began targeting Google | |
email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, along with a smaller number of dnc.org | |
email acc0unts_117 | |
The GRU spearphishing operation enabled it to gain access to numerous email accounts of | |
Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers, including campaign chairman John Podesta, junior | |
volunteers assigned to the Clinton Campaign's advance team, informal Clinton Campaign | |
advisors, and a DNC employee." GRU officers stole tens of thousands of emails from | |
spearphishing victims, including various Clinton Campaign-related communications. | |
download malware that enables the sender to gain access to an account or network. Nelyksho Indictment | |
1] 10. | |
113 Bitcoin mining consists of unlocking new bitcoins by solving computational problems. IT | |
! kept its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform CEX.io. To make | |
purchases, the GRU routed funds into other accounts through transactions designed to obscure the source | |
of funds. Ne lyksho Indictment 1162. | |
114 Netyksho Indictment 'II 69. | |
115 Netyksho Indictment 'II 9. | |
116 See SM-2589105, serials 144 & 495. | |
118 | |
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2. Intrusions intq_the DCCC and DNC Networks | |
a. Initial Aceess | |
By no later than April 12, 2016, the GRU had gained access to the DCCC computer | |
network using the credentials stolen from a DCCC employee who had been successfully | |
spearphished the week before. Over the ensuing weeks, the GRU traversed the network, | |
identifying different computers connected to the DCCC network. By stealing network access | |
credentials along the way (including those of IT administrators with unrestricted access to the | |
system), the GRU compromised approximately 29 different computers on the DCCC network.l 19 | |
Approximately six days after first hacking into the DCCC network, on April 18, 2016, | |
GRU officers gained access to the DNC network via a virtual private network (VPN) connections | |
between the DCCC and DNC networks.I2I Between April 18, 2016 and June 8, 2016, Unit 26165 | |
compromised more than 30 computers on the DNC network, including the DNC mail server and | |
shared file server.122 | |
b. Implantation of Malwaf*e on DCCC and DNC Networks | |
Unit 26165 implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks two types of customized | |
malware,123 known as "X-Agent" and "X-Tunnel", Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool, and | |
rar.exe, a tool used in these intrusions to compile and compress materials for exfiltration. X-Agent | |
was a multi-function hacking tool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and | |
gather other data about the infected computers (e.g., file directories, operating systems).l24 X- | |
Tunnel was a hacking tool that created an encrypted connection between the victim DCCC/DNC | |
computers and GRU-controlled computers outside the DCCC and DNC networks that was capable | |
of large-scale data transfers.125 GRU officers then used X-Tunnel to exfiltrate stolen data from the | |
victim computers. | |
120 A VPN extends a private network, allowing users to send and receive data across public | |
networks (such as the internet) as if the connecting computer was directly connected to the private network. | |
The VPN in this case had been created to give a small number of DCCC employees access to certain | |
databases housed on the DNC network. Therefore, while the DCCC employees were outside the DNC's | |
private network, they could access parts of the DNC network from their DCCC computers. | |
SM-2589105-HACK. serial 5 | |
M-2589105-HACK. serial 5 | |
123 "Malware" is short for malicious software, and here refers to software designed to allow a third | |
party to infiltrate a computer without the consent or knowledge of the computer's user or operator. | |
124 | |
125 I | |
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To operate X-Agent and X-Tunnel on the DCCC and DNC networks, Unit 26165 officers | |
set up a group of computers outside those networks to communicate with the implanted | |
malware.126 The first set of GRU-controlled computers, known by the GRU as "middle servers," | |
sent and received messages to and from malware on the DNC/DCCC networks. The middle | |
servers, in tum, relayed messages to a second set of GRU-controlled com titers, labeled internally | |
by the GRU as an "AMS Panel." The AMS Panel served as a | |
nerve center through which GRU officers monitored and directed the malware's operations on the | |
DNC/DCCC networks.127 | |
The AMS Panel used to control X-Agent during the DCCC and DNC intrusions was housed | |
on a leased commuter located near Arizona 128 | |
126 In connection with these intrusions, the GRU used computers (virtual private networks, | |
dedicated servers operated by hosting companies, etc.) that it leased from third-party providers located all | |
over the world. The investigation identified rental a reements and payments for computers located in, inter | |
alia, all of which were used in the operations | |
targeting the U.S. election. | |
127 New)/ksho Indictment 1]25. | |
128 Ne tyksho Indictment 1]24(c). | |
129 Ne lyksho Indictment 'H 24(b). | |
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Unit 26165 officers appear to have stolen thousands of emails and attachments, which were later | |
released by WikiLeaks in July 2016.136 | |
B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials | |
The GRU's operations extended beyond stealing materials, and included releasing | |
documents stolen from the Clinton Campaign and its supporters. The GRU carried out the | |
anonymous release through two fictitious online personas that it created-DCLeaks and Guccifer | |
2.0-and later through the organization WikiLeaks. | |
1. DCLeaks | |
The GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April 19, 2016, when Unit 26165 | |
registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service that anonymized the registrant.137 Unit26165 | |
paid for the registration using a pool ofbitcoin that it had mined.138 The dcleaks.com landing page | |
pointed to different tranches of stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter. Other | |
dcleaks.com pages contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the | |
sender, recipient, and date of the email). To control access and the timing of releases, pages were | |
sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later made unrestricted to the public. | |
Starting in June 2016, the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website dcleaks.com, | |
including documents stolen from a number of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign. | |
These documents appeared to have originated from personal email accounts (in particular, Google | |
and Microsoft accounts), rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks. DCLeaks victims | |
included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign, a former DNC employee and Clinton Campaign | |
employee, and four other campaign volunteers.l39 The GRU released through dcleaks.com | |
thousands of documents, including personal identifying and financial information, internal | |
correspondence related to the Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising files and | |
information.'4° | |
136 Nelyksho Indictment ii 29. The last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated May | |
25, 2016, the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the DNC's email server. | |
Nefyksho Indictment ii 45 . | |
137 Ne tyksho Indictment 1] 35. Approximately a week before the registration of dcleaks.com, the | |
same actors attempted to re ister the website electionleaks.com using the same domain registration service. | |
138 See sM-2589105, serial 181, Netyksho Indictment 1121(a). | |
139111\1 | |
See, e.g., Internet Archive, "h https://dcleaks.com/" (archive date N N ov. 10 1 , 022 0 016). Additionally | |
DCLeaks released documents relating to emails belonging | |
to _, and emails from 2015 relating to Republican Party employees (under the portfolio name | |
"The United States Republican Party"). "The United States Republican Party" portfolio contained | |
approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members, PACS, campaigns, state parties, and businesses | |
dated between May and October 2015. According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same | |
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GRU officers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily | |
used to promote releases of materials.!41 The Facebook page was administered through a small | |
number of preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts.I42 | |
GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account @dcleaks_, | |
and the email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com to communicate privately with reporters and | |
other U.S. persons. GRU officers using the DCLeaks persons gave certain reporters early access | |
to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks.com | |
website that had not yet become public. For example, on July 14, 2016, GRU officers operating | |
under the DCLeaks persons sent a link and password for a non-public DCLeaks webpage to a U.S. | |
reporter via the Facebook account.143 Similarly, on September 14, 2016, GRU officers sent | |
reporters Twitter direct messages from @dcleaks_, with a password to another non-public part of | |
the dc1eaks.com website.l44 | |
The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March 2017. | |
2. Guccifer 2.0 | |
On June 14, 2016, the DNC and its Cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC | |
network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In the statements, the Cyber-response team | |
alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as "Fancy Bear") were | |
responsible for the breach.145 Apparently in response to that announcement, on June 15, 2016, | |
GRU officers using the person Guccifer 2.0 created a WordPress blog. In the hours leading up | |
to the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and | |
managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English, | |
including "some hundred sheets," "illuminati," and "worldwide known." Approximately two | |
hours after the last of those searches, Guccifer 2.0 published its first post, attributing the DNC | |
server hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phrases | |
that the GRU officers had searched for that day.l46 | |
Tennessee-based web-hosting company, called Smartech Corporation. William Bastone, RNC E-Mail Was, | |
In Fact, Hacked By Russians, The Smoking Gun (Dec. 13, 2016). | |
141 Netyksho Indictment1]38. | |
142 See, et., Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donovan). | |
143 7/14/16 Facebook Message, ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID | |
144 See I 9/14/16 Twit"Fer DM dcleaks _ to , 9/14/16 Twitter DM, | |
@dcleaks_ to . The messages read: "H1 https://t.co/QTvKUjQcOx pass: | |
KvFsg%* 14@gPgu&, enjoy ,)." | |
. 145 Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, | |
CrowdStrike Blog (June 14, 2016). CrowdStrike updated its post after the June 15, 2016 post by Guccifer | |
2.0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion. | |
146 Ne lyksho Indictment 1i'I41-42. | |
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That same day, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 WordPress blog to begin | |
releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC computer networks. The | |
Guccifer 2.0 persons ultimately released thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC | |
in a series of blog posts between June 15, 2016 and October 18, 2016.147 Released documents | |
included opposition research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing | |
potential criticisms of candidate Trump), internal policy documents (such as recommendations on | |
how to address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races, and | |
fundraising documents. Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states | |
(e.g., Florida and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential | |
election. | |
Beginning in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 persons to release | |
documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals. Specifically, on June 27, 2016, | |
Guccifer 2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide "exclusive | |
access to some leaked emails linked [to] Hillary Clinton's staff_»14s The GRU later sent the | |
reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks.com website that contained an | |
archive of emails stolen by Unit26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016.149 That | |
the Guccifer 2.0 persons provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website | |
tends to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of | |
people.l5° | |
The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2.0 into August 2016. For | |
example, on August 15, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persons sent a candidate for the U.S. Congress | |
documents related to the candidate's opponent.!5! On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persons | |
transferred approximately 2.5 gigabytes of Florida-related data stolen from the DCCC to a U.S. | |
blogger covering Florida politics.I52 On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persons sent a U.S. | |
reporter documents stolen from the DCCC pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement.153 | |
147 Releases of documents on the Guccifer 2.0 blog occurred on June 15, 2016, June 20, 2016, June | |
21, 2016, July 6, 2016, July 14, 2016; August 12, 2016, August 15, 2016, August 21, 2016, August 31, | |
2016, September 15, 2016, September 23, 2016; October 4, 2016, and October 18, 2016. | |
148 6/27/16 E mal' l, uccifer20@ao1.fr to (subject "leaked emails"); | |
149 6/27/16 Email, uccifer20@aol.h' to (s ub'ect "leaked emails" | |
see also 6/27/16 Email uccifer20@aol.fr to | |
(subject "leaked emails") (claiming DCLeaks was a "Wikileaks sub | |
project"). | |
150 Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in an | |
apparent effort to deflect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 were operated by the same | |
organization, the Guccifer 2.0 persons sent the reporter an email stating that DCLeaks was a "Wikileaks | |
sub project" and that Guccifer 2.0 had asked DCLeaks to release the leaked emails with "closed access" to | |
give reporters a preview of them. | |
151 Ne tyksho Indictment 1]43 (a) . | |
152 Ne lyksho Indictment1143(b). | |
153 Netyksho Indictment 11 43 (c). | |
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The GRU was also in contact through the Guccifer 2.0 persons with a former | |
Trump Cal'I'lDaiE¥] member | |
In early August 2016 Twitter's suspension of the | |
W Gucc I ifer 2.0 Twitter account. After it was reinstated, GRU officers posing as Guccifer 2.0 wrote | |
via private message, "thank u for writing back ... do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the | |
docs l posted'?" On August 17, 2016, the GRU added, "please tell me if i can help u anyhow ... | |
» | |
it would be a great pleasure to me." On September 9, 2016, the GRU- ln posing as l | |
Guccifer 2.0-referred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked "what do u | |
think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign." ¢ | |
responded, "pretty standard."155 The investigation did not identify evidence of other | |
communications between and Guccifer 2.0. | |
3. Use of WikiL9gks | |
In order to expand its interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the GRU units | |
transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton | |
Campaign to WikiLeaks. GRU officers used both the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas to | |
communicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter private messaging and through encrypted channels, | |
including possibly through WikiLeaks's private communication system. | |
a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign | |
WikiLeaks, and particularly its founder Julian Assange, privately expressed opposition to | |
candidate Clinton well before the first release of stolen documents. In November 2015, Assange | |
wrote to other members and associates of WikiLeaks that "[w]e believe it would be much better | |
for GOP to win ... Dems+Media+liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in their worst | |
qualities.... With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her worst qualities., | |
dems+media+neoliberals will be mute.... She's a bright, well connected, sadistic sociopath."l56 | |
In March 2016, WikiLeaks released a searchable archive of approximately 30,000 Clinton | |
emails that had been obtained through FOIA litigation.l57 While designing the archive, one | |
WikiLeaks member explained the reason for building the archive to another associate: | |
lorn | |
154 | |
1551 | |
156 11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaks et al. Assange | |
also wrote that, "GOP will generate a lot oposition [sic], including through dumb moves. Hillary will do | |
the same thing, but co-opt the liberal opposition and the GOP opposition. Hence hillary has greater freedom | |
to start wars than the GOP and has the will to do so." Id. | |
157 WikiLeaks, "Hillary Clinton Email Archive," available at https://wildleaks.org/clinton-emails/. | |
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[W]e want this repository to become "the place" to search for background on hillary's | |
plotting at the state department during 2009-2013.... Firstly because its useful and will | |
annoy Hillary, but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the US | |
election, because it [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more important leaks.158 | |
b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Gucci fer 2. 0 and DCLeaks | |
Shortly after the GRU's first release of stolen documents through dcleaks.com in June | |
2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persons to contact WildLeaks about possible | |
coordination in the future release of stolen emails. On June 14, 2016, @dcleaks_ sent a direct | |
message to @WikiLeaks, noting, "You announced your organization was preparing to publish | |
more Hillary's emails. We are ready to support you. We have some sensitive information too, in | |
particular, her financial documents. Let's do it togethe 0 r. e We h r a . t do you athi 0 nk a o b u out p m ubl a is h o i u ng ou u r IS n | |
info at the same moment? Thank "159 | |
Around the same time, WikiLeaks initiated communications with the GRU persons | |
Guccifer 2.0 shortly after it was used to release documents stolen from the DNC. On June 22, | |
2016, seven days after Guccifer 2.0's first releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used | |
Twitter's direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account and suggest that | |
Guccifer 2.0 "[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have | |
a much higher impact than what you are doing."160 | |
On July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer 2.0 through Twitter's private | |
messaging function, writing, "if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next twee [sic] | |
days prefable [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind | |
her after." The Guccifer 2.0 persons responded, "ok... i see." WikiLeaks also explained, "we | |
think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary ... so conflict between bernie and | |
hillary is interesting."l61 | |
c. The GR U's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks | |
Both the GRU and WikiLeaks sought to hide their communications, which has limited the | |
Office's ability to collect all of the communications between them. Thus, although it is clear that | |
the stolen DNC and Podesta documents were transferred from the GRU to WikiLeaks, _ | |
158 3/14/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to_ Less than two weeks earlier, the same | |
account had been used to send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton "in Whitehouse with her | |
bloodlutt and ambitions [sic] of empire with hawldsh liberal-interventionist appointees." 11/19/15 Twitter | |
Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaks et al. | |
159 6/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @wikiLea1<s. | |
160 Nelyksho Indictment 'H 47(a). | |
161 7/6/16 Twitter DMs, @WikiLeaks & @guccife1'_2. | |
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The Office was able to identify when the GRU (operating through its personas Guccifer 2.0 | |
and DCLeaks) transferred some of the stolen documents to WikiLeaks through online archives set | |
up by the GRU. Assange had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Embassy in London | |
England | |
On July 14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks an | |
email bearing the subject "big archive" and the message "a new attempt."163 The email contained | |
an encrypted attachment with the name "wk doc link .txt.gpg."I64 Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter | |
account, GRU officers sent WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on how to open it.165 On | |
July 18, 2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Guccifer 2.0 account that it had | |
"the lGb or so archive" and would make a release of the stolen documents "this week."l66 On | |
July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC | |
computer networks.167 The Democratic National Convention began three days later. | |
Similar communications occurred between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persons | |
DCLeaks. On September 15, 2016, @dcleaks wrote to @WikiLeaks, "hi there! I'm from DC | |
Leaks. How could we discuss some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach out to you via | |
your secured chat but getting no response. I've got something that might interest you. You won't | |
be disappointed, I promise."168 The WikiLeaks account responded, "Hi there," without further | |
elaboration. The @dcleaks_ account did not respond immediately. | |
The same day, the Twitter account @guccifer_2 sent @dcleaks_ a direct message, which | |
is the first known contact between the personas.169 During subsequent communications, the | |
163 This was hot the GRU's first attempt at transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June 29, 2016, the | |
GRU used a Guccifer 2.0 email accou t t n 0 se nd a a I t e enc red file to a WikiLeal<s email account. | |
6/29/16 Email, guccifer2@maiLcom (The email appears to have been | |
undelivered.) | |
"64 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28 (analysis). | |
165 6/27/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 to @WikiLeaks. | |
166 7/18/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks. | |
167 "DNC Email Archive," WikiLeaks (Jul. 22, 2016), available at https://wikilea1<s.org/dnc-emails. | |
168 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks . | |
169 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @guccifer_2 to @dcleaks_. | |
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Guccifer 2.0 person informed DCLeaks that WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and | |
arrange for a way to speak through encrypted emails.170 | |
An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks site revealed that the stolen | |
Podesta emails show a creation date of September 19, 2016.171 Based on information about | |
Assange's computer and its possible operating system, this date may be when the GRU staged the | |
stolen Podesta emails for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for | |
the DNC emails).172 The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken from | |
Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account, these documents had a creation date of | |
October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date the attachments were separately staged by | |
WikiLeaks on its site.173 | |
Beginning on September 20, 2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in | |
a brief exchange. On September 22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account dcleaksproject@gmaiI.com | |
sent an email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject "Submission" and the message "Hi from | |
DCLeaks." The email contained PGP-encr red message with the filename | |
"wiki _mail.txt.gpg."174 The email, however, bears a | |
number of similarities to the July 14, 2016 email in which GNU officers used the Guccifer 2.0 | |
persons to give WikiLeaks access to the archive of DNC files. On September 22, 2016 (the same | |
day of DCLeaks' email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account @dcleaks sent a single message to | |
WikiLeaks with the string of characters | |
The Office cannot rule out that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through | |
intermediaries who visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reporting identified | |
Andrew Miiller-Maguhn as a WikiLeaks associate who ma have assisted with the transfer of these | |
stolen documents to WikiLeaks 175 | |
170 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28, 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks. | |
171 See SM-2284941, serials 63 & 64 | |
At the time, certain Apple operating systems used a setting that left a | |
downloaded file's creation date the same as the creation date shown on the host computer. This would | |
explain why the creation date on WikiLeaks's version of the files was still September 19, 2016. See SM- | |
2284941, serial 6 | |
173 When WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails, its computer system | |
appears to have treated each attachment as a new file and given it a new creation date. See SM-2284941 , | |
serials 63 & 64. | |
174 See 9/22/16 Email, dcleaksproject@gmail.com [I | |
175 Ellen Nakashima et al., A German Hacker Overs a Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of | |
Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2018). | |
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On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the Podesta email | |
account. In total, WikiLeaks released 33 tranches of stolen emails between October 7, 2016 and | |
November 7, 2016. The releases included private speeches given by Clinton,l77 internal | |
communications between Podesta and other high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign,I78 | |
and correspondence related to the Clinton Foundation.'79 In total, WikiLeaks released over 50,000 | |
documents stolen from Podesta's personal email account. The last-in-time email released from | |
Podesta's account was dated March 21, 2016, two days after Podesta received a spearphishing | |
email sent by the GRU. | |
d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials | |
As reports attributing the DNC and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged, | |
WikiLeaks and Assange made several public statements apparently designed to obscure the source | |
of the materials that WikiLeaks was releasing. The file-transfer evidence described above and | |
other information uncovered during the investigation discredit WikiLeaks's claims about the | |
source of material that it posted. | |
Beginning in the summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements | |
about Seth Rich, a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016. The statements about | |
Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails. On August 9, 2016, | |
the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: "ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a | |
US$20k reward for information leading to conviction for the murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich."180 | |
Likewise, on August 25, 2016, Assange was asked in an interview, "Why are you so interested in | |
Seth Rich's killer'?" and responded, "We're very interested in anything that might be a threat to | |
alleged Wikileaks sources." The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by commenting, | |
"I know you don't want to reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you're suggesting a man | |
who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered." Assange replied, "If there's someone | |
who's potentially connected to our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious | |
179 Ne tyksho Indictment 1]43 . | |
180 @Wi1dLeaks 8/9/16 Tweet. | |
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circumstances, it doesn't necessarily mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious | |
matter...that type of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us."181 | |
After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was | |
behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by | |
WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to media reports, Assange told a U.S. | |
congressman that the DNC hack was an "inside job," and purported to have "physical proof' that | |
Russians did not give materials to Assange.182 | |
C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations | |
While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and | |
WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign | |
and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states. | |
1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims | |
On July 27, 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton's | |
personal office Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that | |
included the following: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails | |
that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press."l83 The "30,000 | |
emails" were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored | |
on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State. | |
Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU officers targeted for the first | |
time Clinton's personal office. After candidate Trump's remarks, Unit _ 26165 created and sent | |
malicious links targeting 15 email acc _ ounts at the domain .. including an email | |
account belonging to Clinton aide The investigation did not find evidence of earlier | |
GRU attempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was | |
able to identify these email accounts, which were not public.184 | |
Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service | |
On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate | |
copies of the DNC data usin Hlnction designed to allow users to produce backups of | |
databases (referred to as "snapshots"). The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving | |
181 See Assange: "Murdered DNC Sta]§%r Was 'Potential ' WikiLeaks Source, " Fox News (Aug. 25, | |
20l6)(containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly). | |
182 M. Raju & Z. Cohen, A GOP Congressman's Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assarzge, CNN | |
(May 23, 2018). | |
183 "Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails," YouTube Channel C~SPAN, | |
Posted 7/27/16, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uIUsWU (starting at 0:4l). | |
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them to _ account that they controlled, from there, the copies were moved to GRU- | |
controlled computers. The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloud- | |
based 3CCOLlI'lt.185 | |
2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections | |
In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also | |
targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included | |
U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and | |
county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.186 The GRU also | |
targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related | |
software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.l87 The | |
GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the | |
investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office | |
did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other | |
relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. | |
Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity. | |
By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer | |
networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental | |
entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a | |
technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local | |
website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).188 In one instance | |
in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State | |
Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained | |
access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,l89 and | |
extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.190 | |
GRU officers scanned state and local websites for | |
vulnerabilities. For exam je, over a two-da | |
eriod in July 2016, GRU officers _ | |
for vulnerabilities on websites of more than | |
two dozen states | |
Investigative Technique 185 Ne tyksho Indictment11 34, see also sM-2589105-HAcK, serial 29 | |
186 Ne lyksho Indictment 'H 69. | |
Netvksho Indictment 91 69 | |
188 | |
ll.il | |
189 | |
19011.\1 | |
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Similar for vulnerabilities continued through the election | |
Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved in election | |
administration and personnel at com ante p s a n in es volved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU | |
officers targeted employees of , a voting technology company that developed software | |
I | |
used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company | |
network. Similarly, in November 2016, the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email | |
accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U.S. election.l91 | |
The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software | |
(commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer.192 | |
The FBI was separately responsible for this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this | |
operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county | |
government. The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above, did not | |
undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so. | |
D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials | |
The Trump Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases of hacked materials | |
throughout the summer and fall of 2016 | |
1. | |
a. Background | |
Netvksho Indictment 1176 | |
192 11.11 | |
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b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks | |
On June 12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to "have emails relating | |
to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication,"194 but provided no additional context. | |
In debriefings with the Office. former deaf)utv camDai2n chairman Rick Gates said that | |
Gates recalled candidate | |
Trump being generally frustrated that the Clinton emails had not been found.'96 | |
Paul Manafort. who would later become camnaiszn chairman | |
197 | |
194 See Mahita Gajanan, Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democratic Convention, | |
Time (July 27, 2016) (quoting the June 12, 2016 television interview). | |
195 In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a superseding criminal | |
information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure | |
to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the | |
United States, as well as making false statements to our Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United | |
States v. Richard W Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195 ("Gates Superseding Criminal | |
Information"); Plea Agreement, United State5 v. Richard W Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), | |
Doc. 205 ("Gates Plea Agreement"). Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office | |
has deemed to be reliable. | |
196 Gates 10/25/18 302, at 1-2. | |
197 As explained further in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, infra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement | |
with our Office. We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and | |
before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of events in this report only when his | |
statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy, to identity issues on which Manafort's untruthful | |
responses may themselves be of evidentiary value, or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events, | |
even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible. His account appears here | |
principally because it aligns with those of other witnesses. | |
1981 | |
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Michael Cohen, former executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special | |
counsel to Donald J. Trump,l99 told the Office that he recalled an incident in which he was in | |
candidate Trump's office in Trump Tower | |
Cohen further told the Office that, after WikilQeaks's subsequent release of stolen WI | |
DNC emails in July 2016, candidate Trump said to Cohen something to the effect of, | |
202 | |
According to Gates, Manafort expressed excitement about the | |
release 203 Manafort, for his part, told the Office that, shortly after a e | |
WikiLeaks's July 22 release. Manafort also spoke with candidate Trum | |
Manafort also wanted to be kept apprised of any | |
199 In November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count | |
information charging him with making false statements to Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 100 l(a) & | |
(c). He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney's | |
Office in the Southern District of New York, after a referral from this Office. In the months leading up to | |
his false-statements guilty plea, Cohen met with our Office on multiple occasions for interviews and | |
provided information that the Office has generally assessed to be reliable and that is included in this report. | |
200 I | |
Cohen 9/18/18 302. at 10 | |
203 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4. | |
204 I | |
205 I | |
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developments with WikiLeaks and separately told Gates to keep in touch about future | |
WikiLeaks releases.206 | |
According to Gates, by the late summer of 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a | |
press strategy, a communications campaign and messaizin based on the possible release of | |
Clinton emails by WikiLeaks 207 | |
208 | |
wh h i 'l e TTrump and Gate a sw es ew re ed r r e i v r i l n v g ln to LaGuardia Airport | |
shortly after the call | |
candidate Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging information would be coming.209 | |
Corsi is an author who holds a doctorate in political science In 2016. Corsi also worked for the | |
media outlet WorldNetDailv (WND | |
206 | |
207 Gates 4/10/18 302, at 3; Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2. | |
208 nm | | |
209 Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4. | |
210 lem | |
lerir | |
211 | | |
212 Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book Unff for | |
Command: SwW Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry. In the 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained | |
prominence for being a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama was not born in the United | |
States. Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings, and that he spoke with | |
Trump on the phone on at least six occasions. Corsi 9/6/18 302, at 3. | |
213 Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 2; _ Corsi was first | |
interviewed on September 6, 2018 at the Special Counse1's offices in Washington, D.C. He was | |
accompanied by counsel throughout the interview. Corsi was subsequently interviewed on September 17, | |
2018, September 21, 2018; October 31, 2018, November 1, 2018, and November 2, 2018. Counsel was | |
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Corsi told the Office durin | |
interviews that he "must have" oreviouslv discussed Assansze with Malloch 215 | |
According to Malloch, Corsi asked Him to put Corsi in touch with Assange, whom Corsi | |
wished to interview. Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the "orbit" of | |
U.K. politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them. | |
Malloch told Corsi that he would think about the request but made no actual attempt to connect | |
Corsi with Assange.218 | |
present for all interviews, and the interviews beginning on September 21, 2018 were conducted pursuant to | |
a proffer agreement that precluded affirmative use of his statements against him in limited circumstances. | |
let 214 | |
215 Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 4. | |
:lm | |
216 | |
1zm | |
217 | |
_ Malloch denied ever communicating with Assange | |
218 | |
or WikiLeaks, stating that he did n | |
pu | |
o | |
r | |
t | |
su | |
p | |
e | |
ursue the re rest to contact Assange because he believed he had no | |
connections to Assange. | |
lair | |
219 | |
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Malloch stated to investigators that beginning in or about August 2016. he and Corsi had | |
multiple FaceTime discussions about WikiLeaks | |
had made a connection to Assange and that the hacked emails of John Podesta would be released | |
prior to Election Day and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or | |
around August or September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta emails was | |
coming, after which "we" were going to be in the driver's seat.221 | |
2211 | |
223 | |
224 I | |
225 l | |
I l • | |
• | |
l • l • | l • l | |
226 | |
227 I | |
nm | |
228 | |
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1 | |
Harm to Ongoing Matter 230 | |
231 I | |
232 | |
• | |
234 l l • I a lc I | l | |
Harm to Ongoing Matter 235 • | |
236 | l l • I I l • l I l | |
237 | |
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d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails | |
On October 7 2016, four days after the Assange press conference | |
in the Washington Post published an Access Hollywood video that | |
captured comments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to adversely | |
affect the Campaign." Less than an hour after the video's publication, WikiLeaks released the | |
first set of emails stolen by the GRU from the account of Clinton Campaign chairman | |
John Podesta. | |
Corsi said that, because he had no direct means of communicating with | |
WikiLeaks, he told members of the news site WND-who were participating on a conference call | |
with him that day-to reach Assange imrnediately.244 Corsi claimed that the pressure was | |
239 Candidate Trump can be heard off camera making graphic statements about women. | |
240 Erin | |
rem | |
24 l | |
rum | |
242 | |
[EET | |
243 | |
244 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated [ | |
at he believed Malloch was on the call but then focused | |
on other individuals who were on the call-invitation, which Malloch was not, (Separate travel records show | |
that at the time of the call, Malloch was aboard a transatlantic flight). Corsi at one point stated that after | |
WikiLeaks's release of stolen emails on October 7, 2016, he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with | |
Assange. Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6. | |
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enormous and recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming.245 Corsi | |
stated that he was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when they | |
did.246 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated that he thought that he had told people | |
on a WND conference call about the forthcoming tape and had sent out a tweet asking whether | |
anyone could contact Assange, but then said that maybe he had done nothing.247 | |
The Office investigated Corsi's allegations about the events of October 7 2016 but found | |
little corroboration for his allegations about the da 248 | |
However, the phone records | |
themselves do not indicate that the conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the | |
Access Hollywood sto , and the Office has not otherwise been able to identif the substance of | |
the conversation | |
However. the Office | |
has not identified any conference call participant, or anyone who spoke to Corsi that day, who says | |
that they received non-public information about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having | |
contacted a member of WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016 after a conversation with Corsi. | |
e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks | |
Donald Trump Jr. had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the | |
campaign period. On September 20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fischbein sent WikiLeaks | |
the password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's "unprecedented and dangerous" ties | |
245 During the same interview, Corsi also suggested that he may have sent out public tweets because | |
he knew Assange was reading his tweets. Our Office was unable to find evidence of any such tweets. | |
246 Corsi 9/21/18 302, at 6-7. | |
247 Corsi 11/U18 302, at 6. | |
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to Russia, PutinTrump.org.252 WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: "'Let's bomb Iraq' Progress for | |
America PAC to launch "PutinTrump.org' at 9:30am. Oops pw is 'putintrump' putintrunlp.org." | |
Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald Trump Jr., "A PAC run | |
anti-Trump site putintrumporg is about to launch. The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC. We | |
have guessed the password. It is 'putintrump.' See 'About' for who is behind it. Any | |
comments?"253 | |
Several hours later, Trump Jr. emailed a variety of senior campaign staff: | |
Guys I got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it | |
works and the about section they reference contains the next pic in terms of who is behind | |
it. Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow | |
them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are I | |
looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it's a fully built out page claiming to | |
be a PAC let me know your thoughts and if we want to look into it.254 | |
Trump Jr. attached a screenshot of the "About" page for the unlaunched site PutinTrutnp.org. The | |
next day (after the website had launched publicly), Trump Jr. sent a direct message to WikiLeaks: | |
"Off the record, l don't know who that is but l'll ask around. Thanks."255 | |
On October 3, 2016, WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr., asking "you | |
guys" to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to target | |
Julian Assange. Trump Jr. responded that he already "had done so," and asked, "what's behind | |
this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?"256 WikiLeaks did not respond. | |
On October 12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was "great to see you and your dad | |
talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us | |
wlsearch.tk."257 WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in "digging through" leaked | |
emails and stated, "we just released Podesta emails Part 4."258 Two days later, Trump Jr. publicly | |
tweeted the wlsearch.tk link.259 | |
Q 252 9/20/16 Twitter DM JasonFishbein to @WikiLeaks; see JF00587 (9/21/16 Messages, | |
@jabber.cryptoparty.is @jabber.cryptoparty.is), Fischbein 9/5/18 302, at 4. When | |
interviewed by our Office, Fischbein produced what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the | |
participants discussed U.S. politics, one of the other participants had posted the website and password that | |
Fischbein sent to WikiLeaks. | |
253 9/20/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr. | |
254 TRUMPORG _28_000629-33 (9/21/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Conway et al. (subject | |
"Wikileaks")). | |
255 9/21/16 Twitter DM, @DonaldJTrumpJr to @WikiLeaks. | |
256 10/3/16 Twitter DMs, @DonaldJTrumpJr & @WikiLeaks. | |
257 At the time, the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign documents. | |
25s 10/12/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @Dona1dJTrL1mpJr. | |
259 @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/14/16 (6:34 a.m.) Tweet. | |
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2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials | |
Throughout 2016, the Trump Campaign expressed interest in Hillary Clinton's private | |
email server and whether approximately 30,000 emails from that server had in fact been | |
permanently destroyed, as reported by the media. Several individuals associated with the | |
Campaign were contacted in 2016 about various efforts to obtain the missing Clinton emails and | |
other stolen material in support of the Trump Campaign. Some of these contacts were met with | |
skepticism, and nothing came of them, others were pursued to some degree. The investigation did | |
not find evidence that the Trump Campaign recovered any such Clinton emails, or that these | |
contacts were part of a coordinated effort between Russia and the Trump Campaign. | |
a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) | |
In the spring of 2016, Trump Campaign advisor Michael Caputo learned through a Florida- | |
based Russian business partner that another Florida-based Russian, Henry Oknyansky (who also | |
went by the name Henry Greenberg), claimed to have information pertaining to Hillary Clinton. | |
Caputo notified Roger Stone and brokered communication between Stone and Oknyansky. | |
Oknyansky and Stone set up a May 2016 in-person meeting.260 | |
Oknyansky was accompanied to the meeting by Alexei Rasin, a Ukrainian associate | |
involved in Florida real estate. At the meeting, Rasin offered to sell Stone derogatory information | |
on Clinton that Rasin claimed to have obtained while working for Clinton. Rasin claimed to | |
possess financial statements demonstrating Clinton's involvement in money laundering with | |
Rasin's companies. According to Oknyansky, Stone asked if the amounts in question totaled | |
millions of dollars but was told it was closer to hundreds of thousands. Stone refused the offer, | |
stating that Trump would not pay for opposition research.26l | |
Oknyansky claimed to the Office that Rasin's motivation was financial. According to | |
Oknyansky, Rasin had tried unsuccessfully to shop the Clinton information around to other | |
interested parties, and Oknyansky would receive a cut if the information was sold.262 Rasin is | |
noted in public source documents as the director and/or registered agent for a number of Florida | |
companies, none of which appears to be connected to Clinton. The Office found no other evidence | |
that Rasin worked for Clinton or any Clinton-related entities. | |
In their statements to investigators, Oknyansky and Caputo had contradictory recollections | |
about the meeting. Oknyansky claimed that Caputo accompanied Stone to the meeting and | |
provided an introduction, whereas Caputo did not tell us that he had attended and claimed that he | |
was never told what information Oknyansky offered. Caputo also stated that he was unaware | |
Oknyansky sought to be paid for the information until Stone informed him after the fact.263 | |
260 Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4, Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1. | |
261 Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1-2. | |
262 Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 2. | |
263 Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4, Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1. | |
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The Office did not locate Rasin in the United States, although the Office confirmed Rasin | |
had been issued a Florida driver's license. The Office otherwise was unable to determine the | |
content and origin of the information he purportedly offered to Stone. Finally, the investigation | |
did not identify evidence of a connection between the outreach or the meeting and Russian | |
interference efforts. | |
b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails | |
After candidate Trump stated on July 27, 2016, that he hoped Russia would "find the | |
30,000 emails that are missing," Trump asked individuals affiliated with his Campaign to find the | |
deleted Clinton emails.264 Michael Flynn-who would later serve as National Security Advisor in | |
the Trump Administration-recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly, and Flynn | |
subsequently contacted multiple people in an effort to obtain the emails.265 | |
Barbara Ledeen and Peter Smith were among the people contacted by Flynn. Ledeen, a | |
long-time Senate staffer who had previously sought the Clinton emails, provided updates to Flynn | |
about her efforts throughout the summer of 2016.266 Smith, an investment advisor who was active | |
in Republican politics, also attempted to locate and obtain the deleted Clinton emails.267 | |
Ledeen began her efforts to obtain the Clinton emails before Flynn's request, as early as | |
December 2015.268 On December 3, 2015, she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails, | |
stating, "Here is the proposal I briefly mentioned to you. The person I described to you would be | |
happy to talk with you either in person or over the phone. The person can get the emails which l. | |
Were classified and 2. Were purloined by our enemies. That would demonstrate what needs to be | |
demonstrated."269 | |
Attached to the email was a 25-page proposal stating that the "Clinton email server was, in | |
all likelihood, breached long ago," and that the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian intelligence services | |
could "re-assemble the server's email content."270 The proposal called for a three-phase approach. | |
The first two phases consisted of open-source analysis. The third phase consisted of checking with | |
certain intelligence sources "that have access through liaison work with various foreign services" | |
to determine if any of those services had gotten to the server. The proposal noted, "Even if a | |
single email was recovered and the providence [sic] of that email was a foreign service, itwould | |
be catastrophic to the Clinton campaign[.]" Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and | |
264 Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 5-6, Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 1-3. | |
265 Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 1-3. | |
266 Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 7, Flynn 5/4/18 302, at 1-2, Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8. | |
267 Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7. | |
268 Szobocsan 3/29/17 302, at l. | |
269 12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith. | |
270 12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to smith (attachment). | |
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and Kellyann Conway.280 The investigation established that Smith communicated with at least | |
Flynn and Clovis about his search for the deleted Clinton emails,281 but the Office did not identify | |
evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed Smith's efforts. | |
In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each other about their | |
respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, "wondering if you had some more detailed reports or | |
memos or other data you could share because we have come a long way in our efforts since we | |
last visited.... We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it | |
against the new data we have found and then could share it back to you 'your eyes only."'282 | |
Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the "dark | |
web") that purported to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen wanted to authenticate the emails | |
and solicited contributions to fund that effort. Erik Prince provided funding to hire a tech advisor | |
to ascertain the authenticity of the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that | |
the emails were not authentic.283 | |
A backup of Smith's computer contained two files that had been downloaded from | |
WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails received by John Podesta. The files on | |
Smith's computer had creation dates of October 2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release | |
by WikiLeaks. Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not reflect | |
when the files were downloaded to Smith's computer. (It appears the creation date was when | |
WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed in Volume I, Section III.B.3.c, supra.284) | |
The investigation did not otherwise identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their | |
release by WikiLeaks. | |
Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about Clinton's deleted | |
emails until shortly before the election. For example, on October 28, 20 16, Smith wrote that there | |
was a "tug-of-war going on within WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days," and | |
that WikiLeaks "has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the theory this | |
allows little time for response prior to the U.S. election November 8."285 An attachment to the | |
280 The same recruitment document listed Jerome Corsi under "Independent | |
GroLips/Organizations/Individuals," and described him as an "established author and writer from the right | |
on President Obama and Sec. Clinton." | |
281 Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8; 10/15/16 Email, Smith to Flynn et al.; 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith | |
(bcc: Clovis et al.). | |
282 9/16/16 Email, Ledeen to Smith. | |
283 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 4-5. | |
zs4 The forensic analysis of Smith's computer devices found that Smith used an older Apple | |
operating system that would have preserved that October 2, 2016 creation date when it was downloaded | |
(no matter what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith). See Volume 1, Section III.B.3.c, supra. The | |
Office tested this theory in March 2019 by downloading the two files found on Smith's computer from | |
WikiLeal<s's site using the same Apple operating system on Smith's computer, both files were successfully | |
downloaded and retained the October 2, 2016 creation date. See SM-2284941, serial 62. | |
285 10/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith. | |
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email claimed that WikiLeaks would release "All 33k deleted Emails" by "November 1st. No | |
77 | |
emails obtained from Clinton's server were subsequently released. | |
Smith drafted multiple eMails stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian | |
hackers. For example, in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016, KLS Research had | |
organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails, including parties | |
with "ties and affiliations to Russia."286 The investigation did not identify evidence that any such | |
meetings occurred. Associates and security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did | |
not believe that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such | |
connection.287 The investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers | |
or that Smith, Ledeen, or other individuals in touch with the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained | |
the deleted Clinton emails. | |
* * * | |
In sum, the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons | |
affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, as well as the computers of the DNC and DCCC. The GRU | |
then exfiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these accounts and computers, and | |
disseminated that data through fictitious online personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0) and later | |
through WikiLeaks The investigation also e S s O tae b s l i a shed I t S he at the T a rump eCam us m ign disnlaved | |
interest in the WikiLeaks releases. and that | |
explained in Volume 1, Section V.B, infra, the evidence was sufficient to support computer | |
intrusion (and other) charges against GRU officers for their role in election-related hackin | |
2s6 8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith. | |
287 Safron 3/20/18 302, at 3, Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 6. | |
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IV. RUSSIAN GQVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN | |
The Office identified multiple contacts-"links," in the words of the Appointment Order- | |
between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The | |
Office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian | |
interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In particular, the investigation | |
examined whether these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the | |
Trump Campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the | |
Campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the available | |
information, the investigation did not establish such coordination. | |
This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and individuals | |
with ties to the Russian government, including some contacts with Campaign officials or associates | |
that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts. Each subsection begins with an | |
overview of the Russian contact at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts, which are | |
generally presented in chronological order, beginning with the early months of the Campaign and | |
extending through the post-election, transition period. | |
A. Campaign Period (September 2015 - November 8, 2016) | |
Russian-government-connected individuals and media entities began showing interest in | |
Trump's campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015.288 Because | |
Trump's status as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and | |
entertainment dealings, this Office investigated whether a business contact with Russia-linked | |
individuals and entities during the campaign period-the Trump Tower Moscow project, see | |
Volume I, Section IV.A.l, infra-led to or involved coordination of election assistance. | |
Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016, | |
when Trump was moving toward-and eventually becoming-the Republican nominee for | |
President. As set forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period: | |
outreach to two of Trump's then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a | |
representation that Russia had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (Volume I, | |
Sections IV.A.2 & IV.A.3), dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and | |
has connections with its government (Volume I, Section IV.A.4), a meeting at Trump Tower | |
between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was "part of | |
Russia and its government's support for [Trump]" (Volume I, Section IV.A.5), events at the | |
Republican National Convention (Volume I, Section IV.A.6), post-Convention contacts between | |
Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to the United States (Volume I, Section | |
IV.A.7), and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for | |
a Russian oligarch and a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume I, Section IV.A.8). | |
288 For example, on August 18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper | |
Vzglyad, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person | |
candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. One day earlier, the publication's founder (and | |
former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites-Trump2016.ru | |
and DonaldTrump20l6.ru. No interview took place. | |
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1. Trum_p Tower Moscow Project | |
The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as | |
part of its real estate portfolio. Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership | |
(through subsidiary corporate structures) of property. In other cases, the Trump Organization has | |
executed licensing deals with real estate developers and management companies, often local to the | |
country where the project was located.289 | |
Between at least 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal | |
in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow. The project, | |
commonly referred to as a "Trump Tower Moscow" or "Trump Moscow" project, anticipated a | |
combination of commercial, hotel, and residential properties all within the same building. | |
Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then- | |
president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian | |
counterparties. From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the | |
Trump Organization's pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the | |
project's status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization.290 | |
a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014) | |
The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estate conglomerate owned | |
and controlled by Aras Agalarov, began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after | |
the conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow.29I Donald J. Trump Jr. served as | |
the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Ervin Agalarov (son of Aras | |
Agalarov) and Irakli "Ike" Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations,292 with | |
the occasional assistance of Robert Goldstone.293 | |
In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signed preliminary terms of | |
289 See, kg., Interview of' Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 151-52 | |
(Sept. 7, 2017) (discussing licensing deals of specific projects). | |
290 As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.l, supra, in November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to | |
making false statements to Congress concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower | |
Moscow project. See Information 'H7(a), United States v. Mienael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, | |
2018), Doc. 2 ("Cohen Information"). | |
291 See Interview of: Donald .I Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7, | |
2017) ("Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr. Agalarov's company, Crocus Group, began | |
preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow."). As has been widely reported, the | |
Miss Universe pageant-which Trump co-owned at the time-was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus | |
City Hall in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and Aras | |
Agalarov's son Emit was a musical performer at the event, which Trump attended. | |
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 2, 4-6; _ osc- | |
292 | |
KAV _00385 (12/6/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov). | |
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an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow project.294 On December 23, 2013, after discussions | |
with Donald J. Trump, the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the | |
organization received a flat 3.5% commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or incentives.295 | |
The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and February 20 l 4.296 | |
From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group | |
discussed development plans for the Moscow project. Some time before January 24, 2014, the | |
Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be | |
constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called "Crocus City," which had also been the | |
site of the Miss Universe pageant.297 In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Ervin Agalarov | |
and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow.298 From March 2014 through July 2014, | |
the groups discussed "design standards" and other architectural elements.299 For example, in July | |
2014, members of the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the | |
"demographics of these prospective buyers" in the Crocus City area, the development of | |
neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the building.300 In | |
August 2014, the Trump Organization requested specifications for a competing Marriott-branded | |
tower being built in Crocus City.301 | |
Beginning in September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely | |
fashion to correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group.302 Communications between the | |
two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency; what appears to be the | |
last communication is dated November 24, 2014.303 The project appears not to have developed | |
past the planning stage, and no construction occurred. | |
294 I | |
295 esc-KAv _00452 (12/23/13 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov). | |
296 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_01158 (Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr. & E. Agalarov), OSC- | |
KAV_01 147 (I I20/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.). | |
297 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00972 (10/14/14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group | |
contractor about specifications), OSC-KAV_00540 (1/24/14 Email, McGee to Trump Jr. et al.). | |
298 See esc-KAv 00631 (2/5/14 Email, E. A 1 aarov o tv I a no a Trum 5 T rump Jr. & Kaveladze), | |
Goldstone Facebook post, 2/4/14 (8:01 a.m.)1 " | |
299 See, Ag., OSC-KAV_0079 l (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al., OSC-KAV_00799 | |
(6/10/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze et aL), OSC-KAV_00817 (6/16/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze | |
et at.). | |
300 OSC-KAV _00870 (w17/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et aL). | |
301 OSC-KAV _00855 (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). | |
302 OSC-KAV _00903 (9/29/14 Email, Tropea to McGee & Kaveladze (noting last response was on | |
August 26, 2014)), OSC-KAV_00906 (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea & McGee (suggesting silence | |
"proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project")), OSC-KAV_00972 (10/14/14 Email, | |
McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about development specifications)). | |
303 OSC-KAV _01140 (11/24/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.). | |
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b. Communications with LC. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi | |
Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015) | |
In the late summer of 2015, the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing | |
a Trump Tower project in Moscow. In approximately September 2015, Felix Sater, a New York- | |
based real estate advisor, contacted Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump | |
Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump.304 Sater had previously worked with the | |
Trump Organization and advised it on a number of domestic and international projects. Sater had | |
explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump | |
Organization and therefore knew of the organization's general interest in completing a deal | |
there.305 Sater had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow | |
previously and had accompanied Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid- | |
20005.30 | |
Sater contacted Cohen on behalf of I.C. Expert Investment Company (I.C. Expert), a | |
Russian real-estate development corporation controlled by Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov.307 Sater | |
had known Rozov since approximately 2007 and, in 2014, had served as an agent on behalf of | |
Rozov during Rozov's purchase of a building in New York City.308 Sater later contacted Rozov | |
and proposed that I.C. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which I.C. Expert would | |
license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own. | |
Sater worked on the deal with Rozov and another employee of I.C. Expert.309 | |
Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with I.C. | |
Expert or its agents. In approximately September 2015, Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with | |
I.C. Expert from candidate Trump, who was then president of the Trump Organization. Cohen | |
provided updates directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016, assuring him | |
the project was continuing.310 Cohen also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka | |
Trump as to design elements (such as possible architects to use for the project3ii) and Donald J. | |
Trump Jr. (about his experience in Moscow and possible involvement in the project3l2) during the | |
fall of 2015. | |
304 Sater provided information to our Office in two 2017 interviews conducted under a proffer | |
agreement! | |
3051 | |
306 Sater 9/19/17 302, at 1-2, 5. | |
307 Sater 9/19/17 302, at 3. | |
308 Rozov 1/25/18 302, at 1. | |
309 Rozov 1/25/18 302, at 1, see also l 1/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (sending letter of intent). | |
310 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-2, 4-6. | |
311 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. | |
312 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4-5. | |
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Also during the fall of 2015, Cohen communicated about the Trump Moscow proposal with | |
Giorgi Rtsldiiladze, a business executive who previously had been involved in a development deal | |
with the Trump Organization in Batumi, Georgia.3!3 Cohen stated that he spoke to Rtskhiladze in | |
part because Rtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensing deal with | |
the Agalarov-owned Crocus Group.314 On September 22, 2015, Cohen forwarded a preliminary | |
design study for the Trump Moscow project to Rtskhiladze, adding "I look forward to your reply | |
about this spectacular project in Moscow." Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen's email to an associate | |
and wrote, "[i]f we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian | |
Government and Mr. Trump this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention."315 | |
On September 24, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a | |
proposed "[l]etter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trump org," explaining that "[w]e need to send | |
this letter to the Mayor of Moscow (second guy in Russia) he is aware of the potential project and | |
will pledge his support."316 In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Rtskhiladze provided a | |
translation of the letter, which described the Trump Moscow project as a "symbol of stronger | |
economic, business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore | |
United States and the Russian Federation."3'7 On September 27, 2015, Rtsldiiladze sent another | |
email to Cohen, proposing that the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with | |
"Global Development Group LLC," which he described as being controlled by Michail Posikhin, a | |
Russian architect, and Simon Nizharadze.318 Cohen told the Office that he ultimately declined the | |
proposal and instead continued to work with I.C. Expert, the company represented by Felix Sater.319 | |
c. Letter of lntent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-January | |
2016) | |
i. Trump Signs the Letter oflntent on behalfoftne Trump Organization | |
Between approximately October 13, 2015 and November 2, 2015, the Trump Organization | |
(through its subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC) and I.C. Expert completed a letter of intent (LOI) | |
for a Trump Moscow property. The LOI, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization and Rozov | |
on behalf of I.C. Expert, was "intended to facilitate further discussions" in order to "attempt to | |
313 Rtskhiladze was a U.S.-based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group. In | |
approximately 2011, Silk Road Group and the Trump Organization entered into a licensing agreement to | |
build a Trump-branded property in Baturni, Georgia. Rtsldriladze was also involved in discussions for a | |
. t . | |
Trump-branded t r o 0 1 e e c ctIll A S tana, Kazakhstan. The Office twice interviewed Rtskhiladze, | |
314 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12, see also Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 1. | |
315 9/22/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Nizharadze. | |
316 9/24/15 Email, Rtsldiiladze to Cohen. | |
317 9/24/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. | |
318 9/27/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. | |
319 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12. | |
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enter into a mutually acceptable agreement" related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow.320 | |
The LOI contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and office components, | |
and called for "[a]pproximately 250 first class, luxury residential condominiums," as well as "[o]ne | |
first class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150 | |
hotel rooms."321 For the residential and commercial portions of the project, the Trump | |
Organization would receive between 1% and 5% of all condominium sales,322 plus 3% of all rental | |
and other revenue.323 For the project's hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base | |
fee of 3% of gross operating revenues for the first five years and 4% thereafter, plus a separate | |
incentive fee of 20% of operating profit. 324 Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would | |
receive a $4 million "up-front fee" prior to groundbreaking.325 Under these terms, the Trump | |
Organization stood to earn substantial sums over the lifetime of the project, without assuming | |
significant liabilities or financing commitments.326 | |
On November 3, 2015, the day after the Trump Organization transmitted the LOI, Sater | |
emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate | |
Trump's chances at being elected, writing: | |
Buddy our boy can become President of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get all of | |
Putin team to buy in on this, I will manage this process.... Michael, Putin gets on stage | |
with Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump Moscow, and Donald owns the republican | |
nomination. And possibly beats Hillary and our boy is in.... We will manage this process | |
better than anyone. You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very | |
shortly. That the game changer.327 | |
Later that day, Sater followed up: | |
Donald doesn't stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin | |
only want to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a successful business man is a good | |
candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate. "Business, politics, whatever it all is | |
the same for someone who knows how to deal" | |
320 11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (attachment) (hereinafter "Lo1"), see also 10/13/15 Email, | |
Sater to Cohen & Davis (attaching proposed letter of intent) . | |
321 Lot, p. 2. | |
322 The LOI called for the Tramp Organization to receive 5% of all gross sales up to $100 million, | |
4% of all gross sales from $100 million to $250 million; 3% of all gross sales tom 83250 million to $500 | |
million, 2% of all gross sales from $500 million to $1 billion, and 1% of all gross sales over $1 billion. | |
LOI, Schedule 2. | |
323 LOI, Schedule 2. | |
324 LOI, Schedule l. | |
325 Lol, Schedule 2. | |
326 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3. | |
327 11/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:14 p.m.). | |
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I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscow press conference. | |
If he says it we own this election. Americas most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald | |
is a good guy to negotiate.... | |
We can own this election. | |
Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putin very very close people, we can pull | |
this off. | |
Michael lets go. 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elected. This is good really | |
good. 28 | |
According to Cohen, he did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscow project | |
to the 2016 U.S. presidential election at the time. Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or | |
anyone affiliated with the Trump Campaign discussing the political implications of the Trump | |
Moscow project with him. However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the | |
candidate suggested that his campaign would be a significant "infomercial" for Trump-branded | |
properties.329 | |
ii, Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia | |
Given the size of the Trump Moscow project, Sater and Cohen believed the project required | |
approval (whether express or implicit) from the Russian national government, including from the | |
Presidential Administration of Russia.330 Sater stated that he therefore began to contact the | |
Presidential Administration through another Russian business contact.33! In early negotiations | |
with the Trump Organization, Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his | |
attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials. On October 12, 2015, for example, Sater wrote | |
to Cohen that "all we need is Putin on board and we are golden," and that a "meeting with Putin | |
and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th [of October]."332 _ this meeting | |
was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no direct interaction with the Russian | |
government.333 | |
Approximately a month later, after the LOI had been signed, Lana Erchova emailed Ivanka | |
Trump on behalf of Erchova's then-husband Dmitry Klokov, to offer Klokov's assistance to the | |
Trump Campaign.334 Klokov was at that time Director of External Communications for PJSC | |
Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission | |
328 11/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:40 pm)- | |
329 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3-4, Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15. | |
330_ Safer 12/15/17 302, at 2. | |
331 Sater 12/15/17 302, at 3-4. | |
332 10/12/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (8:07 a.m.). | |
333 I | |
334 Ivanka Trump received an email from a woman who identified herself as "Lana E. Alexander," | |
which said in part, "If you ask anyone who knows Russian to Google my husband Dmitry Klokov, you'll | |
see who he is close to and that he has done Putin's political campaigns." 11/16/15 Email, Erchova to | |
I. Trump. | |
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company, and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia's energy | |
minister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen.335 He told the Office that, after receiving | |
this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov's name and concluded (incorrectly) | |
that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter.336 | |
Between November 18 and 19, 2015; Klokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call | |
and exchanged several emails. Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a "trusted person" who | |
could offer the Campaign "political synergy" and "synergy on a government level," Klokov | |
recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary. | |
Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the | |
candidate and an individual Klokov described as "our person of interest."337 In an email to the | |
Office, Erchova later identified the "person of interest" as Russian President Vladimir Putin.338 | |
In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use | |
a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscow project with local | |
developers. Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified | |
intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump- | |
including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin-would need to be "in | |
conjunction with the development and an official visit" with the Trump Organization receiving a | |
formal invitation to visit.339 (Klokov had written previously that "the visit [by candidate Trump | |
to Russia] has to be informal.")340 | |
Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over | |
a possible meeting between Trump and "the person of interest" from any existing business track.341 | |
Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business, Klokov added in second | |
email to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have "phenomenal" impact "in a | |
business dimension" and that the "person of interest['s]" "most important support" could have | |
significant ramifications for the "level of projects and their capacity." Klokov concluded by telling | |
335 11/16/15 Email, 1. Trump to Cohen. | |
336 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 17. During his interviews with the Office, Cohen still appeared to believe | |
that the Klokov he spoke with was that Olympian. The investigation, however, established that the email | |
address used to communicate with Cohen belongs to a different Dmitry Klokov, as described above. | |
337 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.). | |
338 In July 2018, the Office received an unsolicited email purporting to be from Erchova, in which | |
she wrote that "[a]t the end of2015 and beginning of 2016 I was asked by my ex-husband to contact Ivanka | |
Trump ... and offer cooperation to Trump's team on behalf of the Russian officials." 7/27/18 Email, | |
Erchova to Special Counsel's Office. The email claimed that the officials wanted to offer candidate Trump | |
"land in Crimea among other things and unofficial meeting with Putin." ld. In order to vet the email's | |
claims, the Office responded requesting more details. The Office did not receive any reply. | |
339 11/18/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (7:15 a.m.). | |
340 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.). | |
341 11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.) ("I would suggest separating your negotiations | |
and our proposal to meet. I assure you, after the meeting level of projects and their capacity can be | |
completely different, having the most important support."). | |
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Cohen that there was "no bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of | |
interest."342 Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that "[c]urrently our LOI developer is in talks | |
with VP's Chief of Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet."343 This email appears | |
to be their final exchange, and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought | |
Klokov's initial offer of assistance to the Campaign's attention or that anyone associated with the | |
Trump Organization or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained that he | |
did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already working on the Moscow Project with | |
Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government.344 | |
By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to | |
use those connections to set up the promised meeting with Russian government officials. Cohen | |
told Sater that he was "setting up the meeting xnyself."345 On January II, 2016, Cohen emailed | |
the office of Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government's press secretary, indicating that he desired | |
contact with Sergei Ivanov, Putin's chief of staff. Cohen erroneously used the email address | |
"Pr _peskova@prpress.gof.ru" instead of "Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru," so the email apparently | |
did not go through.346 On January 14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address | |
(info@prpress.gov.ru) with the following message : | |
Dear Mr. Peskov, | |
Over the past few months, I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding | |
the development of a Trump Tower-Moscow project in Moscow City. | |
Without getting into lengthy specifics, the communication between our two sides has | |
stalled. As this project is too important, I am hereby requesting your assistance. | |
I respectfully request someone, preferably you, contact me so that I might discuss the | |
specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals. | |
I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you S00FL347 | |
Two days later, Cohen sent an email to Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, repeating his request to speak | |
with Sergei Ivanov.348 | |
Cohen testified to Congress, and initially told the Office, that he did not recall receiving a | |
response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump | |
Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohen later admitted that these statements were false. In | |
342 11/19/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (7:40 a.m.). | |
343 11/19/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (12:56 p.m.). | |
344 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 12. | |
345 FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (6: 17 p.rn.)). | |
346 1/11/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru (9: 12 a.m.). | |
347 1/14/16 Email, Cohen to info@prpress.gov.ru (9:21 a.m.). | |
348 1/16/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prp1°ess.gov.ru (10:28 a.m.). | |
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|- | |
8 ! | |
In 5 Q | |
aim | |
Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Poliakova or from any other | |
representative of the Russian government, nor | |
follow-up. However, the day after Cohen's call al | |
to "[c]all me when you have a few minutes to oh | |
then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit M al | |
along with a note to "[t]el1 me if the letter is go | |
you want and send it back to m€.»»355 After a few | |
sent Cohen an invitation-signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ-to travel to | |
"Moscow for a working visit" about the "prospects of development and the construction business | |
in Russia," "the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower," and | |
"the opportunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr. Donald Trump."356 According | |
349 Cohen Information 11114, 7. Cohen's interactions with President Trump and the President's | |
lawyers when preparing his congressional testimony are discussed further in Volume II. See Vol. II, Section | |
II.K.3, infra. | |
350 1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen (5:57 a.m.) ("Mr. Cohen[,] I can't get through to both your | |
phones. Pls, call me."). | |
351 Telephone records show a 20-minute call on January 20, 2016 between Cohen and the number | |
Poliakova provided in her email. Call Records of Michael Cohen _ After | |
the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact list. | |
1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.). | |
352 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2-3. | |
353 FS00011 (1/21/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen). | |
354 The invitation purported to be from Genbank, a Russian bank that was, according to Sater, | |
working at the behest of a larger bank, VTB, and would consider providing financing. FS00008 (12/31/15 | |
Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). Additional information about Genbank can be found in/ia. | |
355 FS00011 (1/21/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:44 p.m.)); 1/21/16 Email, Sater to Cohen | |
(6:49 p.m.), | |
356 1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:01 p.ln.) (attachment). | |
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to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete | |
proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project.357 | |
al Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump | |
(December 2015-June 2016) | |
i. Safer 's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia | |
The late January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen | |
contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project. Beginning in late 2015, | |
Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump, as representatives of the Trump | |
Organization, to travel to Russia to meet with Russian government officials and possible financing | |
partners. In December 2015, Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to | |
Russia for meetings.358 On December 19, 2015, Sater wrote: | |
Please call me I have Evgeney [Dvoskin] on the other line.[359] He needs a copy of your | |
and Donald's passports they need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations & | |
Visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower | |
Moscow. Politically neither Putin office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue | |
invite, so they are inviting commercially/ business. VTB is Russia's 2 biggest bank and | |
VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business | |
meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite | |
& have visa issued.360 | |
In response, Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport.36l Cohen told the Office that at one | |
point he requested a copy of candidate Trump's passport from Rhona Graff, Trump's executive | |
assistant at the Trump Organization, and that Graff later brought Trump's passport to Cohen's | |
357 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-7. | |
35s See, e.g., 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41 p.m.) ("Please scan and send me a copy of your | |
passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs."). | |
359 T011 records show that Sater was spealdng to Evgeny Dvoskin. Call Records of Felix Sater | |
_ Dvoskin is an executive of Genbank, a large bank with lending focused | |
in Crimea, Ukraine. At the time that Sater provided this financing letter to Cohen, Genbank was subject to | |
U.S. government sanctions, see Russia/Ukraine-related Sanctions and Identyications, Office of Foreign | |
Assets Control (Dec. 22, 2015), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC- | |
Enforcement/Pages/2015l222.aspx. Dvoskin, who had been deported from the United States in 2000 for | |
criminal activity, was under indictment in the United States for stock fraud under the aliases Eugene Slusker | |
and Gene Shustar. See United States v. Rizzo, et al., 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003). | |
360 12/19/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (10:50 a.m.), FS00002 (12/19/15 Text Messages, Safer to | |
Cohen, (10:53 a.m.). | |
361 FS00004 (12/19/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); ERT_0198-256 (12/19/15 Text Messages, | |
Cohen & Sater). | |
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office.362 The investigation did not, however, establish that the passport was forwarded to Sate1'.363 | |
Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in | |
connection with the Trump Moscow project. On April 20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, "[t]he People | |
wanted to know when you are coming?"364 On May 4, 2016, Sater followed up : | |
I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after | |
the convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that's it's probably after the | |
convention. Obviously the pre-meeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but | |
the 2 big guys where [sic] the question. I said I would confirm and revert.... Let me | |
know about If I was right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you want to | |
speak to them and possibly fly over.365 | |
Cohen responded, "My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the | |
convention."366 | |
The day after this exchange, Sater tied Cohen's travel to Russia to the St. Petersburg | |
International Economic Forum ("Forum"), an annual event attended by prominent Russian | |
politicians and businessmen. Sater told the Office that he was informed by a business associate | |
that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the Forum.367 On May 5, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen: | |
Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia's | |
Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to | |
either Putin or Medvedev, as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there. | |
This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia will be there as well. | |
He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to | |
discuss[.]368 | |
The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel, Cohen | |
wrote back, "[w]orks for me."369 | |
362 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. | |
363 On December 21, 2015, Safer sent Cohen a text message that read, "They need a copy of DJT | |
passport," to which Cohen responded, "After I return from Moscow with you with a date for him." FS00004 | |
(12/21/l5 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater). . | |
364 Fs00014 (4/20/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (9:06 p.m.)). | |
365 FS00015 (5/4/I6 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:38 p.m.)). | |
366 FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (8:03 p.m.)), | |
367 Sater 12/15/17 302, at 4. | |
36s Fs00016 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater to Cohen (6:26 & 6:27 a.m.)). | |
369 Fs00016 (5/6/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater). | |
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On June 9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for | |
the Forum, adding, "Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well."370 | |
On June 13, 2016, Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the Director of the | |
Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the Forum.37! Sater also sent Cohen a | |
Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos.372 According to Cohen, the | |
invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved in inviting him. Cohen was concerned | |
that Russian officials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him (as | |
Sater had alleged), and so he decided not to go to the Forum.373 On June 14, 2016, Cohen met | |
Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be | |
traveling at that time.374 | |
ii. Candidate Trump '5 Opportunities to Travel to Russia | |
The investigation identified evidence Ithat, during the period the Trump Moscow project | |
was under consideration, the possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts. | |
First, in interviews with the Office, Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of traveling | |
to Russia with Trump twice: once in late 2015, and again in spring 2016.375 According to Cohen, | |
Trump indicated a willingness to travel if it would assist the project significantly. On one occasion, | |
Trump told Cohen to speak with then-carnpaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate the | |
candidate's schedule. Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski, who suggested that they | |
speak again when Cohen had actual dates to evaluate. Cohen indicated, however, that he knew | |
that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be impossible given the candidate's | |
preexisting commitments to the Campaign.376 | |
Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St. Petersburg | |
International Economic Forum. In late December 20 I5, Mira Duma-a contact of Ivanka Trump' s | |
from the fashion industry-first passed along invitations for Ivanl<a Trump and candidate Trump | |
from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.377 On January 14, | |
2016, Rhona Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was "honored to be asked to | |
participate in the highly prestigious" Forum event, but that he would "have to decline" the | |
invitation given his "very grueling and full travel schedule" as a presidential candidate.378 Graff | |
370 FS00018 (6/9/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). | |
371 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (2:10 p.m.). | |
372 FS00018 (6/13/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (2:20 p.m.)), 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen. | |
373 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-8. | |
374 Fs00019 (6/14/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater (12:06 and 2:50 p.m.)). | |
375 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2. | |
376 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. | |
377 12/21/15 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57 a.m.) (attachments), TRUMPORG_16_000057 | |
(1/7/l6 Email, I. Trump to Graff (9:18 a.m.)). | |
31s 1/14/16 Email, Graff to Mira. | |
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asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff "send a formal note to the Deputy Prime | |
Minister" declining his invitation, Duma replied that a formal note would be "great."379 | |
It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately. According to written answers | |
from President Trump,380 Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on | |
March 17, 2016, again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 Forum in St. Petersburg.38l Two | |
weeks later, on March 31, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump's signature a two-paragraph letter | |
declining the invitation.382 The letter stated that Trump's "schedule has become extremely | |
demanding" because of the presidential campaign, that he "already ha[d] several commitments in | |
the United States" for the time of the Forum, but that he otherwise "would have gladly given every | |
consideration to attending such an important event."383 Graff forwarded the letter to another | |
executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructions to print the document on letterhead | |
for Trump to 8i8n.384 | |
At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert Foresman-a | |
New York-based investment banker-began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting | |
with candidate Trump. According to Foresman, he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian | |
presidential aide involved with the Roscongress Foundation, to see if Trump could speak at the | |
Forum.385 Foresman first emailed Graff on March 31, 2016, following a phone introduction | |
brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who produced the television show The | |
Apprentice). In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional | |
expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his work setting up an early "private channel" between Vladimir | |
Putin and former U.S. President George W. Bush, and an "approach" he had received from "senior | |
Kremlin officials" about the candidate. Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate, | |
Corey Lewandowski, or "another relevant person" to discuss this and other "concrete things" | |
Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over "unsecure email."386 On April 4, 2016, Graff | |
forwarded Foresman's meeting request to Jessica Macchia, another executive assistant | |
to Trump.387 | |
379 1/15/16 Email, Mira to Graff | |
380 As explained in Volume II and Appendix C, on September 17, 2018, the Office sent written | |
questions to the President's counsel. On November 20, 2018, the President provided written answers to | |
those questions through counsel. | |
3sl Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, | |
Part (e)) ("[D]ocuments show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the | |
invitation."). | |
382 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part | |
(e)); see also TRUMPORG_l6_000l 34 (unsigned letter dated March 31, 2016). | |
383 TRUMPORG _16__000134 (unsigned letter). | |
384 TRUMPORG _16_000133 (3/31/16 Email, Graff to Macchia). | |
385 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 3-4. | |
386 See TRUMPORG 16 00136 (3/31/16 Email, Foresman to Graff), see also Foresman 10/17/18 | |
302, at 3-4. | |
387 See TRUMPOR_Gl6_00136 (4/4/I 6 Email, Graff to Macchia). | |
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with no response forthcoming, Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff-first on April 26 | |
and again on April 30, 2016.388 Graff sent an apology to Foresman and forwarded his April 26 | |
email (as well as his initial March 2016 email) to Lewandowski.389 On May 2, 2016, Graff | |
forwarded Foresman's April 30 email-which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald | |
Trump Jr. or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that "should be | |
conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts"-to | |
policy advisor Stephen Miller.390 | |
No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump | |
Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the Forum or that the | |
Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until after the election, when he interacted with | |
the Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration.39l When | |
interviewed by the Office, Foresman denied that the specific "approach" from "senior Kremlin | |
officials" noted in his March 31, 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov's invitation to | |
Roscongress. According to Foresman, the "concrete things" he referenced in the same email were | |
a combination of the invitation itself, Foresman's personal perspectives on the invitation and | |
Russia policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank (EastWest | |
Institute). Foresman told the Office that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him | |
to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician. Foresman also said that | |
Kobyakov had asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate | |
withdrew from the race and the other politician's participation did not work 0ut.392 Finally, | |
Foresman claimed to have no plans to establish a back channel involving Trump, stating the | |
reference to his involvement in the Bush-Putin back channel was meant to burnish his credentials | |
to the Campaign. Foresman commented that he had not recognized any of the experts announced | |
as Trump's foreign policy team in March 2016, and wanted to secure an in-person meeting with | |
the candidate to share his professional background and policy views, including that Trump should | |
decline Kobyakov's invitation to speak at the Forum.393 | |
2. George Papadopoulos | |
George Papadopoulos was a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign from March | |
38B See TRUMPORG 16 00137 (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graff), TRuMpoRG_16_00141 | |
(4/30/16 Email, Foresman to Graft). | |
I | |
she See TRUMPORG 16 00139 (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Foresman), TRUMPORG | |
__l6_00137 | |
(4/27/16 Email, Graff to Lewandowski). | |
390 TRUMPORG 16 00142 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to s. Miller), see also TRUMPORG_16_00143 | |
(5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller) (forwarding March 2016 email from Foresman). | |
391 Foresman's contacts during the transition period are discussed further in Volume l, Section | |
IV.B.3, in]9'a. | |
392 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 4. | |
393 Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 8-9. | |
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2016 to early October 2016.394 In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based | |
professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately alter Mifsud's return from a trip to Moscow, that the | |
Russian government had obtained "dirt" on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. | |
One week later, on May 6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign | |
government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that | |
it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be | |
damaging to candidate Clinton. | |
Papadopoulos shared information about Russian "dirt" with people outside of the | |
Campaign, and the Office investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign official. | |
Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom he interacted told the Office that they did | |
not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information. Throughout the relevant period of time | |
and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals | |
to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. That meeting never | |
came to pass. | |
a. Origins of Campaign Work | |
In March 2016, Papadopoulos became a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign.395 | |
As early as the summer of 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but, in | |
a September 30, 2015 email, he was told that the Campaign was not hiring policy advisors.396 In | |
late 2015, Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential | |
candidate Ben Carson.397 | |
Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 2016, Papadopoulos | |
had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016.398 At that time, | |
Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice | |
(LCILP), which billed itself as a "unique institution ... comprising high-level professional | |
international law practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the | |
practice of international 1aw."399 Papadopoulos said that he had finished his role with the Carson | |
394 Papadopoulos met with our Office for debriefings on several occasions in the summer and fall | |
of 2017, after he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in | |
a January 2017 FBI interview about, inter alia, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions and | |
communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals: Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev. | |
Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him with | |
making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § l001(a). | |
395 A Transcript of Donald Trump's Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board, | |
Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016). | |
396 7/15/15 Linkedln Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (6:57 a.m.); 9/30/15 Email, Glassner | |
to Papadopoulos (7:42:21 a.m.). | |
397 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. | |
39a Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2, 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris. | |
399 London Centre of International Law Practice, at https://www.1cilp.org/ (via web.archive.org). | |
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campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring.400 In early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join | |
LCILP and arrived in London to begin work.401 | |
As he was taking his position at LCILP, Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager | |
Corey Lewandowski via Linkedln and emailed campaign official Michael Glassner about his | |
interest in joining the Trump Campaign.402 On March 2, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glassner | |
another message reiterating his interest.403 Glassner passed along word of Papadopoulos's interest | |
to another campaign official, Joy Lutes, who notified Papadopoulos by email that she had been | |
told by Glassner to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis, the Trump Campaign's national co- | |
chair and chief policy advisor.404 | |
At the time of Papadopoulos's March 2 email, the media was criticizing the Trump | |
Campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks.405 | |
To address that issue, senior Campaign officials asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together | |
on short notice.406 After receiving Papadopoulos's name from Lutes, Clovis performed a Google | |
search on Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute, and believed that he | |
had credibility on energy issues.407 On March 3, 2016, Clovis arranged to speak with | |
Papadopoulos by phone to discuss Papadopoulos joining the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor, | |
and on March 6, 2016, the two spoke.408 Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as a | |
topic, and he understood from the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the | |
Campaign's foreign policy.409 At the end of the conversation, Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role | |
as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign, and Papadopoulos accepted the offer.4l° | |
b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts | |
Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor, Papadopoulos traveled | |
400 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris . | |
401 2/5/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos (6:l 1 :25 p.m.), 2/6/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos | |
(5:34:15 p.m.)_ | |
402 2/4/16 Linkedln Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (l :28 p.m.), 2/4/16 Email, | |
Papadopoulos to Glassner (2:l0:36 p.m.). | |
403 3/2/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner (l 1 :l7:23 a.m.). | |
404 3/2/16 Email, Lutes to Papadopoulos 110:08:15 p.rn.). | |
405 Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of 2), at 4. | |
406 Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of2), at 4. | |
407 3/3/16 Email, Lutes to Clovis & Papadopoulos | | |
(6:05:47 p.m,), 9 | |
408 3/6/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (4:24:21 p.m.). | |
409 Statement of Offense 1]4, United States v. George Papadopoulos, 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, | |
2017), Doc. 19 ("Papadopoulos Statement of Offense"). | |
410 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. | |
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to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with LCILP.4'1 The purpose of the trip was to meet officials | |
affiliated with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian | |
government officiaL412 During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud. | |
Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of | |
Diplomacy in London, England.413 Although Mifsud worked out of London and was also affiliated | |
with LCILP, the encounter in Rome was the first time that Papadopoulos met him.414 Mifsud | |
maintained various Russian contacts while living in London, as described further below. Among | |
his contacts was ,415 a one-time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out | |
the Russian social media campaign (see Volume I, Section II, supra). In January and February | |
IT 2016, Mifsud and IT discussed possibly meeting in Russia. The | |
IT investigation did not identi evidence of them meeting. Later, in the spring of 2016, | |
was also in contact that was linked to an employee of the Russian | |
Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian military- | |
controlled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the | |
course of the GRU's hack-and-release operations (see Volume I, Section III.B.l, supra). | |
According to Papadopoulos, Mifsud at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when | |
they met in Rome.416 After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump Campaign, | |
however, Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos.417 The two discussed Mifsud's | |
European and Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia, Mifsud also offered to | |
introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian | |
government.418 Papadopoulos told the Office that Mifsud's claim of substantial connections with | |
Russian government officials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such connections could | |
increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump Carnpaign.4l9 | |
411 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3, Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1]5. | |
412 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3, Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al., Joseph Mmsud.' more I | |
questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) ("Link | |
Campus University ... is headed by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti."). | |
413 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 115. | |
414 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. | |
416 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 'H 5. | |
417 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1[ 5. | |
418 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3, Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 2. | |
419 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1]5. | |
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On March 17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London.420 Four days later, candidate | |
Trump publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team | |
chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as "an oil and energy consultant" and | |
an "[e]xcellent guy."42 I | |
On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsud in London.422 Mifsud was | |
accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya. Mifsud introduced Polonskaya as a | |
former student of his who had connections to Vladimir Putin.423 Papadopoulos understood at the | |
time that Polonskaya may have been Putin's niece but later learned that this was not true.424 During | |
the meeting, Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that | |
the Russian ambassador in London was a friend ofhers.425 Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos | |
expected Mifsud and Polonskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London, but that | |
did not OCCUT.426 | |
Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump | |
Campaign's foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was "Meeting with | |
Russian leadership--including Putin."427 The message stated in pertinent part: | |
I just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud, the | |
director of the London Academy of Diplomacy--who introduced ine to both Putin's niece | |
and the Russian Ambassador in London--who also acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister.428 | |
The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to | |
discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump. They are keen to host us in a "neutral" | |
city, or directly in Moscow. They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with | |
us and Mr. Trump should there be interest. Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving | |
forward with this very important issue.429 | |
420 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2. | |
421 Phillip Rucker & Robert Costa, Trump Questions Needfor NA TO, Outlines Noninterventionist | |
Foreign Policy, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016). | |
422 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; 3/24/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos. | |
423 Papadopoulos s/10/17 302, at 3. | |
424 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3, Papadopoulos 2/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Internet | |
Search History (3/24/16) (revealing late-morning and early-afternoon searches on March 24, 2016 for | |
"putin's niece," "Olga putin," and "russian president niece Olga," among other terms) . | |
425 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. | |
426 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 'II 8 n. 1 . | |
427 3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:2l a.m.). | |
428 Papadopoulos's statements to the Campaign were false. As noted above, the woman he met was | |
not Putin's niece, he had not met the Russian Ambassador in London, and the Ambassador did not also | |
serve as Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister. | |
429 3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:2l a.m.). | |
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Papadopoulos's message came at a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign's approach | |
toward Russia-from one of engaging with Russia throu h the NATO framework and takin | |
strong stance on Russian aggression in Ukraine | |
Clovis's response to Papadopoulos, however, did not reflect that shift. Replying to | |
Papadopoulos and the other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied on the initial | |
email, Clovis wrote: | |
This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitments until we | |
see how this plays out. My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any | |
meetings with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies, | |
especially France, Germany and Great Britain. We need to reassure our allies that we are | |
not going to advance anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page. | |
More thoughts later today. Great work.431 | |
c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting | |
The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions | |
and candidate Trump approximately one week later, on March 31, 2016, in Washington, D.C.432 | |
The meeting-which was intended to generate press coverage for the Campaign433-took place at | |
the Trump International Hotel.434 Papadopoulos flew to Washington for the event. At the meeting, | |
Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table, while Trump sat at the other. As reflected in the | |
photograph below (which was posted to Trump's Instagram account), Papadopoulos sat between | |
the two, two seats to Sessions's left: | |
430 I | |
431 3/24/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos et al. (8:55:04 a.m.). | |
432 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4, Papadopoulos an 1/17 302, at 3. | |
433 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 16-17. | |
434 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4. | |
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March 31, 2016 Meeting of Foreign Policy Team, with Papadopoulos (Fourlhfrom Right of Candidate Trump) | |
During the meeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced | |
themselves and briefly described their areas of experience or expertise.435 Papadopoulos spoke | |
about his previous work in the energy sector and then brought up a potential meeting with Russian | |
officials.436 Specifically, Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned through his contacts in | |
London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help | |
arrange that meeting.437 | |
Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos's statement. Papadopoulos and | |
Campaign advisor J.D. Gordon-who told investigators in an interview that he had a "crystal | |
clear" recollection of the meeting-have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the | |
idea of a meeting with Putin.438 Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of | |
his efforts to arrange a meeting.439 Gordon and two other attendees, however, recall that Sessions | |
generally opposed the proposal, though they differ in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or | |
the strength of the opposition he expressed.44° | |
d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of Clinton | |
Emails | |
Whatever Sessions's precise words at the March 31 meeting, Papadopoulos did not | |
understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump Campaign to have directed that he refrain from | |
435 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4. | |
436 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4. | |
437 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 119, see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 14, Carafano 9/12/17 302, | |
at 2; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1. | |
438 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5, Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 4-5. | |
439 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5, Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3. | |
440 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 17, Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 5, Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1, Carafano | |
9/12/17 302, at 2. | |
I | |
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making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. | |
To the contrary, Papadopoulos told the Office that he understood the Campaign to be supportive | |
of his efforts to arrange such a meeting.441 Accordingly, when he returned to London, | |
Papadopoulos resumed those efforts.442 | |
Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with, meet with, and seek | |
Russia contacts through Mifsud and, at times, Polonskaya.443 For example, within a week of her | |
initial March 24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message- | |
which email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud-addressing | |
Papadopoulos's "wish to engage with the Russian Federation."444 When Papadopoulos learned | |
from Mifsud that Polonskaya had tried to message him, he sent her an email seeking another | |
meeting.445 Polonskaya responded the next day that she was "back in St. Petersburg" but "would | |
be very pleased to support [Papadopoulos's] initiatives between our two countries" and "to meet | |
[him] again."446 Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought "a good step" would be to introduce | |
him to "the Russian Ambassador in London," and that he would like to talk to the ambassador, "or | |
anyone else you recommend, about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia."447 | |
Mifsud, who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April l l, | |
2016. He wrote, "This is already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow on the l 8th for a Valdai | |
meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma. We will talk tomorrow."448 The two bodies referenced | |
by Mifsud are part of or associated with the Russian government: the Duma is a Russian legislative | |
assembly,449 while "Valdai" refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that "is | |
close to Russia's foreign-policy establishment."45° Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he | |
would see him "tomorrow."45l For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had "already alerted | |
my personal links to our conversation and your request," that "we are all very excited the | |
possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump," and that "[t]he Russian Federation would love | |
to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced."452 | |
441 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5, Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3, Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, | |
at 2. | |
442 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1] 10. | |
443 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 'W 10-15. | |
444 3/29/16 Emails, Mifsud to Polonskaya (3:39 a.m. and 5:36 a.m.). | |
445 4/10/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (2:45:59 p.m.). | |
446 4/11/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (3:l 1 :24 a.m.). | |
447 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (9:21 :56 a.m.). | |
448 4/11/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (1 l :43:53). | |
449 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1110(c). | |
450 Anton Troianovsld, Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to US. | |
Nuclear Stance, Washington Post (Feb. 10, 2018). | |
451 4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (11 :Sl :53 a.m.). | |
452 4/12/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (4:47:06 a.m.). | |
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meeting).463 During that meeting, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level | |
Russian government officials during his recent trip to Moscow. Mifsud also said that, on the trip, | |
he learned that the Russians had obtained "dirt" on candidate Hillary Clinton. As Papadopoulos | |
later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the "dirt" was in the form of "emails of Clinton," and that | |
they "have thousands of emails."464 On May 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, | |
Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had | |
received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the | |
anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton.465 | |
e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign | |
While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials | |
with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts. | |
On April 25, 20 16, the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote | |
to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that "[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by | |
Putin for Mr. Trump to meet him when he is ready," and that "[t]he advantage of being in London | |
is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities."466 On April 27, 20 16, | |
after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that "some | |
interesting messages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right."467 The | |
same day, Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling | |
Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had "been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin | |
wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right."468 | |
Papadopoulos's Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued | |
throughout the spring and summer of 2016. On May 4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an | |
email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow, asking Lewandowski | |
whether that was "something we want to move forward with."469 The next day, Papadopoulos | |
forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email "Russia | |
update."47° He included the same email in a May 21, 2016 message to senior Campaign official | |
Paul Manafort, under the subject line "Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump," stating that | |
"Russia has been eager to meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me | |
463 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1114, 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos. | |
464 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1114. | |
465 This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials. The | |
infetnnatien--is--law-cnforeement sensitive (LES) and must be treated ueeordingly in any external | |
dissemination. The foreign government conveyed this information to the U.S. government on July 26, | |
2016, a few days after WikiLeaks's release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its investigation of | |
potential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a few days later based on the information. | |
466 4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to s. Miller (8:12:44 pm). | |
467 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to s. Miller (6:55:58 p.m.). | |
468 4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7: 15:14 p.m.). | |
469 5/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowsld (8: 14:49 a.m.). | |
470 5/5/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21 p.m.). | |
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to discuss."47I Manafort forwarded the message to another Campaign official, without including | |
Papadopoulos, and stated: "Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is | |
not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send | |
any signal."472 | |
On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about | |
a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski "want[ed] to have a call about this topic" and whether "we | |
were following up with it."473 After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to "connect with" Clovis | |
because he was "running point," Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that "the Russian MFA" was asking | |
him "if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point."474 Papadopoulos wrote in an | |
email that he "[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what's best to do with it | |
and what message I should send (or to ignore)."475 | |
After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev,476 Papadopoulos sent one more | |
email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski's last day as campaign manager.477 The | |
email stated that "[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs" had contacted him and asked whether, | |
if Mr. Trump could not travel to Russia, a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could | |
attend meetings.478 Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was "willing to make the trip off the | |
record if it's in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet specific people."479 | |
Following Lewandowski's departure from the Campaign, Papadopoulos communicated | |
with Clovis and Walid Phares, another member of the foreign policy advisory team, about an off- | |
the-record meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials or with | |
Papadopoulos's other Russia connections, Mifsud and Timofeev.480 Papadopoulos also interacted | |
471 5/21/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30:14 p.m.). | |
472 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 'II 19 n.2. | |
473 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (3:08:18 p.m.). | |
474 6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 p.m.), 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to | |
Clovis (3:29:14 p.1n.). | |
475 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). Papadopoulos's email coincided in time | |
with another message to Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting. First, on May 15, 2016, David Klein- | |
a distant relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt-emailed Clovis about a potential | |
Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia. The email stated that Klein had contacted | |
Lazar in February about a possible Trump-Putin meeting and that Lazar was "a very close confidante of | |
Putin." DJTFP00011547 (5/15/16 Email, Klein to Clovis (5:45:24 p.1n.)). The investigation did not find | |
evidence that Clovis responded to Klein's email or that any further contacts of significance came out of | |
Klein's subsequent meeting with Greenblatt and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower. Klein 8/30/18 302, at 2. | |
476 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 112l(a). | |
477 I | |
478 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1 :11:11 p.m.). | |
479 6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:11:11 p.m.). | |
480 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 'II 21, 7/14/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Timofei (11 :57:24 | |
p.m.); 7/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud; 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (2:14: 18 p.m.). | |
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directly with Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the Transatlantic Parliamentary | |
Group on Counterterrorism (TAG), a group for which Pharos was co-secretary general.481 On July | |
16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington, D.C., where he sat next to | |
Clovis (as reflected in the photograph below).482 | |
George Papadopoulos Her right and Sam Clovis (secondfrom right) | |
Although Clovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAG summit,483 | |
Papadopoulos remembered discussing Russia and a foreign policy trip with Clovis and Pharos | |
during the event.48'* Papadopoulos's recollection is consistent with emails sent before and after | |
the TAG summit. The pre-summit messages included a July 11, 2016 email in which Pharos | |
suggested meeting Papadopoulos the day after the summit to chat,485 and a July 12 message in the | |
same chain in which Phares advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees "are very nervous | |
about Russia. So be aware."486 Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud | |
listing Phares and Clovis as other "participants" in a potential meeting at the London Academy of | |
Diplomacy.487 | |
Finally, Papadopoulos's recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a | |
481 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17, 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic | |
Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism. | |
482 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism. | |
483 I | |
I | |
484 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17. | |
485 7/11/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos. | |
486 7/12/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos (14:52:29). | |
487 7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (14: 14: 18). | |
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No documentary evidence, and nothing in the email accounts or other | |
communications facilities reviewed by the Office, shows that Papadopoulos shared this | |
information with the Campaign. | |
g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact | |
The Office investigated another Russia-related contact with Papadopoulos. The Office was | |
not fully able to explore the contact because the individual at issue-Sergei Millian-remained | |
out of the country since the inception of our investigation and declined to meet with members of | |
the Office despite our repeated efforts to obtain an interview. | |
Papadopoulos first connected with Millian via Linkedln on July 15, 2016, shortly after | |
Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Clovis.5°0 Millian, an American citizen who is | |
a native of Belarus, introduced himself "as president of [the] New York-based Russian American | |
Chamber of Commerce," and claimed that through that position he had "insider knowledge and | |
direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics."5°! Papadopoulos asked Timofeev whether | |
he had heard of Millian,502 Although Timofeev said n0,503 Papadopoulos met Millian in New York | |
City.504 The meetings took place on July 30 and August 1, 2016.505 Afterwards, Millian invited | |
Papadopoulos to attend-and potentially speak at-two international energy conferences, | |
including one that was to be held in Moscow in September 2016.506 Papadopoulos ultimately did | |
not attend either conference . | |
On July 31, 2016, following his first in-person meeting with Millian, Papadopoulos | |
emailed Trump Campaign official Bo Denysyk to say that he had been contacted "by some leaders | |
of Russian-American voters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr. Trump," and to | |
ask whether he should "put you in touch with their group (US-Russia chamber of commerce)."507 | |
Denysyk thanked Papadopoulos "for taking the initiative," but asked him to "hold off with | |
499 I | |
500 7/15/16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos. | |
501 7/15/16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos. | |
502 7/22/16 Facebook Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (7:40:23 p.m.); 7/26/16 Facebook | |
Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (3:08:57 p.m.). | |
503 7/23/16 Facebook Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (4:31 :37 a.m.), 7/26/16 Facebook | |
Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (3:37: 16 p.m.). | |
504 7/16/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (7:55:43 p.m.). | |
505 7/30/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (5:38 & 6:05 p.m.), 7/31/16 Text Messages, | |
Millian & Papadopoulos (3:48 & 4:18 p.m.), 8/1/16 Text Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (8:19 p.m.). | |
506 8/2/16 Text Messages, Millian & Papadopoulos (3:04 & 3:05 p,m.); 8/3/16 Facebook Messages, | |
Papadopoulos & Millian (4:07:37 a.m. & 1:11:58 p.m.). | |
507 7/31/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Denysyk (12:29:59 p.m.). | |
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outreach to Russian-Americans" because "too many articles" had already portrayed the Campaign, | |
then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trump as "being pro-Russian."508 | |
On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he | |
would "share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work | |
for the campaign."509 Papadopoulos claimed to have no recollection of this matter.5l0 | |
On November 9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian | |
in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential work with Russian "billionaires | |
who are not under sanctions."5u The meeting took place on November 14, 2016, at the Trump | |
Hotel and Tower in Chicago.512 According to Papadopoulos, the two men discussed partnering on | |
business deals, but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian's attitude toward him changed when | |
Papadopoulos stated that he was only pursuing private-sector opportunities and was not interested | |
in a job in the Administration.513 The two remained in contact, however, and had extended online | |
discussions about possible business opportunities in Russia.514 The two also arranged to meet at a | |
Washington, D.C. bar when both attended Trump's inauguration in late January 2017.515 | |
3. Carter Rage | |
Carter Page worked for the Trump Campaign from January 2016 to September 2016. He | |
was formally and publicly announced as a foreign policy advisor by the candidate in March | |
20 l6.516 Page had lived and worked in Russia, and he had been approached by Russian intelligence | |
officers several years before he volunteered for the Trump Campaign. During his time with the | |
Campaign, Page advocated pro-Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to Moscow in his | |
personal capacity. Russian intelligence officials had formed relationships with Page in 2008 and | |
2013 and Russian officials may have focused on Page in 2016 because of his affiliation with the > | |
Campaign. However, the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russian | |
government in its efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. | |
508 7/31/16 Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos (21 :54:52). | |
509 8/23/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (2:55:36 a.m.). | |
510 Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 2. | |
511 11/10/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (9:35:05 p.m.). | |
512 11/14/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (1 :32:11 a.m.). | |
513 Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 19. | |
514 Fig., 11/29/16 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (5:09 - 5:11 p.m.); 12/7/16 | |
Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (5:10:54 p.m.). | |
515 1/20/17 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (4:37-4:39 a.m.). | |
516 Page was inte e r r v v l l e e w w e e d by the F e BI during five meeting s in March 2017, before the Special | |
Counsel's appointment. | |
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a. Background | |
Before he began working for the Campaign in January 2016, Page had substantial prior | |
experience studying Russian policy issues and living and working in Moscow. From 2004 to 2007, | |
Page was the deputy branch manager of Merrill Lynch's Moscow office.517 There, he worked on | |
transactions involving the Russian energy company Gazprom and came to know Gazprom's | |
deputy chief financial officer, Sergey Yatsenko.5I8 | |
In 2008, Page founded Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment mono ement and | |
advisory firm focused on the ener , sector in emerging markets.519 | |
520 The company otherwise had no sources of income, and | |
Page was forced to draw down his life savings to support himself and pursue his business | |
venture 521 Page asked Yatsenko to work with him at GEC as a senior advisor on a contin enc | |
basis | |
In 2008, Page met Alexander Bulatov, a Russian government official who worked at the | |
Russian Consulate in New York 523 Page later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intelligence | |
officer,l 524 | |
In 2013, Victor Podobnyy, another Russian intelligence officer working covertly in the | |
United States under diplomatic cover, formed a relationship with Page.525 Podobnyy met Page at | |
an energy symposium in New York City and began exchanging emails with him.526 Podobnyy | |
and Page also met in person on multiple occasions, during which Page offered his outlook on the | |
future of the energy industry and provided documents to Podobnyy about the energy business.527 | |
In a recorded conversation on April 8, 20 13, Podobnyy told another intelligence officer that Page | |
was interested in business opportunities in Russia.528 In Podobnyy's words, Page "got hooked on | |
517 Testimony of Carter Page, Hearing Before the US. House ofRepresentatives, Permanent Select | |
Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 40 (Nov. 2, 2017) (exhibit). a | |
518 Page 3/30/17 302, at 10. | |
5191 | |
520 I | |
521 I | |
522 Page 3/30/17 302, at 10; | |
523 I | |
524 I | |
525 Complaint 117 22, 24, 32, United States v. Buryakov, 1:15- | |
mj-215 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2015), Doc. 1 ("Burjyakov Complaint"). | |
526 Buryokov Complaint11 34. | |
527 Buryakov Complaint 1134. | |
528 Burjyakov Complaint 1132. | |
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the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing.574 Page recalled mentioning his | |
involvement in the Trump Campaign with Baranov, although he did not remember details of the | |
conversation.575 Page also met with individuals from Tatneft, a Russian energy company, to | |
discuss possible business deals, including having Page work as a consultant.576 | |
On July 8, 2016, while he was in Moscow, Page emailed several Campaign officials and | |
stated he would send "a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I've received | |
from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here."577 | |
On July 9, 2016, Page emailed Clovis, writing in pertinent part: | |
Russian Deputy Prime minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke | |
before the event. In a private conversation, Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr. | |
Trump and a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the | |
vast range of current international problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of | |
other sources close to the Presidential Administration, it was readily apparent that this | |
sentiment is widely held at all levels of govemment.578 | |
Despite these representations to the Campaign | |
The Office was unable to obtain additional evidence or testimony about who Page | |
may have met or communicated with in Moscow, thus, Page's activities in Russia-as described | |
in his emails with the Campaign-were not fully explained. | |
Page 3/30/17 302. at 9 | |
575 Page 3/30/17 302, at 3. | |
576 Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 7; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2. | |
577 7/8/16 Email, Page to Dahl & Gordon. | |
5781 | 7/9/16 Email, Page to Clovis. | |
5791 | |
5s0l | |
581 I | |
582 I | |
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d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign | |
In July 2016, after returning from Russia, Page traveled to the Republican National | |
Convention in Cleveland.583 While there, Page met Russian Ambassador to the United States | |
Sergey Kislyak, that interaction is described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6.a, inf}'a.584 Page later | |
emailed Campaign officials with feedback he said he received from ambassadors he had met at the | |
Convention. and he wrote that Ambassador Kislvak was ver worried about candidate Clinton' | |
world views 585 | |
Following the Convention, Page's trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russia foreign | |
policy drew the media's attention and began to generate substantial press coverage. The Campaign | |
responded by distancing itself from Page, describing him as an "informal foreign policy advisor" | |
who did "not speak for Mr. Trump or the campaign."587 On September 23, 2016, Yahoo! News | |
reported that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened private | |
communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S. sanctions policy under a possible | |
Trump Administration.588 A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo! News that Page had "no role" in | |
the Campaign and that the Campaign was "not aware of any of his activities, past or present."589 | |
On September 24, 2016, Page was formally removed from the Campaign.590 | |
Although Page had been removed from the Campaign, after the election he sought a | |
position in the Trump Administration.59l On November 14, 2016, he submitted an application to | |
the Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a | |
Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with "top world leaders" and "effectively | |
583 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4, Page 3/16/17 302, at 3. | |
584 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3. | |
585 7/23/16 Email, Page to Clovis; 7/25/16 Email, | |
Page to Gordon 8c Schmltz. 5 | |
586 I | |
587 See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Tom Hamburger, Trump Advisor's Public Comments, Ties to | |
Moscow Stir Unease in Both Parties, Washington Post (Aug. 5, 2016). | |
588 Michael Isikoff, US. Intel Ojicials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo! | |
News (Sept. 23, 2016). | |
589 Michael Isikoff, US. Intel Of icials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo! | |
News (Sept. 23, 2016), see also 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Barron (instructing that inquiries about | |
Page should be answered with "[h]e was announced as an informal adviser in March. Since then he has | |
had no role or official contact with the campaign. We have no knowledge of activities past or present and | |
he now officially has been removed from all lists etc."). | |
590 Page 3/16/17 302, at 2, see, Ag., 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon & s. Miller (discussing | |
plans to remove Page from the campaign). | |
"Transition Online Form," 11/14/16 (- | |
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responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia, Europe, the | |
Middle East, Africa, [and] the Americas."592 Page received no response from the Transition Team. | |
When Page took a personal trip to Moscow in December 2016, he met again with at least one | |
Russian government official. That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth | |
in Volume I, Section IV.B.6, in/9'a. | |
4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest | |
Members of the Trump Campaign interacted on several occasions with the Center for the | |
National Interest (CNI), principally through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Dimitri | |
Simes. CNI is a think tank with expertise in and connections to the Russian government. Simes | |
was born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. In April | |
2016, candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and national security at an event | |
hosted by the National Interest, a publication affiliated with CNI. Then-Senator Jeff Sessions and | |
Russian Ambassador Kislyak both attended the event and, as a result, it gained some attention in | |
relation to Sessions's confirmation hearings to become Attorney General. Sessions had various | |
other contacts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters, including Russia. | |
Jared Kushner also interacted with Simes about Russian issues during the campaign. The | |
investigation did not identify evidence that the Campaign passed or received any messages to or | |
from the Russian government through CNI or Simes. | |
a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign | |
CNI is a Washington-based non-profit organization that grew out of a center founded by | |
former President Richard Nixon.593 CNI describes itself "as a voice for strategic realism in U.S. | |
foreign policy," and publishes a bi-monthly foreign policy magazine, the National Interest.594 CN I | |
is overseen by a board of directors and an advisory council that is largely honorary and whose | |
members at the relevant time included Sessions, who served as an advisor to candidate Trump on | |
national security and foreign policy issues.595 | |
Dimitri Simes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the National | |
Interest.596 Simes was born in the former Soviet Union, emigrated to the United States in the early | |
1970s, and joined CNI's predecessor after working at the Carnegie Endowment for International | |
Transition Online Form." I1/14/16 | |
593 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2. | |
594 About the Center, CNI, available at https://cftni.org/about/. | |
595 Advisory Counsel, CNI, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20161030025331/ | |
http://cftni.org/about/advisoly-council/, Simes 3/8/18 302, at 3-4, Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 4; Sessions | |
1/17/18 302, at 16. | |
596 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 2. | |
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Peace.597 Simes personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government | |
officials,598 as does CNI collectively. As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie | |
Corporation in 2015, CNI has "unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among | |
Washington think tanks,"599 in part because CNI has arranged for U.S. delegations to visit Russia | |
and t`or 6Russian delegations to visit the United States as part of so-called "Track II" diplomatic | |
efforts. 00 | |
On March 14, 2016, CNI board member Richard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and | |
its honorary chairman, Henry Kissinger, at the Time Warner Building in New York.601 The idea | |
behind the event was to generate interest in CN1's work and recruit new board members for CNL602 | |
Along with Simes, attendees at the event included Jared Kushner, son-in-law of candidate | |
Trump.6°3 Kushner told the Office that the event came at a time when the Trump Campaign was | |
having trouble securing support from experienced foreign policy professionals and that, as a result, | |
he decided to seek Simes's assistance during the March 14 event.604 | |
Simes and Kushner spoke again on a March 24, 2016 telephone call,605 three days after | |
Trump had publicly named the team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short | |
notice.6°6 On March 31, 2016, Simes and Kushner had an in-person, one-on-one meeting in | |
Kushner's New York office.607 During that meeting, Simes told Kushner that the best way to | |
handle foreign-policy issues for the Trump Campaign would be to organize an advisory group of | |
experts to meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent | |
with Trump's voice.608 Simes believed that Kushner was receptive to that suggestion.609 | |
Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump Campaign | |
regarding the Campaign's foreign policy positions. For example, on June 17, 2016, Simes sent | |
J.D. Gordon an email with a "memo to Senator Sessions that we discussed at our recent meeting" | |
597 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 19. | |
598 Simes 3/27/18 302, at 10-15. | |
599 C00011656 (Rethinking US.-Russia Relations, CNI (Apr. 18, 2015)). | |
600 Simes 3/8/18 302, at s, Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 29-30, Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at 3. | |
601 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; C00006784 (3/11/16 Email, Gilbride to Saunders (3:43:12 p.m.); of | |
Zaldleim 1/25/18 302, at 1 (Kissinger was CNl's "Honorary Chairman of the Board"), Boyd 1/24/18 302, | |
at 2; P. Sanders 2/15/18 302, at 5. | |
602 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5-6, Simes 3/27/18 302, at 2. | |
603 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6, Kushner 4/11/18 302 at 2. | |
604 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 2. | |
605 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6-7. | |
606 I I see Volume I, Section IV.A.2, supra. | |
607 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-9. | |
608 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-8. | |
609 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8, see also Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 2. | |
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The Office found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either Trump or Sessions after | |
the speech, or would have had the opportunity to do so. Simes, for example, did not recall seeing | |
Kislyak at the post-speech luncheon,632 and the only witness who accounted for Sessions's | |
whereabouts stated that Sessions may have spoken to the press after the event but then departed | |
for Capitol Hill.633 Saunders recalled, based in part on a food-related request he received from a | |
Campaign staff member, that Trump left the hotel a few minutes after the speech to go to the | |
airport.63 | |
c. JejfSessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI | |
In the wake of Sessions's confirmation hearings as Attorney General, questions arose about | |
whether Sessions's campaign-period interactions with CNI apart from the Mayflower speech | |
included any additional meetings with Ambassador Kislyak or involved Russian-related matters. | |
With respect to Kislyak contacts, on May 23, 2016, Sessions attended CNI's Distinguished Service | |
Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D.C.635 Sessions attended a pre-dinner | |
reception and was seated at one of two head tables for the event.636 A seating chart prepared by | |
Saunders indicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to have | |
responded to the invitation by indicating he would attend the event.637 Sessions, however, did not | |
remember seeing, speaking with, or sitting next to Kislyak at the dinner.638 Although CNI board | |
member Charles Boyd said he may have seen Kislyak at the dinner,639 Simes, Saunders, and Jacob | |
I-Ieilbrunn-editor of the National Interest-all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May | |
23 event.640 Kislyak also does not appear in any of the photos from the event that the Office | |
obtained. | |
In the summer of 2016, CNI organized at least two dinners in Washington, D.C. for | |
Sessions to meet with experienced foreign policy professionals.641 The dinners included CNI- | |
affiliated individuals, such as Richard Burt and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. ambassador to | |
Afghanistan and Iraq and the person who had introduced Trump before the April 27, 2016 foreign- | |
632 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 22, Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7. | |
633 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 4. | |
634 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 15. | |
635 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22, Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 17. | |
636 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 17, C00004779-80 (5/23/16 Email, Cantelmo to Saunders & Hagberg | |
(9:30:12 a.m.), C00004362 (5/23/16 Email, Bauman to Cantelmo et al. (2:02:32 a.m.). | |
637 C00004362 (5/23/16 Email Bauman to Cantelmo et al. (2:02:32 a.m.). | |
638 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22. | |
639 Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 4. | |
640 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 23, Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 18, Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7. | |
641 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 31, Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 19; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 | |
302, at 5. | |
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Trump.653 In advance of the meeting, Simes sent Kushner a "Russia Policy Memo" laying out | |
"what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia."654 In a cover email transmitting that memo and | |
a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned "a well-documented story of highly | |
questionable connections between Bill Clinton" and the Russian government, "parts of [which]" | |
(according to Simes) had even been "discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and | |
shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency."655 Kushner | |
forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick | |
Gates, with the note "suggestion only."656 Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his | |
assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes.657 (Manafort was on the verge of leaving the | |
Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only | |
with Kushner). V | |
During the August 17 meeting, Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information | |
that he had promised 658 Simes told Kushner that | |
Simes claimed that he had received this information from former | |
CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth, who claimed to have learned it from U.S. | |
intelligence sources, not from RL\ssians.660 | |
Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the | |
Campaign because it was, in Simes's words, "old news."66I When interviewed by the Office, | |
Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about | |
the Clinton given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes | |
information that could be "operationalized" for the Trump Campaign.662 Despite Kushner's | |
653 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12; C00007269 | |
(8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simes et a1.); DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort | |
(5:57:15 p.m.)). | |
654 C00007981-84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). The memorandum | |
recommended "downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time" and suggested that "some | |
tend to exaggerate Putin's flaws." The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russian- | |
related questions in the framework of "how to work with Russia to advance important U.S. national | |
interests" and that a Trump Administration "not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." The | |
memorandum did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions, including | |
questions about Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea. | |
ess C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). | |
656 DJTFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to s. Miller et al. (1 l :30:l3 a.m.)). | |
657 DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.)), | |
658 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30, Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6, Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12. | |
659 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30, Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6. | |
660 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30. | |
661 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30, Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6. | |
662 Kushner 4/1 1/18 302, at 12. | |
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reaction, Simes believed that he provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign | |
policy experts that CNI organized for Sessions.663 | |
5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower | |
On June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with | |
a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the | |
Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump Jr. in an email from Robert | |
Goldstone, at the request of his then-client Ervin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estate developer | |
Aras Agalarov. Goldstone relayed to Trump Jr. that the "Crown prosecutor of Russia ... offered | |
to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would | |
incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as "part of Russia and its government's support | |
for Mr. Trump." Trump Jr. immediately responded that "if it's what you say I love it," and arranged | |
the meeting through a series of emails and telephone calls. | |
Trump Jr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior advisor Jared Kushner to | |
attend the meeting, and both attended. Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it | |
occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an | |
upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the meeting to | |
Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has no recollection of | |
learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found no documentary evidence showing that he | |
was made aware of the meeting-or its Russian connection-before it occurred. | |
The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously | |
worked for the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout | |
this period of time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided | |
to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to support those claims, but | |
Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She and her associates then turned to a critique of | |
the origins of the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on | |
Russian officials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian children. Trump Jr. | |
suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump was elected. After the | |
election, Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump | |
Transition Team did not engage. | |
a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting | |
i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr. | |
Aras Agalarov is a Russian real-estate developer with ties to Putin and other members of | |
the Russian government, including Russia's Prosecutor General, Yuri Chaika.664 Aras Agalarov | |
is the president of the Crocus Group, a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian | |
government construction contracts and that-as discussed above, Volume I, Section IV.A. 1, supra | |
663 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30. | |
Goldstone 2/8/18 302, | |
at 4. | |
110 | |
an | |
D | |
um. | |
I. in-an up | |
m | |
Jn: | |
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Attorney Work Product // May--Gontuin Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. F. 6(0) | |
appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in | |
Moscow offering "confidential information" from "the Prosecutor General of Russia" about | |
"interactions between certain political forces in our two countries."683 | |
l | |
Shortly after his June 3 call with Emir Agalarov, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr.684 The | |
email stated: | |
Good morning . | |
Emln just calledand asked me to contact you with something very Interesting. | |
The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this momlng and in their meeting offered lo provide the Trump campaign with | |
some oflidal documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father. | |
This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump - helped along by | |
Aras and Ervin. | |
What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Emln about it directly? | |
lean also send this into to your father via Rhona, but it is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first. | |
Best | |
Rob Goldstone | |
Within minutes of this email, Trump Jr. responded, emailing back: "Thanks Rob I appreciate that. | |
I am on the road at the moment but perhaps just speak to Ervin first. Seems we have some time | |
and if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next | |
week when I am back'?"685 Goldstone conveyed Trump Jr.'s interest to Ervin Agalarov, emailing | |
that Trump Jr. "wants to speak personally on the issue."686 | |
On June 6, 2016, Emir Agalarov asked Goldstone if there was "[a]ny news," and Goldstone | |
explained that Trump Jr. was likely still traveling for the "final elections ... where [T]rump will | |
be 'crowned' the official nominee."687 On the same day, Goldstone again emailed Trump Jr. and | |
asked when Trump Jr. was "free to talk with Emir about this Hillary info."688 Trump Jr. asked if | |
ess See Gribbin 8/31/17 302, at 1-2 & 1A (undated one-page document given to congressional | |
delegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with broad national responsibilities in the | |
Russian legal system. See Federal Law on the Prosecutor's Of'ice of the Russian Federation (1992, | |
amended 2004). | |
684 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to | |
Donald Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11 :00) Tweet. | |
685 DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone), @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11:00) | |
Tweet, RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone). | |
686 RG000062 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone & Trump Jr.). | |
687 RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A. Agalarov to Goldstone); RG000064 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to | |
A. Agalarov). | |
688 RG000065 (6/6/l6 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to | |
Trump Jr.). | |
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they could "speak now," and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump Jr. and Ervin Agalarov.689 | |
On June 6 and June 7, Trump Jr. and Emir Agalarov had multiple brief calls.69° | |
Also on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a | |
meeting in New York with the Trump Organization.691 Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized | |
U.S. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras | |
Agalarov.692 Kaveladze told the Office that, in a second phone call on June 6, 20 16, Aras Agalarov | |
asked Kaveladze if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis | |
for the meeting and Veselnitskaya's business card. According to Kaveladze, Aras Agalarov said | |
the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kaveladze to | |
translate.693 | |
ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign | |
On June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. and said that "Ervin asked that I schedule a | |
meeting with you and [t]he Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow."694 | |
Trump Jr. replied that Manafort (identified as the "campaign boss"), Jared Kushner, and Trump | |
Jr. would likely attend.695 Gold t s one was sur rxse ' d to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner | |
would attend.696 Kaveladze "puzzled" by the list of attendees and that he | |
checked with one of Ervin Agalarov's assistants, Roman Beniaminov, who said that the purpose | |
of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey "negative information on Hillary Clinton."697 | |
Beniaminov, however, stated that he did not recall having known or said that.698 | |
Early on June 8, 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3:00 p.m. | |
689 DJTJR00445 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone and Trump Jr.); RG000065-67 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone | |
and Trump Jr.),l | |
690 DJTJR00499 Call Records of Donald Trump Jr. ); Call Records | |
of Donald Trump Jr | |
691 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6, | |
692 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302. at 1-2 Beniaminov 1/6/18 | |
302, at 2-3 , | |
693 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6. | |
694 DJTJR00467 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trum DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 11:00) | |
Tweet; RG000068 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump .lr.); f | |
695 DJTJR00469 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/1 U17 (11:00) | |
Tweet; RG000071 6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone), OSC-KAV_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to | |
Kaveladze), | |
696 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 7, | |
697 see Kaveladze 11/16/17 302 at 7, osc- | |
KAV _00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze). | |
698 Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3. | |
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meeting the following day with Trump Jr.699 Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of | |
his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under | |
the subject line "FW: Russia - Clinton - private and confidential," adding a note that the "[m]eeting | |
got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices."700 Kushner then sent his assistant a second email, | |
informing her that the "[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now."701 Manafort responded, "See you | |
then. P.»=702 | |
Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the | |
Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of | |
senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about | |
the Clinton Foundation.703 Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a | |
group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend.704 Gates recalled that | |
the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late, | |
Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the | |
meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful.705 Hicks denied any | |
knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017,706 and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9 | |
meeting came up at all earlier that week.707 | |
Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump's office on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr. | |
told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward.708 | |
Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia.709 From the tenor | |
of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his | |
father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation.71° In an interview with the | |
Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father about the | |
699 NOSC0000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas). | |
700 NOSC00000039-42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort), DJTJR00485 (6/8/16 | |
Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort). | |
701 NOSC0000004 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas). | |
702 6/8/16 Email, Manafort to Trump Jr. | |
703 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7, Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. Although the March 1 302 refers to "June | |
19," that is likely a typographical error, external emails indicate that a meeting with those participants | |
occurred on June 6. See NOSC00023603 (6/6/l 6 Email, Gates to Trump Jr. et aL). | |
704 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting | |
indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. See Neil | |
MacFarquhar, A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?, | |
New York Times (July 16, 2017). | |
705 Gates 3/1/18 302, at 3-4. | |
706 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6. | |
707 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 8. | |
708 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6. | |
709 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-5. | |
710 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 15-16. | |
115 | |
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Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitskaya with Magnitsky a -rl e 'l l l a S ted lobbying and the | |
Prevezon case. also attended the lunch 717 Veselnitskava said she was | |
meeting' l and | |
asked Aldlmetshin what she should tell him/ is According to several participants in the lunch, | |
Veselnitskaya showed Aldxmetshin a document alleging financial misconduct by Bill Browder and | |
the Ziff brothers (Americans with business in Russia , and those individuals subse uently makin | |
olitical donations to the DNC 719 | |
The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting."1 | |
ii. Conduct of the Meeting | |
Trump Jr., Manafoli, and Kushner participated on the Trump side, while Kaveladze, | |
Samochornov, AId1metshin, and Goldstone attended with Veselnitskaya.722 The Office spoke to | |
every participant except Veselsneit snk1a sy aa aan adn Trump r u Jr m ., the rl '7 atte e r a o f ew ro h o W m o d m ece li c n e m d eto be volu 0 ne ta v r e i l un all | |
interviewed by the Office | |
The meeting lasted amoroximatelv 20 minutes 723 | |
Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselnitskaya to begin but did not | |
say anything about the subject of the meet1ng.725 Participants agreed that Veselnltskaya stated that | |
the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton | |
Campaign.726 She asserted that the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering | |
717 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302. at 7 Samochornov 7/13/17 | |
302, at 2, 41 | |
71st | |
Kaveladze 11/16/17302, at 7;_ | |
Samochornov did not recall the planned | |
. subject matter of the Trump Tower meeting coming up at lunch. | |
Samochomov 7/12/17 302, at 4. In her later Senate statement and interactions with the press, | |
Veselnitskaya produced what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9 meeting. | |
720 | |
721 E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. | |
722 Et., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. | |
723 Fig., Samochomov 7/12/17 302, at 4, Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 9. | |
724 I | |
725 | |
726 I | |
117 | |
I I | |
n | |
_ | |
-ill: | |
oug not all of its details | |
At some point in the meeting, Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating "waste of time," | |
followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that | |
Washington DC, 115th Cong. 57 (Sept. 7, 2017). | |
734 Manafort's notes state: | |
Bill browder | |
Offshore - Cyprus | |
133m shares | |
Companies | |
Not invest - loan | |
Value in Cyprus as inter | |
Illici | |
Active sponsors of RNC | |
Browder hired Joanna Glover | |
Tied into Cheney | |
Russian adoption by American families | |
PJM-SJC-00000001-02 (Notes Produced to Senate Judiciary Committee). | |
118 | |
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they call him to give him an excuse to leave.735 Samochornov recalled that Kushner departed the | |
meeting before it concluded; Veselnitskaya recalled the same when interviewed by the press in | |
July 2017.736 | |
Veselnitskaya's press interviews and written statements to Congress differ materially from | |
other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview, Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection | |
to the Russian government and had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the | |
Clinton Campaign when she met with Trump Campaign officials.737 Veselnitskaya's November | |
2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June 9 | |
meeting was not to connect with "the Trump Campaign" but rather to have "a private meeting with | |
Donald Trump Jr.-a friend of my good acquaintance's son on the matter of assisting me or my | |
colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and | |
interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress."738 In other words, Veselnitskaya | |
claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign. No witness, however, recalled any | |
reference to Congress during the meeting. Veselnitskaya also maintained that she "attended the | |
meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv," the previously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, but | |
she did not "introduce [her]self in this capacity."739 | |
In a July 2017 television interview, Trump Jr. stated that while he had no way to gauge the | |
reliability, credibility, or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting, | |
if "someone has information on our opponent ... maybe this is something. I should hear them | |
out."74° Trump Jr. iilrther stated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he | |
should "listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say."741 Depending on what, if any, | |
information was provided, Trump Jr. stated he could then "consult with counsel to make an | |
informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration."742 | |
735 nosc00003992 (6/9/16 Text Message, Kushner to Manafort); Kushner 4/1 ms 302, at 9, | |
Vargas 4/4/18 302, at 7; NOSC00000044 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas); NOSC00000045 (6/9/16 | |
Email, Kushner to Cain). | |
736 Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4 Kushner 4/11/18 | |
302, at 9-10, see also Interview of' Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 48-49 | |
(Sept. 7, 2017). | |
737 Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr. Info on Clinton, NBC News | |
(July 11, 2017). | |
738 Testimony 0/'Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, | |
115'1' Cong. 10(Nov 20, 2017). | |
739 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, | |
I 15th Cong. 21 (Nov. 20, 2017). | |
740 Sean Hannity, Transcript-Donald Trump Jr, Fox News (July 11, 2017). | |
741 Interview of: Donaldl Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16 (Sept. 7, 2017). | |
742 Interview of: Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16-17 (Sept. 7, | |
2017)~ | |
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After the June 9 meeting concluded. Goldstone aooloszized to Trumn Jr 743 According to | |
Goldstone, he told Trump Jr 744 and | |
told Emir Azalarov in a phone call that the meeting was about adoption | |
745 | |
Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze to | |
report in after the meeting, but before Kaveladze could call, Aras Agalarov called him.747 With | |
Veselnitskaya next to him, Kaveladze reported that the meeting had gone well, but he later told | |
Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a waste of time because it was | |
not with lawyers and they were "preaching to the wrong cr0wd."748 | |
e. Post-June 9 Events | |
Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarov made at least two unsuccessful attempts after the election | |
to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder and the | |
Magnitsky Act.749 On November 23, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstone about setting up another | |
meeting "with T people" and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed on | |
June 9.750 Kaveladze followed up with Goldstone, stating that "Mr. A," which Goldstone | |
understood to mean Aras Agalarov, called to ask about the meeting.75' Goldstone emailed the | |
document to Rhona Graff, saying that "Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in | |
the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team. If needed, a lawyer representing the case is | |
Kaveladze 11/16/17 302. at 8 I Goldstone 2/8/18 302, | |
at 9; | |
744 I | |
The week after the June 9 meeting, a cybersecuri urity tf1irm | |
and the DNC announced the Russian hack of the DNC. See Volume I, Section III.B.2, supra | |
(and one text message shows) that, shortly after the DNC | |
announcement, Goldstone made comments connecting the DNC hacking announcement to the June 9 | |
meeting. OSC-KAV_00029 (6/l4/I6 Email, Goldstone to E. | |
Agalarov & Kaveladze (10:09 a.m.)). The investigation did not identify evidence connecting the events of | |
June 9 to the GRU's hack-and-dump operation. OSC-KAV_00029-30 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E. | |
Agalarov). | |
746 I | |
747 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8, Call Records of Ike Kaveladze | |
. | |
748 Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze | |
On June 14, 2016 Kaveladze's teenage daughter emailed asking how the June 9 meeting had gone, and | |
Kaveladze responded, "meeting was boring. The Russians did not have an bad info on Hilarv." OSC- | |
KAV _00257 (6/14/16 Email, I. Kaveladze to A. Kaveladze; . | |
749 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 11, | |
OSC-KAV 00138 11/23/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze); | |
751 RG000196 (11/26-29/16 Text Messages, Goldstone & Kaveladze), | |
120 | |
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in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team."752 According | |
to Goldstone, around January 2017, Kaveladze contacted him again to set up another meeting, but | |
Goldstone did not make the request.753 The investigation did not identify evidence of the transition | |
team following up. | |
Participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting began receiving inquiries from attorneys | |
representing the Trump Organization starting in approximately June 2017.754 On approximately | |
June 2, 2017, Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten, general counsel of the Trump Organization, | |
about his participation in the June 9 meeting.755 The same day, Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya's | |
name to Garten, identifying her as the "woman who was the attorney who spoke at the meeting | |
from Moscow."756 Later in June 2017, Goldstone participated in a lengthier call with Garter and | |
Alan Futerfas, outside counsel for the Trump Organization (and, subsequently, personal counsel | |
for Trump ]r.).757 On June 27, 2017, Goldstone emailed Etnin Agalarov with the subject "Trump | |
attorneys" and stated that he was "interviewed by attorneys" about the June 9 meeting who were | |
"concerned because it links Don Jr. to officials from Russia-which he has always denied | |
1neeting."758 Goldstone stressed that he "did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible | |
meeting."759 Ervin Agalarov sent a screenshot of the message to Kaveladze.760 | |
The June 9 meeting became public in July 2017. In a July 9, 2017 text message to Ervin | |
Agalarov, Goldstone wrote "I made sure I kept you and your father out of [t]his story,"76I and "[i]f | |
contacted I can do a dance and keep you out of it."762 Goldstone added, "FBI now investigating," | |
and "I hope this favor was worth for your dad-it could blow up."763 On July 12, 2017 Ervin | |
Agalarov complained to Kaveladze that his father, Aras, "never listens" to him and that their | |
752 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at II, DJTJR00118 (11/28/16 | |
| | |
Email, Goldstone to Graff). | |
753 I | |
754 I | |
755 I | |
756 RG000256 (6/2/17 Email, Goldstone to Garten). | |
757 I | |
753 RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov). | |
RG000092 (6/27/17 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov | |
760 OSC-KAV _01190 (6/27/17 Text Message, E. Agalarov to Kaveladze). | |
761 RG000286-87 (7/9/17 Text Messages, E. Agalarov & Goldstone); | |
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relationship with "mr T has been thrown down the drain."764 The next month, Goldstone | |
commented to Ervin Agalarov about the volume of publicity the June 9 meeting had generated, | |
stating that his "reputation [was] basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father | |
insisted on even though Ike and Me told him would be bad news and not to d0."765 Goldstone | |
added, "I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father. So am painted as some | |
mysterious link to Putin."766 | |
After public reporting on the June 9 meeting began, representatives from the Trump | |
Organization again reached out to participants. On July 10, 2017, Futerfas sent Goldstone an email | |
with a proposed statement for Goldstone to issue, which read: | |
As the person who arranged the meeting, I can definitively state that the statements I have | |
read by Donald Trump Jr. are 100% accurate. The meeting was a complete waste of time | |
and Don was never told Ms. Veselnitskaya's name prior to the meeting. Ms. Veselnitskaya | |
mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted | |
20 to 30 minutes at most. There was never any follow up and nothing ever came of the | |
meeting.767 | |
the statement drafted by Trump Organization representatives was | |
1768 He proposed a different statement, asserting that he had been | |
asked "by [his] client in Moscow - Ervin Agalarov - to facilitate a meeting between a Russian | |
attorney (Natalia Veselnitzkaya [sic]) and Donald Trump Jr. The lawyer had apparently stated | |
that she had some information regarding funding to the DNC from Russia, which she believed Mr. | |
Trump Jr. might find interesting."769 Goldstone never released either statement.77° | |
On the Russian end, there were also communications about what participants should say | |
about the June 9 meeting. Specifically, the organization that hired Samochornov-an anti- | |
Magnitsky Act group controlled by Veselnitskaya and the owner of Prevezon-offered to pay | |
$90,000 of Samochornov's legal fees.771 At Veselnitskaya's request, the organization sent | |
Samochornov a transcript of a Veselnitskaya press interview, and Samochornov understood that | |
the organization would pay his legal fees only if he made statements consistent with | |
Veselnitskaya's.772 Samochornov declined, telling the Office that he did not want to perjure | |
764 OSC-KAV 01197 (7/l1-12/17 Text Messages, Kaveladze & E. Agalarov),_ | |
765 | |
766 I | |
767 7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garden. | |
768 I | |
769 7/10/17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garter. | |
770 I Samochornov we/w 302, at 1 | |
Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at l. | |
122 | |
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himself.773 The individual who conveyed Veselnitskaya's request to Samochornov stated that he | |
did not expressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya's answers but, in hindsight, | |
recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of | |
assistance to be conditioned on his not contradicting Veselnitskaya's account.774 | |
Volume II, Section II.G, inj9*a, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump Jr., | |
and others in June and July 2017 regarding the June 9 meeting. | |
6. Events at the Republican National Convention | |
Trump Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the week | |
of the Republican National Convention. The evidence indicates that those interactions were brief | |
and non-substantive. During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention, | |
J.D. Gordon, a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposed | |
amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing "lethal" assistance | |
to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. Gordon requested that platform committee | |
personnel revise the proposed amendment to state that only "appropriate" assistance be provided | |
to Ukraine. The original sponsor of the "lethal" assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her | |
(the sponsor) that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to | |
dilute the language. Gordon denied making that statement to the sponsor, although he | |
acknowledged it was possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the | |
subject matter. The investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to or was directed by the | |
candidate to make that proposal. Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed the | |
proposed language was inconsistent with Trump's position on Ukraine. | |
a. Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and JD. Gordon the | |
Week of the RNC | |
In July 2016, Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy | |
event, a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in | |
Cleveland, Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention (RNC or | |
"Convention").775 Approximately 80 foreign ambassadors to the United States, including Kislyak, | |
were invited to the conference.776 | |
On July 20, 2016, Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at the conference.777 In | |
his speech, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the United States should have better relations with | |
773 Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 1. | |
714 I | |
775 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22, Allan Smith, We Now Know More About | |
why Jeff Sessions and a Russian Ambassador Crossed Paths at the Republican Convention, Business Insider | |
(Mar, 2, 2017). | |
776 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9, Laura DeMarco, Global Cleveland and Sen. Bob Corker Welcome | |
International Republican National Convention Guests, Cleveland Plain Dealer (July 20, 2016). | |
777 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9, Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22. | |
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Russia.778 During Sessions's speech, he took questions from the audience, one of which may have | |
been asked by Kislyak.779 When the speeches concluded, several ambassadors lined up to greet | |
the speakers.780 Gordon shook hands with Kislyak and reiterated that he had meant what he said | |
in the speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations.781 Sessions separately spoke with between | |
six and 12 ambassadors, including Kislyak.782 Although Sessions stated during interviews with | |
the Office that he had no specific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak, he believed that | |
the two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said | |
some things about U.S.-Russia relations.783 | |
Later that evening, Gordon attended a reception as part of the conflerence.784 Gordon ran | |
into Kislyak as the two prepared plates of food, and they decided to sit at the same table to eat.785 | |
They were joined at that table by the ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and by Trump | |
Campaign advisor Carter Page.786 As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for what Gordon | |
estimated to have been three to five minutes, during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant | |
what he said in his speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations.787 | |
b. Change to Republican Party Platform | |
In preparation for the 2016 Convention, foreign policy advisors to the Trump Campaign, | |
working with the Republican National Committee, reviewed the 2012 Convention's foreign policy | |
platform to identify divergence between the earlier platform and candidate Trump's positions.788 | |
The Campaign team discussed toning down language from the 2012 platform that identified Russia | |
as the country's number one threat, given the candidate's belief that there needed to be better U.S. | |
relations with Russia.789 The RNC Platform Committee sent the 2016 draft platform to the | |
National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee on July 10, 2016, the evening before its | |
778 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9. | |
779 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3. | |
780 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3. | |
781 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9. | |
782 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3, see also Volume I, Section IV.A.4.b, supra | |
(explaining that Sessions and Kislyak may have met three months before this encounter during a reception | |
held on April 26, 2016, at the Mayflower Hotel). | |
783 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22. | |
784 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10. | |
785 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10. | |
786 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at IO, see also Volume I, Section IV.A.3.d, supra (explaining that Page | |
acknowledged meeting Kislyak at this event). | |
787 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10. | |
788 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10. | |
789 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10. | |
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first meeting to propose amendments.790 | |
Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote on the platform, | |
the Trump Campaign could request changes, and members of the Trump Campaign attended | |
committee meetings.791 John Mashburn, the Campaign's policy director, helped oversee the | |
Campaign's involvement in the platform committee meetings.792 He told the Office that he | |
directed Campaign staff at the Convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach | |
and only to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes.793 | |
On July 11, 2016, delegate Diana Denman submitted a proposed platform amendment that | |
included provision of armed support for Ukraine.794 The amendment described Russia's "ongoing | |
military aggression" in Ukraine and announced "support" for "maintaining (and, if warranted, | |
increasing) sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully | |
restored" and for "providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater | |
coordination with NATO on defense planning."795 Gordon reviewed the proposed platform | |
changes, including Denman's.796 Gordon stated that he flagged this amendment because of | |
Trump's stated position on Ukraine, which Gordon personally heard the candidate say at the March | |
31 foreign policy meeting-namely, that the Europeans should take primary responsibility for any | |
assistance to Ukraine, that there should be improved U.S.-Russia relations, and that he did not | |
want to start World War III over that region.797 Gordon told the Office that Trump's statements | |
on the campaign trail following the March meeting underscored those positions to the point where | |
Gordon felt obliged to object to the proposed platform change and seek its dilution.798 | |
On July II, 2016, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform | |
Subcommittee, Denman offered her amendment.799 Gordon and another Campaign staffer, Matt | |
Miller, approached a committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendment to permit further | |
discussion.8°° Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing "lethal | |
790 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10, Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1-2. | |
791 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 10. | |
792 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4, Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 7-8. | |
793 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4, Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10. | |
794 DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 1; | |
Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2. | |
795 DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22. | |
796 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10-11. | |
797 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11, Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11; Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 1-2, 5-6. | |
798 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 5-6. | |
799 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2, see DENMAN 000014. | |
800 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2, Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2, Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12, see Hoff | |
5/26/17 302, at 2. | |
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defensive weapons to Ukraine."801 Miller did not have any independent basis to believe that this | |
language contradicted Trump's views and relied on Gordon's recollection of the candidate's | |
VieWS_802 | |
According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they | |
had to clear the language and that Gordon was "talking to New York."803 Denman told others that | |
she was asked by the two Trump Campaign staffers to strike "lethal defense weapons" from the | |
proposal but that she refused.804 Dem ran recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with | |
candidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true.805 Gordon denied having told | |
Denman that he was on the phone with Trump, although he acknowledged it was possible that he | |
mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter.806 Gordon's phone | |
records reveal a call to Sessions's office in Washington that afternoon, but do not include calls | |
directly to a number associated with Trump.807 And according to the President's written answers | |
to the Office's questions, he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the | |
platform amendment.808 | |
Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn, a senior foreign policy advisor, and | |
Mashburn, the Campaign policy director. Gordon stated that he connected with both of them (he | |
could not recall if by phone or in person) and apprised them of the language he took issue with in | |
the proposed amendment. Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn and that | |
all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation ("appropriate assistance").8°9 | |
Dearborn recalled Gordon warning them about the amendment, but not weighing in because | |
Gordon was more familiar with the Campaign's foreign policy stance.810 Mashburn stated that | |
Gordon reached him, and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue and that | |
the Campaign should not intervene.811 | |
When the amendment came up again in the committee's proceedings, the subcommittee | |
changed the amendment by striking the "lethal defense weapons" language and replacing it with | |
801 Dem ran 6/7/17 302, at 3. | |
802 M. Miller 10/25/17 302 at 3. | |
$03 Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2. | |
$04 Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2. | |
B05 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2-3, 3-4, Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2. | |
806 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7. | |
807 Call Records of .1.D. Gordon Gordon stated to the Office that | |
his calls with Sessions were unrelated to the platform change. Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7. | |
802 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, | |
Part (0). | |
809 Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6-7, Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 1 1-12, see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11. | |
810 Dearborn 11/28/17 302, at 7-8. | |
811 Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4. | |
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meet with foreign officials in that capacity.821 But | |
Sessions's staff reported, and Sessions himself acknowledged, that meeting requests from | |
ambassadors increased substantially in 20]6, as Sessions assumed a prominent role in the Trump | |
Campaign and his name was mentioned for potential cabinet-level positions in a future | |
Trump Administration.822 | |
On September 8, 2016, Sessions met with Kislyak in his Senate office.823 Sessions said | |
that he believed he was doing the Campaign a service by meeting with foreign ambassadors, | |
including Kislyak.824 He was accompanied in the meeting by at least two of his Senate staff: | |
Sandra Luff, his legislative director, and Pete Landrum, who handled military affairs.825 The | |
meeting lasted less than 30 minL1tes.826 Sessions voiced concerns about Russia's sale of a missile- | |
defense system to Iran, Russian planes buzzing U.S. military assets in the Middle East, and Russian | |
aggression in emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova.827 Kislyak offered | |
explanations on these issues and complained about NATO land forces in former Soviet-bloc | |
countries that border Russia.828 Landry recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential | |
campaign as "an interesting campaign,"829 and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the | |
Russian government was receptive to the overtures Trump had laid out during his campaign.830 | |
None of the attendees, though, remembered any discussion of Russian election interference or any | |
request that Sessions convey information from the Russian government to the Trump Campaign.831 | |
During the meeting, Kislyak invited Sessions to further discuss U.S.-Russia relations with | |
him over a meal at the ambassador's residence.832 Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak | |
extended the invitation. After the meeting ended, Luff advised Sessions against accepting the one- | |
on-one meeting with Kislyak, whom she assessed to be an "old school KGB 8uy.»»833 Neither Luff | |
nor Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or made any further effort to dine | |
821 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24, Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5. | |
822 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24, Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5, Landry 2/27/18 302, at 3-5. | |
823 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. | |
824 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. | |
825 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23, Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5-6, Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5 (stating he | |
could not remember if election was discussed). | |
826 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6, Landry 2/27/18 302, at 5. | |
827 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6, Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5. | |
828 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6, Landrum 2/27/18 302 at 4-5. | |
829 Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5. | |
830 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. Sessions also noted that ambassadors came to him for information | |
about Trump and hoped he would pass along information to Trump. Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24. | |
831 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6, Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5. | |
832 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5, Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4. | |
833 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5. | |
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Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine. | |
Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin | |
Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort's office in Kiev and who | |
the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. | |
Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee,839 | |
to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign-including internal polling data, | |
although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to | |
share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such | |
polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign. | |
834 Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6, Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5. | |
835 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. | |
836 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. | |
1337 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. | |
838 On August 21, 2018, Manafort was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on eight tax, | |
Foreign Bank Account Registration (FBAR), and bank fraud charges. On September 14, 2018, Manafort | |
pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to | |
commit offenses against the United States (money laundering, tax fraud, FBAR, Foreign Agents | |
Registration Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and (2) conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness | |
tampering). Manafort also admitted criminal conduct with which he had been charged in the Eastern | |
District of Virginia, but as to which the jury hung. The conduct at issue in both cases involved Manafort's | |
work in Ukraine and the money he earned for that work, as well as crimes after the Ukraine work ended. | |
On March 7, 2019, Manafoit was sentenced to 47 months of imprisonment in the Virginia prosecution. On | |
March 13, the district court in D.C. sentenced Manafort to a total term of 73 months: 60 months on the | |
Count 1 conspiracy (with 30 of those months to run concurrent to the Virginia sentence), and 13 months on | |
the Count 1 conspiracy, to be served consecutive to the other two sentences. The two sentences resulted in | |
a total term of 90 months . | |
B39 As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.1.b, supra, Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in | |
the District of Columbia, including making a false statement to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. He | |
has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. See also | |
Transcript at 16, United States v. Paul .1 Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 514 | |
("Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript") (court's explanation of reasons to credit Gates's statements in one | |
instance). | |
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Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the United States during the campaign period and | |
conveyed campaign information. The second meeting took place on August 2, 2016, in New York | |
City. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian | |
President Viktor Yanukovych, who was then living in Russia. The message was about a peace | |
plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a "backdoor" means for Russia to | |
control eastern Ukraine. Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an | |
email to Manafort expressing the view-which Manafort later said he shared-that the plan's | |
success would require U.S. support to succeed: "all that is required to start the process is a very | |
minor 'wink' (or slight push) from [Donald Trump]."840 The email also stated that if Manafort | |
were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his | |
reception in Russia "at the very top level." | |
Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four | |
occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2: December 2016 (the Kilimnik email | |
described above), January 2017, February 2017, and again in the spring of 2018. The Office | |
reviewed numerous Manafort email and text communications, and asked President Trump about | |
the plan in written questions.84' The investigation did not uncover evidence of Manafort's passing | |
along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or | |
the Administration. The Office was not, however, able to gain access to all of Manafort's | |
electronic communications (in some instances, messages were sent using encryption applications). | |
And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new | |
Administration about the peace plan, he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan | |
and his meetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that | |
the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreement.842 | |
The Office could not reliably determine Manafort s purpose in sharing internal polling data | |
with Kilimnik during the campaign period. ManafoM;.!! e did not see | |
a downside to sharing campaign information, and told Gates that his role in the Campaign would | |
The email was drafted in Kilimnik's DMP email account (in English | |
841 According to the President's written answers, he does not remember Manafort communicating | |
to him any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Written | |
Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 16-17 (Response to Question IV, Part (d)). | |
842 Manafort made several false statements during debriefings. Based on that conduct, the Office | |
determined that Manafort had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness. The | |
judge presiding in Manafort's D.C. criminal case found by a preponderance of the evidence that Manafort | |
intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the Office, and the grand jury concerning his | |
interactions and communications with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues). Although the report | |
refers at times to Manafort's statements, it does so only when those statements are sufficiently corroborated | |
to be trustworthy, to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of | |
evidentiary value, or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events, even when we were unable to | |
determine whether' that explanation was credible. | |
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be "good for business" and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed | |
in the Ukraine. As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with | |
him, Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a "disagreement"-a reference to | |
one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafort's credibility and our | |
limited ability to gather evidence on what happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik, | |
the Office could not assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The | |
Office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort's sharing polling data and | |
Russia's interference in the election, which had already been reported by U.S. media outlets at the | |
time of the August 2 meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise | |
coordinated with the Russian government on its election-interference efforts. | |
a. Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine | |
Manafort's Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stem from his | |
consulting work for Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate political | |
consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 20 15, including through his company DMP International | |
LLC (DMI). Kilimnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to | |
communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018. Kilimnik, who speaks and writes | |
Ukrainian and Russian, facilitated many of Manafort's communications with Deripaska and | |
Ukrainian oligarchs. | |
i. Oleg Der zpaska Consulting Work | |
In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who | |
has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with | |
Vladimir Putin.843 A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in | |
2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits | |
that the work could confer on "the Putin Govemment."844 Gates described the work Manafort did | |
for Deripaska as "political risk insurance," and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install | |
friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests.845 Manafort's | |
company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and was loaned millions | |
of dollars by Deripaska as well.846 | |
In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners | |
L.P. ("Pericles"), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner | |
Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe.847 | |
Deripaska was the sole investor.848 Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led | |
843 Pinchuk et al., Russian Tycoon Deripaska in Putin Delegation to China, Reuters (June 8, 2018). | |
$44 6/23/05 Memo, Manafort & Davis to Deripaska & Rothschild. | |
845 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 7. | |
846 Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2-5, Manafort Income by Year, 2005 - 2015, Manafort Loans from | |
Wire Transfers, 2005 - 2015. | |
847 Gates 3/12/18 302, at 5. | |
848 Manafort 12/16/15 Dep., at 157:8-11. | |
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to a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska.849 In particular, when the | |
fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009, | |
Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had "dried up."850 According to Gates, various | |
interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to | |
resolve the legal dispute.851 As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others | |
engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation. | |
ii. Political Consulting Work | |
Through Deripaska, Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov, a Ukrainian oligarch | |
who hired Manafort as a political consultant.852 In 2005, Aldimetov hired Manafort to engage in | |
political work supporting the Party of Regions,853 a political party in Ukraine that was generally | |
understood to align with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power, and | |
its candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a close and | |
trusted political advisor to Yanukovych during his time as President of Ukraine. Yanukovych | |
served in that role until 2014, when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests.854 | |
iii. Konstantin Kilimnik | |
Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a | |
longtime Manafort employee.855 Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his | |
senior entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients, including | |
Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs.856 Kilimnik also maintained a relationship with | |
Deripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin,857 a Russian national who previously served in the defense | |
attaché office of the Russian Embassy to the United States.858 | |
849 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9. | |
850 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 6. | |
851 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9-10. | |
852 Manafbtt 7/30/14 302, at 1; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2. | |
853 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5-6. | |
854 Gates 3/16/18 302, at l, Davis 2/8/18 302, at 9; Devine 7/6/18 302, at 2-3. | |
855 Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5, Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19, 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, u.s. | |
Department of State. | |
856 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19, Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8, Gates 1/31/18 302, at 4-5, Gates 1/30/18 | |
302, at 2, Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11. | |
857 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8. | |
858 Boyarkin Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. | |
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Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian | |
"spy."859 The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence.860 Several | |
pieces of the Office's evidence-including witness interviews and emails obtained through court- | |
authorized search warrants-support that assessment: | |
• Kilimnik was bom on April 27, 1970, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, then of the Soviet Union, | |
and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992.861 Sam | |
Patten, a business partner to Kilimnik,862 stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a | |
translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian | |
armament industry selling arms and military equipment.863 | |
U.S. government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United | |
. | |
States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997.864 | |
Kilimnik worked for the International Republican Institutes (IRI) Moscow office, where | |
. | |
he did translation work and general office management from 1998 to 2005.865 While | |
another official recalled the incident differently,866 one former associate of Kilimnik's at | |
IRI told the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian | |
intelligence were too strong. The same individual stated that it was well known at IRI that | |
Kilimnik had links to the Russian government.867 | |
Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI | |
. | |
Consulting, worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After | |
Hawker's work for DMI ended, Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian | |
859 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5. | |
860 The Office has noted Kilimnik's assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings. | |
Fig., Gov 't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, United States v. Paul .I Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, | |
2017), Doc. 73, at 2 ("Manafbrt (D.D.C.) Gov 't Opp. to Mot. to Modify"). | |
861 12/17/16 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. | |
862 In August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign | |
Agents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld | |
documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the course of its investigation of Russian | |
election interference. Plea Agreement, United States v. W Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, | |
2018), Doc. 6, Statement of Offense, United States v. W Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, | |
2018), Doc. 7. | |
was Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5-6. | |
864 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. | |
865 Nix 3/30/18 302, at 1-2. | |
866 Nix 3/30/18 302, at 2. | |
867 Lenzi 1/30/18 302, at 2. | |
133 | |
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government entity on a public-relations project that would promote, in Western and | |
Ukrainian media, Russia's position on its 2014 invasion of Crimea.868 | |
Gates suspected that Kilimnik was a "spy," a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker, | |
. | |
and Alexander van der Zwaan,869 an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for | |
the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.870 | |
b. Contacts during Paul Manaforfs Time with the Trump Campaign | |
i. Paul Manqfort Joins the Campaign | |
Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August 19, 2016. On March | |
29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign's "Convention | |
Manager."871 On May 19, 2016, Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief | |
strategist, and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy | |
campaign chairman.872 | |
Thomas Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump.873 In | |
early 2016, at Manafort's request, Barrack suggested to Trump that Manafort join the Campaign | |
to manage the Republican Convention.874 Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately | |
1980 until the mid-1990s through various consulting and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trump in | |
1982 when Trump hired the Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly lobbying firm.875 Over the years, | |
Manafort saw Trump at political and social events in New York City and at Stone's wedding, and | |
Trump requested VIP status at the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions worked by Manafort.876 | |
868 Hawker 1/9/18 302, at 13, 3/18/14 Email, Hawker & Tulukbaev. | |
869 van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to making | |
false statements to the Special Counsel's Office. Plea Agreement, United States v. Alex van der Zwaan, | |
1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2018), Doc. 8. | |
870 Hawker 6/9/18 302, at 4, van der Zwaan 11/3/17 302, at 22. Manafort said in an interview that | |
Gates had joked with Kilimnik about Kilirnnik's going to meet with his KGB handler. Manafort 10/16/18 | |
302, at 7. | |
B71 Press Release - Donald J Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager Paul .I Manafort, | |
The American Presidency Project - U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar. 29, 2016). | |
sn Gates 1/29/18 302, at 8, Meghan Keneally, Timeline ofManafort 's role in the Trump Campaign, | |
ABC News (Oct. 20, 2017). | |
373 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8, Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 1-2, Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3. | |
874 Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3, Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8. | |
875 Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6. | |
876 Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6. | |
134 | |
. . ....... | |
..... | |
. U.S. Department of Justice ...... | |
..... | |
... | |
Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protcctod Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(0) ......... | |
..... | |
. . . .. . . .. . . ......... | |
.. . . . . . . . | |
... . . | |
. . . .. | |
According to Gates, in March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in ..... | |
. . . . .. | |
........ | |
Florida to meet with Trump. Trump hired him at that time.877 Manafort agreed to work on the ..... | |
... | |
Campaign without pay. Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time, but resuscitating ..... | |
. . . . ................... | |
his domestic political campaign career could be financially beneficial in the future. Gates reported : | |
i | |
that Manafort intended, if Trump won the Presidency, to remain outside the Administration and I .... | |
I ..... ...... | |
monetize his relationship with the Administration.878 . .. . ........ | |
.......... | |
. .. . ... ..... | |
ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts . . . . . . . .. ... .... ............... | |
... Immediately upon joining the Campaign, Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review . . . . . .. | |
I . .. .... ..... separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Boris ! .... ......... | |
.. Kolesnikov,879 the last three being Ukrainian oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc ...... ......... | |
. . . . ..... officials.880 The memoranda described Manafort's appointment to the Trump Campaign and | |
. . .. . . . ........ | |
indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates ... . . ..... .......... emailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort's appointment to Kilimnik for | |
....... | |
translation and dissemination.881 Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages ...................... | |
had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown "our friends" | |
.... | |
the media coverage of his new r0le.882 Kilimnik replied, "Absolutely. Every article." Manafort . .. . . . .............. | |
I | |
further asked: "How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation I | |
i ....... | |
seen'?" Kilimnik wrote back the same day, "Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor I z . . .. . . ............ | |
! [Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD."883 ...... | |
. . . . ......... | |
.. . . . . .. . . . . . .... | |
Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be "good for ..... ...... | |
. . . ... business" and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately $2 million E . . .. . . . ...................... | |
he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ul<raine.884 Gates also explained to the | |
5 Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help "confirm" that Deripaska had .... ....... | |
. . . . .. . . | |
dropped the Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska (as n ...... | |
....... | |
. .. .. ... n I . .. .......... | |
. . . . . . . . I . . . . . . ........ 877 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10. I . I . . . ... | |
.. . . . | |
. . .. . . . .................. 878 Gates U30/18 302, at 4. I I | |
. .. . ..... $79 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11. | |
I | |
...... .................. | |
880 See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort's Trial Isn't About Russia, but It Will Be in the Air, New York | |
. . .. . . Times (July 30, 2018), Tierney Sneed, Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made $60 Million Consulting in . . . . . . . . | |
. . . . . . . . | |
...... Ukraine, Talking Points Memo (July 30, 2018); Mykola Vorobiov, How Pro-Russian Forces Will Take .. .. .... | |
............... | |
Revenge on Ukraine, Atlantic Council (Sept. 23, 2018), Sergii Leshchenko, Ukraine's Oligarchs Are Still | |
Calling fne SNots, Foreign Policy (Aug. 14, 2014), Interface-Ukraine, Kolesnikov: Inevitability of . . .. . . . . .. . | |
. . . . . . . . . . . . PunisNmehfNeededfor Real Fight Against Smuggling in Ukraine, Kyiv Post (June 23, 2018), Igor Kossov, . .. ................................. . . . . . .. ...... | |
.. Kyiv Hotel Industry Makes Room for New Entrants, Kyiv Post (Mar. 7, 2019); Markian Kuzmowycz, How | |
I | |
one Kremlin Can Win Ukraine'.s' Elections, Atlantic Council (Nov. 19, 2018). The Opposition Bloc is a I I | |
I ! I I | |
Ukraine political party that largely reconstituted the Party of Regions. ......... | |
.... .. . . . . . . ... $81 3/30/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik. .......... | |
882 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik. | |
I . . . . . ... | |
. . . . ...... I I I I ... | |
883 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik. I . . . . ... | |
I ... I I | |
........ | |
......... 884 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10. | |
.... ... | |
. . . . .. ............. | |
135 | |
..... | |
....... | |
.... .... ....... | |
....... | |
. .... ... ... .... ..... . . . | |
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Third, according to Gates and what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed | |
two sets of financial disputes related to Manafort's previous work in the region. Those consisted | |
of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafort for | |
his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment.933 | |
After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both stated that they left separately from Kilimnik | |
because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his | |
connections to Kilirnnik.934 | |
e. Post-Resignation Activities | |
Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016, approximately two | |
weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political | |
consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation, | |
Manafort continued to offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election. | |
Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Barron, and candidate Trump,935 and some | |
of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. For example, on October 21, 2016, | |
\ Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the | |
Campaign make the case against Clinton "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment" | |
and that "Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible | |
way ._ by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members."936 Later, in a | |
November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled "Securing the Victory," Manafort stated that he was | |
"really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory," and | |
that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by "mow[ing] immediately | |
to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and Cyber-fraud, including the claim that | |
the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results."937 | |
Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the Office that, in the | |
wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an Administration job. Manafort instead | |
preferred to stay on the "outside," and monetize his campaign position to generate business given | |
his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.938 Manafort | |
appeared to follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and | |
China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would €ntai1_939 | |
Manafort's activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and Russia. The | |
933 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2-4, Patten 5/22/18 302, at 7. | |
934 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 5, Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5. | |
935 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 12. | |
936 nosc00021517-20 (10/21/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner). | |
937 NOSC00021573-75 (11/5/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner). | |
938 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1, 4-5, Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4. | |
939 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1. | |
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Aven_ told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alfa-Bank | |
shareholders from potential sanctions, and one of those steps would be to try to reach out to the | |
incoming Administration to establish a line of communication.986 Aven described Putin | |
responding with skepticism about Aven's prospect for success.987 According to Aven, although | |
Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team, Aven understood | |
that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised.988 Avon's efforts are | |
described in Volume I, Section IV.B.5, infra. | |
2. Kirill Qmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration | |
Aven's description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behavior of Kirill | |
Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign wealth fund and is closely connected | |
to Putin. Dmitriev undertook efforts to meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in | |
the months after the election. Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United | |
Arab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trump transition officials, | |
and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitriev and Erik Prince, a | |
Trump Campaign supporter and an associate of Steve Bannon.989 In addition, the UAE national | |
security advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner, Rick | |
Gerson, in late November 2016. In December 2016 and January 2017, Dmitriev and Gerson | |
worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev | |
implied he cleared through Putin. Gerson provided that proposal to Kushner before the | |
inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. | |
a. Background | |
Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, | |
the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), when it was founded in 2011.990 Dmitriev reported | |
directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his "boss."991 | |
RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth f`unds.992 Dmitriev | |
regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed | |
986 I | |
987 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6. | |
988 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 4-8, | |
989 Nader provided information to the Office in multi je interviews, all but one of which were | |
conducted under a proffer agreement . The | |
investigators also interviewed Prince under a proffer agreement. Bannon was interviewed by the Office, | |
| under a proffer agreement. | |
990 Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available at | |
https://rdif.rL1/Eng_person_dmitriev_kiril1/. See also Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available | |
at https://rdiflru/Eng_About/. | |
991 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. See also, e.g., 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17 | |
Text Message, Drnitriev to Gerson. | |
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11077 | |
After the brief second meeting concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had | |
transpired.1078 Dmitriev told Nader that he was disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two | |
reasons: first, he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had more | |
authority within the incoming Administration than Prince had.1079 Second, he had hoped to have | |
a discussion of greater substance, such as outlinin a strategic roadmap for both countries to | |
follow 1080 Dmitriev told Nader that Prince's co - m | ments _ | |
were insulting 1081 | |
Hours after the second meeting, Prince sent two text messages to Barron from the | |
Seychelles.1082 As described further below, investigators were unable to obtain the content of these | |
or other messages between Prince and Bannon, and the investigation also did not identify evidence | |
of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles. | |
iii. Erik Prince 's Meeting with Steve Barron after the Seychelles Trip | |
After the Seychelles meetings, Prince told Nader that he would inform Bannon about his | |
discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was | |
interested in seeking better relations with the incoming Administration.I083 On January 12, 2017, | |
Prince contacted Bannon's personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following weel<.I084 | |
Several days later, Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon's schedule.1085 | |
Prince said that he met Barron at Bannon's home after returning to the United States in | |
mid-January and briefed him about several topics, including his meeting with Dmitriev.1086 Prince | |
told the Office that he explained to Barron that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign | |
wealth fund and was interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.1087 | |
Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot of Dmitriev's Wikipedia page dated January 16, 2017, | |
10771 | |
1078 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15, | |
_ | |
_ | |
1079 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 9, 15, | |
1080 Nader U22/18 302, at 15. | |
1081 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15. | |
1082 Call Records of Erik Prince | |
1083 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10, Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4, | |
1084 1/12/17 Text Messages, Prince to Preate. | |
1085 1/15/17 Text Message, Prince to Preate. | |
1086 Prince 4/4/18 302, at II; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. | |
1087 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11, Prince 5/3/1 s 302, at 5. | |
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and Prince told the Office that he likely showed that image to Bannon.1088 Prince also believed he | |
provided Bannon with Dmitriev's contact infornlation.1089 According to Prince, Barron instructed | |
Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev, and Prince had the impression that the issue was not a | |
priority for Bannon.1090 Prince related that Bannon did not appear angry, just relatively | |
uninterested. 1091 | |
Bannon, by contrast, told the Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding | |
Dmitriev, RDIF, or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin. 1092 | |
Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have remembered it, | |
and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken place.1093 | |
The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently | |
clarified by reviewing their communications, because neither one was able to produce any of the | |
messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince's phone | |
contained no text messages prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and | |
Bannon exchanged dozens of messages.1094 Prince denied deleting any messages but claimed he | |
did not know why there were no messages on his device before March2017.1095 Bannon's devices | |
similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period, and Bannon also stated he did not | |
know why messages did not appear on his device.'096 Bannon told the Office that, during both the | |
months before and after the Seychelles meeting, he regularly used his personal Blackberry and | |
personal email for work-related communications (including those with Prince), and he took no | |
steps to preserve these work communications.1097 | |
d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding ILS.- | |
Russia Relations | |
Dmitriev's contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by | |
Nader. In approximately late November 2016, the UAE national security advisor introduced | |
Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner who runs a hedge fund in New York.I098 | |
Gerson stated he had no formal role in the transition and had no involvement in the Trump | |
1088 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5, 1/16/17 Image on Prince Phone (on file with the Office). | |
1089 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. | |
1090 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. | |
1091 Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5. | |
1092 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11. | |
1093 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11. | |
1094 Call Records of Erik Prince | |
1095 Prince 4/4/18 302, at 6. | |
1096 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11, Barron 2/14/18 302, at 36. | |
1°°Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11. | |
1098 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at l, 3, 11/26/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson, 1/25/17 Text Message, | |
Dmitriev to Nader. | |
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Campaign other than occasional casual discussions about the Campaign with Kushner.1099 After | |
the election, Gerson assisted the transition by arranging meetings for transition officials with | |
former UK prime minister Tony Blair and a UAE delegation led by Crown Prince Mohammed.!I00 | |
When Dmitriev and Gerson met, they principally discussed potential joint ventures | |
between Gerson's hedge fund and RDIF.110l Dmitriev was interested in improved economic | |
cooperation between the United States and Russia and asked Gerson who he should meet with in | |
the incoming Administration who would be helpful towards this g0al.1102 Gerson replied that he | |
would try to figure out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions, but noted that | |
confidentiality would be required because of the sensitivity of holding such meetings before the | |
new Administration took power, and before Cabinet nominees had been confirmed by the | |
Senate] 103 Gerson said he would ask Kushner and Michael Flynn who the "key person or people" | |
were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia, joint security concerns, and economic matters. l 104 | |
Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop and execute a | |
reconciliation plan between the United States and Russia. He noted in a text message to Gerson | |
that if Russia was "approached with respect and willingness to understand our position, we can | |
have Major Breakthroughs quickly."! 105 Gerson and Dmitriev exchanged ideas in December 2016 | |
about what such a reconciliation plan would include.1106 Gerson told the Office that the Transition | |
Team had not asked him to engage in these discussions with Dmitriev, and that he did so on his | |
own initiative and as a private citizen.1107 | |
On January 9, 2017, the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be | |
worthwhile, Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could "share it with Jared | |
(or somebody else very senior in the team) - so that they know that we are focused from our side | |
on improving the relationship and my boss asked me to play a key role in that."l 108 Dmitriev also | |
asked Gerson if he knew Prince, and if Prince was somebody important or worth spending time | |
1099 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1. | |
1100 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1-2, Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 21. | |
1101 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3-4, see, e.g., 12/2/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson, 12/14/16 Text | |
Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; 1/3/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev, 12/2/16 Email, Tolokonnikov to | |
Gerson. | |
1102 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3, 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. | |
1103 12/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev. | |
1104 12/14/16 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev. | |
1105 12/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. | |
1106 12/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson. | |
1107 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. | |
1108 1/9/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Gerson, 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader. | |
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with_l109 After his trip to the Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Barron had asked Prince to | |
meet with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting 1I0 | |
On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.-Russia reconciliation that | |
he and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points: (I) | |
jointly fighting terrorism, (2) jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts, (3) | |
developing "win-win" economic and investment initiatives, (4) maintaining an honest, open, and | |
continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement, and (5) ensuring proper communication and | |
trust by "key people" from each country On January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the | |
document to Kushner.I 112 Kushner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time.lI 13 Gerson explained | |
that Dmitriev was the head of RDIF, and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev's being well | |
connected.1I'4 Kushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right | |
people.1'15 Kushner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex | |
Tillerson; according to Kushner, neither of them followed up with Kushner about it.1116 On | |
January 19, 2017, Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document, telling him that this was | |
"a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our | |
friends. Please share with them - we believe this is a good foundation to start from."m7 | |
Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering | |
it.m8 On January 26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his "boss"-an apparent reference to | |
Putin-was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposal.m9 Dmitriev said, "[w]e do | |
not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. At the same time, my boss asked me to | |
try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if possible."* 120 He informed Gerson that | |
Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and noted that that information | |
was "very confidential."' 121 | |
The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his "boss" again yesterday who | |
had "emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication | |
1109 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 4. | |
1110 1/18/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson. | |
Ill 1/16/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson. | |
1112 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3, Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2. | |
1113 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3. | |
1114 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3, Gerson 6/15/18.302, at 1-2, Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 22. | |
1115 Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3. | |
1116 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 32. | |
1117 1/19/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11 :11 :56 a.m.). | |
1118 1/18/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev, Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2. | |
1119 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. | |
1120 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. | |
1121 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. | |
158 | |
U.S. Department of Justice | |
Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. F. 6(e) | |
channel to avoid bureaucracy."1122 On January 28, 2017, Dmitriev texted Nader that he wanted | |
"to see if I can confirm to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas from the 2 pager I | |
sent you in the telephone call that will happen at 12 EST,""23 an apparent reference to the call | |
scheduled between President Trump and Putin. Nader replied, "Definitely paper was so submitted | |
to Team by Rick and me. They took it seriously!"l124 After the call between President Trump and | |
Putin occurred, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that "the call went very well. My boss wants me to | |
continue making some public statements that us [sic] Russia cooperation is good and | |
important."1125 Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well, and Dmitriev | |
replied that the document they had drafted together "played an important r0le."1126 | |
Gerson and Dmitriev appeared to stop communicating with one another in approximately | |
March 2017, when the investment deal they had been working on together showed no signs of | |
progressing."27 | |
3. Ambassador Kislvak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in | |
Trump Tower Following the E_lection | |
On November 16, 2016, Catherine Vargas, an executive assistant to Kushner, received a | |
request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.1128 That same day, Vargas sent | |
Kushner an email with the subject, "MISSED CALL: Russian Ambassador to the US, Sergey | |
Jovanovich Kislyak ...."1129 The text of the email read, "RE: setting up a time to meet w/you on | |
12/1. LMK how to proceed." Kushner responded in relevant part, "I think I do this one -- confirm | |
with Dimitri [Simes of CNI] that this is the right guy."l130 After reaching out to a colleague of | |
Simes at CNI, Vargas reported back to Kushner that Kislyak was "the best go-to guy for routine | |
matters in the US," while Yuri Ushakov, a Russian foreign policy advisor, was the contact for | |
"more direct/substantial matters."1131 | |
Bob Foresman, the UBS investment bank executive who had previously tried to transmit | |
to candidate Trump an invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia, see Volume I, Section | |
IV.A. l .d.ii, supra, may have provided similar information to the Transition Team. According to | |
1122 1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:04:41 p.m.). | |
1123 1/28/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11 :05:39 a.m.). | |
1124 1/28/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (11 :l 1133 a.m.). | |
1125 1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11 :06:35 a.m.). | |
1126 1/28/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev, 1/29/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson. | |
1127 Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 4, 3/21/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev. | |
1128 Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees ("Kushner Stmt."), at 6 (7/24/17) | |
(written statement by Kushner to the Senate Judiciary Committee). | |
1129 NOSC00004356 (1 U16/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (6:44 p-m-))- | |
1130 NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (9:54 p.m.)). | |
1131 11/17/16 Email, Brown to Simes (10:41 a.m.), Brown 10/13/17 302, at 4, 11/17/16 Email, | |
Vargas to Kushner (12:31 :18). | |
159 | |
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162 | |
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I I | |
U.S. Department of Justice | |
Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Frotoctcd Undci* Fed. R. Clim. P. 6(0) | |
The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and | |
Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushner stated), focused | |
on business (as VEB's public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of | |
those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner | |
and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting. | |
Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant, "Hi, | |
please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!"'I63 | |
Over the following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts.1164 | |
On February 8, 2017, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant (Berkowitz) to try to set up | |
another meeting, and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed.1165 According | |
to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding | |
the Russia investigation, and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request.l 166 | |
5. Petr Avon's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team | |
In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in Volume I, | |
Section IV.B.l.b, supra, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate "all-hands" oligarch | |
meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen.H67 As in Aven's one-on-one | |
meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of | |
forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions.I 168 | |
After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, Aven tried to establish a connection to the | |
Trump team. Aven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump | |
Administration. Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne (Ll), another company headed | |
by Aven, and had done work for Alfa-Bank.l169 Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador | |
to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his | |
primary roles with Alfa-Bank and L1 was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the | |
United States and other Western countries.1170 | |
While at a Ll board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 20 16, Aven pulled Burt | |
aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed | |
1163 AKIN _GUMP_BI8RKOWITZ_0000011 (12/19/I6 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz | |
(9:56 a.m.)). | |
1164 AKIN _GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000011-15 (12/19/16 .- 2/16/17 Text Messages, Ivanchenko | |
& Berkowitz). | |
1165 AKIN _GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000015 (2/8/17 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz | |
(10:41 a.m.)). | |
1166 Berkowitz 3/22/18 302, at 4-5. | |
1167 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7, | |
ll6BI | |
1169 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6. | |
1170 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6, Bun 2/9/18 302, at 2. | |
163 | |
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interest in establishing a communications channel between the Kremlin and the Trump Transition | |
Team.1I71 Aven asked for Burt's help in contacting members of the Transition Team.l 172 Although | |
Burt had been responsible for helping Aven build connections in the past, Burt viewed Aven's | |
request as unusual and outside the normal realm of his dealings with Aven.! 173 | |
Burt, who is a member of the board of CNI (discussed at Volume I, Section lV.A.4, | |
supra),1174 decided to approach CNI president Dimitri Simes for help facilitating Aven's request, | |
recalling that Simes had some relationship with Kushner.1l75 At the time, Simes was lobbying the | |
Trump Transition Team, on Burt's behalf, to appoint Butt U.S. ambassador to Russia.1176 | |
Burt contacted Simes by telephone and asked if he could arrange a meeting with Kushner | |
to discuss setting up a high-level communications channel between Putin and the incoming | |
Administration.! 177 Simes told the Office that he declined and stated to Burt that setting up such | |
a channel was not a good idea in light of the media attention surrounding Russian influence in the | |
U.S. presidential election.1178 According to Simes, he understood that Burt was seeking a secret | |
channel, and Simes did not want CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian | |
government and the incoming Administration."79 Based on what Simes had read in the media, he | |
stated that he already had concerns that Trump's business connections could be exploited by | |
Russia, and Simes said that he did not want CNI to have any involvement or apparent involvement | |
in facilitating any connection.I 180 | |
In an email dated December 22, 2016, Burt recounted for Aven his conversation with | |
Simes: | |
Through a trusted third party, I have reached out to the very influential person I mentioned | |
in Luxembourg concerning Project A. There is an interest and an understanding for the | |
need to establish such a channel. But the individual emphasized that at this moment, with | |
so much intense interest in the Congress and the media over the question of Cyber-hacking | |
(and who ordered what), Project A was too explosive to discuss. The individual agreed to | |
discuss it again after the New Year. I trust the individual's instincts on this. | |
1171 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 2,_ | |
1172 I | |
1173 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 4. | |
1174 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 5. | |
1175 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3. | |
1176 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3. | |
1177 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3, Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4. | |
1178 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4. | |
1179 Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5. | |
1180 Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5. | |
164 | |
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If this is unclear or you would like to discuss, don't hesitate to call.! 181 | |
According to Burt, the "very influential person" referenced in his email was Simes, and the | |
reference to a "trusted third party" was a fabrication, as no such third party existed. "Project A" | |
was a term that Burt created for Aven's effort to help establish a communications channel between | |
Russia and the Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was | |
requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia's influence in the U.S. presidential | |
election.I 182 According to Burt, his report that there was "interest" in a communications channel | |
reflected Simes's views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event, Burt | |
acknowledged that he added some "hype" to that sentence to make it sound like there was more | |
interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed.1!83 | |
Aven replied to Burt's email on the same day, saying "Thank you. All clear."1184 | |
According to Aven, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue.1l85 Burt | |
i sp t oke to Aven some time thereafter about his attempt to make contact with the Trum team | |
ex lair in to Aven that the current environment made it impossible, | |
.l 186 Burt did not recall discussing Avon's request with Simes again, nor did | |
he recall speaking to anyone else about the request. I 187 | |
In the first quarter of 2017, Aven met again with Putin and other Russian officials.1188 At | |
that meeting, Putin asked about Aven's at tem t to build relations with the Trum Administration | |
and Aven recounted his lack of SLlCC€SS.1189 | |
1190 Putin continued to inquire about Avon's efforts to connect to the Trump | |
Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings."91 | |
Aven also told Putin's chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBLH92 As part | |
of that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked | |
to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration.l]93 | |
1181 12/22/16 Email, Burt to Aven (7:23 p.m.). | |
1182 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3. | |
1183 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4. | |
1184 12/22/16 Email, Aven to Burt (4:58:22 p.m.). | |
1185 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7. | |
1186 I | |
1187 Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4. | |
no en 8/2/18 302, at 7. | |
1192 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8. | |
Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8 | |
165 | |
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According to Aven, the official showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear | |
to care.l194 | |
6. Carter Page Contact_with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich | |
In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump | |
Campaign, former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Pa e again visited Moscow in an | |
attempt to pursue business opportunities H95 | |
According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort's | |
associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression that he had maintained his | |
connections to President-Elect Trump. In a December 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, | |
Kilimnik wrote, "Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending messages he is authorized to talk to | |
Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine."1197 | |
On December 9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and | |
Andrej Krickovic.l198 Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town | |
and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant | |
for a few minutes to meet with Page.! 199 Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump's election and | |
expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia.I200 Dvorkovich | |
asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition | |
to begin a discussion of future cooperation 1201 | |
1194 Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8, | |
1195 Page 3/10/17 302, at 4,~ Page 3/16/17 302, at 3,1 Among | |
d' | |
other meetings, Page contacted Andrey Baranov, head of investor relations at Rosneft, a d th e 1scusse d | |
the sale of Rosneft and meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin. | |
11961 | |
1197 | |
1198 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3, Page 3/30/17 302, at 8. | |
1109 Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4, Page 3/16/17 302, at 3, | |
1200 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3, | |
1201 Page 3/16/17 302, at 3, | |
1202 I | |
1203 I | |
166 | |
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According to Flynn, the Transition Team regarded the vote as a significant issue and | |
wanted to support Israel by opposing the resolution.!211 On December 22, 2016, multiple members | |
of the Transition Team, as well as President-Elect Trump, communicated with foreign government | |
officials to determine their views on the resolution and to rally support to delay the vote or defeat | |
the resolution.1212 Kushner led the effort for the Transition Team, Flynn was responsible for the | |
Russian government.m3 Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December | |
22, Flynn called Kislyak.12l4 According to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the | |
Transition Team's opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the | |
resolution.l215 Later that day, President-Elect Trump spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah | |
al-Sisi about the V0te.1216 Ultimately, Egypt postponed the V0te.1217 | |
On December 23, 2016, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela resubmitted the | |
resolution. 1218 Throughout the day, members of the Transition Team continued to talk with foreign | |
leaders about the resolution, with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian | |
government through Kislyak.1219 When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak, Kislyak informed Flynn | |
that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against i¢.I220 The resolution later | |
passed 14-0, with the United States abstaining.1221 | |
b. US. Sanctions Against Russia | |
Flynn was also the Transition Team member who spoke with the Russian government when | |
the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to | |
Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-President | |
Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which took effect at 12:01 a.m. the following day and | |
1211 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2. | |
1212 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14, Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2. | |
1213 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-145 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/22/16 | |
Email, Kushner to Flynn, 12/22/16 Email, McFarland to et al. | |
1214 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13, Call Records of Michael T. Flynn | |
4 | |
1215 Statement of Offense 113(d), United States v. Michael T Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. | |
1, 2017), Doc. 4 ("Flynn Statement of Offense"), Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-13. | |
1216 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13. | |
1217 UN Vote on Israeli Settlement Postponed, "Potentially Indefinitely", Reuters (Dec. 22, 2016). | |
1218 Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Rebuting Israel, US. Allows Censure Over Settlements, | |
New York Times (Dec. 23, 2016). | |
1219 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/23/16 Email, Flynn to Kushner et | |
al. | |
1220 Flynn Statement of Offense 1]3(g). | |
1221 Israel 's Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of lnternational | |
Law, Security Council Rea/irms, 7853rd Meeting (PM), United Nations Security Council (Dec. 23, 2016). | |
168 | |
U.S. Department of Justice | |
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Immediately after spealdng with McFarland, Flynn called and spoke with Kis1yak.!248 | |
Flynn discussed multiple topics with Kislyak, including the sanctions, scheduling a video | |
teleconference between President-Elect Trump and Putin, an upcoming terrorism conference, and | |
Russia's views about the Middle East.l249 With respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested that | |
Russia not escalate the situation, not get into a "tit for tat," and only respond to the sanctions in a | |
reciprocal mann¢r_1250 | |
Multiple Transition Team members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislyak that | |
day. In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus, at 4:43 p.m., McFarland | |
sent an email to Transition Team members about the sanctions, informing the group that "Gen | |
[F]1ynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening."l251 Less than an hour later, McFarland | |
briefed President-Elect Trump. Bannon, Priebus, Sean Spicer, and other Transition Team members | |
were present.1252 During the briefing, President-Elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did | |
"it," meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election.l253 McFarland said | |
yes, and President-Elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians.1254 McFarland also | |
discussed potential Russian responses to the sanctions, and said Russia's response would be an | |
indicator of what the Russians wanted going forward.I255 President-Elect Trump opined that the | |
sanctions provided him with leverage to use with the Russians.1256 McFarland recalled that at the | |
end of the meeting, someone may have mentioned to President-Elect Trump that Flynn was | |
speaking to the Russian ambassador that evening.!257 | |
After the briefing, Flynn and McFarland spoke over the phone.1258 Flynn reported on the | |
substance of his call with Kislyak, including their discussion of the sanctions.l259 According to | |
McFarland, Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be | |
escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming Administration.I260 | |
McFarland also gave Flynn a summary of her recent briefing with President-Elect Trump.126l | |
1248 Flynn Statement of Offense 113(d). | |
1249 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4, Flynn Statement of Offense 11 3(0), 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to | |
McFarland. | |
1250 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1, Flynn Statement of Offense 13(d). | |
1251 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al. | |
1252 12/29/16 Email, Westerhout to Flaherty, McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. | |
1253 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. | |
1254 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. | |
1255 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. | |
1256 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. | |
1257 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. | |
1258 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. | |
1259 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4, Flynn Statement of Offense '113(e). | |
1260 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8. | |
1261 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8. | |
171 | |
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The next day, December 30, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that | |
Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions. 1262 Putin superseded that comment two hours later, | |
releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions | |
at that time.1263 Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. | |
Putin)."1264 Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with | |
Kislyak from the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Bannon, Priebus, and other Transition | |
Team members.1265 The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics | |
discussed with Kislyak.1266 Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of | |
sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration's | |
foreign policy.'267 | |
On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received | |
at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the | |
request.1268 Two hours later, Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with | |
Kislyak.1269 According to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better | |
relationship and that the relationship was back on track.mo Flynn also told McFarland that he | |
believed his phone call had made a difference.I27I McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in | |
response.1272 Flynn spoke with other Transition Team members that day, but does not recall | |
whether they discussed the sanctions.'273 Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the | |
next day and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversation with Kislyak.1274 Bannon, | |
1262 Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion of | |
Russian diplomats, Moscow, December 20, 2016, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation | |
(Dec. 30, 2016 (5:32 a.m.)). | |
1263 Statement of the President of the Russian Federation, Kremlin, Office of the President (Dec. | |
30, 2016 (7:15 a.m.)). | |
1264 @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (11 :41 a.m.) Tweet. | |
1265 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al. | |
1266 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al. | |
1267 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4. | |
1268 Call Records of Michael T. Flynn Flynn 11/17/17 302, at I; | |
Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense 113(g). 9 | |
[269 Call Records of Michael T. Flynn Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; | |
Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3, McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. 9 | |
1270 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. | |
1271 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. | |
1272 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10. | |
1273 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5-6. | |
1274 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 5; Flynn Statement | |
of Offense fl3(h). | |
172 | |
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for his part, recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said that he did not remember discussing | |
sanctions with him.I275 | |
Additional information about Flynn's sanctions-related discussions with Kislyak, and the | |
handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the Trump Administration, is provided | |
in Volume II of this report. | |
* * * | |
In sum, the investigation established multiple links between Trump Campaign officials and | |
individuals tied to the Russian government. Those links included Russian offers of assistance to | |
the Campaign. In some instances, the Campaign was receptive to the offer, while in other instances | |
the Campaign officials shied away. Ultimately, the investigation did not establish that the | |
Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference | |
activities. | |
1275 Barron 2/12/18 302, at 9. | |
173 | |
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V. PROSECUTiON AND DECLINATION DEcIsIons | |
The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel's Office "to prosecute federal | |
crimes arising from [its] investigation" of the matters assigned to it. In deciding whether to | |
exercise this prosecutorial authority, the Office has been guided by the Principles of Federal | |
Prosecution set forth in the Justice (formerly U.S. Attorney's) Manual. In particular, the Office | |
has evaluated whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a | |
federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain | |
a conviction for such an offense. Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018). Where the answer to those | |
questions was yes, the Office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial | |
federal interest, the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, and | |
there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. Id | |
As explained below, those considerations led the Office to seek charges against two sets of | |
Russian nationals for their roles in Deroetratin the active-measures social media camDai2n and | |
commuter-intrusion onerations | |
The Office | |
similarly determined that the contacts between Campaign officials and Russia-linked individuals | |
either did not involve the commission of a federal crime or, in the case of campaign-finance | |
offenses, that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. At the | |
same time, the Office concluded that the Principles of Federal Prosecution supported charging | |
certain individuals connected to the Campaign with making false statements or otherwise | |
obstructing this investigation or parallel congressional investigations . | |
A. Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign | |
On February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an | |
indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities-including the Internet | |
Research Agency (IRA) and Concord Management and Consulting LLC (Concord)-with | |
violating U.S. criminal laws in order to interfere with U.S. elections and political processes.I276 | |
The indictment charges all of the defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count | |
One), three defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud (Count Two), and | |
five defendants with aggravated identity theft (Counts Three through Eight). Internet Research | |
Agency Indictment. Concord, which is one of the entities charged in the Count One conspiracy, | |
entered an appearance through U.S. counsel and moved to dismiss the charge on multiple grounds. | |
In orders and memorandum opinions issued on August 13 and November 15, 2018, the district | |
court denied Concord's motions to dismiss. United States v. Concord Management & Consulting | |
LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018). United States v. Concord Management & Consulting | |
LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018). As of this writing, the prosecution of Concord remains | |
ongoing before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The other defendants remain | |
at large. | |
1276 A more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate | |
memorandum provided to the Acting Attorney General before the indictment. | |
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2. Potential Section 1030 Violation By_ | |
See United States v~ | |
Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the 1986 amendments to Section | |
1030 reflect Congress's desire to reach "'intentional acts of unauthorized access-rather than | |
mistaken, inadvertent, or careless ones"') (quoting S. Rep. 99-432, at 5 (1986)). In addition, the | |
computer_ likely qualifies as a "protected" one under the statute, which | |
reaches "effectively all computers with Internet access." United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, | |
859 (9th Cir. 20121 (en bane | |
Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, however, the Office determined that | |
prosecution of this potential violation was not warranted. Those Principles instruct prosecutors to | |
consider, among other things, the nature and seriousness of the offense, the person's culpability in | |
connection with the offense, and the probable sentence to e b n ee n im ce pose o d if e th1 e m use 1 e rosecution is | |
successful. Justice Manual 8 9-27.230 | |
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C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts | |
As explained in Section IV above, the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of | |
numerous links (i.e., contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or | |
claiming to have ties to the Russian government. The Office evaluated the contacts under several | |
sets of federal laws, including conspiracy laws and statutes governing foreign agents who operate | |
in the United States. After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue charges | |
under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in Section IV above-with the | |
exception of PARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on | |
behalf of Ukraine. | |
One of the interactions between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals- | |
the June 9, 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising | |
derogatory information on Hillary Clinton-implicates an additional body of law: campaign- | |
finance statutes. Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources | |
raise difficult statutory and constitutional questions. As ex fained below. the Office evaluated | |
those questions in connection with the June 9 meeting . | |
The Office ultimately concluded that, even if the principal legal questions were resolved favorably | |
to the government, a prosecution would encounter difficulties proving that Campaign officials or | |
individuals connected to the Campaign willfully violated the law. | |
Finally, although the evidence of contacts between Campaign officials and Russia- | |
affiliated individuals may not have been sufficient to establish or sustain criminal charges, several | |
U.S. persons connected to the Campaign made false statements about those contacts and took other | |
steps to obstruct the Office's investigation and those of Congress. This Office has therefore | |
charged some of those individuals with making false statements and obstructing justice. | |
l. potential Coordination: Qonspir_acy and Collusion | |
As an initial matter, this Office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the | |
collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of "collusion," but through the lens | |
of conspiracy law. In so doing, the Office recognized that the word "collude]" appears in the | |
Acting Attorney General's August 2, 2017 memorandum, it has frequently been invoked in public | |
reporting, and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law, see, e.g., Brooke Group v. Brown & | |
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). But collusion is not a specific offense or | |
theory of liability found in the U.S. Code, nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. To the | |
contrary, even as defined in legal dictionaries, collusion is largely synonymous with conspiracy as | |
that crime is set forth in the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Black 's Law | |
Dictionary 321 (10th ed. 2014) (collusion is "[a]n agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain | |
something forbidden by law"); 1 Alexander Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 31 l (1871) | |
("An agreement between two or more persons to defraud another by the forms of law, or to employ | |
such forms as means of accomplishing some unlawful object."), l Bouvier 's Law Dictionary 352 | |
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(1897) ("An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms | |
of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law."). | |
For that reason, this Office's focus in resolving the question of joint criminal liability was | |
on conspiracy as defined in federal law, not the commonly discussed term "collusion" The Office | |
considered in particular whether contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia-linked | |
individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy--either under statutes that have their | |
own conspiracy language (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, l95l(a)), or under the general conspiracy | |
statute (18 U.S.C. § 371). The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in Volume | |
I, Section IV, supra, amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal | |
criminal law-including foreign-influence and campaign-finance laws, both of which are | |
discussed further below. The Office therefore did not charge any individual associated with the | |
Trump Campaign with conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts, either | |
under a specific statute or under Section 371 's offenses clause. | |
The Office also did not charge any campaign official or associate with a conspiracy under | |
Section 371 's defraud clause. That clause criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a | |
lawful function of the U.S. government or its agencies through deceitful or dishonest means. See | |
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966), Hammerscnmidt V. United States, 265 U.S. | |
182, 188 (1924), see also United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38, | |
46 (D.D.C. 2018). The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign officials- | |
or between such officials and Russia-linked individuals-to interfere with or obstruct a lawful | |
function of a government agency during the campaign or transition period. And, as discussed in | |
Volume I, Section V.A, supra, the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign | |
official or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the | |
Office charged, namely, the active-measures conspiracy described in Volume I, Section II, supra. | |
Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with | |
conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section | |
IV above. | |
2. Potentgll Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA al 18 U.S.C. § 951) | |
The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliated individuals under | |
federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of, 01° work done for, a foreign government. | |
a. Governing Law | |
Under 18 U.S.C. § 951, it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a | |
foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General. Although the defendant | |
must act on behalf of a foreign government (as opposed to other kinds of foreign entities), the acts | |
need not involve espionage, rather, acts of any type suffice for liability. See United States v. | |
Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (l lth Cir. 2010), United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 7]5 (7th | |
Cir. 2009), United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 581 (7th Cir. 2005). An "agent of a foreign | |
government" is an "individual" who "agrees to operate" in the United States "subject to the | |
direction or control of a foreign government or official." 18 U.S.C. § 95 l(d). | |
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The crime defined by Section 951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States | |
as an unregistered foreign-government agent. 18 U.S.C. § 95l(a). The statute does not require | |
willfulness, and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense. United | |
States v. Compo, 529 F.3d 980, 998-99 (1 ith Cir. 2008); Duran, 596 F.3d at 1291-94, Dumeisi, | |
424 F.3d at 581. | |
The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) generally makes it illegal to act as an agent | |
of a foreign principal by engaging in certain (largely political) activities in the United States | |
without registering with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621. The triggering agency | |
relationship must be with a foreign principal or "a person any of whose activities are directly or | |
indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a | |
foreign principal." 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). That includes a foreign government or political party | |
and various foreign individuals and entities. 22 U.S.C. § 61 l(b). A covered relationship exists if | |
a person "acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant" or "in any other capacity at the | |
order, request, or under the [foreign principals] direction or control." 22 U.S.C. §611(c)(1). It | |
is sufficient if the person "agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds | |
himself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, an agent of a foreign | |
principal." 22 U.S.C. §611(0)(2)- | |
The triggering activity is that the agent "directly or through any other person" in the United | |
States (1) engages in "political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign principal," which | |
includes attempts to influence federal officials or the public; (2) acts as "public relations counsel, | |
publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such | |
foreign principal", (3) '°solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or | |
other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal", or (4) "represents the interests | |
of such foreign principal" before any federal agency or official. 22 U.S.C. § 61 l (c)(l). | |
It is a crime to engage in a "[w]illful violation of any provision of the Act or any regulation | |
thereunder." 22 U.S.C. § 6l8(a)(1). It is also a crime willfully to make false statements or | |
omissions of material facts in PARA registration statements or supplements. 22 U.S.C. | |
§ 618(a)(2). Most violations have a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment and a $10,000 | |
fine. 22 U.S.C. § 618. | |
b. Application | |
The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort's and Richard Gates's | |
pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated FARA. Manafort and Gates were | |
charged for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal | |
informations in the District of Columbia prosecution.1280 The evidence underlying those charges | |
is not addressed in this report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate | |
1280 Gates Superseding Criminal Information, Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Richard W | |
Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 203, Waiver of Trial by Jury, United States v. Richard | |
W Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 204, Gates Plea Agreement, Statement of Offense, | |
United States v. Richard W Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 206, Plea Agreement, | |
United States v. Paul J Manafbrt, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 20 l 8), Doc. 422, Statement of Offense, | |
United States v. Paul .I Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 423 . | |
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prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment | |
in that case. | |
In addition, the investigation produced evidence of FARA violations involving Michael | |
Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned a country other than Russia (i.e., Turkey) | |
and were resolved when Flynn admitted to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that | |
accompanied his guilty plea to a false-statements charge. Statement of Offense, United States v. | |
Michael T Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. l, 2017), Doc. 4 ("Flynn Statement of | |
Offense").1281 | |
The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any | |
individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the | |
meaning of FARA or, in terms of Section 951 , subject to the direction or control of the government | |
of Russia, or any official thereof. In particular, the Office did not find evidence likely to prove | |
beyond a reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos, | |
and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian overnment-or at its direction control | |
request-during the relevant time period 1282 | |
As a result, the Office did not charge any other Trump Campaign official with violating | |
FARA or Section 951, or attempting or conspiring to do so, based on contacts with the Russian | |
government or a Russian principal. | |
Finally, the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors-George | |
Papadopoulos-acted as an agent of, or at the direction and control of, the government of Israel. | |
While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel (and search | |
warrants were obtained in part on that basis), the Office ultimately determined that the evidence | |
was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction under FARA or Section 95 l . | |
3. Campaign Finance | |
Several areas of the Office's investigation involved efforts or offers by foreign nationals to | |
provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump Campaign or to distribute that | |
information to the public, to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign. As explained below, the | |
Office considered whether two of those efforts in particular-the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump | |
1282 On four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) issued warrants based | |
on a finding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b), | |
1805(a)(2)(A). The FISC's probable-cause finding was based on a different (and lower) standard than the | |
one governing the Office's decision whether to bring charges against Page, which is whether admissible | |
evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the | |
Russian Federation during the period at issue. Cf United States v. Cardozo, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir. | |
2013) (explaining that probable cause requires only "a fair probability," and not "certainty, or proof beyond | |
a reasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance of the evidence"). | |
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Tower , constituted prosecutable violations of | |
the campaign-finance laws. The Office determined that the evidence was not sufficient to charge | |
either incident as a criminal violation. | |
a. Overview Of Governing Law | |
"[T]he United States has a compelling interest ... in limiting the participation of foreign | |
citizens in activities of democratic self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence | |
over the U.S. political process." Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) | |
(Kavanaugh, J., for three-judge court), aff'd, 565 U.S. l 104 (2012). To that end, federal campaign- | |
finance law broadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions, donations, | |
expenditures, or other disbursements in connection with federal, state, or local candidate elections, | |
and prohibits anyone from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such contributions or donations. As | |
relevant here, foreign nationals may not make-and no one may "solicit, accept, or receive" from | |
them-"a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value" or "an express or implied | |
promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election." | |
52 U.S.C. § 30l21(a)(l)(A), (a)(2).1283 The term "contribution," which is used throughout the | |
campaign-finance law, "includes" "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or | |
anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal | |
office." 52 U.S.C. § 30l01(8)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, "the value of [volunteer] | |
services." 52 U.S.C. §30l01(8)(B)(i). | |
Foreign nationals are also barred from making "an expenditure, independent expenditure, | |
or disbursement for an electioneering communication." 52 U.S.C. § 30l2l(a)(l)(C). The term | |
"expenditure" "includes" "any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of | |
money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for | |
Federal office." 52 U.S.C. §.30lOl(9)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, news stories and | |
non-partisan get-out-the-vote activities. 52 U.S.C. § 30lOl(9)(B)(i)-(ii). An "independent | |
expenditure" is an expenditure "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified | |
candidate" and made independently of the campaign. 52 U.S.C. §30lOl(l7). An "electioneering | |
communication" is a broadcast communication that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for | |
Federal office" and is made within specified time periods and targeted at the relevant electorate. | |
52 U.S.C. §30l04(f)(3). | |
The statute defines "foreign national" by reference to FARA and the Immigration and | |
Nationality Act, with minor modification. 52 U.S.C. § 30l2l(b) (cross-referencing 22 U.S.C. | |
§ 611(b)(1)-(3) and 8 U.S.C. § l10l(a)(20), (22)). That definition yields five, sometimes- | |
overlapping categories of foreign nationals, which include all of the individuals and entities | |
relevant for present purposes-namely, foreign governments and political parties, individuals | |
1283 Campaign-finance law also places financial limits on contributions, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a), and | |
prohibits contributions from corporations, banks, and labor unions, 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a), see Citizens | |
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). Because the conduct that the Office investigated involved | |
possible electoral activity by foreign nationals, the foreign-contributions ban is the most readily applicable | |
provision. | |
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outside of the U.S. who are not legal permanent residents, and certain non-U.S. entities located | |
outside of the U.S. | |
A "knowing[] and willfLll[]" violation involving an aggregate of $25,000 or more in a | |
calendar year is a felony. 52 U.S.C. § 30l09(d)(l)(A)(i); see Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 | |
(noting that a willful violation will require some "proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law"); | |
United States v. Dan ielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d 573, 577 (ED. Va. 2013) (applying willfulness | |
standard drawn from Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998)), see also Wagner V. | |
FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 19 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (same). A "knowing[] and willfLll[]" violation | |
involving an aggregate of $2,000 or more in a calendar year, but less than $25,000, is a | |
misdemeanor. 52 U.S.C. § 30l09(d)(1)(A)(ii). | |
b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting | |
The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials with crimes in | |
connection with the June 9 meeting described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra. The Office | |
concluded that, in light of the government's substantial burden of proof on issues of intent | |
("knowing" and "willful"), and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information, | |
criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that "the admissible evidence will | |
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction." Justice Manual § 9-27.220. | |
In brief, the key facts are that, on June 3, 2016, Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump | |
Jr., to pass along from Ervin and Aras Agalarov an "offer" from Russia's "Crown prosecutor" to | |
"the Trump campaign" of "official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and | |
her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father." The email described | |
this as "very high level and sensitive information" that is "part of Russia and its government's | |
support to Mr. Trump-helped along by Aras and Ervin." Trump Jr. responded: "if it's what you | |
say I love it especially later in the summer." Trump Jr. and Ervin Agalarov had follow-up | |
conversations and, within days, scheduled a meeting with Russian representatives that was | |
attended by Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner. The communications setting up the meeting and | |
the attendance by high-level Campaign representatives support an inference that the Campaign | |
anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information from official Russian sources that | |
could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects. | |
This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban on contributions and | |
donations by foreign nationals, 52 U.S.C. § 30l2l(a)(l)(A). Specifically, Goldstone passed along | |
an offer purportedly from a Russian government official to provide "official documents and | |
information" to the Trump Campaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election. | |
Trump Jr. appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive those | |
materials. Documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the inference that Kushner | |
and Manafort were aware of that purpose and attended the June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt | |
of helpful information to the Campaign from Russian sources. | |
The Office considered whether this evidence would establish a conspiracy to violate the | |
foreign contributions ban, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the solicitation of an illegal foreign- | |
source contribution, or the acceptance or receipt of "an express or implied promise to make a | |
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[foreign-source] contribution," both in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30l2l(a)(l)(A), (a)(2). There are | |
reasonable arguments that the offered information would constitute a "thing of value" within the | |
meaning of these provisions, but the Office determined that the government would not be likely to | |
obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons: first, the Office did not obtain admissible | |
evidence likely to meet the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these | |
individuals acted "willfully," i.e., with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct, and, | |
second, the government would likely encounter difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt | |
that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for a criminal violation, see 52 | |
U.S.C. § 30l09(d)(l)(A)(i). | |
i. Thing-of- Value Element | |
A threshold legal question is whether providing to a campaign "documents and | |
information" of the type involved here would constitute a prohibited campaign contribution. The | |
foreign contribution ban is not limited to contributions of money. It expressly prohibits "a | |
contribution or donation of money or other thing of value." 52 U.S.C. § 30l2l(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) | |
(emphasis added). And the term "contribution" is defined throughout the campaign-finance laws | |
to "include[]" "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value." | |
52 U.S.C. § 30l01(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). | |
The phrases "thing of value" and "anything of value" are broad and inclusive enough to | |
encompass at least some forms of valuable information. Throughout the United States Code, these | |
phrases serve as "term[s] of art" that are construed "broad[ly]." United States v. Nilsen, 967 F.2d | |
539, 542 (1 lth Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("thing of value" includes "both tangibles and intangibles"); | |
see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 20l(b)(1), 666(a)(2) (bribery statutes); id § 641 (theft of government | |
property). For example, the term "thing of value" encompasses law enforcement reports that | |
would reveal the identity of informants, United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979), | |
classified materials, United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 1991); confidential | |
information about a competitive bid, United States v. Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1994); | |
secret grand jury information, United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 680 (6th Cir. 1985), and | |
information about a witness's whereabouts, United States v. Sneker, 618 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. | |
1980) (per curiam). And in the public corruption context, "'thing of value' is defined broadly to | |
include the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items received." United States | |
v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 744 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). | |
Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations recognize the value to a campaign of at | |
least some forms of information, stating that the term "anything of value" includes "the provision | |
of any goods or services without charge," such as "membership lists" and "mailing lists." II | |
C.F.R. § l00.52(d)(1). The FEC has concluded that the phrase includes a state-by-state list of | |
activists. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 338 | |
(D,C. Cir. 2007) (describing the FEC's findings). Likewise, polling data provided to a campaign | |
constitutes a "contribution." FEC Advisory Opinion 1990-12 (Strub), 1990 WL 153454 (citing II | |
C.F.R. § l06.4(b)). And in the specific context of the foreign-contributions ban, the FEC has | |
concluded that "election materials used in previous Canadian campaigns," including "flyers, | |
advertisements, door hangers, tri-fOlds, signs, and other printed material," constitute "anything of | |
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value," even though "the value of these materials may be nominal or difficult to ascertain." FEC | |
Advisory Opinion 2007-22 (Hurysz), 2007 WL 5172375, at *5. | |
These authorities would support the view that candidate-related opposition research given | |
to a campaign for the purpose of influencing an election could constitute a contribution to which | |
the foreign-source ban could apply, A campaign can be assisted not only by the provision of funds, | |
but also by the provision of derogatory information about an opponent. Political campaigns | |
frequently conduct and pay for opposition research. A foreign entity that engaged in such research | |
and provided resulting information to a campaign could exert a greater effect on an election, and | |
a greater tendency to ingratiate the donor to the candidate, than a gift of money or tangible things | |
of value. At the same time, no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of | |
uncompensated opposition research or similar information as a thing of value that could amount | |
to a contribution under campaign-finance law. Such an interpretation could have implications | |
beyond the foreign-source ban, see 52 U.S.C. §30116(a) (imposing monetary limits on campaign | |
contributions), and raise First Amendment questions. Those questions could be especially difficult | |
where the information consisted simply of the recounting of historically accurate facts. It is | |
uncertain how courts would resolve those issues. | |
ii. Willfulness | |
Even assuming that the promised "documents and information that would incriminate | |
Hillary" constitute a "thing of value" under campaign-finance law, the government would | |
encounter other challenges in seeking to obtain and sustain a conviction. Most significantly, the | |
government has not obtained admissible evidence that is likely to establish the scienter requirement | |
beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove that a defendant acted "knowingly and willfully," the | |
government would have to show that the defendant had general knowledge that his conduct was | |
unlawful. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 123 (Sth ed. Dec. | |
2017) ("Election Offenses"); see Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (noting that a willful violation | |
requires "proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law"), Dan ielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 577 | |
("knowledge of general unlawfulness"). "This standard creates an elevated scienter element | |
requiring, at the very least, that application of the law to the facts in question be fairly clear. When | |
there is substantial doubt concerning whether the law applies to the facts of a particular matter, the | |
offender is more likely to have an intent defense." Election Offenses 123 . | |
On the facts here, the government would unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable | |
doubt that the June 9 meeting participants had general knowledge that their conduct was unlawful. | |
The investigation has not developed evidence that the participants in the meeting were familiar | |
with the foreign-contribution ban or the application of federal law to the relevant factual context. | |
The government does not have strong evidence of surreptitious behavior or efforts at concealment | |
at the time of the June 9 meeting. While the government has evidence of later efforts to prevent | |
disclosure of the nature of the June 9 meeting that could circumstantially provide support for a | |
showing of scienter, see Volume II, Section Il.G, infra, that concealment occurred more than a | |
year later, involved individuals who did not attend the June 9 meeting, and may reflect an intention | |
to avoid political consequences rather than any prior knowledge of illegality. Additionally, in light | |
of the unresolved legal questions about whether giving "documents and information" of the sort | |
offered here constitutes a campaign contribution, Trump Jr. could mount a factual defense that he | |
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did not believe his response to the offer and the June 9 meeting itself violated the law. Given his | |
less direct involvement in arranging the June 9 meeting, Kushner could likely mount a similar | |
defense. And, while Manafort is experienced with political campaigns, the Office has not | |
developed evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge of these legal issues. | |
iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information | |
The Office would also encounter difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the | |
value of the promised documents and information exceeds the $2,000 threshold fox' a criminal | |
violation, as well as the $25,000 threshold for felony punishment. See 52 U.S.C. § 30l09(d)(l). | |
The type of evidence commonly used to establish the value of non-monetary contributions-such | |
as pricing the contribution on a commercial market or determining the upstream acquisition cost | |
or the cost of distribution-would likely be unavailable or ineffective in this factual setting. | |
Although damaging opposition research is surely valuable to a campaign, it appears that the | |
information ultimately delivered in the meeting was not valuable. Arid while value in a conspiracy | |
may well be measured by what the participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement, | |
see, e.g., United States v. Tom brello, 666 F.2d 485, 489 (1 lth Cir. 1982), Goldstone's description | |
of the offered material here was quite general. His suggestion of the information's value-i.e., | |
that it would "incriminate Hillary" and "would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father"-was non- | |
specific and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability, given | |
Goldstone's lack of direct access to the original source. The uncertainty over what would be | |
delivered could be reflected in Trump Jr.'s response ("{f it 's what you say I love it") (emphasis | |
added). | |
Accordingly, taking into account the high burden to establish a culpable mental state in a | |
campaign-finance prosecution and the difficulty in establishing the required valuation, the Office | |
decided not to pursue criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign | |
officials for the events culminating in the June 9 meeting. | |
mm: c. Application to E | |
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uestions Over Whether | |
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ii. Willfulness | |
As discussed, to establish a criminal campaign-finance violation, the government must | |
prove that the defendant acted "knowingly and willfully." 52 U.S.C. § 30l09(d)(l)(A)(i). That | |
standard requires proof that the defendant knew generally that his conduct was unlawful. Election | |
Offenses 123. Given the uncertainties noted above, the "willfulness" requirement would pose a | |
substantial barrier to prosecution. | |
iii. Constitutional Considerations | |
Finally. the First Amendment could Dose constraints on a Drosecution | |
iv. Analysis as to | |
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4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation | |
The Office determined that certain individuals associated with the Campaign lied to | |
investigators about Campaign contacts with Russia and have taken other actions to interfere with | |
the investigation. As explained below, the Office therefore charged some U.S. persons connected | |
to the Campaign with false statements and obstruction offenses. | |
a. Overview Of Governing Law | |
False Statements. The principal federal statute criminalizing false statements to | |
government investigators is 18 U.S.C. § 1001. As relevant here, under Section l00l(a)(2), it is a | |
crime to knowingly and willfully "make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement | |
or representation" "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive ... branch of the | |
Government." An FBI investigation is a matter within the Executive Branch'sjurisdiction. United | |
States V. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984). The statute also applies to a subset of legislative | |
branch actions-viz., administrative matters and "investigation[s] or review[s]" conducted by a | |
congressional committee or subcommittee. 18 U.S.C. § l00l(c)(l) and (2), see United States v. | |
Pickett, 353 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2004). | |
Whether the statement was made to law enforcement or congressional investigators, the | |
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the same basic non-jurisdictional elements: | |
the statement was false, fictitious, or fraudulent, the defendant knew both that it was false and that | |
it was unlawful to make a false statement, and the false statement was material. See, e.g., United | |
States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1222 n.27 (9th Cir. 2017) (listing elements), see also Ninth Circuit | |
Pattern Instruction 8.73 & cut. (explaining that the Section 1001 jury instruction was modified in | |
light of the Department of Justice's position that the phrase "knowingly and willfully" in the statute | |
requires the defendant's knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful). In the D.C. Circuit, the | |
government must prove that the statement was actually false, a statement that is misleading but | |
"literally true" does not satisfy Section l00l(a)(2). See United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45 | |
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(D.C. Cir. 1993), United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 832-33 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For that | |
false statement to qualify as "material," it must have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable | |
of influencing, a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to which it is addressed. See | |
United States v. Gaudier, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995), United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 701 | |
(D.C. Cir. 2010). | |
Perjure. Under the federal perjury statutes, it is a crime for a witness testifying under oath | |
before a grand jury to knowingly make any false material declaration. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The | |
government must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under | |
Section l623(a): the defendant testified under oath before a federal grand jury; the defendant's | |
testimony was false in one or more respects, the false testimony concerned matters that were | |
material to the grand jury investigation, and the false testimony was knowingly given. United | |
States v. Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444, 1449 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The general perjury statute, 18 | |
U.S.C. § 1621 , also applies to grand jury testimony and has similar elements, except that it requires | |
that the witness have acted willfully and that the government satisfy "strict common-law | |
requirements for establishing falsity." See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 & n.6 (1979) | |
(explaining "the two-witness rule" and the corroboration that it demands). | |
Obstruction of Justice. Three basic elements are common to the obstruction statutes | |
pertinent to this Office's charging decisions: an obstructive act, some form of nexus between the | |
obstructive act and an official proceeding, and criminal (i.e., corrupt) intent. A detailed discussion | |
of those elements, and the law governing obstruction of justice more generally, is included in | |
Volume II of the report. | |
b. Application to Certain Individuals | |
i. George Papadopoulos | |
Investigators approached Papadopoulos for an interview based on his role as a foreign | |
policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and his suggestion to a foreign government representative | |
that Russia had indicated that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of | |
information damaging to candidate Clinton. On January 27, 2017, Papadopoulos agreed to be | |
interviewed by FBI agents, who informed him that the interview was part of the investigation into | |
potential Russian government interference in the 2016 presidential election. | |
During the interview, Papadopoulos lied about the timing, extent, and nature of his | |
communications with Joseph Mifsud, Olga Polonskaya, and Ivan Timofeev. with respect to | |
timing, Papadopoulos acknowledged that he had met Mifsud and that Mifsud told him the Russians | |
had "dirt" on Clinton in the form of "thousands of emails." But Papadopoulos stated multiple | |
times that those communications occurred before he joined the Trump Campaign and that it was a | |
"very strange coincidence" to be told of the "dirt" before he started working for the Campaign. | |
This account was false. Papadopoulos met Mifsud for the first time on approximately March 14, | |
2016, after Papadopoulos had already learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the | |
Campaign. Mifsud showed interest in Papadopoulos only after learning of his role on the | |
Campaign. And Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the Russians possessing "dirt" on candidate | |
Clinton in late April 2016, more than a month after Papadopoulos had joined the Campaign and | |
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been publicly announced by candidate Trump. Statement of Offense W 25-26, United States v. | |
George Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-l82 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017), Doc. 19 ("Papadopoulos Statement | |
of Offense"). | |
Papadopoulos also made false statements in an effort to minimize the extent and | |
importance of his communications with Mifsud. For example, Papadopoulos stated that | |
"[Mifsud]'s a nothing," that he thought Mifsud was "just a guy talk[ing] up connections or | |
something," and that he believed Mifsud was "BS'ing to be completely honest with you." In fact, | |
however, Papadopoulos understood Mifsud to have substantial connections to high-level Russian | |
government othcials and that Mifsud spoke with some of those officials in Moscow before telling | |
Papadopoulos about the "dirt." Papadopoulos also engaged in extensive communications over a | |
period of months with Mifsud about foreign policy issues for the Campaign, including efforts to | |
arrange a "history making" meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials. In | |
addition, Papadopoulos failed to inform investigators that Mifsud had introduced him to Timofeev, | |
the Russian national who Papadopoulos understood to be connected to the Russian Ministry of | |
Foreign Affairs, despite being asked if he had met with Russian nationals or "[a]nyone with a | |
Russian accent" during the campaign. Papadopoulos Statement of Offense W 27-29. | |
Papadopoulos also falsely claimed that he met Polonskaya before he joined the Campaign, | |
and falsely told the FBI that he had "no" relationship at all with her. He stated that the extent of | |
their communications was her sending emails-"Just, 'Hi, how are you?' That's it." In truth, | |
however, Papadopoulos met Polonskaya on March 24, 2016, after he had joined the Campaign, he | |
believed that she had connections to high-level Russian government officials and could help him | |
arrange a potential foreign policy trip to Russia. During the campaign he emailed and spoke with | |
her over Skype on numerous occasions about the potential foreign policy trip to Russia. | |
Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 111130-3 l . | |
Papadopoulos's false statements in January 2017 impeded the FB1's investigation into | |
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Most immediately, those statements | |
hindered investigators' ability to effectively question Mifsud when he was interviewed in the lobby | |
of a Washington, D.C. hotel on February 10, 2017. See Gov 't Sent. Mem. at 6, United States v. | |
George Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2017), Doc. 44. During that interview, | |
Mifsud admitted to knowing Papadopoulos and to having introduced him to Polonskaya and | |
Timofeev. But Mifsud denied that he had advance knowledge that Russia was in possession of | |
emails damaging to candidate Clinton, stating that he and Papadopoulos had discussed | |
cybersecurity and hacking as a larger issue and that Papadopoulos must have misunderstood their | |
conversation. Mifsud also falsely stated that he had not seen Papadopoulos since the meeting at | |
which Mifsud introduced him to Polonskaya, even though emails, text messages, and other | |
information show that Mifsud met with Papadopoulos on at least two other occasions-April 12 | |
and April 26, 2016. In addition, Mifsud omitted that he had drafted (or edited) the follow-up | |
message that Polonskaya sent to Papadopoulos following the initial meeting and that, as reflected | |
in the language of that email chain ("Baby, thank you!"), Mifsud may have been involved in a | |
personal relationship with Polonskaya at the time. The false information and omissions in | |
Papadopoulos's January 2017 interview undermined investigators' ability to challenge Mifsud | |
when he made these inaccurate statements . | |
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Given the seriousness of the lies and omissions and their effect on the FBI's investigation, | |
the Office charged Papadopoulos with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. | |
§ 1001. Information, United States v. George Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, | |
2017), Doc. 8. On October 7, 2017, Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea | |
agreement. On September 7, 2018, he was sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment, a $9,500 fine, | |
and 200 hours of community service. | |
ii. | |
iii. Michael Flynn | |
Michael Flynn agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on January 24, 2017, four days after he | |
had officially assumed his duties as National Security Advisor to the President. During the | |
interview, Flynn made several false statements pertaining to his communications with the Russian | |
ambassador. | |
First, Flynn made two false statements about his conversations with Russian Ambassador | |
Kislyak in late December 2016, at a time when the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia | |
for interfering with the 2016 presidential election and Russia was considering its response. See | |
Flynn Statement of Offense. Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from | |
escalating the situation in response to the United States's imposition of sanctions. That statement | |
was false. On December 29, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak to request Russian restraint. Flynn made | |
the call immediately after speaking to a senior Transition Team official (K.T. McFarland) about | |
what to communicate to Kislyak. Flynn then spoke with McFarland again after the Kislyak call to | |
report on the substance of that conversation. Flynn also falsely told the FBI that he did not | |
remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate | |
its response to the U.S. sanctions as a result of Flynn's request. On December 31 , 2016, Flynn in | |
fact had such a conversation with Kislyak, and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the | |
call to relay the substance of his conversation with Kislyak. See Flynn Statement of Offense 113. | |
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Second, Flynn made false statements about calls he had previously made to representatives | |
of Russia and other countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations | |
Security Council on December 21, 2016. Specifically, Flynn stated that he only asked the | |
countries' positions on how they would vote on the resolution and that he did not request that any | |
of the countries take any particular action on the resolution. That statement was false. On | |
December 22, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak, informed him of the incoming Trump Administration's | |
opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. Flynn | |
also falsely stated that Kislyak never described Russia's response to his December 22 request | |
regarding the resolution. Kislyak in fact told Flynn in a conversation on December 23, 2016, that | |
Russia would not vote against the resolution if it came to a vote. See Flynn Statement of Offense | |
'[[4. | |
Flynn made these false statements to the FBI at a time when he was serving as National | |
Security Advisor and when the FBI had an open investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 | |
presidential election, including the nature of any links between the Trump Campaign and Russia. | |
Flynn's false statements and omissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on that | |
ongoing investigation. Flynn Statement of Offense W 1-2. They also came shortly before Flynn | |
made separate submissions to the Department of Justice, pursuant to FARA, that also contained | |
materially false statements and omissions. Id 'II 5. Based on the totality of that conduct, the Office | |
decided to charge Flynn with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. | |
§ 100l(a). On December 1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty to that | |
charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his FARA filing. See id.; Plea | |
Agreement, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, No. 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3. | |
Flynn is awaiting sentencing. | |
iv. Michael Cohen | |
Michael Cohen was the executive vice president and special counsel to the Trump | |
Organization when Trump was president of the Trump Organization. Information 'II l, United | |
States v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 ("Cohen Information"). From | |
the fall of 2015 through approximately June 2016, Cohen was involved in a project to build a | |
Trump-branded tower and adjoining development in Moscow. The project was known as Trump | |
Tower Moscow. | |
In 2017, Cohen was called to testify before the House Permanent Select Committee on | |
Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), both of which were | |
investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible links between | |
Russia and the presidential campaigns. In late August 2017, in advance of his testimony, Cohen | |
caused a two-page statement to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump Tower Moscow. | |
Cohen Information 'lm 2-3. The letter contained three representations relevant here. First, Cohen | |
stated that the Trump Moscow project had ended in January 20 16 and that he had briefed candidate | |
Trump on the project only three times before making the unilateral decision to terminate it. | |
Second, Cohen represented that he never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the project | |
and never considered asking Trump to travel for the project. Third, Cohen stated that he did not | |
recall any Russian government contact about the project, including any response to an email that | |
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he had sent to a Russian government email account. Cohen Information 114. Cohen later asked | |
that his two-page statement be incorporated into his testimony's transcript before SSCI, and he | |
ultimately gave testimony to SSCI that was consistent with that statement. Cohen Information 115. | |
Each of the foregoing representations in Cohen's two-page statement was false and | |
misleading. Consideration of the project had extended through approximately June 2016 and | |
included more than three progress reports from Cohen to Trump. Cohen had discussed with Felix | |
Sater his own travel to Russia as part of the project, and he had inquired about the possibility of | |
Trump traveling there both with the candidate himself and with senior campaign official Corey | |
Lewandowski. Cohen did recall that he had received a response to the email that he sent to Russian | |
government spokesman Dmitry Peskov-in particular, that he received an email reply and had a | |
follow-up phone conversation with an English-speaking assistant to Peskov in mid-January 2016. | |
Cohen Information 117. Cohen knew the statements in the letter to be false at the time, and | |
admitted that he made them in an effort (1) to minimize the links between the project and Trump | |
(who by this time was President), and (2) to give the false impression that the project had ended | |
before the first vote in the Republican Party primary process, in the hopes of limiting the ongoing | |
Russia investigations. Id | |
Given the nature of the false statements and the fact that he repeated them during his initial | |
interview with the Office, we charged Cohen with violating Section 1001. On November 29, 2018, | |
Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information charging him | |
with making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, in | |
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) and (c). Cohen Information. The case was transferred to the | |
district judge presiding over the separate prosecution of Cohen pursued by the Southern District | |
of New York (after a referral from our Office). On December 7, 2018, this Office submitted a | |
letter to that judge recommending that Cohen's cooperation with our investigation be taken into | |
account in sentencing Cohen on both the false-statements charge and the offenses in the Southern | |
District prosecution. On December 12, 2018, the judge sentenced Cohen to two months of | |
imprisonment on the false-statements count, to run concurrently with a 36-month sentence | |
imposed on the other counts. | |
v. | |
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vi../e]f Se5sion5 | |
As set forth in Volume I, Section IV.A.6, supra, the investigation established that, while a | |
U.S. Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted | |
with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July | |
2016 and again at a meeting in Sessions's Senate office in September 2016. The investigation also | |
established that Sessions and Kislyak both attended a reception held before candidate Trump's | |
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foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., in April 2016, and that it is | |
possible that they met briefly at that reception. | |
The Office considered whether, in light of these interactions, Sessions committed perjury | |
before, or made false statements to, Congress in connection with his confirmation as Attorney | |
General. In January 2017 testimony during his confirmation hearing, Sessions stated in response | |
to a question about Trump Campaign communications with the Russian government that he had | |
"been called a surrogate at a time or two in that campaign and I didn't have - did not have | |
communications with the Russians." In written responses submitted on January 17, 2017, Sessions | |
answered "[n]o" to a question asking whether he had "been in contact with anyone connected to | |
any part of the Russian government about the 2016 election, either before or after election day." | |
And, in a March 2017 supplement to his testimony, Sessions identified two of the campaign-period | |
contacts with Ambassador Kislyak noted above, which had been reported in the media following | |
the January 2017 confirmation hearing. Sessions stated in the supplemental response that he did | |
"not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador, or any other representatives of the | |
Russian government, regarding the political campaign on these occasions or any other occasion." | |
Although the investigation established that Sessions interacted with Kislyak on the | |
occasions described above and that Kislyak mentioned the presidential campaign on at least one | |
occasion, the evidence is not sufficient to prove that Sessions gave knowingly false answers to | |
Russia-related questions in light of the wording and context of those questions. With respect to | |
Sessions's statements that he did "not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador ... | |
regarding the political campaign" and he had not been in contact with any Russian official "about | |
the 2016 election," the evidence concerning the nature of Sessions's interactions with Kislyak | |
makes it plausible that Sessions did not recall discussing the campaign with Kislyak at the time of | |
his statements. Similarly, while Sessions stated in his January 2017 oral testimony that he "did | |
not have communications with Russians," he did so in response to a question that had linked such | |
communications to an alleged "continuing exchange of information" between the Trump | |
Campaign and Russian government intermediaries. Sessions later explained to the Senate and to | |
the Office that he understood the question as narrowly calling for disclosure of interactions with | |
Russians that involved the exchange of campaign information, as distinguished from more routine | |
contacts with Russian nationals. Given the context in which the question was asked, that | |
understanding is plausible. | |
Accordingly, the Office concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Sessions | |
was willfully untruthful in his answers and thus insufficient to obtain or sustain a conviction for | |
perjury or false statements. Consistent with the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office | |
therefore determined not to pursue charges against Sessions and informed his counsel of that | |
decision in March 2018. | |
vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation | |
The Office considered whether, during the course of the investigation, other individuals | |
interviewed either omitted material information or provided information determined to be false. | |
Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office did not seek criminal charges against | |
any individuals other than those listed above. In some instances, that decision was due to | |
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evidentiary hurdles to proving falsity. In others, the Office determined that the witness ultimately | |
provided truthful information and that considerations of culpability, deterrence, and resource- | |
reservation weighed against Drosecution. See Justice Manual 88 9-27.220, 9-27.230 | |
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Report On The Investigation Into | |
Russian Interference In The | |
20 I6 Presidential Election | |
Volume II of II | |
Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III | |
Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §600.8(c) | |
Washington, D.C. | |
March 2019 | |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS -. VOLUME II | |
INTRODUCTION To VOLUME . I . I ....................................................................................................... 1 | |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY To VOLUME . I .. I .......................................................................................... 3 | |
I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPL .. E ... S ........................................................... 9 | |
A. Legal Framework of Obstruction . of Justice ................................................................... 9 | |
B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations .............................................................. 12 | |
II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGAT .. I . O .. N ................................................. 15 | |
A. The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump ................. 15 | |
1. Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia .............. 16 | |
2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails ........... 17 | |
3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to | |
Aid Candidate Trump ...........................................................................................18 | |
4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or | |
Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election ................................ 21 | |
B. The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn .................. 24 | |
l. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia | |
with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak ........................................................... 24 | |
2. President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's | |
Assessment of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens | |
Election-Interference Investigations ..................................................................... 27 | |
3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to | |
Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI ................................ 29 | |
4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn ............. 31 | |
5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates, President | |
Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Comey ....................................................... 32 | |
6. Flynn's Resignation .............................................................................................. 36 | |
7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey ................................... 38 | |
8. The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating | |
Flynn ..................................................................................................................... 41 | |
9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness | |
Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak .............. 42 | |
C. The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI's Russia | |
Investigation ................................................................................................................. 48 | |
l . Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation ..................... 48 | |
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2. FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia | |
Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI ........................................................... 52 | |
3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public | |
Statements that he had No Connection to Russia ................................................. 55 | |
4. The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russia | |
Investigation .......................................................................................................... 57 | |
D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director | |
Comey .......................................................................................................................... 62 | |
l. Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to | |
Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation ............. 62 | |
2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey ...................................... 64 | |
E. The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel ............................................. 77 | |
1. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reaction .............. 78 | |
2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest ............. 80 | |
3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction | |
of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the | |
Special Counsel Removed .................................................................................... 84 | |
F. The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation .......................... 90 | |
I. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions | |
to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation ......................................................... 90 | |
2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski ..................................................... 92 | |
3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview .... . . n .. . . 93 | |
4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation ....................... 94 | |
G. The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9, | |
2016 Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials ............................... 98 | |
l. The President Leams About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June | |
9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting ............................................................................. 98 | |
2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose | |
Information About the June 9 Meeting ............................................................... 100 | |
3. The President Directs Trump ]r.'s Response to Press Inquiries About the | |
June 9 Meeting .................................................................................................... 101 | |
4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting ............................................... 103 | |
H. The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over | |
the Investigation ......................................................................................................... 107 | |
l. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal .................... 107 | |
2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations | |
Covered by his Recusal ....................................................................................... 109 | |
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I. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the | |
Special Counsel .......................................................................................................... 113 | |
I. The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel ............. 113 | |
2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports ...... . . .. . ... . .. . .. . .. . .. . ....... 114 | |
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J. The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, | |
.... | |
1 | |
. | |
2 | |
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0 | |
............. | |
1. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn .................................................................... 120 | |
2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort .................................................................... 122 | |
IolOIIloll*1-LI Jil ....................................................................... 128 | |
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K. The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen .................................................. 134 | |
l. Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower | |
Moscow Project .................................................................................................. 134 | |
2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Party Line" Distancing Candidate | |
Trump From Russia ............................................................................................ 138 | |
3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump | |
Tower Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line ............................... 139 | |
4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen .......................................... 144 | |
5. The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the | |
Government ......................................................................................................... 148 | |
L. Overarching Factual Issues ........................................................................................ 156 | |
III. LEGAL DEFENSES TO THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE | |
PRESIDENT ....................................................................................................................... 159 | |
A. Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions | |
to the Conduct Under Investigation ........................................................................... 160 | |
1. The Text of Section l512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive | |
Acts . ......................................................................................................... 160 | |
2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section l5l2(c)(2) .................. 162 | |
3. The Legislative History of Section 15 l 2(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing | |
Its Text.. ............................................................................................................. 164 | |
4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section | |
15 I 2(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation .......................... 165 | |
5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this | |
Investigation ........................................................................................................ 167 | |
B. Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to | |
Presidential Conduct .................................................................................................. 168 | |
I . The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential | |
Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes ............................................. 169 | |
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2. Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress | |
May Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the | |
President's Official Powers ................................................................................. 171 | |
a. The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies In | |
This Context ................................................................................................... 172 | |
b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's | |
Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited ..................... I 73 | |
c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and Judicial | |
Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source .................................... 176 | |
3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes | |
Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties ................................. 178 | |
IV. CONCLUSION. ........................................................................................................................ 182 | |
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INTRODUCTION To VQLUME II | |
This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which | |
states that, "[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he ... shall provide the Attorney | |
General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special | |
Counsel] reached." | |
Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety of actions towards the | |
ongoing FBI investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related | |
matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice. The Order appointing the | |
Special Counsel gave this Office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the | |
FBI's Russia investigation, including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection | |
with Russia-related investigations. The Special Counsel's jurisdiction also covered potentially | |
obstructive acts related to the Special Counsel's investigation itself. This Volume of our report | |
summarizes our obstruction-of-justice investigation of the President. | |
We first describe the considerations that guided our obstruction-of-justice investigation, | |
and then provide an overview of this Volume: | |
First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to | |
initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial | |
judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that "the indictment | |
or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the | |
executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions" in violation of "the | |
constitutional separation of powers."' Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the | |
Department oflustice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, see 28 U.S.C. § 5 l 5, | |
28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a), this Office accepted OLC's legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising | |
prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC's constitutional view, we recognized that a federal | |
criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President's capacity to | |
govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct | |
Second, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted, | |
it recognizes that a criminal investigation during the President's term is permissible The OLC | |
opinion also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leaves office.4 And if | |
individuals other than the President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at | |
this time. Given those considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public interest in | |
1 A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, | |
222, 260 (2000) (OLC Op.). | |
2 See U.S. CONST. Art. I § 2, cl. 5, § 3, cl. 6, of OLC Op. at 257-258 (discussing relationship | |
between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President). | |
3 OLC Op. at 257 n.36 ("A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of | |
immunity"). | |
4 OLC Op. at 255 ("Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not | |
4 preclude such prosecution once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by | |
resignation or impeachment"). | |
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safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system, we conducted a thorough factual | |
investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories were fresh and documentary | |
materials were available. | |
Third, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice | |
Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to apply | |
an approach that could potentially result in ajudgment that the President committed crimes. The | |
threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person's conduct | |
"constitutes a federal offense." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018) (Justice | |
Manual). Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges | |
can be brought. The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a | |
speedy and public trial, with all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case. An | |
individual who believes he was wrongly accused can use that process to seek to clear his name. in | |
contrast, a prosecutor'sjudgment that crimes were committed, but that no charges will be brought, | |
affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name-clearing before an impartial adjudicator.5 | |
The concerns about the fairness of such a determination would be heightened in the case | |
of a sitting President, where a federal prosecutor's accusation of a crime, even in an internal report, | |
could catTy consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice. OLC noted similar | |
concerns about sealed indictments. Even if an indictment were sealed during the President's term, | |
OLC reasoned, "it would be very difficult to preserve [an indictment's] secrecy," and if an | |
indictment became public, "[t]he stigma and opprobrium" could imperil the President's ability to | |
govern."G Although a prosecutor's internal report would not represent a formal public accusation | |
akin to an indictment, the possibility of the report's public disclosure and the absence of a neutral | |
adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining "that the | |
person's conduct constitutes a federal offense." Justice Manual § 9-27220. | |
Fourth, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President | |
clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the | |
applicable legal standards, however, we are unable to reach that judgment. The evidence we | |
obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from | |
conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does | |
not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him. | |
* * * | |
This report on our investigation consists of four parts. Section I provides an overview of | |
obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary | |
considerations. Section II sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and | |
analyzes the evidence. Section III addresses statutory and constitutional defenses. Section IV | |
states our conclusion. | |
5 For that reason, criticisms have been lodged against the practice of naming unindicted co- | |
conspirators in an indictment. See United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The courts | |
have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse persons of crime while affording | |
them no forum in which to vindicate themselves."), see also Justice Manual § 9-11.130. | |
6 OLC Op. at 259 & n.38 (citation omitted). | |
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME II | |
Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the President that | |
related to the Russian-interference investigations, including the President's conduct towards the | |
law enforcement officials overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events. | |
FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION | |
The key issues and events we examined include the following: | |
The Campaign 's response to reports about Russian supportfor Trump. During the 20 16 | |
presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russian government's apparent support for | |
candidate Trump. After WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that | |
were reported to have been hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia | |
was responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials privately | |
sought information l . | • • i • • ' I - ' about any further planned WikiLeaks | |
releases. Trump also denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though as late | |
as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a skyscraper to be | |
built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. After the election, the President expressed concerns | |
to advisors that reports of Russia's election interference might lead the public to question the | |
legitimacy of his election. | |
Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017, | |
incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice President, other | |
administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak | |
about Russia's response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for its election interference. On January 27, | |
the day after the President was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar | |
statements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Comey to a private dinner at the White | |
House and told Comey that he needed loyalty. On February 14, the day after the President | |
requested Flynn's resignation, the President told an outside advisor, "Now that we fired Flynn, the | |
Russia thing is over." The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue. | |
Later that afternoon, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting | |
with Comey. Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the President said, "I hope you can | |
see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this | |
go." Shortly after requesting Flynn's resignation and speaking privately to Comey, the President | |
sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating | |
that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. McFarland declined | |
because she did not know whether that was true, and a White House Counsel's Office attorney | |
thought that the request would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered. | |
The President's reaction to the continuing Russia investigation. In February 2017, | |
Attorney General Jeff Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from campaign- | |
related investigations because of his role in the Trump Campaign. In early March, the President | |
told White House Counsel Donald McGahn to stop Sessions from recusing. And after Sessions | |
announced his recusal on March 2, the President expressed anger at the decision and told advisors | |
that he should have an Attorney General who would protect him. That weekend, the President | |
took Sessions aside at an event and urged him to "unrecuse." Later in March, Comey publicly | |
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disclosed at a congressional hearing that the FBI was investigating "the Russian government's | |
efforts to interfere in the 20 16 presidential election," including any links or coordination between | |
the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. In the following days, the President reached | |
out to the Director of National Intelligence and the leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency | |
(CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) to ask them what they could do to publicly dispel | |
the suggestion that the President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort. | |
The President also twice called Comey directly, notwithstanding guidance from McGahn to avoid | |
direct contacts with the Department of Justice. Comey had previously assured the President that | |
the FBI was not investigating him personally, and the President asked Comey to "lift the cloud" | |
of the Russia investigation by saying that publicly. | |
The President's termination of Comey. On May 3, 2017, Comey testified in a | |
congressional hearing, but declined to answer questions about whether the President was | |
personally under investigation. Within days, the President decided to terminate Comey. The | |
President insisted that the termination letter, which was written for public release, state that Comey | |
had informed the President that he was not under investigation. The day of the firing, the White | |
House maintained that Comey's termination resulted from independent recommendations from the | |
Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General that Comey should be discharged for mishandling | |
the Hillary Clinton email investigation. But the President had decided to fire Comey before | |
hearing from the Department of Justice. The day after firing Comey, the President told Russian | |
officials that he had "faced great pressure because of Russia," which had been "taken off" by | |
Comey's firing. The next day, the President acknowledged in a television interview that he was | |
going to fire Comey regardless of the Department of Justice's recommendation and that when he | |
"decided to just do it," he was thinking that "this thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story." | |
In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation, | |
the President said, "As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done properly," | |
adding that firing Comey "might even lengthen out the investigation." | |
The appointment ofa Special Counsel and efforts to remove him. On May 17, 2017, the | |
Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation appointed a Special Counsel to conduct the | |
investigation and related matters. The President reacted to news that a Special Counsel had been | |
appointed by telling advisors that it was "the end of his presidency" and demanding that Sessions | |
resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, but the President ultimately did not accept it. The | |
President told aides that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and suggested that the Special | |
Counsel therefore could not serve. The President's advisors told him the asserted conflicts were | |
meritless and had already been considered by the Department of Justice. | |
On June 14, 2017, the media reported that the Special Counsel's Office was investigating | |
whether the President had obstructed justice. Press reports called this "a major turning point" in | |
the investigation: while Comey had told the President he was not under investigation, following | |
Comey's firing, the President now was under investigation. The President reacted to this news | |
with a series of tweets criticizing the Department of Justice and the Special Counsel's | |
investigation. On June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn at home and directed him to call | |
the Acting Attorney General and say that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and must be | |
removed. McGahn did not carry out the direction, however, deciding that he would resign rather | |
than trigger what he regarded as a potential Saturday Night Massacre. | |
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Ef/arts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation. Two days after directing McGahn | |
to have the Special Counsel removed, the President made another attempt to affect the course of | |
the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with | |
his former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, a trusted advisor outside the government, and | |
dictated a message for Lewandowski to deliver to Sessions. The message said that Sessions should | |
publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal from the Russia investigation, the investigation | |
was "very unfair" to the President, the President had done nothing wrong, and Sessions planned to | |
meet with the Special Counsel and "let [him] move forward with investigating election meddling | |
for future elections." Lewandowski said he understood what the President wanted Sessions to do. | |
One month later, in another private meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the | |
President asked about the status of his message for Sessions to limit the Special Counsel | |
investigation to future election interference. Lewandowski told the President that the message | |
would be delivered soon. Hours alter that meeting, the President publicly criticized Sessions in an | |
interview with the New York Times, and then issued a series of tweets making it clear that | |
Sessions's job was in jeopardy. Lewandowski did not want to deliver the President's message | |
personally, so he asked senior White House official Rick Dearborn to deliver it to Sessions. | |
Dearborn was uncomfortable with the task and did not follow through. | |
Ejforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence. In the summer of 2017, the President | |
learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower | |
between senior campaign officials, including Donald Trump Jr., and a Russian lawyer who was | |
said to be offering damaging information about Hillary Clinton as "part of Russia and its | |
government's support for Mr. Trump." On several occasions, the President directed aides not to | |
publicly disclose the emails setting up the June 9 meeting, suggesting that the emails would not | |
leak and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited. Before the emails | |
became public, the President edited a press statement for Trump Jr. by deleting a line that | |
acknowledged that the meeting was with "an individual who [Trump Jr.] was told might have | |
information helpful to the campaign" and instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions | |
of Russian children. When the press asked questions about the President's involvement in Trump | |
Jr.'s statement, the President's personal lawyer repeatedly denied the President had played any | |
role. | |
Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation. In early | |
summer 2017, the President called Sessions at home and again asked him to reverse his recusal | |
from the Russia investigation. Sessions did not reverse his recusal. In October 20 17, the President | |
met privately with Sessions in the Oval Office and asked him to "take [a] look" at investigating | |
Clinton. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation | |
agreement, the President met with Sessions in the Oval Office and suggested, according to notes | |
taken by a senior advisor, that if Sessions unrecused and took back supervision of the Russia | |
investigation, he would be a "hero." The President told Sessions, "I'm not going to do anything | |
or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly." In response, Sessions volunteered | |
that he had never seen anything "improper" on the campaign and told the President there was a | |
"whole new leadership team" in place. He did not unrecuse. | |
Efforts to have MeGahn deny that the President had ordered him to have the Special | |
Counsel removed. In early 2018, the press reported that the President had directed McGahn to | |
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have the Special Counsel removed in June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather | |
than can'y out the order. The President reacted to the news stories by directing White House | |
officials to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had not been ordered to | |
have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn told those officials that the media reports were | |
accurate in stating that the President had directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. | |
The President then met with McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the | |
reports. In the same meeting, the President also asked McGahn why he had told the Special | |
Counsel about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel and why McGahn took notes | |
of his conversations with the President. McGahn refused to back away from what he remembered | |
happening and perceived the President to be testing his mettle. | |
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Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, After Flynn withdrew from ajoint defense | |
agreement with the President and began cooperating with the government, the President's personal | |
counsel left a message for Flynn's attorneys reminding them of the President's warm feelings | |
towards Flynn, which he said "still remains," and asking for a "heads up" if Flynn knew | |
"information that implicates the President." When Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could no | |
longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the President's personal counsel | |
said he would make sure that the President knew that Flynn's actions reflected "hostility" towards | |
the President. During Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal. trial was | |
deliberating, the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated | |
unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was convicted, the President called | |
Manafort "a brave man for refusin break" and said that "li ' " "almost ought to be | |
outlawed | |
Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The President's conduct towards Michael Cohen, a | |
former Trump Organization executive, changed from praise for Cohen when he falsely minimized | |
the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project, to castigation of Cohen when | |
he became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the | |
Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization and had briefed candidate | |
Trump on the project numerous times, including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia | |
to advance the deal. In 2017, Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project, | |
including stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed | |
travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhere to a "party line" that Cohen said was developed to | |
minimize the President's connections to Russia. While preparing for his congressional testimony, | |
Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, | |
said that Cohen should "stay on message" and not contradict the President. After the FBI searched | |
Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not | |
"flip," contacted him directly to tell him to "stay strong," and privately passed messages of support | |
to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if | |
he stayed on message he would be taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the | |
government in the summer of 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a "rat," and | |
suggested that his family members had committed crimes. | |
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Overarehing factual issues. We did not make a traditional prosecution decision about | |
these facts, but the evidence we obtained supports several general statements about the President's | |
conduct. | |
Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction-of- | |
justice cases. First, the investigation concerned the President, and some of his actions, such as | |
firing the FBI director, involved facially lawful acts within his Article II authority, which raises | |
constitutional issues discussed below. At the same time, the President's position as the head of | |
the Executive Branch provided him with unique and powerful means of influencing official | |
proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses-all of which is relevant to a potential | |
obstruction-of-justice analysis. Second, unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of | |
justice to cover up a crime, the evidence we obtained did not establish that the President was | |
involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. Although the obstruction | |
statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of | |
the President's intent and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct. Third, | |
many of the President's acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with | |
the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, took place in public view. That | |
circumstance is unusual, but no principle of law excludes public acts from the reach of the | |
obstruction laws. If the likely effect of public acts is to influence witnesses or alter their testimony, | |
the harm to the justice system's integrity is the same. | |
Although the series of events we investigated involved discrete acts, the overall pattern of | |
the President's conduct towards the investigations can shed light on the nature of the President's | |
acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent. In particular, the actions we investigated | |
can be divided into two phases, reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. The first | |
phase covered the period from the President's first interactions with Comey through the President's | |
firing of Comey. During that time, the President had been repeatedly told he was not personally | |
under investigation. Soon after the firing of Comey and the appointment of the Special Counsel, | |
however, the President became aware that his own conduct was being investigated in an | |
obstruction-of-justice inquiry. At that point, the President engaged in a second phase of conduct, | |
involving public attacks on the investigation, non-public efforts to control it, and efforts in both | |
public and private to encourage witnesses not to cooperate with the investigation. Judgments about | |
the nature of the President's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the | |
evidence. | |
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSES | |
The President's counsel raised statutory and constitutional defenses to a possible | |
obstruction-of-justice analysis of the conduct we investigated. We concluded that none of those | |
legal defenses provided a basis for declining to investigate the facts. | |
Statutory defenses. Consistent with precedent and the Department of Justice's general | |
approach to interpreting obstruction statutes, we concluded that several statutes could apply here. | |
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(b)(3), l5l2(c)(2). Section l512(c)(2) is an omnibus | |
obstruction-of-justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or | |
contemplated official proceedings. No principle of statutory construction justifies narrowing the | |
provision to cover only conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence. Sections | |
1503 and 1505 also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury, | |
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judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings, and they are supplemented by a provision | |
in Section 15 l2(b) aimed specifically at conduct intended to prevent or hinder the communication | |
to law enforcement of information related to a federal crime. | |
Constitutional defenses. As for constitutional defenses arising from the President's status | |
as the head of the Executive Branch, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts | |
have not definitively resolved these issues. We therefore examined those issues through the | |
framework established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues. The | |
Department of Justice and the President's personal counsel have recognized that the President is | |
subject to statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or suborning perjury | |
because that conduct does not implicate his constitutional authority. with respect to whether the | |
President can be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of the | |
Constitution, we concluded that Congress has authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his | |
authority in order to protect the integrity of the administration ofjustice. | |
Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and | |
permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers. | |
The separation-of-powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings, including | |
those of courts and grand juries, from corrupt, obstructive acts regardless of their source. We also | |
concluded that any inroad on presidential authority that would occur from prohibiting corrupt acts | |
does not undermine the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional mission. The term | |
"corruptly" sets a demanding standard. lt requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an | |
intent to obtain an improper advantage for himself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty | |
and the rights of others. A preclusion of"corrupt" official action does not diminish the President's | |
ability to exercise Article II powers. For example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not | |
demand freedom for the President to act with a corrupt intention of shielding himself from criminal | |
punishment, avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, | |
a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers, rather than | |
hinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. It also aligns with the President's | |
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. Finally, we concluded that in the rare case in | |
which a criminal investigation of the President's conduct is justified, inquiries to determine | |
whether the President acted for a corrupt motive should not impermissibly chill his performance | |
of his constitutionally assigned duties. The conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction | |
laws to the President's corrupt exercise of the powers of office accords with our constitutional | |
system of checks and balances and the principle that no person is above the law. | |
CONCLUSION | |
Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw | |
ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct. The evidence we obtained about the | |
President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were | |
making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a | |
thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction ofjustice, | |
we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach | |
that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a | |
crime, it also does not exonerate him. | |
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I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES | |
A. Legal Framework of Obstruction of Justice | |
The May 17, 2017 Appointment Order and the Special Counsel regulations provide this | |
Office with jurisdiction to investigate "federal crimes committed in the course of and with intent | |
to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, | |
destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses." 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Because of that | |
description of ourjurisdiction, we sought evidence for our obstruction-of-justice investigation with | |
the elements of obstruction offenses in mind. Our evidentiary analysis is similarly focused on the | |
elements of such offenses, although we do not draw conclusions on the ultimate questions that | |
govern a prosecutorial decision under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual | |
§ 9-27.000 etseq. (2018). | |
Here, we summarize the law interpreting the elements of potentially relevant obstruction | |
statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address the unique constitutional issues that | |
arise in an inquiry into official acts by the President. Those issues are discussed in a later section | |
of this report addressing constitutional defenses that the President's counsel have raised. See | |
Volume II, Section IILB, infra. | |
Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstruction statutes: (1) an | |
obstructive act, (2) a nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding, and (3) a corrupt | |
intent. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, l5l2(c)(2). We describe those elements as they have | |
been interpreted by the courts. We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering, | |
see 18 U.S.C. § l5l2(b), and describe the requirements for attempted offenses and endeavors to | |
obstruct justice, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, l5l2(c)(2). | |
Obstructive act. Obstruction-of-justice law "reaches all corrupt conduct capable of | |
producing an effect that prevents justice from being duly administered, regardless of the means | |
employed." United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (I lth Cir. 1984) (interpreting 18 | |
U.S.C. § 1503). An "effort to influence" a proceeding can qualify as an endeavor to obstruct | |
justice even if the effort was "subtle or circuitous" and "however cleverly or with whatever | |
cloaking of purpose" it was made. United States v. Roe, 529 F.2d 629, 632 (4th Cir. 1975), see | |
also United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 173 (2d Cir. 2006). The verbs "'obstruct or impede' | |
are broad" and "can refer to anything that blocks, makes difficult, or hinders." Marinello v. United | |
States, 138 S. Ct. 1 101, 1 106 (2018) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). | |
An improper motive can render an actor's conduct criminal even when the conduct would | |
otherwise be lawful and within the actor's authority. See United States v. Cue to, 151 F.3d 620, | |
631 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming obstruction conviction of a criminal defense attorney for "litigation- | |
related conduct"), United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 992 (1st Cir. 1987) ("any act by any | |
party-whether lawful or unlawlill on its face-may abridge § 1503 if performed with a corrupt | |
motive"). | |
Nexus to a pending or contemplated official proceeding. Obstruction-of-justice law | |
generally requires a nexus, or connection, to an official proceeding. In Section 1503, the nexus | |
must be to pending "judicial or grand jury proceedings." United States v. Aguilar, 5 15 U.S. 593, | |
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599 (1995). In Section 1505, the nexus can include a connection to a "pending" federal agency | |
proceeding or a congressional inquiry or investigation. Under both statutes, the government must | |
demonstrate "a relationship in time, causation, or logic" between the obstructive act and the | |
proceeding or inquiry to be obstructed. ld. at 599, see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, | |
544 U.S. 696, 707-708 (2005). Section l5l2(c) prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at official | |
proceedings including judicial or grand jury proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § l5l5(a)(l)(A). "For | |
purposes of" Section 1512, "an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted | |
at the time of the offense." 18 U.S.C. § l5l2(f)(l). Although a proceeding need not already be in | |
progress to trigger liability under Section 15 l2(c), a nexus to a contemplated proceeding still must | |
be shown. United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019), United States v. Petruk, 78 l | |
F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 20l5); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009), | |
United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). The nexus requirement narrows the | |
scope of obstruction statutes to ensure that individuals have "fair warning" of what the law | |
proscribes. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted). | |
The nexus showing has subjective and objective components. As an objective matter, a | |
defendant must act "in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice," such that the statute "excludes | |
defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably | |
be successful." Aguilar, 5 15 U.S. at 601-602 (emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted). | |
"[T]he endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due | |
administration of justice." Id at 599 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a | |
subjective matter, the actor must have "contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding." | |
Pelruk, 781 F.3d at 445-446. A defendant need not directly impede the proceeding. Rather, a | |
nexus exists if "discretionary actions of a third person would be required to obstruct the judicial | |
proceeding if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the third party would act on the [defendant's] | |
communication in such a way as to obstruct the judicial proceeding." United States v. Martinez, | |
862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017) (brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). | |
Corruptly. The word "corruptly" provides the intent element for obstruction ofjustice and | |
means acting "knowingly and dishonestly" or "with an improper motive." United States v. | |
Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 508 (Sth Cir. 2012), United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 | |
(10th Cir. 2013) (to act corruptly means to "act[] with an improper purpose and to engage in | |
conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct" the | |
relevant proceeding) (some quotation marks omitted), see 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) ("As used in section | |
1505, the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing | |
another."), see also Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-706 (interpreting "corruptly" to mean | |
"wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil" and holding that acting "knowingly ... corruptly" in 18 | |
U.S.C. § 1512(b) requires "consciousness of wrongdoing"). The requisite showing is made when | |
a person acted with an intent to obtain an "improper advantage for [him]self or someone else, | |
inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." BALLENT1NE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d | |
ed. 1969), see United States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015), Aguilar, 515 U.S. at a | |
616 (Scalier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this definition as the | |
"longstanding and well-accepted meaning" of"corruptly"). | |
Witness tampering. A more specific provision in Section 15 12 prohibits tampering with a | |
witness. See 18 U.S.C. § I5I2(b)(l), (3) (making it a crime to "knowingly use[] intimidation ... | |
or corruptly persuade fj another person," or "engage[] in misleading conduct towards another | |
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person," with the intent to "influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official | |
proceeding" or to "hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer ... | |
of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense"). To | |
establish corrupt persuasion, it is sufficient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to | |
investigators in contemplation of a likely federal investigation into his conduct. United States v. | |
Edlind, 887 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir. 2018), United States v. Sparks, 791 F.3d l 188, 1191-1192 | |
(10th Cir. 2015), United States v. Eyrne, 435 F.3d 16, 23-26 (1st Cir. 2006), United States v. | |
LaShay, 417 F.3d 715, 718-719 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Eurns, 298 F.3d 523, 539-540 | |
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 1999). The | |
"persuasion" need not be coercive, intimidating, or explicit, it is sufficient to "urge," "induce," | |
"ask[]," "argue]," "give] reasons," Sparks, 791 F.3d at 1 192, or "coach[] or remind[] witnesses | |
by planting misleading facts," Edlind, 887 F.3d at 174. Corrupt persuasion is shown "where a | |
defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness | |
believe the story and testify to it." United States v. Radolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1986), see | |
United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). It also covers urging a witness to recall | |
a fact that the witness did not know, even if the fact was actually true. See LaShay, 417 F.3d at | |
719. Corrupt persuasion also can be shown in certain circumstances when a person, with an | |
improper motive, urges a witness not to cooperate with law enforcement. See United States v. | |
Shorts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (1 1th Cr. 1998) (telling Secretary "not to [say] anything [to the FBI] | |
and [she] would not be bothered"). | |
When the charge is acting with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication | |
of information to law enforcement under Section 1512(b)(3), the "nexus" to a proceeding inquiry | |
articulated in Aguilar-that an individual have "knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the | |
judicial proceeding," 5 I 5 U.S. at 599-does not apply because the obstructive act is aimed at the | |
communication of information to investigators, not at impeding an official proceeding. | |
Acting "knowingly ... corruptly" requires proof that the individual was "conscious of | |
wrongdoing." Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-706 (declining to explore "[t]he outer limits of | |
this element" but indicating that an instruction was infirm where it permitted conviction even if | |
the defendant "honestly and sincerely believed that [the] conduct was lawful"). It is an affirmative | |
defense that "the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention | |
was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully." I 8 U.S.C. § 15 l2(e). | |
Attempts and endeavors. Section 15 l 2(c)(2) covers both substantive obstruction offenses | |
and attempts to obstruct justice. Under general principles of attempt law, a person is guilty of an | |
attempt when he has the intent to commit a substantive offense and takes an overt act that | |
constitutes a substantial step towards that goal. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. | |
102, 106-107 (2007). "[T]he act [must be] substantial, in that it was strongly corroborative of the | |
defendant's criminal purpose." United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003). While | |
"mere abstract talk" does not suffice, any "concrete and specific" acts that corroborate the | |
defendant's intent can constitute a "substantial step." United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d l 184, l 198- | |
1205 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus, "soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an | |
element of the crime" may qualify as a substantial step. Model Penal Code § 5.01 (2)(g), see United | |
States v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, 781 (8th Cir. 2007). | |
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The omnibus clause of I8 U.S.C. § 1503 prohibits an "endeavor" to obstructjustice, which | |
sweeps more broadly than Section 1512's attempt provision. See United States v. Sampson, 898 | |
F.3d 287, 302 (zd Cir. 2018), United State5 v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1988) | |
(collecting cases). "lt is well established that a[n] [obstruction-of-justice] offense is complete | |
when one corruptly endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice, the | |
prosecution need not prove that the due administration of justice was actually obstructed or | |
impeded." UniledStates v. Davis, 854 F.3d 1276, 1292 (1 lth Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks | |
omitted). | |
B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations | |
After the appointment of the Special Counsel, this Office obtained evidence about the | |
following events relating to potential issues of obstruction of justice involving the President: | |
(a) The President's January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James Comey in which | |
the President reportedly asked for Comey's loyalty, one day after the White House had | |
been briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts between former National Security | |
Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador, | |
(b) The President's February 14, 20 I7 meeting with Comey in which the President reportedly | |
asked Comey not to pursue an investigation of Flynn, | |
(c) The President's private requests to Corney to make public the fact that the President was | |
not the subject of an FBI investigation and to lift what the President regarded as a cloud, | |
(d) The President's outreach to the Director of NationaI Intelligence and the Directors of the | |
National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI's Russia | |
investigation; | |
(e) The President's stated rationales for terminating Comey on May 9, 2017, including | |
statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the FBl's Russia | |
investigation was a factor in Comey's termination, and | |
(f) The President's reported involvement in issuing a statement about the June 9, 2016 Trump | |
Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said the | |
meeting was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to provide the | |
Trump Campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton. | |
Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional | |
principles (discussed below in Volume II, Section III, infra), we determined that there was a | |
sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues | |
involving the President. | |
Many of the core issues in an obstruction-of-justice investigation turn on an individual's | |
actions and intent. We therefore requested that the White House provide us with documentary | |
evidence in its possession on the relevant events. We also sought and obtained the White House's | |
concurrence in our conducting interviews of White House personnel who had relevant information. | |
And we interviewed other witnesses who had pertinent knowledge, obtained documents on a | |
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voluntary basis when possible, and used legal process where appropriate. These investigative steps | |
allowed us to gather a substantial amount of evidence. | |
We also sought a voluntary interview with the President. After more than a year of | |
discussion. the President declined to be interviewed | |
During the course of our discussions | |
the President did agree to answer written questions on certain Russia-related topics, and he | |
provided us with answers. He did not similarly agree to provide written answers to questions on | |
obstruction topics or questions on events during the transition. Ultimately, while we believed that | |
we had the authority and legal justification to issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain the President's | |
testimony, we chose not to do so. We made that decision in view of the substantial delay that such | |
an investigative step would likely produce at a late stage in our investigation. We also assessed | |
that based on the significant body of evidence we had already obtained of the President's actions | |
and his public and private statements describing or explaining those actions, we had sufficient | |
evidence to understand relevant events and to make certain assessments without the President's | |
testimony. The Office's decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in | |
Appendix C, infra, in a note that precedes the President's written responses. | |
In assessing the evidence we obtained, we relied on common principles that apply in any | |
investigation. The issue of criminal intent is often inferred from circumstantial evidence. See, | |
e.g., United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1305 (I lth Cir. 2016) ("[G]uilty knowledge can | |
rarely be established by direct evidence.... Therefore, mens rea elements such as knowledge or | |
intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence.") (internal quotation marks omitted), United | |
States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) ("The government's case rested on | |
circumstantial evidence, but the mens rea elements of knowledge and intent can often be proved | |
through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.") (internal | |
quotation marks omitted). The principle that intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence | |
is a necessity in criminal cases, given the right of a subject to assert his privilege against compelled | |
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and therefore decline to testify. Accordingly, | |
determinations on intent are frequently reached without the opportunity to interview an | |
investigatory subj ect. | |
Obstruction-of-justice cases are consistent with this rule. See, e.g., Edlind, 887 F.3d at | |
174, 176 (relying on "significant circumstantial evidence that [the defendant] was conscious other | |
wrongdoing" in an obstruction case, "[b]ecause evidence of intent will almost always be | |
circumstantial, a defendant may be found culpable where the reasonable and foreseeable | |
consequences of her acts are the obstruction of justice") (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and | |
punctuation omitted), Quattrone, 441 F.3d at 173-174. Circumstantial evidence that illuminates | |
intent may include a pattern of potentially obstructive acts. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) ("Evidence of a | |
crime, wrong, or other act ... may be admissible ... [to] prov[e] motive, opportunity, intent, | |
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident."), see, e.g., United | |
States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648-650 (1st Cir. 1996), United States v. Arnold, 773 F.2d | |
823, 832-834 (7th Cir. 1985), Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 1000. | |
Credibility judgments may also be made based on objective facts and circumstantial | |
evidence. Standard jury instructions highlight a variety of factors that are often relevant in | |
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assessing credibility. These include whether a witness had a reason not to tell the truth, whether | |
the witness had a good memory, whether the witness had the opportunity to observe the events | |
about which he testified, whether the witness's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses, | |
and whether anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts his testimony. See, e.g., | |
First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 1.06 (2018); FWI1 Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions | |
(Criminal Cases) § 1.08 (2012), Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction § 3.01 (2012). | |
In addition to those general factors, we took into account more specific factors in assessing | |
the credibility of conflicting accounts of the facts. For example, contemporaneous written notes | |
can provide strong corroborating evidence. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 232 (1975) | |
(the fact that a "statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report ... would tend | |
strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview"). Similarly, a witness's | |
recitation of his account before he had any motive to fabricate also supports the witness's | |
credibility. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (1995) ("A consistent statement that | |
predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a | |
consequence of that motive."). Finally, a witness's false description of an encounter can imply | |
consciousness of wrongdoing. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010) | |
(noting the "well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence-often strong | |
evidence-of guilt"). We applied those settled legal principles in evaluating the factual results of | |
our investigation. | |
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II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION | |
This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We first provide an overview | |
of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, and how candidate Trump | |
responded. We then tum to the key events that we investigated: the President's conduct concerning | |
the FBI investigation of Michael Flynn, the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI's | |
Russia investigation, events leading up to and surrounding the termination of FBI Director Comey, | |
efforts to terminate the Special Counsel, efforts to curtail the scope of the Special Counsel's | |
investigation, efforts to prevent disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower | |
meeting between Russians and senior campaign officials, efforts to have the Attorney General | |
unrecuse, and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses. | |
We summarize the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory | |
obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and intent. We focus on | |
elements because, by regulation, the Special Counsel has "jurisdiction ... to investigate ... federal | |
crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's | |
investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of | |
witnesses." 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal | |
obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of those crimes and | |
analyzed them within an elements framework-while refraining from reaching ultimate | |
conclusions about whether crimes were committed, for the reasons explained above. This section | |
also does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President, those | |
defenses are analyzed in Volume II, Section Ill, infra. | |
A. The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump | |
During the 20 I6 campaign, the media raised questions about a possible connection between | |
the Trump Campaign and Russia.7 The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released politically | |
damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump | |
responded to questions about possible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement | |
in Russia-even though the Trump Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late | |
as June 2016. Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same | |
time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information about any | |
further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted about possible | |
links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect continued to deny any | |
connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election | |
interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election." | |
7 This section summarizes and cites various news stories not for the truth of the information | |
contained in the stories, but rather to place candidate Trump's response to those stories in context. Volume | |
I of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on by the media | |
during the campaign. | |
8 As discussed in Volume I, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals | |
with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence | |
was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with | |
representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election. | |
15 | |
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18 | |
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mightily by our press."36 Trump also said that "there's nothing that I can think of that I'd rather | |
do than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now," and in response to a | |
question about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting | |
sanctions, Trump replied, "We'll be looking at that. Yeah, we'll be looking."37 | |
During the press conference, Trump repeated "I have nothing to do with Russia" five | |
times." He stated that "the closest [he] came to Russia" was that Russians may have purchased a | |
home or condos from him." He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in | |
20 13 he had been interested in working with Russian companies that "wanted to put a lot of money | |
into developments in Russia" but "it never worked out."40 He explained, "[f]rankly, l didn't want | |
to do it for a couple of different reasons. But we had a major developer ... that wanted to develop | |
property in Moscow and other places. But we decided not to do it."4I The Trump Organization, | |
however, had been pursuing a building project in Moscow-the Trump Tower Moscow project- | |
from approximately September 2015 through June 2016, and the candidate was regularly updated | |
on developments, including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to promote the deal and | |
by Trump himself to finalize it.42 | |
Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference about Trump's denial of | |
any business dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded as untrue." Trump told Cohen that Trump | |
Tower Moscow was not a deal yet and said, "Why mention it if it is not a deal'?"44 According to | |
Cohen, at around this time, in response to Trump's disavowal of connections to Russia, campaign | |
36 Donald Trump News Conference, Donal, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). Within five hours | |
of Trump's remark, a Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with Hillary | |
Clinton for possible hacks. See Volume I, Section Ill, supra. In written answers submitted in this | |
investigation, the President stated that he made the "Russia, if you're listening" statement "in jest and | |
sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective observer." Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, | |
2018), at 13 (Response to Question II, Part (d)). | |
37 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). In his written | |
answers submitted in this investigation, the President said that his statement that "we'll be looking" at | |
Crimea and sanctions "did not communicate any position." Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. | |
20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part (g)). | |
38 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). | |
39 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). | |
40 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). | |
41 Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). | |
4z The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump's involvement in it is discussed in detail in | |
Volume I, Section lv.A.l, supra, and Volume II, Section II.K, infra. | |
43 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4. | |
44 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4-5. | |
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advisors had developed a "party line" that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections | |
to Russia/*5 | |
In addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to reports | |
of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to distance itself from Russian | |
contacts. For example, in August 2016, foreign policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation | |
to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak's residence because the timing was "not optimal" in view | |
of media reports about Russian interference.46 On August 19, 2016, Manafort was asked to resign | |
amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine and links to | |
Russian business." And when the media published stories about Page's connections to Russia in | |
September 2016, Trump Campaign officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and | |
told the press that he had played "no role" in the Campaign." | |
On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian | |
intelligence agency from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta.49 The same day, the federal | |
government announced that "the Russian Government directed the recent compromises ore-mails | |
from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations."50 The government | |
statement directly linked Russian hacking to the releases on WikiLeaks, with the goal of interfering | |
with the presidential election, and concluded "that only Russia's senior-most officials could have | |
authorized these activities" based on their "scope and sensitivity."5l | |
On October I I, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating Russia's | |
hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that the hacked emails were | |
going to be released." Vice Presidential Candidate Mike Pence was asked whether the Trump | |
45 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at I, Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3-5. The formation of the "party line" is | |
described in greater detail in Volume II, Section II.K, infra. | |
46 DJTFP00004953 (8/8/I6 Email, Gordon to Pchelyakov) (stating that "[t]hese days are not | |
optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a stream of false media stories"). The invitation and | |
Gordon's response are discussed in Volume I, Section lV.A.7.a, supra. | |
47 See, kg., Amber Phillips, Paul Manafort's complicated lies to Ukraine, explained, Washington | |
Post (Aug. 19, 2016) ("There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with investigations into | |
[Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine."), Tom Winter & Ken Dilanian, Donald Trump | |
Aide Paul Manafort Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). Relevant events | |
involving Manafort are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, supra. | |
4s Michael lsikoff, U.S. infel of icials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo News | |
(Sep. 23, 2016), see, kg., 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon, 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon | |
& S. Miller, Page 3/16/17 302, at 2. | |
49 @WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet. | |
50 Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of | |
National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). | |
51 Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of | |
National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016). | |
52 John Wagner & Anne Gearard, Clinton campaign chairman lies email hack to Russians, suggests | |
Trump ad early warning, Washington Post (Oct. II, 2016). | |
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Campaign was "in cahoots" with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information | |
and responded, "Nothing could be further from the truth."53 | |
4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections | |
with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election | |
On November 8, 2016, Trump was elected President. Two days later, Russian officials | |
told the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump's "immediate | |
entourage" during the campaign.5'* In response, Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign | |
spokesperson, said, "We are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with | |
any foreign entities before yesterday, when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders."55 Hicks | |
gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and Russia: "It never | |
happened. There was no communication between the campaign and any foreign entity during the | |
campaign."56 | |
On December 10, 2016, the press reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had "concluded | |
that Russia interfered in last month's presidential election to boost DOnald Trump's bid for the | |
White House."57 Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, "l think it's | |
ridiculous. I think it's just another excuse."58 He continued that no one really knew who was | |
responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the intelligence community had "no idea if it's Russia | |
or China or somebody. It could be somebody sitting in a bed some place."59 The President-Elect | |
53 Louis Nelson, Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with WikiLeaks, Politico (Oct. 14, 2016). | |
54 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New | |
York Times (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying, "[t]here | |
were contacts" and "I cannot say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian | |
representatives"), Jim Heifetz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better lies with Trump; says contacts underway, | |
Associated Press (Nov. l l, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov saying, "I don't say that all of them, but a whole array | |
of them supported contacts with Russian representatives"). | |
55 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Ojjicials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says, New | |
York Times (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Hicks). | |
56 Jim Heifetz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway, | |
Associated Press (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she | |
spoke with Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Miller, and probably Kushner | |
and Bannon to ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or pushback from any of them. Hicks | |
12/8/17 302, at 4. | |
57 Damien Gayle, CIA concludes Russia interj%red to help Trump win election, say reports, | |
Guardian (Dec. 10, 2016). | |
58 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ | |
Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016). | |
59 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ | |
Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. l 1, 2016). | |
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also said that Democrats were "putting [] out" the story of Russian interference "because they | |
suffered one of the greatest defeats in the history of politics."60 | |
On December 18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was "distorted by the | |
Russian intervention" and questioned whether Trump Campaign officials had been "in touch with | |
the Russians."6I The same day, incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus appeared on Fox News | |
Sunday and declined to say whether the President-Elect accepted the intelligence community's | |
determination that Russia intervened in the election.62 When asked about any contact or | |
coordination between the Campaign and Russia, Priebus said, "Even this question is insane. Of | |
course we didn't interface with the Russians."63 Priebus added that "this whole thing is a spin job" | |
and said, "the real question is, why the Democrats ... are doing everything they can to delegitimize | |
the outcome of the election?"64 | |
On December 29, 2016, the Obama Administration announced that in response to Russian | |
Cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election, it was imposing sanctions and other measures on | |
several Russian individuals and entities.65 When first asked about the sanctions, President-Elect | |
Trump said, "I think we ought to get on with our lives."66 He then put out a statement that said | |
"It's time for our country to move on to bigger and better things," but indicated that he would meet | |
with intelligence community leaders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference. | |
The briefing occurred on January 6, 2017.68 Following the briefing, the intelligence community | |
released the public version of its assessment, which concluded with high confidence that Russia | |
had intervened in the election through a variety of means with the goal of harming Clinton's | |
60 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ | |
Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. l 1, 2016). | |
61 David Morgan, Clinton campaign: It's an 'open question' lf Trump team colluded with Russia, | |
Reuters Business Insider (Dec. 18, 2016). | |
62 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with Incoming White House Chief ofSta]§' | |
Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016). | |
63 Chris Wallaee Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with Incoming While House Chief of Sta/f' | |
Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016). | |
64 Chris Wallace Hosts "Fox News Sunday, " Interview with Incoming White House Chief of Stajt | |
Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016). | |
65 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and | |
Harassment, White House (Dec. 29, 2016), see also Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces | |
measures to punish Russia fOr 2016 election interference, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016). | |
66 John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: 'Get on with our lives, ' | |
Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016). | |
67 Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces measures foppish Russiafor 2016 election | |
intern%rence, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016). | |
es Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. | |
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electability.6° The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian | |
government had developed a clear preference for Trump." | |
Several days later, BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British | |
intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump's Russia | |
connections under the headline "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia."71 In a | |
press conference the next day, the President-Elect called the release "an absolute disgrace" and | |
said, "I have no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia, because we've | |
stayed away.... So I have no deals, I have no loans and I have no dealings. We could make deals | |
in Russia very easily if we wanted to, Adjust don't want to because I think that would be a confIict."72 | |
Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian | |
connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence community assessment of Russian | |
interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory." Hicks, for example, said that | |
the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his "Achilles heel" because, | |
even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking | |
away from what he had accomplished." Sean Spicer, the first White House communications | |
director, recalled that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the | |
legitimacy of his election." Gates said the President viewed the Russia investigation as an attack | |
on the legitimacy of his win.76 And Priebus recalled that when the intelligence assessment came | |
out, the President-Elect was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win." | |
69 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia 's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 | |
US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017). | |
70 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia 's Influence Campaign Targeting fne 2016 | |
US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017). | |
71 Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed (Jan. 10, | |
2017)- | |
72 Donald Trump 's News Conference: Full Transcript and Rodeo, New York Times (Jan. I l, | |
2017), available al https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/ l I/us/po1itics/trump-press-conference- | |
transcript.htm1. | |
73 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18; Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 6, Bannon 2/14/18 | |
302, at 2, Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3, see Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2 (the President believed that the purpose of | |
the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency). | |
74 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18. | |
75 Spicer 10/17/17 302, at 6. | |
76 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 3. | |
77 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7. | |
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B. The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn | |
Overview | |
During the presidential transition, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn had | |
two phone calls with the Russian Ambassador to the United States about the Russian response to | |
U.S. sanctions imposed because of Russia's election interference. After the press reported on | |
Flynn's contacts with the Russian Ambassador, Flynn lied to incoming Administration officials | |
by saying he had not discussed sanctions on the calls. The officials publicly repeated those lies in | |
press interviews. The FBI, which previously was investigating Flynn for other matters, | |
interviewed him about the calls in the first week after the inauguration, and Flynn told similar lies | |
to the FBI. On January 26, 2017, Department of Justice (DOJ) officials notified the White House | |
that Flynn and the Russian Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Flynn had been | |
interviewed by the FBI. The next night, the President had a private dinner with FBI Director James | |
Comey in which he asked for Comey's loyalty. On February 13, 2017, the President asked Flynn | |
to resign. The following day, the President had a one-on-one conversation with Comey in which | |
he said, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go." | |
Evidence | |
1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with | |
Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak | |
Shortly after the election, President-Elect Trump announced he would appoint Michael | |
Flynn as his National Security Advisor." For the next two months, Flynn played an active role on | |
the Presidential Transition Team (PTT) coordinating policy positions and communicating with | |
foreign government officials, including Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey | |
Kislyak.79 | |
On December 29, 2016, as noted in Volume II, Section Il.A.4, supra, the Obama | |
Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian | |
individuals and entities." That day, multiple members of the PTT exchanged emails about the | |
sanctions and the impact they would have on the incoming Administration, and Flynn informed | |
members of the PTT that he would be speaking to the Russian Ambassador later in the day.8l | |
78 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 7, President-Elect Donaldl Trump Selects US. Senator JeffSessionsfor | |
Attorney General Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as Assistant to the President for National Security Ajj'airs and | |
US. Rep. Mike Pompeo as Director oft re Central Intelligence Agency, President-Elect Donald J. Trump | |
Press Release (Nov. 18, 2016), see also, e.g., Bryan Bender, Trump names Mike Flynn national security | |
adviser, Politico, (Nov. 17, 2016). | |
79 Flynn 11116/17 302, at 8-14, Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 3-5. | |
so Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and | |
Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016). | |
al 12/29/16 Email, O'Brien to McFarland et al., 12/29/16 Email, Bossert to Flynn et al., 12/29/16 | |
Email, McFarland to Flynn et al., SF000001 (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty) ("Tit for tat w | |
Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today."), Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 2. | |
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Flynn, who was in the Dominican Republic at the time, and K.T. McFarland, who was slated to | |
become the Deputy National Security Advisor and was at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida with | |
the President-Elect and other senior staff, talked by phone about what, if anything, Flynn should | |
communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions.82 McFarland had spoken with incoming | |
Administration officials about the sanctions and Russia's possible responses and thought she had | |
mentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak.83 Based on | |
those conversations, McFarland informed Flynn that incoming Administration officials at Mar-a- | |
Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation.84 At 4:43 p.m. that afternoon, McFarland sent | |
an email to several officials about the sanctions and informed the group that "Gen [F]lynn is talking | |
to russian ambassador this evening."85 | |
Approximately one hour later, McFarland met with the President-Elect and senior officials | |
and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia's possible responses." Incoming Chief of Staff | |
Rance Priebus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions | |
situation could be "cooled down" and not escalated." McFarland recalled that at the end of the | |
meeting, someone may have mentioned to the President-Elect that Flynn was speaking to the | |
Russian Ambassador that evening." McFarland did not recall any response by the President- | |
Elect.89 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect viewed the sanctions as an attempt by the Obama | |
Administration to embarrass him by delegitimizing his election." | |
Immediately after discussing the sanctions with McFarland on December 29, 2016, Flynn | |
called Kislyak and requested that Russia respond to the sanctions only in a reciprocal manner, | |
without escalating the situation.91 After the call, Flynn briefed McFarland on its substance.92 | |
Flynn told McFarland that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory | |
because Russia wanted a good relationship with the Trump Administration." On December 30, | |
2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures | |
sz Statement of Offense at 2-3, United States v. Michael T Flynn, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, | |
2017), Doc. 4 (Flynn Statement of Offense); Flynn llll7/l'1 302, at 3-4, Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3, | |
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7. | |
83 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-7 (recalling discussions about this issue with Barron and Priebus). | |
x4 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3, Flynn 11/17/ I7 302, at 3-4, McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7. | |
85 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al. | |
86 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. | |
87 Priebus in8/18 302, at 3. | |
is McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. Priebus thought it was possible that McFarland had mentioned | |
Flynn's scheduled call with Kislyak at this meeting, although he was not certain. Priebus 1/18/18 302, at | |
3. | |
B9 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. | |
90 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 3. | |
91 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3, Flynn l 1/17/17 302, at 3-4. | |
92 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3, McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7-8, Flynn ll/I7/17 302, at 4. | |
93 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8. | |
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in response to the sanctions at that time and would instead "plan ... filrther steps to restore Russian- | |
US relations based on the policies of the Trump Administration."94 Following that announcement, | |
the President-Elect tweeted, "Great move on delay (by V. Putin) - I always knew he was very | |
smart!"95 | |
On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn's request had been | |
received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request.96 | |
Later that day, Flynn told McFarland about this follow-up conversation with Kislyak and Russia's | |
decision not to escalate the sanctions situation based on Flynn's request.97 McFarland recalled | |
that Flynn thought his phone call had made a difference." Flynn spoke with other incoming | |
Administration officials that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions." | |
Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions issue with incoming Administration official | |
Stephen Bannon the next d3y.100 Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's | |
conversations with Kislyak, and he and Bannon agreed that they had "stopped the train on Russia's | |
response" to the sanctions.'0l On January 3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect in person and | |
thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but Flynn did not have a specific | |
recollection of telling the President-Elect about the substance of his calls with Kislyak.102 | |
Members of the intelligence community were surprised by Russia's decision not to retaliate | |
in response to the sanctions.l03 When analyzing Russia's response, they became aware of Flynn's | |
discussion of sanctions with Kislyak.!04 Previously, the FBI had opened an investigation of Flynn | |
based on his relationship with the Russian government.105 Flynn's contacts with Kislyak became | |
a key component of that investigation.l°' | |
94 Statement by the President of Russia, President of Russia (Dec. 30, 2016) 12/30/16. | |
95 @realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (2:41 p.m. ET) Tweet. | |
96 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 3, Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3. | |
97 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 6; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10, Flynn | |
Statement of Offense, at 3. | |
98 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10, see Flynn U19/18 302, at 4. | |
99 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5-6. | |
100 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 4-5. Bannon recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said he did not | |
remember discussing sanctions with him. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9. | |
101 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1, Flynn U19/18 302, at 5. | |
102 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 6; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 6. | |
103 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2. | |
104 McCord w1w17 302, at 2. | |
105 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2-3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 5. | |
106 McCord ww/17 302, at 2-3. | |
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2. President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Assessment | |
of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens Election- | |
Interference Investigations | |
On January 6, 2017, as noted in Volume II, Section II.A.4, supra, intelligence officials | |
briefed President-Elect Trump and the incoming Administration on the intelligence community's | |
assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election.'°7 When the briefing | |
concluded, Comey spoke with the President-Elect privately to brief him on unverified, personally | |
sensitive allegations compiled by Steele.!°8 According to a memorandum Comey drafted | |
immediately after their private discussion, the President-Elect began the meeting by telling Comey | |
he had conducted himself honorably over the prior year and had a great reputati0n.109 The | |
President-Elect stated that he thought highly of Comey, looked forward to working with him, and | |
hoped that he planned to stay on as FBI director.l 10 Comey responded that he intended to continue | |
serving in that role."l Comey then briefed the President-Elect on the sensitive material in the | |
Steele reporting.l 12 Comey recalled that the President-Elect seemed defensive, so Comey decided | |
107 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, | |
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at | |
I-2). | |
108 Comey I l/l5/17 302, at 3, Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select | |
Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 20I7) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former | |
Director of the FBI, at l-2). | |
109 Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at I. Comey began drafting the memorandum summarizing the | |
meeting immediately after it occurred. Comey I 1/15/17 302, at 4. He finished the memorandum that | |
evening and finalized it the following morning. Comey I 1/15/17 302, at 4. | |
110 Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at I, Comey I 1/15/17 302, at 3. Comey identified several other | |
occasions in January201 7 when the President reiterated that he hoped Comey would stay on as FBI director. | |
On January I 1, President-Elect Trump called Comey to discuss the Steele reports and stated that he thought | |
Comey was doing great and the President-Elect hoped he would remain in his position as FBI director. | |
Comey Il/I5/17 302, at 4, Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence | |
Committee, ll5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ | |
Cong. Transcripts, at 90. ("[D]uring that call, he asked me again, 'Hope you're going to stay, you're doing | |
a great job.' And l told him that I intended to."). On January 22, at a White House reception honoring law | |
enforcement, the President greeted Comey and said he looked forward to working with him. Hearing on | |
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I I 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) | |
(testimony of lames B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 22. And as discussed | |
in greater detail in Volume II, Section II.D, infra, on January 27, the President invited Comey to dinner at | |
the White House and said he was glad Comey wanted to stay on as FBI Director. | |
111 Comey IN/I7 Memorandum, at 1, Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. | |
112 Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1-2, Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. Comey's briefing included the | |
Steele reportings unverified allegation that the Russians had compromising tapes of the President involving | |
conduct when he was a private citizen during a 2013 trip to Moscow for the Miss Universe Pageant. During | |
the 2016 presidential campaign, a similar claim may have reached candidate Trump. On October 30, 2016, | |
Michael Cohen received a text from Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladze that said, "Stopped flow of | |
tapes from Russia but not sure if there's anything else. Just so you know ...." 10/30/16 Text Message, | |
Rtskhiladze to Cohen. Rtsldiiladze said "tapes" referred to compromising tapes of Trump rumored to be | |
held by persons associated with the Russian real estate conglomerate Crocus Group, which had helped host | |
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to assure him that the FBI was not investigating him personally.'l3 Comey recalled he did not | |
want the President-Elect to think of the conversation as a "J. Edgar Hoover move."' 14 | |
On January 10, 2017, the media reported that Comey had briefed the President-Elect on | |
the Steele reporting,l!5 and BuzzFeed News published information compiled by Steele online, | |
stating that the information included "specific, unverified, and potentially unverifiable allegations | |
of contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives."l'6 The next day, the President-Elect | |
expressed concern to intelligence community leaders about the fact that the information had leaked | |
and asked whether they could make public statements refuting the allegations in the Steele | |
reports.' 7 | |
In the following weeks, three Congressional committees opened investigations to examine | |
Russia's interference in the election and whether the Trump Campaign had colluded with | |
Russia.118 On January 13, 2017, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) announced | |
that it would conduct a bipartisan inquiry into Russian interference in the election, including any | |
"links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns."1!9 On January 25, | |
2017, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) announced that it had been | |
conducting an investigation into Russian election interference and possible coordination with the | |
political campaigns.120 And on February 2, 2017, the Senate Judiciary Committee announced that | |
it too would investigate Russian efforts to intervene in the election.!2! | |
the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Russia. Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 12. Cohen said he spoke to Trump | |
about the issue after receiving the texts from Rtskhiladze. Cohen 9/12/ I8 302, at 13. Rtskhiladze said he | |
was told the tapes were fake, but he did not communicate that to Cohen. Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 7. | |
113 Comey I I/ I5/ 17 302, at 3-4, Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select | |
Intelligence Committee, l 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former | |
Director of the FBI, at 2). | |
114 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. | |
115 See, eg., Evan Perez et al., Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian ports to | |
compromise him, CNN (Jan. 10, 2017, updated Jan. 12, 2017). | |
116 Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed News | |
(Jan. 10, 2017). | |
117 See 1/1 1/17 Email, Clapper to Comey ("He asked ill could put out a statement. He would prefer | |
of course that I say the documents are bogus, which, of course, I can't do."), 1/12/17 Email, Comey to | |
Clapper ("He called me at 5 esterda and we had a very similar conversation."), Comey 11/15/17 302, at y y | |
4-5. | |
la See 2016 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts, CNN (first published Oct. 12, 2017, | |
updated Mar. l, 2019) (summarizing starting dates of Russia-related investigations). | |
119 Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities, SSCI (Jan. 13, 2017). | |
120 Joint Statement on Progress ofBipartisan HPSCI Inquiry info Russian Active Measures, HPSCI | |
(Jan. 25, 2017). | |
121 Join! Stoternentfrom Senators Graham and Whitehouse on Investigation info Russian Influence | |
on Democratic Nations ' Elections (Feb. 2, 2017). | |
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3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to | |
Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI | |
On January 12, 2017, a Washington Post columnist reported that Flynn and Kislyak | |
communicated on the day the Obama Administration announced the Russia sanctions.'22 The | |
column questioned whether Flynn had said something to "undercut the U.S. sanctions" and | |
whether Flynn's communications had violated the letter or spirit of the Logan Act.I23 | |
President-Elect Trump called Priebus after the story was published and expressed anger | |
about it.124 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked, "What the hell is this all about?"125 | |
Priebus called Flynn and told him that the President-Elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn's | |
conversations with Kislyak.I26 Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had | |
spoken to the "boss" and said Flynn needed to "kill the story."I27 Flynn directed McFarland to | |
call the Washington Post columnist and inform him that no discussion of sanctions had occurred.128 | |
McFarland recalled that Flynn said words to the effect of, "I want to kill the story."!29 McFarland | |
made the call as Flynn had requested although she knew she was providing false information, and | |
the Washington Post updated the column to reflect that a "Trump official" had denied that Flynn | |
and Kislyak discussed sanctions.!3° | |
When Priebus and other incoming Administration officials questioned Flynn internally | |
about the Washington Post column, Flynn maintained that he had not discussed sanctions with | |
Kislyak.131 Flynn repeated that claim to Vice President-Elect Michael Pence and to incoming press | |
secretary Sean Spicer.l32 In subsequent media interviews in mid-January, Pence, Priebus, and | |
122 David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia 's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017). | |
123 David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia 's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. IZ, 20 I 7). | |
The Logan Act makes it a crime for "[a]ny citizen of the United States, wherever he may be" to "without | |
authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commence[] or carr[y] on any correspondence or | |
intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or | |
controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 953. | |
124 Priebus in an8 302, at 6. | |
125 Priebus in8/18 302, at 6. | |
126 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 6. | |
127 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 6. | |
128 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13. | |
I | |
129 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12. | |
130 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13, McFarland 8/29/17 302, at 8; see David Ignatius, Why did | |
Obama dawdle on Russia 's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017). | |
131 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1, 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 7, Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7-8, s. miner | |
8/31/17 302, at 8-11. | |
132 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1, 8, Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 7, s. Miller 8/31/17 302, at 10-1 1. | |
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Spicer denied that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions, basing those denials on their | |
conversations with Flynn.133 | |
The public statements of incoming Administration officials denying that Flynn and Kislyak | |
had discussed sanctions alarmed senior DOJ officials, who were aware that the statements were | |
not true.l3'* Those officials were concerned that Flynn had lied to his colleagues-who in turn had | |
unwittingly misled the American public-creating a compromise situation for Flynn because the | |
Department of Justice assessed that the Russian government could Prove Flynn 11ed.1" The FBI | |
investigative team also believed that Flynn's calls with Kislyak and subsequent denials about | |
discussing sanctions raised potential Logan Act issues and were relevant to the FBI's broader | |
Russia investigation.!36 | |
On January 20, 2017, President Trump was inaugurated and Flynn was sworn in as | |
National Security Advisor. On January 23, 20 17, Spicer delivered his first press briefing and stated | |
that he had spoken with Flynn the night before, who confirmed that the calls with Kislyak were | |
about topics unrelated to sanctions.!37 Spicer's statements added to the Department of Justice's | |
concerns that Russia had leverage over Flynn based on his lies and could use that derogatory | |
information to compromise him.138 | |
On January 24, 2017, Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the PBM" During | |
the interview, which took place at the White House, Flynn falsely stated that he did not ask Kislyak | |
to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the | |
Obama Administration.l4° Flynn also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up | |
conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those | |
sanctions as a result of Flynn's request.l'*' | |
133 Face the Nation Interview with Vice President-Eleet Pence, CBS (Jan. 15, 2017), Julie | |
Hirschfield Davis et al., Trump National Security Advisor Called Russian Envoy Day Before Sanctions | |
Were Imposed, Washington Post (Jan. 13, 20 l 7), Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Jan. | |
15, 2017). | |
134 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 2-3, McCord 7/17117 302, at 3-4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 5 (DOJ officials | |
were "really freaked out about it"). | |
135 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 3, McCord 7/17/17 302, at 4. | |
136 McCord 7/17/17 302, at 4, McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 5-6. | |
137 Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Jan. 23, 2017). | |
138 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 4, Axelrod 7/20/17 302, at 5. | |
139 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2. | |
140 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2. | |
141 Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2. On December 1, 2017, Flynn admitted to making these false | |
statements and pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which makes it a crime to knowingly and | |
willfully "make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation" to federal law | |
enforcement officials. See Volume 1, Section IV.A.7, supra. | |
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4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn | |
On January 26, 20 I7, Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel | |
Donald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in | |
person.!42 Later that day, Yates and Mary McCord, a senior national security official at the | |
Department of Justice, met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel's Office | |
attorney James Burnham.l43 Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President | |
denying that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions were not true and put Flynn in a potentially | |
compromised position because the Russians would know he had lied.144 Yates disclosed that Flynn | |
had been interviewed by the FBI.l45 She declined to answer a specific question about how Flynn | |
had performed during that interview,146 but she indicated that Flynn's statements to the FBI were | |
similar to the statements he had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed | |
sanctions.'47 McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not | |
pinned Flynn down in lies,l48 but he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the | |
National Security Council, to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn's FBI interview and | |
his contacts with KisIyak.I49 | |
That afternoon, McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to | |
discuss concerns about FIynn.150 McGahn described what Yates had told him, and the President | |
asked him to repeat it, so he did.!5l McGahn recalled that when he described the FBI interview of | |
Flynn, he said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanctions with Kislyak, but that there | |
may not have been a clear violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.152 The President asked about Section | |
1001, and McGahn explained the law to him, and also explained the Logan Act.l53 The President | |
142 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6. | |
¢ | |
143 Yates 8/15/17 302 at 6; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6; SCROI5_000198 (2/15/17 Drain | |
Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President). | |
Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6-8, McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6-7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4, 144 | |
SCRO I5_000198 (2/l5/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President). | |
145 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5; Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7, McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7, Burnham | |
11/3/17 302, at 4. | |
146 Yates an5/17 302, at 7, McCord 7/17/17 302, at 7. | |
147 SCR01 _ 5 000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the | |
President), Burnham 1 1/3/17 302, at 4. | |
14a McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5. | |
149 SCROl _ 5 000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the | |
President), McGahn l 1/30/17 302, at 6, 8. | |
150 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6, SCR015_000278 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum | |
re: "Flynn Tick Tock") (on January 26, "McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS"), SCR015_000198 | |
(2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President). | |
151 McGahn 1 1/30/17 302, at 6. | |
152 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7. | |
153 McGahn 1 1/30/17 302, at 7. | |
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instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further and directed | |
that they not discuss it with any other officials.I54 Priebus recalled that the President was angry | |
with Flynn in light of what Yates had told the White House and said, "not again, this guy, this | |
stuff."l 55 | |
That evening, the President dined with several senior advisors and asked the group what | |
they thought about FBI Director Comey.156 According to Director of National Intelligence Dan | |
Coats, who was at the dinner, no one openly advocated terminating Comey but the consensus on | |
him was not positive.'57 Coats told the group that he thought Comey was a good director.158 Coats | |
encouraged the President to meet Comey face-to-face and spend time with him before making a | |
decision about whether to retain him.l59 | |
5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates, President Trump | |
has Dinner with FBI Director Comey | |
The next day, January 27, 2017, McGahn and Eisenberg discussed the results of | |
Eisenberg's initial legal research into Flynn's conduct, and specifically whether Flynn may have | |
violated the Espionage Act, the Logan Act, or 18 U.S.C. § 1001.160 Based on his preliminary | |
research, Eisenberg informed McGahn that there was a possibility that Flynn had violated 18 | |
U.S.C. § 1001 and the Logan Act.'6! Eisenberg noted that the United States had never successfully | |
prosecuted an individual under the Logan Act and that Flynn could have possible defenses, and | |
154 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7, SCR015_000198-99 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to tile from the | |
Office of the Counsel to the President). | |
- 155 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 8. Several witnesses said that the President was unhappy with Flynn | |
for other reasons at this time. Bannon said that Flynn's standing with the President was not good by | |
December 2016. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 12. The President-Elect had concerns because President Obama | |
had warned him about Flynn shortly after the election. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 4-5, Hicks 12/8/17 302, at | |
7 (President Obama's comment sat with President-Elect Trump more than Hicks expected). Priebus said | |
that the President had become unhappy with Flynn even before the stony of his calls with Kislyak broke | |
and had become so upset with Flynn that he would not look at him during intelligence briefings. Priebus | |
1/18/ 18 302, at 8. Hicks said that the President thought Flynn had bad judgment and was angered by tweets | |
sent by Flynn and his son, and she described Flynn as "being on thin ice" by early February 2017. Hicks | |
12/8/17 302, at 7, 10. | |
156 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2. | |
157 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2. | |
iss Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2. | |
159 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2. | |
160 SCROl5 _000199 (2/15/I7 Draft Memorandum to File from the Office of the Counsel to the | |
President), McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8. | |
SCROl5 000199 (2/I5/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the | |
161 | |
President), Eisenberg l 1/29/17 302, at 9. | |
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told McGahn that he believed it was unlikely that a prosecutor would pursue a Logan Act charge | |
under the circumstances.162 | |
That same morning, McGahn asked Yates to return to the White House to discuss Flynn | |
again.!63 In that second meeting, McGahn expressed doubts that the Department of Justice would | |
bring a Logan Act prosecution against Flynn, but stated that the White House did not want to take | |
action that would interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn.l6'* Yates responded that | |
Department of Justice had notified the White House so that it could take action in response to the | |
information provided.165 McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying | |
information the Department of Justice possessed pertaining to Flynn's discussions with Kislyak.I66 | |
Also on January 27, the President called FBI Director Comey and invited him to dinner | |
that evening.167 Priebus recalled that before the dinner, he told the President something like, "don't | |
talk about Russia, whatever you do," and the President promised he would not talk about Russia | |
at the dinner.I68 McGahn had previously advised the President that he should not communicate | |
directly with the Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of political interference | |
in law enforcement.!69 When Bannon learned about the President's planned dinner with Comey, | |
he suggested that he or Priebus also attend, but the President stated that he wanted to dine with | |
Comey alone.I70 Comey said that when he arrived for the dinner that evening, he was surprised | |
and concerned to see that no one else had been hwiied!" | |
162 scR015 _000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the | |
President); Eisenberg I 1/29/17 302, at 9. | |
163 SCROl _ 5 000l99 (2/I5/I7 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the | |
President), McGahn l 1/30/17 302, at 8, Yates 8/15/17 302, at 8. | |
164 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9, McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8. | |
165 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9, Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 5; see SCROl5_00l99 (2/I5/17 Draft | |
Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President) ("Yates was unwilling to confirm or | |
deny that there was an ongoing investigation but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not | |
object to the White House taking action against Flynn."). | |
let Yates 9/15/17 302, at 9, Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 5. In accordance with McGahn's request, the | |
Department of Justice made the underlying information available and Eisenberg viewed the information in | |
early February. Eisenberg 11129/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at l (documenting | |
212/ 17 meeting with Eisenberg). | |
167 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 6, SCROl2b_00000l (President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17)§ Hearing on | |
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, l l 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) | |
(Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 2-3). | |
168 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 17. | |
169 See McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 9; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 2, Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 17. | |
170 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 17. | |
171 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, | |
ll5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at | |
3), see Comey I 1/15117 302, at 6. | |
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Comey provided an account of the dinner in a contemporaneous memo, an interview with | |
this Office, and congressional testimony. According to Comey's account of the dinner, the | |
President repeatedly brought up Comey's future, asking whether he wanted to stay on as FBI | |
director.!72 Because the President had previously said he wanted Comey to stay on as FBI director, | |
Comey interpreted the President's comments as an effort to create a patronage relationship by | |
having Comey ask for his job.l73 The President also brought up the Steele reporting that Comey | |
had raised in the January 6, 2017 briefing and stated that he was thinking about ordering the FBI | |
to investigate the allegations to prove they were false.l74 Comey responded that the President | |
should think carefully about issuing such an order because it could create a narrative that the FBI | |
was investigating him personally, which was incorrect.!75 Later in the dinner, the President | |
brought up Flynn and said, "the guy has serious judgment issues."!76 Comey did not comment on | |
Flynn and the President did not acknowledge any FBI interest in or contact with Flynn.!77 | |
According to Comey's account, at one point during the dinner the President stated, "I need | |
loyalty, I expect loyalty."I78 Comey did not respond and the conversation moved on to other | |
topics, but the President returned to the subject of Comey's job at the end of the dinner and | |
repeated, "I need loyalty."'79 Comey responded, "You will always get honesty from me."180 The | |
172 Comey l I/ I5/17 302, at 7, Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at l, 3, Hearing on Russian Election | |
In teijerence Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 3). | |
173 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7, Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select | |
Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former | |
Director of the FBI, at 3). | |
174 Comey 1/28/ I7 Memorandum, at 3, Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate | |
Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, | |
former Director of the FBI, at 4). . | |
175 Comey 1/281 I7 Memorandum, at3, Hearing on Russian Election Inteizrence Before the Senate | |
Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, | |
former Director of the FBI, at 4). | |
176 Comey U28/17 Memorandum, at 4, Comey 1 U15/17 302, at 7. | |
177 Comey U28/I7 Memorandum, at 4, Comey 1 m 5/17 302, at 7. | |
17s Comey 1/28/18 Memorandum, at 2, Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 3). | |
179 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7, Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 3-4). | |
180 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3, Comey I 1/15/17 302, at 7, Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4). | |
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President said, "That's what I want, honest loyalty."l8l Comey said, "You will get that from | |
me.g)l82 | |
After Comey's account of the dinner became public, the President and his advisors disputed | |
that he had asked for Comey's loyalty.183 The President also indicated that he had not invited | |
Comey to dinner, telling a reporter that he thought Comey had "asked for the dinner" because "he | |
wanted to stay 0n."184 But substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account of the dinner | |
invitation and the request for loyalty. The President's Daily Diary confirms that the President | |
"extend[ed] a dinner invitation" to Comey on January 27_I 85 With respect to the substance of the | |
dinner conversation, Comey documented the President's request for loyalty in a memorandum he | |
began drafting the night of the dinner,"*6 senior FBI officials recall that Comey told them about | |
the loyalty request shortly after the dinner occurred,"*7 and Comey described the request while | |
Isl Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7, Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4). | |
182 Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3, Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7, Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4). | |
183 See, et, Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey | |
Demurred., New York Times (May II, 2017) (quoting Sarah Sanders as saying, "[The President] would | |
never even suggest the expectation of personal loyalty"), Ali Vitali, Trump Never Asked for Camey's | |
Loyalty, Pre.s'ident's Personal Lawyer Says, NBC (June 8, 2017) (quoting the President's personal counsel | |
as saying, "The president also never told Mr. Comey, 'I need loyalty, I expect loyalty,' in form or | |
substance."), Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (June 9, 2017) ("I hardly | |
know the man. I'm not going to say 'I want you to pledge allegiance.' Who would do that? Who would | |
ask a man to pledge allegiance under oath?"). In a private conversation with Spicer, the President stated | |
that he had never asked for Comey's loyalty, but added that if he had asked for loyalty, "Who cares?" | |
Spicer lOll6/17 302, at 4. The President also told McGahn that he never said what Comey said he had. | |
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 17. | |
184 Interview of Donald .L Trump, NBC (May l l, 2017). | |
185 SCRO l_20b0000l (President's Daily Diary, I/27/I7) (reflecting that the President called Comey | |
in the morning on January 27 and "[t]he purpose of the call was to extend a dinner invitation"). In addition, | |
two witnesses corroborate Comey's account that the President reached out to schedule the dinner, without | |
Comey having asked for it. Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 17 (the President asked to schedule the January 27 | |
dinner because he did not know much about Comey and intended to ask him whether he wanted to stay on | |
as FBI Director), Rybicki I 1/21/18 302, at 3 (recalling that Comey told him about the President's dinner | |
invitation on the day of the dinner). | |
186 Comey I 1115/17 302, at 8, Hearing on Russian Election Infreence Before the Senate Select | |
Intelligence Committee, l I 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former | |
Director of the FBI, at 4). | |
1s7 McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9-10, Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3. After leaving the White House, | |
Comey called Deputy Director of the FBI Andrew McCabe, summarized what he and the President had | |
discussed, including the President's request for loyalty, and expressed shock over the President's request. | |
McCabe 8/ l7/ I7 302, at 9. Comey also convened a meeting with his senior leadership team to discuss what | |
the President had asked of him during the dinner and whether he had handled the request for loyalty | |
properly. McCabe 8/l'//I7 302, at 10, Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 3. In addition, Comey distributed his | |
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under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interview with investigators subject | |
to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Comey's memory of the details of the dinner, | |
including that the President requested loyalty, has remained consistent throughout.18" | |
6. Flynn's Resignation | |
On February 2, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn's | |
calls with Kislyak.189 Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum about criminal statutes | |
that could apply to Flynn's conduct, but he did not believe the White House had enough | |
information to make a definitive recommendation to the President.'9° Eisenberg and McGahn | |
discussed that Eisenberg's review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary | |
conclusion that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted for violating the Logan Act.19' Because White | |
House officials were uncertain what Flynn had told the FBI, however, they could not assess his | |
exposure to prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001.192 | |
The week of February 6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the | |
Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak.193 Flynn recalled that | |
the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations.'9'* Flynn listed the | |
specific dates on which he remembered speaking with Kislyak, but the President corrected one of | |
the dates he listed.!95 The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed and Flynn | |
responded that he might have talked about sanctions.'96 | |
memorandum documenting the dinner to his senior leadership team, and McCabe confirmed that the | |
memorandum captured what Comey said on the telephone call immediately following the dinner. McCabe | |
8/17/17 302, at 9-10. | |
is There also is evidence that corroborates other aspects of the memoranda Comey wrote | |
documenting his interactions with the President. For example, Comey recalled, and his memoranda reflect, | |
that he told the President in his January 6, 2017 meeting, and on phone calls on March 30 and April II, | |
2017, that the FBI was not investigating the President personally. On May 8, 2017, during White House | |
discussions about firing Comey, the President told Rosenstein and others that Comey had told him three | |
times that he was not under investigation, including once in person and twice on the phone. Gauhar-000058 | |
(Gauhar 5/ l6/17 Notes). | |
189 Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5, FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at l (documenting 2/2/17 | |
meeting with Eisenberg). | |
190 Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 6. | |
191 Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9, SCR015_000200 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the | |
Office of the Counsel to the President). | |
192 Eisenberg 1 1/29/17 302, at 9. | |
193 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2. | |
194 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2. | |
195 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2. | |
196 Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2-3. | |
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| | |
On February 9, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with | |
Kislyak the month before the President took office.197 After the publication of that story, Vice | |
President Pence learned of the Department of Justice's notification to the White House about the | |
content of Flynn's calls.l98 He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the | |
underlying information about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak.199 FBI Deputy Director Andrew | |
McCabe, who provided the White House officials access to the information and was present when | |
they reviewed it, recalled the officials asking him whether Flynn's conduct violated the Logan | |
Act.200 McCabe responded that he did not know, but the FBI was investigating the matter because | |
it was a p0ssibility.20' Based on the evidence of Flynn's contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and | |
Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions | |
and had instead been lying about what he discussed with Kislyak.202 Flynn had also told White | |
House officials that the FBI had told him that the FBI was closing out its investigation ofhim,203 | |
but Eisenberg did not believe him.204 After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn, | |
McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn should be terminated and recommended that course of | |
action to the President.205 | |
That weekend, Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago.206 Flynn recalled that on | |
February 12, 2017, on the return flight to D.C. on Air Force One, the President asked him whether | |
he had lied to the Vice President.207 Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his | |
calls, but he did not think he 1i¢d.20t' The President responded, "Okay. That's fine. I got it."209 | |
197 Greg Miller et al., National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian | |
ambassador, despite denials, officials say, Washington Post (Feb. 9, 2017). | |
198 scR015 _000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the | |
President), McGahn I 1/30/17 302, at 12. | |
199 scR015 _000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the | |
President), McCabe 8/17117 302, at I 1-13, Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10, McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12. | |
200 McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13. | |
201 McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13. | |
202 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 8; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10, | |
SCR015 _000202 (2/15/ 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President). | |
203 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 11, Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9, Priebus 10/13/17 302, at II. | |
204 Eisenberg 1 1/29/17 302, at 9. | |
205 SCR015 _000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the | |
President), Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10, McGahn 1 1/30/17 302, at 12. | |
206 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8. | |
207 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9, Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8. | |
208 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8, Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9. | |
209 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9. | |
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On February 13, 2017, Priebus told Flynn he had to resign.2l° Flynn said he wanted to say | |
goodbye to the President, so Priebus brought him to the Oval Office" Priebus recalled that the | |
President hugged Flynn, shook his hand, and said, "We'll give you a good recommendation. | |
You're a good guy. We'll take care of you."2!2 | |
Talking points on the resignation prepared by the White House Counsel's Office and | |
distributed to the White House communications team stated that McGahn had advised the | |
President that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted, and the President had determined that the issue | |
with Flynn was one of trL1st.2'3 Spicer told the press the next day that Flynn was forced to resign | |
"not based on a legal issue, but based on a trust issue, [where] a level of trust between the President | |
and General Flynn had eroded to the point where [the President] felt he had to make a change."2l4 | |
7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey | |
On February 14, 2017, the day after Flynn's resignation, the President had lunch at the | |
White House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.2l 5 According to Christie, at one point | |
during the lunch the President said, "Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is 0ver."216 Christie | |
laughed and responded, "No way."2I7 He said, "this Russia thing is far from over" and "[w]e'll be | |
here on Valentine's Day 2018 talking about this."218 The President said, "[w]hat do you mean? | |
Flynn met with the Russians. That was the problem. I fired Flynn. It's over."219 Christie recalled | |
responding that based on his experience both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been | |
investigated, firing Flynn would not end the investigation.22° Christie said there was no way to | |
make an investigation shorter, but a lot of ways to make it longer.22' The President asked Christie | |
what he meant, and Christie told the President not to talk about the investigation even if he was | |
210 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9. | |
211 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 10. | |
212 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9, Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 10. | |
213 SCR00_400600 (2/I6/17 Email, Burnham to Donaldson). | |
214 Sean Spicer, White House Daily Btiefng, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017). After Flynn pleaded guilty | |
to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in December 20 l7, the President tweeted, "I had to fire General Flynn because | |
he lied to the Vice President and the FBI." @realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (I2:14 p.m. ET) Tweet. The next | |
day, the President's personal counsel told the press that he had drafted the tweet. Maegan Vazquez et al., | |
Trump 's lawyer says he was behind President's tween aboufjiring Flynn, CNN (Dec. 3, 2017). | |
215 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 2-3, SCR012b_000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17). | |
216 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. | |
217 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. | |
218 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie said he thought when the President said "the Russia thing" | |
he was referring to not just the investigations but also press coverage about Russia. Christie thought the | |
more important thin gwas that there was an investigation. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4. | |
219 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. | |
220 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. | |
221 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. | |
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frustrated at times.222 Christie also told the President that he would never be able to get rid of | |
Flynn, "like gum on the bottom of your shoe."223 | |
Towards the end of the lunch, the President brought up Comey and asked if Christie was | |
still friendly with him.224 Christie said he was.225 The President told Christie to call Comey and | |
tell him that the President "really like[s] him. Tell him he's part of the team."226 At the end of the | |
lunch, the President repeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey.227 Christie had no | |
intention of complying with the President's request that he contact Comey.228 He thought the | |
President's request was "nonsensical" and Christie did not want to put Comey in the position of | |
having to receive such a phone call.229 Christie thought it would have been uncomfortable to pass | |
on that message.230 | |
At 4 p.m. that afternoon, the President met with Comey, Sessions, and other officials for a | |
homeland security briefing.231 At the end of the briefing, the President dismissed the other | |
attendees and stated that he wanted to speak to Comey alone.232 Sessions and senior advisor to the | |
President Jared Kushner remained in the Oval Office as other participants left, but the President | |
222 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3-4. | |
223 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie also recalled that during the lunch, Flynn called Kushner, | |
who was at the lunch, and complained about what Spicer had said about Flynn in his press briefing that | |
day. Kushner told Flynn words to the effect 012 "You know the President respects you. The President cares | |
about you. I'll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later." Kushner looked at the | |
President when he mentioned the tweet, and the President nodded his assent. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. | |
Flynn recalled getting upset at Spicer's comments in the press conference and calling Kushner to say he did | |
not appreciate the comments. Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9. | |
224 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4. | |
z25 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4. | |
226 Christie 2113/19 302, at 4-5. | |
227 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5. | |
228 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5. | |
229 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5. | |
230 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5. | |
231 ScRol2b 000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17), Comey 11/15/17 302, at 9. | |
232 Comey l 1115/17 302, at 10, 2/14/17 Comey Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, l l 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4), Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 18 (confirming | |
that everyone was shooed out "like Comey said" in his June testimony). | |
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excused them, repeating that he wanted to speak only with Comey.233 At some point after others | |
had leis the Oval Office, Priebus opened the door, but the Fresident sent him aWay.234 | |
According to Comey's account of the meeting, once they were alone, the President began | |
the conversation by saying, "I want to talk about Mike Flynn."235 The President stated that Flynn | |
had not done anything wrong in speaking with the Russians, but had to be terminated because he | |
had misled the Vice President.236 The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified | |
information, but the President returned to Flynn, saying "he is a good guy and has been through a | |
lot."237 The President stated, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn | |
go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go."238 Comey agreed that Flynn "is a good guy," | |
but did not commit to ending the investigation of Flynn.239 Comey testified under oath that he | |
took the President's statement "as a direction" because of the President's position and the | |
circumstances of the one-on-one meeting.24* | |
233 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10, Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record ofjames B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4). Sessions recalled that the President asked | |
to speak to Comey alone and that Sessions was one of the last to leave the room, he described Comey's | |
testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with the President as "pretty accurate." | |
Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 6. Kushner had no recollection of whether the President asked Comey to stay | |
behind. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 24. | |
234 Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2, Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 18. | |
235 Comey 1 1/15/17 302, at 10, Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at l, Hearing on Russian Election | |
Intel fence Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4). | |
236 Comey2/14/17 Memorandum, at 1, Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate | |
Select Intelligence Committee, l 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, | |
former Director of the FB1, at 5). | |
237 Comey l 1/15/17 302, at 10, Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2, Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference BefOre the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 5). | |
238 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, | |
I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at | |
5); Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2. Comey said he was highly confident that the words in quotations | |
in his Memorandum documenting this meeting were the exact words used by the President. He said he | |
knew from the outset of the meeting that he was about to have a conversation of consequence, and he | |
remembered the words used by the President and wrote them down soon after the meeting. Comey 1 l/ 15/ 17 | |
302, at 10-11. | |
239 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10, Comey 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 2. | |
240 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, | |
115th Cong. (June s, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 31) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director | |
of the FBI). Comey further stated, "I mean, this is the president of the United States, with me alone, saying, | |
'I hope' this. I took it as, this is what he wants me to do." Id , see also Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10 (Comey | |
took the statement as an order to shut down the Flynn investigation). | |
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Shortly alter meeting with the President, Comey began drafting a memorandum | |
documenting their conversation." Comey also met with his senior leadership team to discuss the | |
President's request, and they agreed not to inform FBI officials working on the Flynn case of the | |
President's statements so the officials would not be influenced by the request.242 Comey also asked | |
for a meeting with Sessions and requested that Sessions not leave Comey alone with the President | |
again." | |
8. The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating Flynn | |
After Flynn was forced to resign, the press raised questions about why the President waited | |
more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to remove Flynn and whether the President had | |
known about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak before the DOJ notification.2'*4 The press also | |
continued to raise questions about connections between Russia and the President's campaign.245 | |
On February 15, 2017, the President told reporters, "General Flynn is a wonderful man. I think | |
he's been treated very, very unfairly by the media."246 On February 16, 2017, the President held | |
241 Comey I I/I5/17 302, at I I, Hearing on Russian Election Interference Eefore the Senate Select | |
Intelligence Committee, I isth Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B. Comey, former | |
Director of the FBI, at 5). | |
242 Comey 11/15/17 302, at II; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4; Rybicki 6122/17 302, at I, Hearing on | |
Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I I 5th Cong. (June 8, 20 I7) | |
(Statement for the record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 5-6). | |
243 Comey 11/15/17 302, at I I, Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4-5, Rybicki 6122/17 302, at 1-2, Sessions | |
1/17/18 302, at 6 (confirming that later in the week following Comey's one-on-one meeting with the | |
President in the Oval Office, Comey told the Attorney General that he did not want to be alone with the | |
President); Hunt2/1/18 302, at 6 (within days of the February 14 Oval Office meeting, Comey told Sessions | |
he did not think it was appropriate for the FBI Director to meet alone with the President), Rybicki 11/21/18 | |
302, at 4 (Rybicki helped to schedule the meeting with Sessions because Comey wanted to talk about his | |
concerns about meeting with the President alone), Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the | |
Senate Select Intelligence Committee, Il5th Cong. (June 8, 20I7) (Statement for the record of James B. | |
Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6). | |
244 See, kg., Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017) (questions from | |
the press included, "if [the President] was notified 17 days ago that Flynn had misled the Vice President, | |
other officials here, and that he was a potential threat to blackmail by the Russians, why would he be kept | |
on for almost three weeks?" and "Did the President instruct [Flynn] to talk about sanctions with the [Russian | |
ambassador]?"). Priebus recalled that the President initially equivocated on whether to fire Flynn because | |
it would generate negative press to lose his National Security Advisor so early in his term. Priebus l/l8/18 | |
302, at 8. | |
245 E.g., Sean Sullivan et al., Senators from both parties pledge to deepen probe of Russia and the | |
2016 election, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2017), Aaron Blake, 5 times Donald Trump 's team denied contact | |
with Russia, Washington Post (Feb. 15, 2017), Oren Dorell, Donald Trump 's ties to Russia go back 30 | |
years, USA Today (Feb. 15, 2017), Pamela Brown et al., Trump aides were in constant touch with senior | |
Russian officials during campaign, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017), Austin Wright, Comey briefs senators amid furor | |
over Trump-Russia ties, Politico (Feb. 17, 2017), Megan Two fey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for | |
Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trurnp Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017). | |
246 Remarks by President Tramp and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in Joint Press Conference, | |
White House (Feb. 15, 2017). | |
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a press conference and said that he removed Flynn because Flynn "didn't tell the Vice President | |
of the United States the facts, and then he didn't remember. And that just wasn't acceptable to | |
me."247 The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak, but "it | |
certainly would have been okay with me if he did. would have directed him to do it if I thought | |
he wasn't doing it. I didn't direct him, but I would have directed him because that's his job."248 | |
In listing the reasons for terminating Flynn, the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him.249 | |
The President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, "I have nothing to do with | |
Russia. I told you, I have no deals there. I have no anything."250 The President also said he "had | |
nothing to do with" WikiLeaks's publication of information hacked from the Clinton campaign." I | |
9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement | |
Dening that he Direc@_d Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak | |
On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland that the President wanted her | |
to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but they suggested to her that the Administration | |
could make her the ambassador to Singapore.252 The next day, the President asked Priebus to have | |
McFarland draft an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to call | |
the Russian Ambassador about sanctions.253 Priebus said he told the President he would only | |
direct McFarland to write such a letter if she were comfortable with it.254 Priebus called McFarland | |
into his office to convey the President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President | |
did not direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak.255 McFarland told Priebus she did not know whether the | |
President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions, and she declined to say yes or no | |
247 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). | |
24s Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). The President | |
also said that Flynn's conduct "wasn't wrong - what he did in terms of the information he saw." The | |
President said that Flynn was just "doing the job," and "if anything, he did something right." | |
249 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017), Priebus | |
1/18/18 302, at 9. | |
250 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). | |
251 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017). | |
252 KTMF 00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record), McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, | |
at 16-17. | |
253 See Priebus 1/18/18 302, at l I, see also KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum | |
for the Record), McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. | |
254 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11. | |
255 KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record), McFarland 12/22/17 302, | |
at 17. | |
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to the request.256 Priebus understood that McFarland was not comfortable with the President's | |
request, and he recommended that she talk to attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office.257 | |
McFarland then reached out to Eisenberg.258 McFarland told him that she had been fired | |
from her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapore | |
but that the President and Priebus wanted a letter from her denying that the President directed | |
Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak.259 Eisenberg advised McFarland not to write the | |
requested letter.260 As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous "Memorandum for the | |
Record" that she wrote because she was concerned by the President's request: "Eisenberg ... | |
thought the requested email and letter would be a bad idea- from my side because the email would | |
be awkward. Why would I be emailing Priebus to make a statement for the record? But it would | |
also be a bad idea for the President because it looked as if my ambassadorial appointment was in | |
some way a quid pro quop926l Later that evening, Priebus stopped by McFarland's office and told | |
her not to write the email and to forget he even mentioned i£.262 | |
Around the same time, the President asked Priebus to reach out to Flynn and let him know | |
that the President still cared about him.263 Priebus called Flynn and said that he was checking in | |
and that Flynn was an American hero. 264 Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn saying | |
bad things about him.265 | |
On March 31, 2017, following news that Flynn had offered to testify before the FBI and | |
congressional investigators in exchange for immunity, the President tweeted, "Mike Flynn should | |
ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt (excuse for big election loss), by media & Dems, of | |
256 KTMF 00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record) ("1 said I did not know | |
whether he did or didn't, but was in Maralago the week between Christmas and New Year's (while Flynn | |
was on vacation in Carribean) and I was not aware of any Flynn-Trump, or Trump-Russian phone calls"), | |
McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. | |
257 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11. | |
258 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. | |
259 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17. | |
260 KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record), McFarland 12/22/17 302, | |
at 17. | |
261 KTMF _00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); see McFarland 12/22/17 | |
302, at 17. | |
262 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17, KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the | |
Record). | |
263 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9. | |
264 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9, Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9. | |
265 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9-10. | |
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historic propontion!"266 In late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a | |
message to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong.267 | |
Analysis | |
In analyzing the President's conduct related to the Flynn investigation, the following | |
evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: | |
a. Obstructive act. According to Comey's account of his February 14, 2017 meeting | |
in the Oval Office, the President told him, "I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to | |
letting Flynn go.... I hope you can let this go." In analyzing whether these statements constitute | |
an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey's account of the interaction is accurate, | |
and, if so, whether the President's statements had the tendency to impede the administration of | |
justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal | |
charge. | |
After Comey's account of the President's request to "let[] Flynn go" became public, the | |
President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. The President told the New York Times | |
that he did not "shoe other people out of the room" when he talked to Comey and that he did not | |
remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey.268 The President also publicly denied | |
that he had asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go" or otherwise communicated that Comey should drop | |
the investigation ofFIynn.269 In private, the President denied aspects of Comey's account to White | |
House advisors, but acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey | |
and stated that Flynn was a good 8uy.270 Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates | |
Comey's account. | |
266 @real DonaldTrump 3/3 I/ I7 (7:04 a.m. ET) Tweet, see Shane Harris at al., Mike Flynn Offers | |
to Tesz'y§/ in Excnangefor Immunity, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 30, 2017). | |
2" McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18. | |
268 Excerpts From The Time5's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). Hicks | |
recalled that the President told her he had never asked Comey to stay behind in his office. Hicks 12/8/17 | |
302, at 12. | |
269 In a statement on May 16, 2017, the White House said: "While the President has repeatedly | |
expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country, the President | |
has never asked Mr. Comey or anyone else to end any investigation, including any investigation involving | |
General Flynn.... This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President | |
and Mr. Comey." See Michael S. Schmidt, Corney Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn | |
Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017) (quoting White House statement), @real Dona1dTrump | |
12/3/17 (6:15 a.m. ET) Tweet ("1 never asked Comey to stop investigating Flynn. Just more Fake News | |
covering another Comey lie!"). | |
270 Priebus recalled that the President acknowledged telling Comey that Flynn was a good guy and | |
he hoped "everything worked out for him." Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 19. McGahn recalled that the | |
President denied saying to Comey that he hoped Comey would let Flynn go, but added that he was "allowed | |
to hope." The President told McGahn he did not think he had crossed any lines. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at | |
8. | |
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First, Comey wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the | |
same day it occulTed. Comey also told senior FBI officials about the meeting with the President | |
that day, and their recollections of what Comey told them at the time are consistent with Comey's | |
account.27l | |
Second, Comey provided testimony about the President's request that he "let[] Flynn go" | |
under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to | |
penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Comey's recollections of the encounter have remained | |
consistent over time. | |
Third, the objective, corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to | |
occur support Comey's description of the event. Comey recalled that the President cleared the | |
room to speak with Comey alone after a homeland security briefing in the Oval Office, that | |
Kushner and Sessions lingered and had to be shooed out by the President, and that Priebus briefly | |
opened the door during the meeting, prompting the President to wave him away. While the | |
President has publicly denied those details, other Administration officials who were present have | |
confirmed Comey's account of how he ended up in a one-on-one meeting with the President.m | |
And the President acknowledged to Priebus and McGahn that he in fact spoke to Comey about | |
Flynn in their one-on-one meeting. | |
Fourth, the President's decision to clear the room and, in particular, to exclude the Attorney | |
General from the meeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Comey, which is | |
consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Comey recalls, rather than a more | |
innocuous conversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General. | |
Finally, Comey's reaction to the President's statements is consistent with the President | |
having asked him to "let[] Flynn go." Comey met with the FBI leadership team, which agreed to | |
keep the President's statements closely held and not to inform the team working on the Flynn | |
investigation so that they would not be influenced by the President's request. Comey also promptly | |
met with the Attorney General to ask him not to be left alone with the President again, an account | |
verified by Sessions, FBI Chief of Staff lames Rybicki, and Jody Hunt, who was then the Attorney | |
General's chief of staff. | |
A second question is whether the President's statements, which were not phrased as a direct | |
order to Comey, could impede or interfere with the FBI's investigation of Flynn. While the | |
President said he "hope[d]" Comey could "let[] Flynn go," rather than affirmatively directing him | |
to do so, the circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Comey to close | |
the FBI's investigation into Flynn. First, the President arranged the meeting with Comey so that | |
they would be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General, which suggests that the | |
President meant to make a request to Comey that he did not want anyone else to hear. Second, | |
because the President is the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he "hopes" a | |
subordinate will do something, it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the | |
President wants. Indeed, the President repeated a version of"let this go" three times, and Comey | |
271 Rybicki 11/21/18 302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13-14. | |
272 See Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 18, Sessions l/l'7/18 302, at 6. | |
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testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the | |
way Comey reacted at the time. | |
b. Nexus to a proceed@g. To establish a nexus to a proceeding, it would be necessary | |
to show that the President could reasonably foresee and actually contemplated that the | |
investigation of Flynn was likely to lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution. | |
At the time of the President's one-on-one meeting with Comey, no grand jury subpoenas | |
had been issued as part of the FBI s investigation into Fl But Flvnn's lies to the FBI violated | |
federal criminal law, la and resulted in Flynn's | |
prosecution for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001. By the time the President spoke to Comey about | |
Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn, who informed the President, that Flynn's statements | |
to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had | |
told the same version of events to the FBI. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn's | |
conduct could violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001. After the Vice President and senior White House officials | |
reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's calls on February 10, 2017, they believed that | |
Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with Kislyak and concluded that he had been | |
lying. In addition, the President's instruction to the FBI Director to "let[] Flynn go" suggests his | |
awareness that Flynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct and was at risk of prosecution. | |
c. Intent. As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a | |
personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn-for example, whether the President | |
was aware of Flynn's communications with Kislyak close in time to when they occurred, such that | |
the President knew that Flynn had lied to senior White House officials and that those lies had been | |
passed on to the public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and | |
content of Flynn's calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be | |
relied upon to establish the President's knowledge. In advance of Flynn's initial call with Kislyak, | |
the President attended a meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have | |
mentioned that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak. Flynn told McFarland about the substance | |
of his calls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia's response, and Flynn | |
recalled talking to Bannon in early January 2017 about how they had successfully "stopped the | |
train on Russia's response" to the sanctions. lt would have been reasonable for Flynn to have | |
wanted the President to know of his communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his | |
request had been received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate | |
in response to the request, and the President was pleased by the Russian response, calling it a | |
"[g]reat move." And the President never said publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him | |
about the calls with Kislyak. | |
But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn's read-out of his | |
calls with Kislyak, and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect | |
directly about the calls. Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn. | |
And in February 2017, the President asked Flynn what was discussed on the calls and whether he | |
had lied to the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Our investigation | |
accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn's | |
discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those | |
discussions in late January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise | |
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possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive | |
to end the FBI's inquiry into Flynn's conduct. | |
Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's | |
broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would | |
end "the whole Russia thing." Flynn's firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress | |
were raising questions about Russia's interference in the election and whether members of the | |
President's campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple witnesses recalled that the President | |
viewed the Russia investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election. The President | |
paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when | |
the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak. Just hours before | |
meeting one-on-one with Comey, the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an end to | |
the Russia inquiries. And after Christie pushed back, telling the President that firing Flynn would | |
not end the Russia investigation, the President asked Christie to reach out to Comey and convey | |
that the President liked him and he was part of "the team." That afternoon, the President cleared | |
the room and asked Comey to "let[] Flynn go." | |
We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President's direction to Comey | |
was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. in public statements the President repeatedly | |
described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the | |
President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him the President "care[d]" | |
about him and felt bad for him. At the same time, multiple senior advisors, including Bannon, | |
Priebus, and Hicks, said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was | |
forced to resign and that the President was frequently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he believed | |
the President's initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from personal regard, but from concern | |
about the negative press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early | |
in the Administration. And Priebus indicated that the President's post-firing expressions of | |
support for Flynn were motivated by the President's desire to keep Flynn from saying negative | |
things about him. | |
The way in which the President communicated the request to Comey also is relevant to | |
understanding the President's intent. When the President first learned about the FBI investigation | |
into Flynn, he told McGahn, Bannon, and Priebus not to discuss the matter with anyone else in the | |
White House. The next day, the President invited Comey for a one-on-one dinner against the | |
advice of an aide who recommended that other White House officials also attend. At the dinner, | |
the President asked Comey for "loyalty" and, at a different point in the conversation, mentioned | |
that Flynn had judgment issues. When the President met with Comey the day after Flynn's | |
termination-shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end the Russia | |
investigation-the President cleared the room, even excluding the Attorney General, so that he | |
could again speak to Comey alone. The President's decision to meet one-on-one with Comey | |
contravened the advice of the White House Counsel that the President should not communicate | |
directly with the Department of Justice to avoid any appearance of interfering in law enforcement | |
activities. And the President later denied that he cleared the room and asked Comey to "let[] Flynn | |
go" -a denial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise | |
of prosecutorial discretion. | |
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Finally, the President's effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the | |
President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President's concern | |
about being associated with Flynn's conduct. The evidence does not establish that the President | |
was trying to have McFarland lie. The President's request, however, was sufficiently irregular | |
that McFarland-who did not know the full extent of Flynn's communications with the President | |
and thus could not make the representation the President wanted-felt the need to draft an internal | |
memorandum documenting the President's request, and Eisenberg was concerned that the request | |
would look like a quid pro quo in exchange for an ambassadorship. | |
c. | |
The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI's Russia | |
Investigation | |
Overview | |
In early March 2017, the President learned that Sessions was considering recusing from | |
the Russia investigation and tried to prevent the recusal. Af'ter Sessions announced his recusal on | |
March 2, the President expressed anger at Sessions for the decision and then privately asked | |
Sessions to "unrecuse." On March 20, 2017, Comey publicly disclosed the existence of the FBI's | |
Russia investigation. In the days that followed, the President contacted Comey and other | |
intelligence agency leaders and asked them to push back publicly on the suggestion that the | |
President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort in order to "lift the cloud" | |
of the ongoing investigation. | |
Evidence | |
I. Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation | |
In late February 2017, the Department of Justice began an internal analysis of whether | |
Sessions should recuse from the Russia investigation based on his role in the 2016 Trump | |
Campaign." On March I, 2017, the press reported that, in his January confirmation hearing to | |
become Attorney General, Senator Sessions had not disclosed two meetings he had with Russian | |
Ambassador Kislyak before the presidential election, leading to congressional calls for Sessions | |
to recuse or for a special counsel to investigate Russia's interference in the presidential election.274 | |
Also on March l, the President called Comey and said he wanted to check in and see how | |
Comey was doing.275 According to an email Comey sent to his chief of staff after the call, the | |
President "talked about Sessions a bit," said that he had heard Comey was "doing great," and said | |
that he hoped Comey would come bY to say hello when he was at the White House.276 Comey | |
273 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 1, Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 3. | |
274 E.g., Adam Entous et al., Sessions met with Russian envoy twice last year, encounters ne later | |
did not disclose, Washington Post (Mar. l, 2017). | |
275 3/1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki; SCROl2b_000030 (President's Daily Diary, 3/1/17, reflecting | |
call with Comey at 11:55 am.) | |
276 3/1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki, see Hearing on Russian Election Inter rence Before the | |
Senate Select Intelligence Committee, l l 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 86) (testimony | |
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interpreted the call as an effort by the President to "pull [him] in," but he did not perceive the call | |
as an attempt by the President to find out what Comey was doing with the Flynn investigation.277 | |
The next morning, the President called McGahn and urged him to contact Sessions to tell | |
him not to recuse himself from the Russia investigation" McGahn understood the President to | |
be concerned that a recusal would make Sessions look guilty for omitting details in his | |
confirmation hearing, leave the President unprotected from an investigation that could hobble the | |
presidency and derail his policy objectives, and detract from favorable press coverage of a | |
Presidential Address to Congress the President had delivered earlier in the week.279 McGahn | |
reached out to Sessions and reported that the President was not happy about the possibility of | |
recusal.28° Sessions replied that he intended to follow the rules on recusal.28! McGahn reported | |
back to the President about the call with Sessions, and the President reiterated that he did not want | |
Sessions to I'€CllSC.282 Throughout the day, McGahn continued trying on behalf of the President to | |
avert Sessions's recusal by speaking to Sessions's personal counsel, Sessions's chief of staff, and | |
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and by contacting Sessions himself two more times.283 | |
Sessions recalled that other White House advisors also called him that day to argue against his | |
recusal.28'* | |
That afternoon, Sessions announced his decision to recuse "from any existing or future | |
investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United | |
States."285 Sessions believed the decision to recuse was not a close call, given the applicable | |
of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI) ("[H]e called me one day.... [H]ejust called to check in | |
and tell me I was doing an awesome job, and wanted to see how I was doing."). | |
277 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 17-18. | |
2713 McGahn 1 1/30/17 302, at 16. | |
279 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16-17, see SC_AD_00l23 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes) ("Just in the | |
middle of another Russia Fiasco."). | |
280 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3. | |
281 McGahn 1 U30/17 302, at 17. | |
232 McGahn 1 1/30/17 302, at 17. | |
2a3 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 18-19, Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3, Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 4, Donaldson | |
1 1/6/17 302, at 8-10, see Hunt-0000l7; SC_AD_00l21 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). | |
z81 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3. | |
285 Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal, Department of Justice Press Release (Mar. 2, | |
2017) ("During the course of the last several weeks, I have met with the relevant senior career Department | |
officials to discuss whether I should recuse myself from any matters arising from the campaigns for | |
President of the United States. Having concluded those meetings today, 1 have decided to recuse myself | |
from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President | |
of the United States."). At the time of Sessions's recusal, Dana Boente, then the Acting Deputy Attorney | |
General and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, became the Acting Attorney General for | |
campaign-related matters pursuant to an executive order specifying the order of succession at the | |
Department of Justice. ld ("Consistent with the succession order for the Department of Justice, ... Dana | |
Boente shall act as and perform the functions of the Attorney General with respect to any matters from | |
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language in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which Sessions considered to be clear and | |
decisive.286 Sessions thought that any argument that the CFR did not apply to him was "very | |
thin."287 Sessions got the impression, based on calls he received from White House officials, that | |
4 | |
the President was very upset with him and did not think he had done his duty as Attorney | |
General.288 | |
Shortly after Sessions announced his recusal, the White House Counsel's Office directed | |
that Sessions should not be contacted about the matter.289 Internal White House Counsel's Office | |
notes from March 2, 2017, state "No contact w/Sessions" and "No corms / Serious concerns about | |
obstruction."29° | |
On March 3, the day after Sessions's recusal, McGahn was called into the Oval Office.29I | |
Other advisors were there, including Priebus and Bannon.2°2 The President opened the | |
conversation by saying, "I don't have a lawyer."293 The President expressed anger at McGahn | |
about the recusal and brought up Roy Cohn, stating that he wished Cohn was his attorney.294 | |
McGahn interpreted this comment as directed at him, suggesting that Cohn would fight for the | |
which I have recused myself to the extent they exist."), see Exec. Order No. 13775, 82 Fed. Reg. 10697 | |
(Feb. 14, 2017). | |
286 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 1-2. 28 C.F.R. §45.2 provides that "no employee shall participate in a | |
criminal investigation or prosecution if he has a personal or political relationship with ... [a]ny person or | |
organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution," | |
and defines "political relationship" as "a close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether | |
or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising from | |
service as a principal adviser thereto or a principal official thereof." | |
257 Sessions w17/18 302, at 2. | |
288 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3. | |
289 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11, SC_AD_00l23 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). It is not clear whether | |
the President was aware of the White House Counsel's Office direction not to contact Sessions about his | |
recusal. | |
290 SC _AD_00l23 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the note "No corms / | |
Serious concerns about obstruction" may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press team | |
saying "crazy things" and trying to spin Sessions's recusal in a way that would raise concerns about | |
obstruction. McGahn l 1/30/17 302, at 19. Donaldson recalled that "No corms" referred to the order that | |
no one should contact Sessions. Donaldson I 1/6/17 302, at l l. | |
291 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. | |
292 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. | |
293 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. | |
294 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. Cohn had previously served as a lawyer for the President during | |
his career as a private businessman. Priebus recalled that when the President talked about Cohn, he said | |
Cohn would win cases for him that had no chance, and that Cohn had done incredible things for him. | |
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. Barron recalled the President describing Cohn as a winner and a fixer, someone | |
who got things done. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 6. | |
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President whereas McGahn would not.295 The President wanted McGahn to talk to Sessions about | |
the recusal, but McGahn told the President that DOJ ethics officials had weighed in on Sessions's | |
decision to recuse.296 The President then brought up former Attorneys General Robert Kennedy | |
and Eric Holder and said that they had protected their presidents.297 The President also pushed | |
back on the DOJ contacts policy, and said words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby | |
and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?"298 | |
Bannon recalled that the President was as mad as Bannon had ever seen him and that he screamed | |
at McGahn about how weak Sessions was.299 Bannon recalled telling the President that Sessions's | |
recusal was not a surprise and that before the inauguration they had discussed that Sessions would | |
have to recuse from campaign-related investigations because of his work on the Trump | |
Campaign.3°0 | |
That weekend, Sessions and McGahn flew to Mar-a-Lago to meet with the President.301 | |
Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to him alone and suggested that | |
Sessions should "unrecuse" from the Russia investigation.3')2 The President contrasted Sessions | |
with Attorneys General Holder and Kennedy, who had developed a strategy to help their presidents | |
where Sessions had not.303 Sessions said he had the impression that the President feared that the | |
investigation could spin out of control and disrupt his ability to govern, which Sessions could have | |
helped avert if he were still overseeing it.304 | |
On March 5, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was | |
asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn-indicating that the FBI was still actively | |
investigating him.305 On March 6, the President told advisors he wanted to call the Acting Attorney | |
295 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. | |
29° McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. | |
297 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3. Bannon said the President saw Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder | |
as Attorneys General who protected the presidents they served. The President thought Holder always stood | |
up for President Obama and even took a contempt charge for him, and Robert Kennedy always had his | |
brother's back. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. Priebus recalled that the President said he had been told his | |
entire life he needed to have a great lawyer, a "bulldog," and added that Holder had been willing to take a | |
contempt-of-Con less charge for President Obama. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. g | |
298 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3. | |
299 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. | |
300 Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. | |
301 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3, Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 5; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3. | |
302 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3-4. | |
303 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3-4 | |
304 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3-4. Hicks recalled that after Sessions recused, the President was angry | |
and scolded Sessions in her presence, but she could not remember exactly when that conversation occurred. | |
Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13. | |
305 SC AD 000]37 (Donaldson 3/5/17 Notes), see Donaldson l 1/6/17 302, at 13. | |
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General to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated, although it | |
is not clear whether the President knew at that time of the FBI's recent request concerning Flynn.306 | |
2. FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms 1e Existence of the Russia | |
Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI | |
On March 9, 2017, Comey briefed the "Gang of Eight" congressional leaders about the | |
FBI's investigation of Russian interference, including an identification of the principal U.S. | |
subjects of the investigation." Although it is unclear whether the President knew of that briefing | |
at the time, notes taken by Annie Donaldson, then McGahn's chief of staff on March 12, 2017, | |
state, "POTUS in panic/chaos ... Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) All things related | |
to Russia."308 The week after Comey's briefing, the White House Counsel's Office was in contact | |
with SSCI Chairman Senator Richard Burr about the Russia investigations and appears to have | |
received information about the status of the FBI investigation.309 | |
On March 20, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify before HPSCl.3!0 In advance of | |
Comey's testimony, congressional officials made clear that they wanted Comey to provide | |
information about the ongoing FBI investigation." Dana Boente, who at that time was the Acting | |
Attorney General for the Russia investigation, authorized Comey to confirm the existence of the | |
Russia investigation and agreed that Comey should decline to comment on whether any particular | |
individuals, including the President, were being investigated.3l2 | |
306 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14, see SC_AD_000l68 (Donaldson 3/6/17 Notes) ("POTUS wants | |
to call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related investigations] / Is investigation / No / | |
We know something on Flynn / GSA got contacted by FBI / There's something hot"). | |
307 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 13-14, SNS-Classified-0000l40-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et | |
aL). | |
308 S_CAD_00 I88 (Donaldson 3/ 12/ 18 Notes). Donaldson said she was not part of the conversation | |
that led to these notes, and must have been told about it from others. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13. | |
309 Donaldson 1 w6/17 302, at 14-15. On March 16, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was | |
briefed by Senator Burr on the existence of "4-5 targets." Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15. The "targets" | |
were identified in notes taken by Donaldson as "Flynn (FBI w in a - s wra in u ->DOJ looking for phone | |
records", "Comey->Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)", "Carter Page (S | |
game)", and "Greek Guy" (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos, later charged with violating 18 | |
U.S.C. § 1001 for lying to the FBI). SC_AD_00l98 (Donaldson 3/16/17 Notes). Donaldson and McGahn | |
both said they believed these were targets of SSCI. Donaldson I 1/6/17 302, at IS, McGahn 12/12/17 302, | |
at 4. But SSCI does not formally investigate individuals as "targets", the notes on their face reference the | |
FBI, the Department of Justice, and Comey, and the notes track the background materials prepared by the | |
FBI for Comey's briefing to the Gang of 8 on March 9. See SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/I7 Email, | |
Gauhar to Page et al.), see also Donaldson I 1/6/17 302, at 15 (Donaldson could not rule out that Burr had | |
told McGahn those individuals were the FBI's targets). | |
310 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence | |
Committee, 1 I 5th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017). | |
311 Comey I 1/15117 302, at 16, McCabe 8/17/17, at 15; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 1. | |
312 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 16-17. | |
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In his opening remarks at the PIPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the | |
Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had "been authorized by the Department of.Iustice to | |
confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian | |
government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating | |
the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian | |
government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts. | |
As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any | |
crimes were committed."3I3 Comey added that he would not comment further on what the FBI | |
was "doing and whose conduct [it] [was] examining" because the investigation was ongoing and | |
classified-but he observed that he had "taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the | |
Department of Justice of briefing this Congress's leaders ... in a classified setting in detail about | |
the investigation."3l4 Comey was specifically asked whether President Trump was "under | |
investigation during the campaign" or "under investigation now."3l5 Comey declined to answer, | |
stating, "Please don't over interpret what I've said as-as the chair and ranking know, we have | |
briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we're doing, but I'm not | |
gonna answer about anybody in this forum.a>3l6 Comey was also asked whether the FBI was | |
investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting, and he declined to answer.3l7 | |
According to McGahn and Donaldson, the President had expressed frustration with Comey | |
before his March 20 testimony, and the testimony made matters worse.3'8 The President had | |
previously criticized Comey for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence | |
briefings at the White House, and the President suspected Comey of leaking certain information | |
to the media." McGahn said the President thought Comey was acting like "his own branch of | |
government."320 | |
313 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence | |
Committee, I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at II) (testimony by FBI Director James | |
B. Come y), Comey ll/I5/17 302, at 17, Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 confirmin that the Department of justice g | |
authorized Comey's remarks). | |
314 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Seleet Intelligence | |
Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James | |
B. Comey ). | |
315 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence | |
Committee, 1 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (question by Rep. Swalwell). | |
316 Hearing on R.ussian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence | |
Committee, l 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 20 17) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (testimony by FBI Director James | |
B. Comey). | |
317 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence | |
Committee, l 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 143) (testimony by FBI Director James | |
B. Comey). | |
31s Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7. | |
319 Donaldson 1116/17 302, at 21, McGa17n 12/12/17 302, at 6-9. | |
320 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7. | |
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Press reports following Comey's March 20 testimony suggested that the FBI was | |
investigating the President, contrary to what Comey had told the President at the end of the January | |
6, 2017 intelligence assessment briefing.32! McGahn, Donaldson, and senior advisor Stephen | |
Miller recalled that the President was upset with Comey's testimony and the press coverage that | |
followed because of the suggestion that the President was under investigation.322 Notes from the | |
White House Counsel's Office dated March 21, 2017, indicate that the President was "beside | |
himself" over Comey's testimony. The President called McGahn repeatedly that day to ask him | |
to intervene with the Department of Justice, and, according to the notes, the President was "getting | |
hotter and hotter, get rid?"324 Officials in the White House Counsel's Office became so concerned | |
that the President would fire Comey that they began drafting a memorandum that examined | |
whether the President needed cause to terminate the FBI director.325 | |
At the President's urging, McGahn contacted Boente several times on March 21 , 2017, to | |
seek Boente's assistance in having Comey or the Department of Justice correct the misperception | |
that the President was under investigation.326 Boente did not specifically recall the conversations, | |
although he did remember one conversation with McGahn around this time where McGahn asked | |
if there was a way to speed up or end the Russia investigation as quickly as possible.327 Boente | |
said McGahn told him the President was under a cloud and it made it hard for him to govern.328 | |
Boente recalled telling McGahn that there was no good way to shorten the investigation and | |
attempting to do so could erode confidence in the investigation's conclusions.329 Boente said | |
McGahn agreed and dropped the issue.330 The President also sought to speak with Boente directly, | |
but McGahn told the President that Boente did not want to talk to the President about the request | |
321 E.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., F.B.I Is Investigating Trump's Russia Ties, Comey Confirms, New | |
York Times (Mar. 20, 20 17), Andy Greenberg. The FBI Has Been Investigating Trump 's Russia Ties Since | |
July, Wired (Mar. 20, 2017), Julie Borger & Spencer Ackerman, Trump-Russia collusion is being | |
investigated by FBL Comey confirms, Guardian (Mar. 20, 2017), see Comey 1/6/17 Memorandum, at 2. | |
322 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-17, s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 4, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7. | |
323 SC _AD_002l3 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). The notes from that day also indicate that the | |
President referred to the "Comey bombshell" which "made [him] look like a fool." SC_AD_00206 | |
(Donaldson 3/2 l/ l7 Notes). | |
324 SC _AD_002l0 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). | |
325 SCROl6 _000002-05 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum). White House Counsel's | |
Office attorney Uttam Dhillon did not recall a triggering event causing the White House Counsel's Office | |
to begin this research. Dhillon l 1/21/17 302, at 5. Metadata from the document, which was provided by | |
the White House, establishes that it was created on March 2 l , 2017. | |
326 Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-21, M<>Gahn 12/12/17 302, at 5-7. | |
327 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5. | |
328 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5. | |
329 Boente U31/18 302, at 5. | |
330 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5. | |
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that right after Coats's meeting with the President, on the walk from the Oval Office back to the | |
Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Coats said that the President had kept him behind to ask | |
him what he could do to "help with the investigation."342 Another ODNI staffer who had been | |
waiting for Coats outside the Oval Office talked to Gistaro a few minutes later and recalled Gistaro | |
reporting that Coats was upset because the President had asked him to contact Comey to convince | |
him there was nothing to the Russia investigation.343 | |
On Saturday, March 25, 20 17, three days after the meeting in the Oval Office, the President | |
called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying words to the effect of, | |
"I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, | |
they're all over me with this."344 Coats told the President that the investigations were going to go | |
on and the best thing to do was to let them run their course.345 Coats later testified in a | |
congressional hearing that he had "never felt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and | |
shape-with shaping intelligence in a political way, or in relationship ... to an ongoing | |
investigation."346 | |
On March 26, 2017, the day after the President called Coats, the President called NSA | |
Director Admiral Michael Rogers.347 The President expressed frustration with the Russia | |
investigation, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult.3'*8 The President told | |
Rogers "the thing with the Russians [was messing up" his ability to get things done with Russia.349 | |
The President also said that the news stories linking him with Russia were not true and asked | |
Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories.35° Deputy Director of the NSA Richard | |
Ledgett, who was present for the call, said it was the most unusual thing he had experienced in 40 | |
years of government service.35l After the call concluded, Ledgett prepared a memorandum that | |
he and Rogers both signed documenting the content of the conversation and the President's | |
request, and they placed the memorandum in a safe.352 But Rogers did not perceive the President's | |
request to be an order, and the President did not ask Rogers to push back on the Russia | |
342 Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 2. | |
343 Culver 6/14/17 302, at 2-3. | |
344 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 4. | |
345 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 4, Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 3 (Coats relayed that the President had asked | |
several times what Coats could do to help "get [the investigation] done," and Coats had repeatedly told the | |
President that fastest way tog " et it done" was to let it mn its course). | |
346 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence | |
Committee, l 15*" Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 25) (testimony by Daniel Coats, Director | |
of National Intelligence). | |
347 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 3-4. | |
34s Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4. | |
349 Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 1-2, see Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4. | |
350 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4-5, Ledgett 6113/17 302, at 2. | |
351 Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2. | |
352 Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2-3, Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4. | |
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investigation itseli353 Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he | |
had "never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal, immoral, unethical or | |
inappropriate" and did "not recall ever feeling pressured to do s0."35'4 | |
In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, Pompeo, and Rogers, the President | |
spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia | |
investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations.355 On at least | |
two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no | |
collusion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could be issued.356 Pompeo | |
recalled that the President vented about the investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that | |
there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him.357 Rogers recalled | |
a private conversation with the President in which he "vent[ed]" about the investigation, said he | |
had done nothing wrong, and said something like the "Russia thing has got to go aWay.,,35z Coats | |
recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times, and Coats said he finally | |
told the President that Coats's job was to. provide intelligence and not get involved in | |
investigations.359 | |
4. The President Asks Comey to "Lift the Cloud" Created by the Russia | |
Investigation | |
On the morning of March 30, 2017, the President reached out to Comey directly about the | |
Russia investigation.36° According to Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the | |
President said "he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making | |
353 Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 5, Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2. | |
354 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence | |
Committee, ll5"' Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 20) (testimony by Admiral Michael | |
Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency). | |
355 Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1, 3, Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2-3. | |
356 Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1. | |
357 Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2. | |
35s Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 6. | |
359 Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3-4. | |
360 scR012b_000044 (President's Daily Diary, 3/30/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8: 14 - 8:24 | |
a.m.), Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at l ("The President called me on my CMS phone at 8: 13 am today . | |
... The call lasted l l minutes (about 10 minutes when he was connected).", Hearing on Russian Election | |
Into/zrence Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, l l 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6). | |
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that difficult."36l The President asked Comey what could be done to "lift the cloud."362 Comey | |
explained "that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great | |
benefit, if we didn't find anything, to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval, but we had to do | |
our work."363 Comey also told the President that congressional leaders were aware that the FBI | |
was not investigating the President personally.364 The President said several times, "We need to | |
get that fact out."365 The President commented that if there was "some satellite" (which Comey | |
took to mean an associate of the President's or the campaign) that did something, "it would be | |
good to find that out" but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Comey | |
"would find a way to get out that we weren't investigating him."366 After the call ended, Comey | |
called Boente and told him about the conversation, asked for guidance on how to respond, and said | |
he was uncomfortable with direct contact from the President about the investigation.367 | |
On the morning of April II, 2017, the President called Comey again.368 According to | |
Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said he was "following up to | |
see if [Comey] did what [the President] had asked last time-getting out that he personally is not | |
under investigation."369 Comey responded that he had passed the request to Boente but not heard | |
back, and he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a request would be to | |
361 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at l. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about this | |
conversation and described it to our Office, his recollections were consistent with his memorandum. | |
Hearing on Russian Election Intelkrence Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. | |
(June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6), Comey | |
11/15/17 302, at 18. | |
362 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1, Comey I 1/15/17 302, at 18. | |
363 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1, Comey 11/15/17 302, at 18. | |
364 Comey3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1, Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate | |
Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, | |
former Director of the FBI, at 6). | |
365 Comey 3/30/ I7 Memorandum, at 1, Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate | |
Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, | |
former Director of the FBI, at 6). | |
366 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1 , Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate | |
Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, | |
former Director of the FBI, at 6-7). | |
367 Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 2, Boente 1/31/18 302, at 6-7, Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 1 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 7). | |
368 SCR012b _000053 (President's Daily Diary, 4/1 1/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8:27 - 8:31 | |
a.m.), Comey 4/1 1/17 Memorandum, at 1 ("I returned the president's call this morning at 8:26 am EDT. | |
We spoke for about four minutes."). | |
369 Comey 4/1 1/17 Memorandum, at 1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about this | |
conversation and his recollections were consistent with his memo. Hearing on Russian Election | |
Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, l 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for | |
the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 7). | |
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have the White House Counsel contact DO] leadership.370 The President said he would take that | |
step.371 The President then added, "Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that | |
thing, you know."372 In a televised interview that was taped early that afternoon, the President was | |
asked if it was too late for him to ask Comey to step down, the President responded, "No, it's not | |
too late, but you know, l have confidence in him. We'll see what happens. You know, it's going | |
to be interesting."373 After the interview, Hicks told the President she thought the President's | |
comment about Comey should be removed from the broadcast of the interview, but the President | |
wanted to keep it in, which Hicks thought was unusual.374 | |
Later that day, the President told senior advisors, including McGahn and Priebus, that he | |
had reached out to Comey twice in recent weeks.375 The President acknowledged that McGahn | |
would not approve of the outreach to Comey because McGahn had previously cautioned the | |
President that he should not talk to Comey directly to prevent any perception that the White House | |
was interfering with investigations. The President told McGahn that Comey had indicated the | |
FBI could make a public statement that the President was not under investigation if the Department | |
of Justice approved that action.377 After speaking with the President, McGahn followed up with | |
Boente to relay the President's understanding that the FBI could make a public announcement if | |
the Department of Justice cleared it.378 McGahn recalled that Boente said Comey had told him | |
there was nothing obstructive about the calls from the President, but they made Comey | |
uncomfortable.379 According to McGahn, Boente responded that he did not want to issue a | |
statement about the President not being under investigation because of the potential political | |
ramifications and did not want to order Comey to do it because that action could prompt the | |
370 Comey 4/1 1/17 Memorandum, at 1. | |
371 Comey 4/1 1/17 Memorandum, at 1. | |
372 Corney 4/11/17 Memorandum, at l. In a footnote to this statement in his memorandum, Comey | |
wrote, "His use of these words did not fit with the flow of the call, which at that point had moved away | |
from any request of me, but I have recorded it here as it happened." | |
373 Maria Bartiromo, Interview with President Trump, Fox Business Network (Apr. 12, 2017), | |
SCROl2b _000054 (President's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12:30 - 12:55 | |
p.m.). | |
374 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13. | |
375 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 23, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. | |
376 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 23, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9, see McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 9, | |
Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 2 (stating that White House Counsel attorneys had advised the President not to | |
contact the FBI Director directly because it could create a perception he was interfering with investigations). | |
Later in April, the President told other attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office that he had called | |
Comey even though he knew they had advised against direct contact. Dhillon 1 1/21/17 302, at 2 (recalling | |
that the President said, "I know you told me not to, but I called Comey anyway."). | |
377 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. | |
373 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. | |
379 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9, see Boente U31/18 302, at 6 (recalling that Comey told him after | |
the March 30, 2017 call that it was not obstructive). | |
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appointment of a Special Counsel.380 Boente did not recall that aspect of his conversation with | |
McGahn, but did recall telling McGahn that the direct outreaches from the President to Comey | |
were a problem.38l Boente recalled that McGahn agreed and said he would do what he could to | |
address that issue.382 | |
Analysis | |
In analyzing the President's reaction to Sessions's recusal and the requests he made to | |
Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of | |
obstruction of justice: | |
a. @struc@e act. The evidence shows that, after Comey's March 20, 2017 | |
testimony, the President repeatedly reached out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBI's | |
investigation. But witnesses had different recollections of the precise content of those outreaches. | |
Some ODNI officials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March 22 Oval Office | |
meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and "stop" the investigation. But | |
the first-hand witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently. Pompeo had no | |
memory of the specific meeting, but generally recalled the President urging officials to get the | |
word out that the President had not done anything wrong related to Russia. Coats recalled that the | |
President asked that Coats state publicly that no link existed between the President and Russia, but | |
did not ask him to speak with Comey or to help end the investigation. The other outreaches by the | |
President during this period were similar in nature. The President asked Rogers if he could do | |
anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to | |
make a public statement that would "lift the cloud" of the ongoing investigation by making clear | |
that the President was not personally under investigation. These requests, while significant enough | |
that Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a written memorandum, were not | |
interpreted by the officials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the | |
investigation. | |
b. Nexus to a proceeding. At the time of the President's outreaches to leaders of the | |
intelligence agencies in late March and early April 2017, the FBI's Russia investigation did not | |
yet involve grand jury proceedings. The outreaches, however, came after and were in response to | |
Comey's March 20, 2017 announcement that the FBI, as a part of its counterintelligence mission, | |
was conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. | |
Comey testified that the investigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign | |
officials and would "include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed." | |
C. Intent. As described above, the evidence does not establish that the President asked | |
or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI's Russia investigation- | |
and the President affirmatively told Comey that if "some satellite" was involved in Russian | |
election interference "it would be good to find that out." But the President's intent in trying to | |
prevent Sessions's recusal, and in reaching out to Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Comey following | |
383 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9-10. | |
3131 Boente 1/3 ms 302, at 7, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9. | |
382 Boente 1/31/18 302, at 7. | |
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Comey's public announcement of the FBl's Russia investigation, is nevertheless relevant to | |
understanding what motivated the President's other actions towards the investigation. | |
The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation's | |
implications for his presidency-and, specifically, on dispelling any suggestion that he was under | |
investigation or had links to Russia. in early March, the President attempted to prevent Sessions's | |
recusal, even after being told that Sessions was following DOJ conflict-of-interest rules. After | |
Sessions recused, the White House Counsel's Office tried to cut off further contact with Sessions | |
about the matter, although it is not clear whether that direction was conveyed to the President. The | |
President continued to raise the issue of Sessions's recusal and, when he had the opportunity, he | |
pulled Sessions aside and urged him to unrecuse. The President also told advisors that he wanted | |
an Attorney General who would protect him, the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric | |
Holder to have protected their presidents. The President made statements about being able to direct | |
the course of criminal investigations, saying words to the effect of, "You're telling me that Bobby | |
and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate?" | |
After Comey publicly confirmed the existence of the FBl's Russia investigation on March | |
20, 2017, the President was "beside himself" and expressed anger that Comey did not issue a | |
statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation. The | |
President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Boente directly and told McGahn to | |
contact Boente to request that Comey make a clarifying statement. The President then asked other | |
intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the | |
President had links to Russia, but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the | |
investigation. On March 30 and April I l, against the advice of White House advisors who had | |
informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in | |
an ongoing investigation, the President made personal outreaches to Comey asking him to "lift the | |
cloud" of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally | |
under investigation . | |
Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia | |
investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, which he knew was not true | |
based on Comey's representations. The President complained to advisors that if people thought | |
Russia helped him with the election, it would detract from what he had accomplished. | |
Other evidence indicates that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia | |
investigation on his ability to govern. The President complained that the perception that he was | |
under investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations, particularly with Russia. | |
The President told Coats he "can't do anything with Russia," he told Rogers that "the thing with | |
the Russians" was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Comey that | |
"he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult." | |
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D. Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director | |
Comey | |
Overview | |
Comey was scheduled to testify before Congress on May 3, 2017. Leading up to that | |
testimony, the President continued to tell advisors that he wanted Comey to make public that the | |
President was not under investigation. At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about | |
the scope or subjects of the Russia investigation and did not state publicly that the President was | |
not under investigation. Two days later, on May 5, 2017, the President told close aides he was | |
going to fire Comey, and on May 9, he did so, using his official termination letter to make public | |
that Comey had on three occasions informed the President that he was not under investigation. | |
The President decided to fire Comey before receiving advice or a recommendation from the | |
Department of Justice, but he approved an initial public account of the termination that attributed | |
it to a recommendation from the Department of Justice based on Comey's handling of the Clinton | |
email investigation. After Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the firing | |
to his recommendation, the President acknowledged that he intended to fire Comey regardless of | |
the DOJ recommendation and was thinking of the Russia investigation when he made the decision. | |
The President also told the Russian Foreign Minister, "I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was | |
crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off..... I'm not | |
under investigation." | |
E video ce | |
l. Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to | |
Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation | |
On May 3, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify at an FBI oversight hearing before the | |
Senate Judiciary Committee.333 McGahn recalled that in the week leading up to the hearing, the | |
President said that it would be the last straw if Comey did not take the opportunity to set the record | |
straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under investigation.384 The President | |
had previously told McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was | |
hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders.385 At the | |
hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about the status of the Russia investigation, stating | |
"[t]he Department of Justice ha[d] authorized [him] to confirm that [the Russia investigation] | |
exists," but that he was "not going to say another word about it" until the investigation was | |
completed.38° Comey also declined to answer questions about whether investigators had "ruled | |
383 Hearing on Oversight of the FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 15th Cong. (May 3, | |
2017). | |
334 Mcoahn 12/12/17 302, at 10-1 1 _ | |
385 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7, 10-11 (McGahn believed that two foreign leaders had expressed | |
sympathy to the President for being under investigation), SC_AD_00265 (Donaldson 4/11/17 Notes) ("P | |
Called Comey ... Day we told him not to? 'You are not under investigation' NK/China/Sapping | |
Credibility"). | |
386 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (CQ Cong. | |
Transcripts, at 70) (May 3, 2017) (testimony by FBI Director James Comey). Comey repeated this point | |
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out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target of the] criminal investigation," including | |
whether the FBI had "ruled out the president of the United States."387 | |
Comey was also asked at the hearing about his decision to announce l 1 days before the | |
presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation.388 Comey stated | |
that it made him "mildly nauseous to think that we might have had some impact on the election," | |
but added that "even in hindsight" he "would make the same decision."389 He later repeated that | |
he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had "done the | |
right thing at each turn."390 | |
In the afternoon following Comey's testimony, the President met with McGahn, Sessions, | |
and Sessions's Chief of Staff Jody Hunt.39I At that meeting, the President asked McGahn how | |
Comey had done in his testimony and McGahn relayed that Comey had declined to answer | |
questions about whether the President was under investigation.392 The President became very | |
upset and directed his anger at Sessions.393 According to notes written by Hunt, the President said, | |
"This is terrible Jeff. it's all because you recused. AG is supposed to be most important | |
appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama appointed Holder. I appointed you and you | |
recused yourself. You left me on an island. I can't do anything."394 The President said that the | |
recusal was unfair and that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his | |
authority with foreign Ieaders.395 Sessions responded that he had had no choice but to recuse, and | |
it was a mandatory rather than discretionary decision.39*" Hunt recalled that Sessions also stated at | |
several times during his testimony. See id at 26 (explaining that he was "not going to say another peep | |
about [the investigation] until we'1°e done"), id. at 90 (stating that he would not provide any updates about | |
the status of investigation "before the matter is concluded"). | |
387 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, l l 5th Cong. (May 3, 2017) | |
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 87-88) (questions by Sen. Blumenthal and testimony by FBI Director James B. | |
Corney). | |
ass Hearing on F81 Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, ll5th Cong. (May 3, 2017) | |
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 15) (question by Sen. Feinstein). | |
389 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, l l 5th Cong. (May 3, 2017) | |
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at I7) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey). | |
390 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, l l 5th Cong. (May 3, 2017) | |
(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 92) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey). | |
391 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8, Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8. | |
392 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8, Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes), McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 6. | |
393 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8-9. | |
394 Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/ 17 Notes). Hunt said that he wrote down notes describing this meeting | |
and others with the President after the events occurred. Hunt 2/1/17 302, at 2. | |
395 Hunt-000021-22 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes) ("I have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being | |
investigated."), Sessions l/l7/18 302, at 8 (Sessions recalled that a Chinese leader had said to the President | |
that he was sorry the President was under investigation, which the President interpreted as undermining his | |
authority), Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8. | |
396 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). | |
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some point during the conversation that a new start at the FBI would be appropriate and the | |
President should consider replacing Comey as FBI director.397 According to Sessions, when the | |
meeting concluded, it was clear that the President was unhappy with Comey, but Sessions did not | |
think the President had made the decision to terminate Comey.398 | |
Bannon recalled that the President brought Comey up with him at least eight times on May | |
3 and May 4, 2017.399 According to Bannon, the President said the same thing each time: "He | |
1 | |
told me three times I'm not under investigation. He's a showboater. He's a grandstander. I don't | |
know any Russians. There was no collusion."400 Bannon told the President that he could not fire | |
Comey because "that ship had sailed."'*°' Bannon also told the President that firing Comey was | |
not going to stop the investigation, cautioning him that he could fire the FBI director but could not | |
fire the FBI.402 | |
2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey | |
The weekend following Comey's May 3, 2017 testimony, the President traveled to his | |
resort in Bedminster, New Jersey.4°3 At a dinner on Friday, May 5, attended by the President and | |
various advisors and family members, including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller, | |
the President stated that he wanted to remove Comey and had ideas for a letter that would be used | |
to make the announcement.404 The President dictated arguments and specific language for the | |
letter, and Miller took notes.405 As reflected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter | |
should start, "While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation | |
concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship - | |
pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the American | |
public - including Ds and Rs - have lost faith in you as Director of the FBI."406 Following the | |
dinner, Miller prepared a termination letter based on those notes and research he conducted to | |
support the President's arguments.407 Over the weekend, the President provided several rounds of | |
397 Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). | |
39s Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9. | |
399 Barron 2/12/18 302, at 20. | |
400 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20. | |
401 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20. | |
402 Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20-21 , see Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28. | |
403 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 4-5; scR025_000019 (President's Daily Dials, 5/4/17). | |
404 s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5. | |
405 s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5-6. | |
406 S. Miller 5/5/1'1 Notes, at 1, see s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8. | |
407 s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 6. | |
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edits on the draft letter.4°8 Miller said the President was adamant that he not tell anyone at the | |
White House what they were preparing because the President was won'ied about leaks.409 | |
In his discussions with Miller, the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open | |
with a reference to him not being under investigation.4l° Miller said he believed that fact was | |
important to the President to show that Comey was not being terminated based on any such | |
investigation.4!' According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that | |
Comey had been under a "review period" and did not have assurance from the President that he | |
would be permitted to keep hisjob.4l2 | |
The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and the President began in a | |
way that closely tracked what the President had dictated to Miller at the May 5 dinner: "Dear | |
Director Comey, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, that I | |
am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a | |
Trump-Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election, please be informed that | |
I, along with members of both political parties and, most importantly, the American Public, have | |
lost faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated."4!3 The four-page letter | |
went on to critique Comey's judgment and conduct, including his May 3 testimony before the | |
Senate Judiciary Committee, his handling of the Clinton email investigation, and his failure to hold | |
leakers accountable.4l4 The letter stated that Comey had "asked [the President] at dinner shortly | |
after inauguration to let [Comey] stay on in the Director's role, and [the President] said that [he] | |
would consider it," but the President had "concluded that [he] ha[d] no alternative but to find new | |
leadership for the Bureau - a leader that restores confidence and trust."415 | |
In the morning of Monday, May 8, 2017, the President met in the Oval Office with senior | |
advisors, including McGahn, Priebus, and Miller, and informed them he had decided to terminate | |
Comey.416 The President read aloud the first paragraphs of the termination letter he wrote with | |
40s s. Miner 10/31/17 302, at 6-8. | |
409 S. Miller 10/31 /17 302, at 7. Miller said he did not want Priebus to be blindsided, so on Sunday | |
night he called Priebus to tell him that the President had been thinking about the "Comey situation" and | |
there would be an important discussion on Monday. S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 7. | |
410 s. miner 10/31/17 302, at 8. | |
411 s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8. | |
412 s. miner 10/31/17 302, at 10. | |
413 scR013_¢000003-06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey). | |
414 SCR013_c000003-06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey). Kushner said that the | |
termination letter reflected the reasons the President wanted to tire Comey and was the truest representation | |
of what the President had said during the May 5 dinner. Kushner 4/1 1/18 302, at 25. | |
415 SCR013_0000003 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey). | |
416 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 1 I; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 24; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11, Dhillon | |
11/21/17 302, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13. | |
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Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and was not up for discussion.'*'7 The | |
President told the group that Miller had researched the issue and determined the President had the | |
authority to terminate Comey without cause.4l8 In an effort to slow down the decision-making | |
process, McGahn told the President that DOJ leadership was currently discussing Comey's status | |
and suggested that White House Counsel's Office attorneys should talk with Sessions and Rod | |
Rosenstein, who had recently been confirmed as the Deputy Attorney General.419 McGahn said | |
that previously scheduled meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity | |
to find out what they thought about firing Comey.420 | |
At noon, Sessions, Rosenstein, and Hunt met with McGahn and White House Counsel's | |
Office attorney Uttam Dhillon at the White House.421 McGahn said that the President had decided | |
to fire Comey and asked for Sessions's and Rosenstein's views.422 Sessions and Rosenstein | |
criticized Comey and did not raise concerns about replacing h1m_423 McGahn and Dhillon said the | |
fact that neither Sessions nor Rosenstein objected to replacing Comey gave them peace of mind | |
that the President's decision to fire Comey was not an attempt to obstruct justice.424 An Oval | |
Office meeting was scheduled later that day so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the | |
issue with the President.425 | |
At around 5 p.m., the President and several White House officials met with Sessions and | |
Rosenstein to discuss Comey.426 The President told the group that he had watched Comey's May | |
417 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at l l (observing that the President started the meeting by saying, "I'm | |
going to read you a letter. Don't talk me out of this. I've made my decision."), Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 6 | |
(the President announced in an irreversible way that he was firing Comey), Eisenberg I 1/29/17 302, at 13 | |
(the President did not leave whether or not to fire Comey up for discussion), Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 25; | |
McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11-12. | |
418 Dhillon 302 11/21/17, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11. | |
419 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12, 13, s. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11, Dhillon 1 1/21/17 302, at 7. | |
Because of the Attorney Genera1's recusal, Rosenstein became the Acting Attorney General for the Russia | |
investigation upon his confirmation as Deputy Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) ("In case of a | |
vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may | |
exercise all the duties of that office"). | |
420 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12. | |
421 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 | |
Notes), see Gauhar-000056-72 (2/1 1/19 Memorandum to File attaching Gauhar handwritten notes) ("Ms. | |
Gauhar determined that she likely recorded all these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday, May | |
16, 2017."). | |
422 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13, see Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). | |
423 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7-9, Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13. | |
424 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13, Dhillon 11121/17 302, at 9. | |
425 Hunt-000026 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes), see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). | |
426 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 14, see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 | |
Notes). | |
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left the meeting, he knew that Comey would be terminated, and he told DOJ colleagues that his | |
own reasons for replacing Comey were "not [the President's] reasons."439 | |
On May 9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending | |
Comey's removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein, addressed to the Attorney General, titled | |
"Restoring Public Confidence in the FB1."440 McGahn recalled that the President liked the DOJ | |
letters and agreed that they should provide the foundation for a new cover letter from the President | |
accepting the recommendation to terminate Comey.44I Notes taken by Donaldson on May 9 | |
reflected the view of the White House Counsel's Office that the President's original termination | |
letter should "[n]ot [see the] light of day" and that it would be better to offer "[n]o other rationales" | |
for the firing than what was in Rosenstein's and Sessions's memoranda.442 The President asked | |
Miller to draft a new termination letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Comey had | |
informed the President three times that he was not under investigation.443 McGahn, Priebus, and | |
Dhillon objected to including that language, but the President insisted that it be inclLlded.444 | |
McGahn, Priebus, and others perceived that language to be the most important part of the letter to | |
439 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2, Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/ I6/ I '1 Notes) ("DAG reasons not their | |
reasons [POTUS]"); Gauhar-000060 (Gauhar 5/ 16/ 17 Notes) ("l st draft had a recommendation. Took it out | |
b/c knew decision had already been made."). | |
440 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15, 5/9/17 Letter, Sessions to President | |
Trump ("Based on my evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the | |
attached memorandum, I have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the FBl."), 5/9/17 | |
Memorandum, Rosenstein to Sessions (concluding with, "The way the Director handled the conclusion of | |
the email investigation was wrong. As a result, the FBI is unlikely to regain public and congressional trust | |
until it has a Director who understands the gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them. Having | |
refused to admit his errors, the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary corrective actions.") . | |
441 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15, Hunt-00003 l (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). | |
442 SC _AD_00342 (Donaldson 5/9/ I7 Notes). Donaldson also wrote "[i]s this the beginning of the | |
end'?" because she was worried that the decision to terminate Comey and the manner in which it was carried | |
out would be the end of the presidency. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25. | |
443 s. Miller I0/3]/I7 302, at 12, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15, Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). | |
444 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; S. Miller 10/3 I/I7 302, at 12; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 8, 10; | |
Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 27, Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 14-15, Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). | |
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the President.445 Dhillon made a final pitch to the President that Comey should be permitted to | |
resign, but the President refused.446 | |
Around the time the President's letter was finalized, Priebus summoned Spicer and the | |
press team to the Oval Office, where they were told that Comey had been terminated for the reasons | |
stated in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions."47 To announce Comey's termination, the White | |
House released a statement, which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President.448 In full, | |
the statement read: "Today, President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Comey that | |
he has been terminated and removed from office. President Trump acted based on the clear | |
recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff | |
SeSSi0NS_"449 | |
That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned to meet with the | |
President at the White House.450 The President told McCabe that he had fired Comey because of | |
the decisions Comey had made in the Clinton email investigation and for many other T€aSOl'lS.45I | |
The President asked McCabe if he was aware that Comey had told the President three times that | |
he was not under investigation."*52 The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the | |
FBI disliked Comey and whether McCabe was part of the "resistance" that had disagreed with | |
Comey's decisions in the Clinton investigation.453 McCabe told the President that he knew Comey | |
had told the President he was not under investigation, that most people in the FBI felt positively | |
about Comey, and that McCabe worked "very closely" with Comey and was part of all the | |
decisions that had been made in the Clinton investigation.454 | |
445 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 10; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 15 (providing the view that the | |
President's desire to include the language about not being under investigation was the "driving animus of | |
the whole thing"), Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 16 (Burnham knew the only line the President cared about was | |
the line that said Comey advised the President on three separate occasions that the President was not under | |
investigation). According to Hunt's notes, the reference to Comey's statement would indicate that | |
"notwithstanding" Comey's having informed the President that he was not under investigation, the | |
President was terminating Comey. Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the | |
President wanted the language included so that people would not think that the President had terminated | |
Comey because the President was under investigation. McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15. | |
446 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25; see SC_AD_00342 (Donaldson | |
5/9/17 Notes) ("Resign vs. Removal. - POTUS/remova1."). | |
447 Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 9, McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16. | |
448 Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 28. | |
449 Statement of the Press Secretary, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (May 9, 2017). | |
450 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 4; SCR025 000044 (President's Daily Diary, 5/9/17), McCabe 5/10/17 | |
Memorandum, at 1. | |
451 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5, McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1. | |
452 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5, McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. | |
453 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5, McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. | |
454 McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5, McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. | |
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Later that evening, the President told his communications team he was unhappy with the | |
press coverage of Comey's termination and ordered them to go out and defend him.455 The | |
President also called Chris Christie and, according to Christie, said he was getting "killed" in the | |
press over Comey's termination.456 The President asked what he should d0.457 Christie asked, | |
"Did you fire [Comey] because of what Rod wrote in the memo?", and the President responded, | |
"Yes."458 Christie said that the President should "get Rod out there" and have him defend the | |
decision.459 The President told Christie that this was a "good idea" and said he was going to call | |
Rosenstein right away.460 | |
That night, the White House Press Office called the Department of Justice and said the | |
White House wanted to put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein's idea to fire Comey.46! | |
Rosenstein told other DOJ officials that he would not participate in putting out a "false story."462 | |
The President then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News, that the | |
coverage had been great, and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference.463 Rosenstein | |
responded that this was not a good idea because if the press asked him, he would tell the truth that | |
Comey's firing was not his idea.464 Sessions also informed the White House Counsel's Office that | |
evening that Rosenstein was upset that his memorandum was being portrayed as the reason for | |
Comey's termination.465 | |
In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May 9, 2017, Spicer told reporters, | |
"It was all [Rosenstein]. No one from the White House. lt was a DOJ decision."'*66 That evening | |
and the next morning, White House officials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the | |
455 Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 11, Hicks 12/8/17, at 18, Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 2. | |
456 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. | |
457 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. | |
45a Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. | |
459 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. | |
460 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6. | |
461 Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/ l6/17 Notes), Page Memorandum, at 3 (recording events of 5/16/17), | |
McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 14. | |
462 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5, Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). | |
463 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5, Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). | |
464 Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). DOJ notes from the week of Comey's firing indicate | |
that Priebus was "screaming" at the DOJ public affairs office trying to get Rosenstein to do a press | |
conference, and the DOJ public affairs office told Priebus that Rosenstein had told the President he was not | |
doing it. Gauhar-000071-72 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes). | |
465 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17, Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 26-27, Dhillon 1 1/21/17 302, at l l. | |
466 Jenna Johnson, After Trump fired Comey, White House staff scrambled lo explain why, | |
Washington Post (May 10, 2017) (quoting Spicer). | |
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President's decision to terminate Comey was driven by the recommendations the President | |
received from Rosenstein and Sessions.467 | |
In the morning on May 10, 2017, President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister | |
Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office.4"8 The media | |
subsequently reported that during the May 10 meeting the President brought up his decision the | |
prior day to terminate Comey, telling Lavrov and Kislyak: "I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He | |
was crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off.... I'm not | |
under investigation."469 The President never denied making those statements, and the White House | |
did not dispute the account, instead issuing a statement that said: "By grandstanding and | |
politicizing the investigation into Russia's actions, James Comey created unnecessary pressure on | |
our ability to engage and negotiate with Russia. The investigation would have always continued, | |
and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it. Once again, the real story is | |
that our national security has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified | |
information."470 Hicks said that when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with | |
Lavrov, he did not look concerned and said of Comey, "he is crazy."47I When McGahn asked the | |
President about his comments to Lavrov, the President said it was good that Comey was fired | |
because that took the pressure off by making it clear that he was not under investigation so he | |
could get more work done.472 | |
That same morning, on May 10, 2017, the President called McCabe.473 According to a | |
memorandum McCabe wrote following the call, the President asked McCabe to come over to the | |
White House to discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to | |
467 See, e.g., Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017), | |
SCROl3 _00l088 (5/10/I7 Email, Hemming to Cheung et al.) (internal White House email describing | |
comments on the Comey termination by Vice President Pence). | |
468 scR08_000353 (5/9/I7 white House Document, "Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergey | |
Lavrov of Russia"), SCR08_001274 (5/10/I7 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et al.). The meeting had been | |
planned on May 2, 2017, during a telephone call between the President and Russian President Vladimir | |
Putin, and the meeting date was confirmed on May 5, 2017, the same day the President dictated ideas for | |
the Comey termination letter to Stephen Miller. SCR08_001274 (5/10/l7 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et | |
al.). | |
469 Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing "Nut Job " Comey Eased Pressure From | |
Investigation, New York Times (May 19, 2017). | |
470 SCR08 _002117 (5/19/17 Email, Walters to Farhi (CBS News)); see Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 13 | |
(noting he would have been told to "clean it up" if the reporting OIll the meeting with the Russian Foreign | |
Minister was inaccurate, but he was never told to correct the reporting), Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 19 (recalling | |
that the President never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meeting and that the | |
President had said similar things about Comey in an off-the-record meeting with reporters on May 18, 2017, | |
calling Comey a "nut job" and "crazy"). | |
471 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 19. | |
472 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 18. | |
473 SCR025 000046 (President's Daily Diary, 5/10/17), McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1. | |
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employees.474 The President said he had received "hundreds" of messages from FBI employees | |
indicating their support for terminating Comey.475 The President also told McCabe that Comey | |
should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington, D.C. on the FBI's airplane after he | |
had been terminated and that he did not want Comey "in the building again," even to collect his | |
belongings.476 When McCabe met with the President that afternoon, the President, without | |
prompting, told McCabe that people in the FBI loved the President, estimated that at least 80% of | |
the FBI had voted for him, and asked McCabe who he had voted for in the 2016 presidential | |
election.477 | |
In the afternoon of May 10, 2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the | |
President about his decision to fire Comey and then spoke to reporters in a televised press | |
conference.478 Sanders told reporters that the President, the Department of Justice, and bipartisan | |
members of Congress had lost confidence in Comey, "[a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of | |
the FBI had lost confidence in their director. Accordingly, the President accepted the | |
recommendation of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Comey from his position."479 | |
In response to questions from reporters, Sanders said that Rosenstein decided "on his own" to | |
review Camey's performance and that Rosenstein decided "on his own" to come to the President | |
on Monday, May 8 to express his concerns about Comey. When a reporter indicated that the "vast | |
majority" of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders said, "Look, we've heard from countless | |
members of the FBI that say very different things."480 Following the press conference, Sanders | |
spoke to the President, who told her she did a good job and did not point out any inaccuracies in | |
her comments.48I Sanders told this Office that her reference to hearing from "countless members | |
I | |
of the FBI" was a "slip of the tongue."482 She also recalled that her statement in a separate press | |
interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey was a comment she made | |
"in the heat of the moment" that was not founded on anything.483 | |
Also on May 10, 2017, Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke to McGahn and expressed | |
concern that the White House was creating a narrative that Rosenstein had initiated the decision to | |
474 McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1. | |
475 McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at l. | |
476 McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at l, Rybicki 6/13/17 302, at 2. Comey had been visiting the | |
FBI's Los Angeles office when he found out he had been terminated. Comey 1 1/15/17 302, at 22. | |
477 McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. McCabe's memorandum documenting his meeting with | |
the President is consistent with notes taken by the White House Counsel's Office. See SC_AD_00347 | |
(Donaldson 5/10/17 Notes). | |
478 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4, Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May IO, 2017). | |
479 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017), Sanders 7/3/ l8 302, at 4. | |
480 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017). | |
481 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4. | |
432 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4. | |
483 Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 3. | |
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fire Comey.4l*4 The White House CoL1nsel's Office agreed that it was factually wrong to say that | |
the Department of Justice had initiated Comey's termination,485 and McGahn asked attorneys in | |
the White House Counsel's Office to work with the press office to correct the narrative.486 | |
The next day, on May l 1, 2017, the President participated in an interview with Lester Holt. | |
The President told White House Counsel's Office attorneys in advance of the interview that the | |
communications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what | |
really happened.487 During the interview, the President stated that he had made the decision to fire | |
Comey before the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions. The President told Holt, "I was | |
going to fire regardless of recommendation .... [Rosenstein] made a recommendation. But | |
regardless of recommendation, I was going to fire Comey knowing there was no good time to do | |
1t_11488 The President continued, "And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself-I said, | |
you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story. It's an excuse by the | |
Democrats for having lost an election that they should've won."489 | |
In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia | |
investigation, the President said, "As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done | |
properly."49° The President added that he realized his termination of Comey "probably maybe will | |
confuse people" with the result that it "might even lengthen out the investigation," but he "ha[d] | |
to do the right thing for the American people" and Comey was "the wrong man for that position."49! | |
The President described Comey as "a showboat" and "a grandstander," said that "[t]he FBI has | |
been in turmoil," and said he wanted "to have a really competent, capable director."492 The | |
President affirmed that he expected the new FBI director to continue the Russia investigation.493 | |
On the evening of May II, 2017, following the Lester Holt interview, the President | |
tweeted, "Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watching as the U.S. tears itself apart over a | |
Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election."494 The same day, the media reported that the | |
President had demanded that Comey pledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly | |
484 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17, Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 26, see Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at | |
II. | |
485 Donaldson 1 U6/17 302, at 27. | |
486 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 17. | |
437 Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11. | |
4sa Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) Transcript, at 2. | |
489 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 2. | |
490 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) Transcript, at 3. | |
491 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 1 1, 2017) Transcript, at 3. | |
492 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 1, 5. | |
493 Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 7. | |
494 @realDona1dTrump 5/1 1/17 (4:34 p.m. ET) Tweet. | |
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after being sworn in.495 Late in the morning of May 12, 2017, the President tweeted, "Again, the | |
story that there was collusion between the Russians & Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems | |
as an excuse for losing the election."496 The President also tweeted, "James Comey better hope | |
that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press" and "When | |
James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there | |
is no collusion, when does it end?aa497 | |
Analysis | |
In analyzing the President's decision to fire Comey, the following evidence is relevant to | |
the elements of obstruction of justice: | |
a. Obstructive act. The act of firing Comey removed the individual overseeing the | |
FBI's Russia investigation. The President knew that Comey was personally involved in the | |
investigation based on Comey's briefing of the Gang of Eight, Camey's March 20, 2017 public | |
testimony about the investigation, and the President's one-on~one conversations with Comey. | |
Firing Comey would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect | |
of interfering with or impeding the investigation-for example, if the termination would have the | |
effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity | |
to appoint a director who would take a different approach to the investigation that the President | |
perceived as more protective of his personal interests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that | |
issue include whether the President's actions had the potential to discourage a successor director | |
or other law enforcement officials in their conduct of the Russia investigation. The President fired | |
Comey abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building, | |
and criticized him publicly, calling him a "showboat" and claiming that the FBI was "in turmoil" | |
under his leadership. And the President followed the termination with public statements that were | |
highly critical of the investigation, for example, three days after firing Comey, the President | |
referred to the investigation as a "witch hunt" and asked, "when does it end?" Those actions had | |
the potential to affect a successor director's conduct of the investigation. | |
The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however, would not necessarily be to | |
prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation. As a general matter, FBI | |
investigations run under the operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director. | |
Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director, but | |
could not fire the FBI. The White House issued a press statement the day after Comey was fired | |
that said, "The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of | |
Comey would not have ended it." In addition, in his May I l interview with Lester Holt, the | |
President stated that he understood when he made the decision to fire Comey that the action might | |
prolong the investigation. And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim director, even | |
495 Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyally. Comey Demurred, New | |
York Times (May l I, 2017). | |
496 @realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (7:51 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
497 @real DonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:26 a.m. ET) Tweet, @realDonaldTrump 5/12/ 17 (8:54 a.m. ET) | |
Tweet. | |
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though McCabe told the President he had worked "very closely" with Comey and was part of all | |
the decisions made in the Clinton investigation. | |
b. Nexus to a proceeding. The nexus element would be satisfied by evidence showing | |
that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from an FBI investigation was | |
objectively foreseeable and actually contemplated by the President when he terminated Comey. | |
Several facts would be relevant to such a showing. At the time the President fired Comey, | |
a grand jury had not begun to hear evidence related to the Russia investigation and no grand jury | |
subpoenas had been issued. On March 20, 2017, however, Comey had announced that the FBI | |
was investigating Russia's interference in the election, including "an assessment of whether any | |
crimes were committed." lt was widely known that the FBI, as part of the Russia investigation, | |
was investigating the hacking of the DNC's computers-a clear criminal offense. | |
In addition, at the time the President fired Comey, evidence indicates the President knew | |
that Flynn was still under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the | |
President's February 14, 20 l7 request that Comey "let[] Flynn go." On March 5, 20 17, the White | |
House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records | |
relating to Flynn-indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating him. The same day, the | |
President told advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente, then the Acting Attorney General for the | |
Russia investigation, to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated. | |
On March 3 l , 20 17, the President signaled his awareness that Flynn remained in legal jeopardy by | |
tweeting that "Mike Flynn should ask for immunity" before he agreed to provide testimony to the | |
FBI or Congress. And in late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a | |
message to Flynn telling him that the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong, | |
further demonstrating the President's awareness of Flynn's criminal exposure. | |
c. Inten_t. Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President's decision | |
to fire Comey was Comey's unwillingness to publicly state that the President was not personally | |
under investigation, despite the President's repeated requests that Comey make such an | |
announcement. In the week leading up to Comey's May 3, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee | |
testimony, the President told McGahn that it would be the last straw if Comey did not set the record | |
straight and publicly announce that the President was not under investigation. But during his May | |
3 testimony, Comey refused to answer questions about whether the President was being | |
investigated. Comey's refusal angered the President, who criticized Sessions for leaving him | |
isolated and exposed, saying "You left me on an island." Two days later, the President told | |
advisors he had decided to fire Comey and dictated a letter to Stephen Miller that began with a | |
reference to the fact that the President was not being investigated: "While I greatly appreciate you | |
informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated | |
story on a Trump-Russia relationship ...." The President later asked Rosenstein to include | |
"Russia" in his memorandum and to say that Comey had told the President that he was not under | |
investigation. And the President's final termination letter included a sentence, at the President's | |
insistence and against McGahn's advice, stating that Comey had told the President on three | |
separate occasions that he was not under investigation. | |
The President's other stated rationales for why he fired Comey are not similarly supported | |
by the evidence. The termination letter the President and Stephen Miller prepared in Bedminster | |
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cited Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation, and the President told McCabe he fired | |
Comey for that reason. But the facts surrounding Comey's handling of the Clinton email | |
investigation were well known to the President at the time he assumed office, and the President | |
had made it clear to both Comey and the President's senior staff in early 2017 that he wanted | |
Comey to stay on as director. And Rosenstein articulated his criticism of Comey's handling of the | |
Clinton investigation after the President had already decided to fire Comey. The President's draft | |
termination letter also stated that morale in the FBI was at an all-time low and Sanders told the | |
press after Comey's termination that the White House had heard from "countless" FBI agents who | |
had lost confidence in Comey. But the evidence does not support those claims. The President told | |
Comey at their January 27 dinner that "the people of the FBI really like [him]," no evidence | |
suggests that the President heard otherwise before deciding to terminate Comey, and Sanders | |
acknowledged to investigators that her comments were not founded on anything. | |
We also considered why it was important to the President that Comey announce publicly | |
that he was not under investigation. Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the | |
erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and | |
foreign affairs, padicularly in dealings with Russia. The President told Comey that the "cloud" of | |
"this Russia business" was making it difficult to run the country. The President told Sessions and | |
McGahn that foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to him for being under investigation and that | |
the perception he was under investigation was hurting his ability to address foreign relations issues. | |
The President complained to Rogers that "the thing with the Russians [was] messing up" his ability | |
to get things done with Russia, and told Coats, "I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd | |
like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS, they're all over me with this." The President also | |
may have viewed Comey as insubordinate for his failure to make clear in the May 3 testimony that | |
the President was not under investigation. | |
Other evidence, however, indicates that the President wanted to protect himself from an | |
investigation into his campaign. The day after learning about the FBI's interview of Flynn, the | |
President had a one-on-one dinner with Comey, against the advice of senior aides, and told Comey | |
he needed Comey's "loyalty." When the President later asked Comey for a second time to make | |
public that he was not under investigation, he brought up loyalty again, saying "Because I have | |
been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know." After the President learned of | |
Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation, the President was furious and said he wanted an | |
Attorney General who would protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder | |
to have protected their presidents. The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney | |
General "who to investigate." | |
In addition, the President had a motive to put the FBI's Russia investigation behind him. | |
The evidence does not establish that the termination of Comey was designed to cover up a | |
conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia: As described in Volume I, the evidence | |
uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were | |
involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies, or that the | |
President otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian official. But the evidence does | |
indicate that a thorough FBI investigation would uncover facts about the campaign and the | |
President personally that the President could have understood to be crimes or that would give rise | |
to personal and political concerns. Although the President publicly stated during and after the | |
election that he had no connection to Russia, the Trump Organization, through Michael Cohen, | |
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was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump | |
was repeatedly briefed on_ the l'O2II€SS of those efforts 498 In addition. some witnesses said that | |
Trump was aware that | |
at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence officials were behind the | |
hacks, and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases.499 More | |
broadly, multiple witnesses described the President's preoccupation with press coverage of the | |
Russia investigation and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his | |
election.5°° | |
Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a pretextual reason to the | |
press and the public for Comey's termination. In the immediate aftermath of the firing, the | |
President dictated a press statement suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ | |
recommendations, and White House press officials repeated that story. But the President had | |
decided to fire Comey before the White House solicited those recommendations. Although the | |
President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the Department | |
of Justice's recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officials made clear to him that they would | |
resist the White House's suggestion that they had prompted the process that led to Comey's | |
termination. The initial reliance on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the | |
President had concerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidence does | |
not resolve whether those concerns were personal, political, or both. | |
E. The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel | |
Overview | |
The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, prompting | |
the President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had | |
failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, which the President | |
ultimately did not accept. The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts | |
of interest, but they responded that those claims were "ridiculous" and posed no obstacle to the | |
Special Counsel's service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly cleared the Special | |
Counsel's service. On June 14, 2017, the press reported that the President was being personally | |
investigated for obstruction of justice and the President responded with a series of tweets | |
498 See Volume II, Section II.K.l, infra. | |
499 See Volume I, Section III.D. l , supra. | |
500 In addition to whether the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI | |
investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President's intent in firing Comey was connected | |
to other conduct that could come to light as a result of the FBI's Russian-interference investigation. In | |
particular, Michael Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the Trump | |
Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts uncovered in the Russia | |
investigation, which our Office referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New | |
York, ultimately led to the conviction of Cohen in the Southern District of New York for campaign-finance | |
offenses related to payments he said he made at the direction of the President. See Volume II, Section | |
II.K.5, infra. The investigation, however, did not establish that when the President fired Comey, he was | |
considering the possibility that the FBI's investigation would uncover these payments or that the President's | |
intent in firing Comey was otherwise connected to a concern about these matters coming to light. | |
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from the investigation.5°' The President learned of the Special Counsel's appointment from | |
Sessions, who was with the President, Hunt, and McGahn conducting interviews for a new FBI | |
Director.502 Sessions stepped out of the Oval Office to take a call from Rosenstein, who told him | |
about the Special Counsel appointment, and Sessions then returned to inform the President of the | |
news.503 According to notes written by Hunt, when Sessions told the President that a Special | |
Counsel had been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, "Oh my God. This | |
is terrible. This is the end of my Presidency. I'm fucked."5°4 The President became angry and | |
lambasted the Attorney General for his decision to recuse from the investigation, stating, "HOW | |
could you let this happen, Jeffl?"505 The President said the position of Attorney General was his | |
most important appointment and that Sessions had "let [him] down," contrasting him to Eric | |
Holder and Robert Kennedy.506 Sessions recalled that the President said to him, "you were | |
supposed to protect me," or words to that effect.507 The President returned to the consequences of | |
the appointment and said, "Everyone tells me if you get one of these independent counsels it ruins | |
your presidency. lt takes years and years and l won't be able to do anything. This is the worst | |
thing that ever happened to me."508 | |
501 Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel | |
to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17, | |
2017). | |
502 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13, Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18, McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039 | |
(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes). | |
503 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13, Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18, McGalm 12/14/17 302, at 4, Hunt-000039 | |
(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes). | |
504 Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes). | |
505 Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes), Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13-14. | |
506 Hunt-000040, see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. | |
507 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. | |
508 Hunt-000040 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes), see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. Early the next morning, | |
the President tweeted, "This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history" | |
@real DonaldTrump 5/18/17 (7:52 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
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The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General.5°9 Sessions agreed | |
to submit his resignation and left the Oval Office.510 Hicks saw the President shortly after Sessions | |
departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel's | |
appointment.5!' Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the | |
Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign.5l2 | |
The next day, May 18, 2017, FBI agents delivered to McGahn a preservation notice that | |
discussed an investigation related to Comey's termination and directed the White House to | |
preserve all relevant documents.5'3 When he received the letter, McGahn issued a document hold | |
to White House staff and instructed them not to send out any burn bags over the weekend while | |
he sorted things out.5I4 | |
Also on May 18, Sessions finalized a resignation letter that stated, "Pursuant to our | |
conversation of yesterday, and at your request, I hereby offer my resignation."5!5 Sessions, | |
accompanied by Hunt, brought the letter to the White House and handed it to the President.5I6 The | |
President put the resignation letter in his pocket and asked Sessions several times whether he | |
wanted to continue sewing as Attorney General.5l 7 Sessions ultimately told the President he | |
wanted to stay, but it was up to the President. 518 The President said he wanted Sessions to stay.519 | |
At the conclusion of the meeting, the President shook Sessions's hand but did not return the | |
resignation letter.52° | |
When Priebus and Barron learned that the President was holding onto Sessions's | |
resignation letter, they became concerned that it could be used to influence the Department of | |
Justice.52! Priebus told Sessions it was not good for the President to have the letter because it | |
509 Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes), Sessions I/I7/18 302, at 14. | |
510 Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes), Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. | |
511 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21. | |
512 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21. The Access Hollywood tape was released on October 7, 2016, as | |
discussed in Volume I, Section 1II.D.1, supra. | |
513 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9, SCR015_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to white House | |
Staff). | |
514 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9, SCR015_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House | |
Staff). The White House Counsel's Office had previously issued a document hold on February 27, 2017. | |
SCR015 _000171 (2/l7/17 Memorandum from McGahn to Executive Office of the President Staff). | |
515 Hunt-000047 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes), 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resigning as | |
Attorney General). | |
516 Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/1 wi8 302, at 14. | |
517 Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes), Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. | |
518 Hunt-000048-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. | |
519 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. | |
520 Hunt-000049 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). | |
521 I-Iunt-000050-51 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes). | |
79 | |
F lQ ' lh.'h!gll-4-ll»»..n.lililun¢m | |
mud | |
Luis | |
live in the District and find that we are unable to make Full use of tile Clul3' and tltat induir8'WHetberWe | |
would be entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee," which was paid in 1994. 10/12/1 l | |
Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded | |
that the Muellers' resignation would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be "placed on a | |
waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned / first refunded basis" in accordance with the club's legal | |
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back on his assertion of conflicts, telling the President they did not count as true conflicts.530 | |
Bannon recalled telling the President that the purported conflicts were "ridiculous" and that none | |
of them was real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from serving as Special | |
Counsel.53! As for Mueller's interview for FBI Director, Bannon recalled that the White House | |
had invited Mueller to speak to the President to offer a perspective on the institution of the FBL532 | |
Bannon said that, although the White House thought about beseeching Mueller to become Director | |
again, he did not come in looking for the j0b.533 Bannon also told the President that the law firm | |
position did not amount to a conflict in the legal community.534 And Bannon told the President | |
that the golf course dispute did not rise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was "ridiculous | |
and petty."535 The President did not respond when Bannon pushed back on the stated conflicts of | |
interest.536 | |
On May 23, 20 17, the Department oflustice announced that ethics officials had determined | |
that the Special Counsel's prior law firm position did not bar his service, generating media reports | |
that Mueller had been cleared to serve.537 McGahn recalled that around the same time, the | |
President complained about the asserted conflicts and prodded McGahn to reach out to Rosenstein | |
about the issue.538 McGahn said he responded that he could not make such a call and that the | |
President should instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not a White House issue.53° | |
Contemporaneous notes of a May 23, 2017 conversation between McGahn and the President | |
reflect that McGahn told the President that he would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest | |
that the President not make such a call either.540 McGahn advised that the President could discuss | |
the issue with his personal attorney but it would "look like still trying to meddle in [the] | |
investigation" and "knocking out Mueller" would be "[a]nother fact used to claim obst[ruction] of | |
documents. 10/27/11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. The Muellers have not had further | |
contact with the club. | |
530 Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 3, Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13 (confirming that he, Priebus, and McGahn | |
pushed back on the asserted conflicts). | |
531 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12-13. | |
532 Barron 10/26/18 302, at 12. | |
533 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. | |
534 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12. | |
535 Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 13. | |
536 Barron 10/26/18 302, at 12. | |
537 Matt Zapotosky & Matea Gold, Justice Department ethics experts clear Mueller Io lead Russia | |
probe, Washington Post (May 23, 2017). | |
538 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at l, McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10, Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12. | |
539 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at I. McGahn and Donaldson said that after the appointment of the Special | |
Counsel, they considered themselves potential fact witnesses and accordingly told the President that | |
inquiries related to the investigation should be brought to his personal counsel. McGahn 12/14/17 302, at | |
7, Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5. | |
540 S_ACD_0036l (Donaldson 5/3 U17 Notes). | |
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just[ice]."54! McGahn told the President that his "biggest exposure" was not his act of firing | |
Comey but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn."542 By the time McGahn | |
provided this advice to the President, there had been widespread reporting on the President's | |
request for Comey's loyalty, which the President publicly denied, his request that Comey "letl] | |
Flynn go," which the President also denied, and the President's statement to the Russian Foreign | |
Minister that the termination of Comey had relieved "great pressure" related to Russia, which the | |
President did not d6ny_543 | |
On June 8, 20] 7, Comey testified before Congress about his interactions with the President | |
before his termination, including the request for loyalty, the request that Comey "let[] Flynn go," | |
and the request that Comey "lift the cloud" over the presidency caused by the ongoing | |
investigation.544 Comey's testimony led to a series of news reports about whether the President | |
had obstructedjustice.545 On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House | |
Counsel's Office that investigators intended to interview intelligence community officials who had | |
allegedly been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation.546 | |
On Monday, June 12, 2017, Christopher Ruddy, the chief executive of Newsmax Media | |
and a longtime friend of the President's, met at the White House with Priebus and Bannon.547 | |
Ruddy recalled that they told him the President was strongly considering firing the Special Counsel | |
541 SC _AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17 Notes). | |
542 SC _AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/3 I/I7 Notes). | |
543 See, et, Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey | |
Demurred, New York Times (May II, 2017), Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memorandum Says Trump | |
Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017), Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told | |
Russians That Firing 'Nut Job' Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation, New York Times (May 19, | |
2017). | |
544 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, | |
115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for' the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at | |
5-6). Comey testified that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February 14, 2017 | |
meeting to be leaked to the New York Times in response to a tweet from the President, sent on May 12, | |
2017, that stated "James Comey better hope that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he starts | |
leaking to the press!," and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter "might prompt the | |
appointment of a special counsel," Hearing on Russian Election Into/rence Be/Ore the Senate Select | |
Intelligence Committee, 1 l 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 55) (testimony by James B. | |
Comey, former Director of the FBI). | |
545 See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Comey lays out the case that Trump obs tructedjustice, Washington | |
Post (June 8, 2017) ("Legal analysts said Comey's testimony clarified and bolstered the case that the | |
president obstructed justice."). | |
546 6/9/ 17 Email, Special Counsel's Office to the White House Counse1's Office. This Office made | |
the notification to give the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the | |
interviews. On June 12, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Admiral Rogers in the presence of | |
agency counsel. Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 1. On June 13, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Ledgett. | |
Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 1. On June 14, the Office interviewed Coats and other personnel from his office. | |
Coats 6/14/17 302, at l, Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at 1; Culver 6/14/17 302, at 1. | |
547 Ruddy 6/6/1 s 302, at 5. | |
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and that he would do so precipitously, without vetting the decision through Administration | |
ofncia1s.54" Ruddy asked Priebus if Ruddy could talk publicly about the discussion they had about | |
the Special Counsel, and Priebus said he could.549 Priebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up | |
like the one that followed the termination of Comey did not happen.550 Later that day, Ruddy | |
stated in a televised interview that the President was "considering perhaps terminating the Special | |
Counsel" based on purported conflicts of interest.55! Ruddy later told another news outlet that | |
"Trump is definitely considering" terminating the Special Counsel and "it's not something that's | |
being dismissed."552 Ruddy's comments led to extensive coverage in the media that the President | |
was considering firing the Special Counsel.553 | |
White House officials were unhappy with that press coverage and Ruddy heard from | |
friends that the President was upset with him.55'* On June 13, 2017, Sanders asked the President | |
for guidance on how to respond to press inquiries about the possible firing of the Special | |
Counsel.555 The President dictated an answer, which Sanders delivered, saying that "[w]hile the | |
president has every right to" fire the Special Counsel, "he has no intention to do s0."556 | |
Also on June 13, 2017, the President's personal counsel contacted the Special Counsel's | |
Office and raised concerns about possible conflicts.557 The President's counsel cited Mueller's | |
previous partnership in his law firm, his interview for the FBI Director position, and an asserted | |
personal relationship he had with Comey.558 That same day, Rosenstein had testified publicly | |
before Congress and said he saw no evidence of good cause to terminate the Special Counsel, | |
including for conflicts of interest.559 Two days later, on June 15, 2017, the Special Counsel's | |
548 Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5-6. | |
549 Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6. | |
550 Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6. | |
551 Trump Confidant Christopher Ruddy says Mueller has "real conflicts " as special counsel, PBS | |
(June 12, 2017 , Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump Is Cons iderin Fgiring Mueller | |
as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017). | |
552 Katherine Faulders & Veronica Stracqualursi, Trumpfriend Chris Ruddy says Spicer 's 'bizarre ' | |
statement does 'z deny claim Trump seeking Muellerfiring, ABC (June 13, 2017). | |
553 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump Is Considering Firing | |
Mueller as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017). | |
554 Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6-7. | |
555 Sanders 7/3/1 s 302, at 6-7. | |
556 Glenn Thrush et al., Trump Stews, StajySteps In, and Mueller Is Safefor Now, New York Times | |
(June 13, 2017), see Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 6 (Sanders spoke with the President directly before speaking to | |
the press on Air Force One and the answer she gave is the answer the President told her to give). | |
557 Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/13/17 Notes. | |
558 Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/13/17 Notes. | |
$59 Hearing on Fiscal 2018 Justice Department Budget before the Senate Appropriations | |
Subcommittee on Commerce, JUstice, and Science, 1 15th Cong. (June 13, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at | |
14) (testimony by Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General). | |
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Office informed the Acting Attorney General's office about the areas of concern raised by the | |
President's counsel and told the President's counsel that their concerns had been communicated to | |
Rosenstein so that the Department of Justice could take any appropriate action.56° | |
3. The Press Reports that the President is Being investigated for Obstruction of | |
Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special | |
Counsel Removed | |
On the evening of June 14, 2017, the Washington Post published an article stating that the | |
Special Counsel was investigating whether the President had attempted to obstructjustice.56' This | |
was the first public report that the President himself was under investigation by the Special | |
Counsel's Office, and cable news networks quickly picked up on the report.562 The Post story | |
stated that the Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders, including Coats | |
and Rogers, about what the President had asked them to do in response to Comey's March 20, | |
2017 testimony, that the inquiry into obstruction marked "a major turning point" in the | |
investigation, and that while "Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director | |
James B. Comey starting in January that he was not personally under investigation," "[o]fficials | |
say that changed shortly after Comey's firing."563 That evening, at approximately l0:3l p.m., the | |
President called McGahn on McGahn's personal cell phone and they spoke for about 15 | |
minutes.564 McGahn did not have a clear memory of the call but thought they might have discussed | |
the stories reporting that the President was under investigation.565 | |
Beginning early the next day, June 15, 2017, the President issued a series of tweets | |
acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation and criticizing it. He wrote: "They | |
made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proof, so now they go for | |
obstruction ofjustice on the phony story. Nice",566 "You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH | |
HUNT in American political history-led by some very bad and conflicted people!",567 and | |
"Crooked H destroyed phones w/ hammer, 'bleached' emails, & had husband meet w/AG days | |
560 Special Counse1's Office Attorney 6/15/17 Notes. | |
561 Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trumpfor possible obstruction ofjustice, | |
officials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017). | |
562 CNN, for example, began running a chyron at 6:55 p.m. that stated: "WASH POST: MUELLER | |
INVESTIGATING TRUMP FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE." CNN, (June 14, 2017, published | |
online at 7:15 p.m. ET). | |
563 Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction ofjustice, | |
O dials so y, Washierg ton Post (June 14, 2017 . | |
564 SCR026 _000183 (President's Daily Diary, 6/14/17) (reflecting call from the President to | |
McGahn on 6/14/17 with start time 10:31 p.m. and end time 10:46 p.m.), Call Records of Don McGahn. | |
565 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-2. McGahn thought he and the President also probably talked about | |
the investiture ceremony for Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, which was scheduled for the following | |
day. McGahn 2/28/18 302, at 2. | |
566 @realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (6:55 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
567 @realDona1dTrump 6/15/17 (7:57 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
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before she was cleared-& they talk about obstruction'?"568 The next day, June 16, 2017, the | |
President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: "After 7 months of investigations | |
& committee hearings about my 'collusion with the Russians,' nobody has been able to show any | |
proof. Sad!",569 and "I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me | |
to fire the FBI Director! Witch Hunt."570 | |
On Saturday, June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the | |
Special Counsel rem0ved.5 McGahn was at home and the President was at Camp David.572 in | |
interviews with this Office, McGahn recalled that the President called him at home twice and on | |
both occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded | |
him from serving as Special Counsel.573 | |
On the first call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like, "You gotta do | |
this. You gotta call Rod."574 McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he could | |
d0.575 McGahn was perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request.576 He and other | |
advisors believed the asserted conflicts were "silly" and "not real," and they had previously | |
communicated that view to the President.577 McGahn also had made clear to the President that the | |
White House Counsel's Office should not be involved in any effort to press the issue of conflicts.578 | |
McGahn was concerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the | |
Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge | |
568 @real DonaldTrump 6/15/17 (3:56 p.m. ET) Tweet. | |
569 @real DonaldTrump 6/16/17 (7:53 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
$70 @real DonaldTrump 6/ I6/ 17 (9:07 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
571 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2, McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10. | |
572 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1, 3, SCR026_000196 (President's Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (records | |
showing President departed the White House at 11 :07 a.m. on June 17, 2017, and arrived at Camp David at | |
1 1:37 a.m.). | |
573 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2, McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 10. Phone records show that the President | |
called McGahn in the afternoon on June 17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes. | |
SCR026 _000196 (President's Daily Diary, 6/ I7/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on | |
6/17/17 with start time 2:23 p.m. and end time 2:46 p.m.), (Call Records of Don McGahn). Phone records | |
do not show another call between McGahn and the President that day. Although McGahn recalled receiving | |
multiple calls from the President on the same day, in light of the phone records he thought it was possible | |
that the first call instead occurred on June 14, 2017, shortly after the press reported that the President was | |
under investigation for obstruction ofjustice. McGahn 2/28/19302, at 1-3. While McGahn was not certain | |
of the specific dates of the calls, McGahn was confident that he had at least two phone conversations with | |
the President in which the President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special | |
Counsel removed. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3. | |
574 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. | |
575 Mcoahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. | |
576 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1. | |
577 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2. | |
578 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2. | |
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87 | |
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investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. Even if the removal | |
of the lead prosecutor would not prevent the investigation from continuing under a new appointee, | |
a faultfinder would need to consider whether the act had the potential to delay further action in the | |
investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel, or otherwise impede the | |
investigation . | |
A threshold question is whether'the President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special | |
Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered | |
McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly disputed these accounts, and | |
privately told McGahn that he had simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the | |
Department of Justice's attention. See Volume II, Section II.I, infra. Some of the President's | |
specific language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation. | |
Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact | |
directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed. | |
First, McGahn's clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein | |
not only that conflicts existed but also that "Mueller has to go." McGahn is a credible witness | |
with no motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House.601 McGahn | |
spoke with the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times, making it | |
unlikely that he misheard or misinterpreted the President's request. In response to that request, | |
McGahn decided to quit because he did not want to participate in events that he described as akin | |
to the Saturday Night Massacre. He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his | |
office, prepared to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff, told Priebus that the President | |
had asked him to "do crazy shit," and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. Those | |
acts would be a highly unusual reaction to a request to convey information to the Department of | |
Justice. | |
Second, in the days before the calls to McGahn, the President, through his counsel, had | |
already brought the asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of Justice. Accordingly, | |
the President had no reason to have McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to raise conflicts issues | |
that already had been raised. | |
Third, the President's sense of urgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate | |
action on a weekend-"You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod."-support McGahn's recollection | |
that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel. | |
Had the President instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examine asserted | |
conflicts to evaluate whether they posed an ethical bar, it would have been unnecessary to set the | |
process in motion on a Saturday and to make repeated calls to McGahn. | |
Finally, the President had discussed "knocking out Mueller" and raised conflicts of interest | |
in a May 23, 2017 call with McGahn, reflecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan | |
to remove the Special Counsel. And in the days leading up to June 17, 2017, the President made | |
clear to Priebus and Bannon, who then told Ruddy, that the President was considering terminating | |
601 When this Office first interviewed McGahn about this topic, he was reluctant to share detailed | |
information about what had occurred and only did SO after continued questioning. See McGahn 12/14/17 | |
302 (agent notes). | |
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the Special Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his | |
thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence shows that the President was not just seeking | |
an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a | |
way to terminate the Special Counsel. | |
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. To satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would | |
be necessary to establish a nexus between the President's act of seeking to terminate the Special | |
Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand jury proceeding. | |
Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was | |
under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a | |
grand jury. On May 23, 20 17, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his "biggest exposure" | |
was not his act of firing Comey but his "other contacts" and "calls," and his "ask re: Flynn." By | |
early June, it was widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury | |
subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn | |
investigation.6°2 On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House that | |
investigators would be interviewing intelligence agency officials who allegedly had been asked by | |
the President to push back against the Russia investigation. On June 14, 2017, news outlets began | |
reporting that the President was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based on | |
widespread reporting, the President knew that such an investigation could include his request for | |
Comey's loyalty, his request that Comey "let[] Flynn go", his outreach to Coats and Rogers, and | |
his termination of Comey and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had | |
relieved "great pressure" related to Russia. And on June 16, 20l'7, the day before he directed | |
McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his | |
conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting, "I am being investigated for | |
firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director!" | |
c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's attempts to remove the | |
Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel's oversight of investigations that involved the | |
President's conduct-and, most immediately, to reports that the President was being investigated | |
for potential obstruction of justice. | |
Before the President terminated Comey, the President considered it critically important that | |
he was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated. | |
As described in Volume II, Section Il.D, supra, advisors perceived the President, while he was | |
drafting the Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than anything else about getting out | |
that he was not personally under investigation. When the President learned of the appointment of | |
the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying | |
"[t]his is the end of my Presidency." The President also faulted Sessions for recusing, saying "you | |
were supposed to protect me." | |
On June 14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was | |
investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted | |
602 See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., CNN exclusive: Grand jury subpoenas issued in F8I's Russia | |
investigation, CNN (May 9, 2017), Matt Ford, Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Flynn Grand./ury, | |
The Atlantic (June 2, 2017). | |
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to avoid: a criminal investigation into his own conduct that was the subject of widespread media | |
attention. The evidence indicates that news of the obstruction investigation prompted the President | |
to call McGahn and seek to have the Special Counsel removed. By mid-June, the Department of | |
Justice had already cleared the Special Counsel's service and the President's advisors had told him | |
that the claimed conflicts of interest were "silly" and did not provide a basis to remove the Special | |
Counsel. On June 13, 2017, the Acting Attorney General testified before Congress that no good | |
cause for removing the Special Counsel existed, and the President dictated a press statement to | |
Sanders saying he had no intention of firing the Special Counsel. But the next day, the media | |
reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice and the Special | |
Counsel was interviewing witnesses about events related to possible obstruction-sputTing the | |
President to write critical tweets about the Special Counsel's investigation. The President called | |
McGahn at home that night and then called him on Saturday from Camp David. The evidence | |
accordingly indicates that news that an obstruction investigation had been opened is what led the | |
President to call McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated. | |
There also is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made those calls to | |
McGahn. The President made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had specifically told the | |
President that the White House Counsel's Office-and McGahn himself-could not be involved | |
in pressing conflicts claims and that the President should consult with his personal counsel if he | |
wished to raise conflicts. Instead of relying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts claims, | |
the President sought to use his official powers to remove the Special Counsel. And after the media | |
reported on the President's actions, he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special | |
Counsel terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in | |
Volume II, Section II.I, infra. Those denials are contrary to the evidence and suggest the | |
President's awareness that the direction to McGahn could be seen as improper. | |
F. The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation | |
Overview | |
Two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the | |
President made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017, | |
the President met one-on-one with Corey Lewandowski in the Oval Office and dictated a message | |
to be delivered to Attorney General Sessions that would have had the effect of limiting the Russia | |
investigation to future election interference only. One month later, the President met again with | |
Lewandowski and followed up on the request to have Sessions limit the scope of the Russia | |
investigation. Lewandowski told the President the message would be delivered soon. Hours later, | |
the President publicly criticized Sessions in an unplanned press interview, raising questions about | |
Sessions's job security. | |
1. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions to | |
Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation | |
On June 19, 2017, two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special | |
Counsel removed, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his former campaign | |
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manager Corey Lewandowski.603 Senior White House advisors described Lewandowski as a | |
"devotee" of the President and said the relationship between the President and Lewandowski was | |
a¢0l0$€."604 | |
During the June 19 meeting, Lewandowski recalled that, after some small talk, the | |
President brought up Sessions and criticized his recusal from the Russia investigation.605 The | |
President told Lewandowski that Sessions was weak and that if the President had known about the | |
likelihood of recusal in advance, he would not have appointed Sessions.606 The President then | |
asked Lewandowski to deliver a message to Sessions and said "write this down."6°7 This was the | |
first time the President had asked Lewandowski to take dictation, and Lewandowski wrote as fast | |
as possible to make sure he captured the content correctly.608 | |
The President directed that Sessions should give a speech publicly announcing: | |
I know that I recused myself from certain things having to do with specific areas. But our | |
POTUS ... is being treated very unfairly. He shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel | |
b/c he hasn't done anything wrong. I was on the campaign w/ him for nine months, there | |
were no Russians involved with him. I know it for a fact b/c I was there. He didn't do | |
anything wrong except he ran the greatest campaign in American history.609 | |
The dictated message went on to state that Sessions would meet with the Special Counsel to limit | |
his jurisdiction to future election interference: | |
Now a group of people want to subvert the Constitution of the United States. I am going | |
to meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special | |
Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections SO that | |
nothing can happen in future elections.6'0 | |
Lewandowski 4/6/18 302. at 2; SCR026 000201 (President's Daily Diary, 6/19/17 | |
604 Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7, Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at I (describing Lewandowski as a "comfort to | |
the President" whose loyalty was appreciated). Kelly said that when he was Chief of Staff and the President | |
had meetings with friends like Lewandowski, Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to the | |
residence to create distance from the West Wing. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7. | |
sos Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2. | |
606 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2. | |
607 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2. | |
608 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3. | |
609 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2-3, Lewandowski 6/19/ l7 Notes, at 1-2. | |
6 i0 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3, Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 3. | |
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The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the "most popular guy in | |
the country."61 l Lewandowski told the President he understood what the President wanted Sessions | |
to d0.6I2 | |
Lewandowski wanted to pass the message to Sessions in person rather than over the | |
phone.6l3 He did not want to meet at the Department of Justice because he did not want a public | |
log of his visit and did not want Sessions to have an advantage over him by meeting on what | |
Lewandowski described as Sessions's turf6!4 Lewandowski called Sessions and arranged a | |
meeting for the following evening at Lewandowski's office, but Sessions had to cancel due to a | |
last minute conflict.6'5 Shortly thereafter, Lewandowski left Washington, D.C., without having | |
had an opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the President's message.6'6 Lewandowski | |
stored the notes in a safe at his home, which he stated was his standard procedure with sensitive | |
items." | |
2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski | |
Following his June meeting with the President, Lewandowski contacted Rick Dearborn, | |
then a senior White House official, and asked if Dearborn could pass a message to Sessions.6'8 | |
Dearborn agreed without knowing what the message was, and Lewandowski later confirmed that | |
Dearborn would meet with Sessions for dinner in late July and could deliver the message then." | |
Lewandowski recalled thinking that the President had asked him to pass the message because the | |
President knew Lewandowski could be trusted, but Lewandowski believed Dearborn would be a | |
better messenger because he had a longstanding relationship with Sessions and because Dearborn | |
was in the government while Lewandowski was not.620 | |
On July 19, 2017, the President again met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office.621 | |
In the preceding days, as described in Volume II, Section Il.G, infra, emails and other information | |
about the June 9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, | |
and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed. In the July 19 meeting with Lewandowski, the | |
611 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3, Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 4. | |
612 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3. | |
613 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3-4. | |
614 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. | |
615 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. | |
616 Lewandowski 4/6/1 s 302, at 4. | |
617 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4. | |
el Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4, see Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3. | |
619 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4-5. | |
620 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4, 6. | |
621 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5, SCR029b_000002-03 (6/5/18 Additional Response to Special | |
Counsel Request for Certain Visitor Log Information). | |
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President raised his previous request and asked if Lewandowski had talked to Sessions.622 | |
Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered SOOIL623 Lewandowski | |
recalled that the President told him that if Sessions did not meet with him, Lewandowski should | |
tell Sessions he was fired.624 | |
Immediately following the meeting with the President, Lewandowski saw Dearborn in the | |
anteroom outside the Oval Office and gave him a typewritten version of the message the President | |
had dictated to be delivered to Sessi0ns.625 Lewandowski told Dearborn that the notes were the | |
message they had discussed, but Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message | |
was from the President.626 The message "definitely raised an eyebrow" for Dearborn, and he | |
recalled not wanting to ask where it came from or think further about doing anything with it.627 | |
Dearborn also said that being asked to serve as a messenger to Sessions made him | |
uncomfortable.628 He recalled later telling Lewandowski that he had handled the situation, but he | |
did not actually follow through with delivering the message to Sessions, and he did not keep a | |
copy of the typewritten notes Lewandowski had given him.629 | |
3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview | |
Within hours of the President's meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the President | |
gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times ih which he criticized Sessions's decision to | |
recuse from the Russia investigation.63° The President said that "Sessions should have never | |
recused himself, and if he was going to recuse himself, he should have told me before he took the | |
job, and I would have picked somebody else."631 Sessions's recusal, the President said, was "very | |
unfair to the president. How do you take ajob and then recuse yourself? If he would have recused | |
himself before the job, I would have said, 'Thanks, Jeff, but I can't, you know, I'm not going to | |
622 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. | |
623 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. | |
624 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. Priebus vaguely recalled Lewandowski telling him that in | |
approximately May or June 2017 the President had asked Lewandowski to get Sessions's resignation. | |
Priebus recalled that Lewandowski described his reaction as something like, "What can I do? I'm not an | |
employee of the administration. I'm a nobody." Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 6. | |
625 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. Lewandowski said he asked Hope Hicks to type the notes when | |
he went in to the Oval Office, and he then retrieved the notes from her partway through his meeting with | |
the President. Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5. | |
626 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5, Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3. | |
627 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3. | |
62a Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3. | |
629 Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 3-4. | |
630 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July | |
19, 2017). | |
631 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July | |
19, 2017). | |
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take you.' It's extremely unfair, and that's a mild word, to the president."632 Hicks, who was | |
present for the interview, recalled trying to "throw [herself] between the reporters and [the | |
President]" to stop parts of the interview, but the President "loved the interview."633 | |
Later that day, Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed the President's New York | |
Times interview.634 Lewandowski recalled telling Hicks about the President's request that he meet | |
with Sessions and joking with her about the idea offspring Sessions as a private citizen if Sessions | |
would not meet with him.635 As Hicks remembered the conversation, Lewandowski told her the | |
President had recently asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a message that he needed to | |
do the "right thing" and resign.636 While Hicks and Lewandowski were together, the President | |
called Hicks and told her he was happy with how coverage of his New York Times interview | |
criticizing Sessions was playing out.637 | |
4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation | |
Three days later, on July 21, 2017, the Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence | |
intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-related matters with the Russian | |
ambassador, contrary to what Sessions had said publicly.638 That evening, Priebus called Hunt to | |
talk about whether Sessions might be fired or might resign.639 Priebus had previously talked to | |
Hunt when the media had reported on tensions between Sessions and the President, and, after | |
speaking to Sessions, Hunt had told Priebus that the President would have to fire Sessions if he | |
wanted to remove Sessions because Sessions was not going to quit.640 According to Hunt, who | |
took contemporaneous notes of the July 21 call, Hunt told Priebus that, as they had previously | |
discussed, Sessions had no intention ofresigning.64I Hunt asked Priebus what the President would | |
632 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview with Trump, New York Times (July | |
19, 2017). | |
633 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 23. | |
634 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10, Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. | |
635 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. | |
636 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recess | |
appointment of a new Attorney General because the Senate was about to go on recess. Hicks 3/ l3/ l8 302, | |
at 10. Lewandowski recalled that in the afternoon of July 19, 2017, following his meeting with the | |
President, he conducted research on recess appointments but did not share his research with the President. | |
Lewandowski 4/6/ I8 302, at 7. | |
637 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. | |
638 Adam Entous et al., Sessions discussed Trump campaign-related matters with Russian | |
ambassador, US. intelligence intercepts snow, Washington Post (July 21, 2017). The underlying events | |
concerning the Sessions-Kislyak contacts are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.4.c, supra. | |
639 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23. | |
640 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23. | |
641 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23-24, Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1. | |
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accomplish by firing Sessions, pointing out there was an investigation before and there would be | |
an investigation after.642 | |
Early the following morning, July 22, 2017, the President tweeted, "A new | |
INTELLIGENCE LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post, this time against A.G. Jeff Sessions. | |
These illegal leaks, like Comey's, must StOp!a1643 Approximately one hour later, the President | |
tweeted, "So many people are asking why isn't the A.G. or Special Council looking at the many | |
Hillary Clinton or Comey crimes. 33,000 e-mails deleted?"644 Later that morning, while aboard | |
Marine One on the way to Norfolk, Virginia, the President told Priebus that he had to get Sessions | |
to resign immediately.645 The President said that the country had lost confidence in Sessions and | |
the negative publicity was not tolerable.646 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus, | |
the President told Priebus to say that he "need[ed] a letter of resignation on [his] desk immediately" | |
and that Sessions had "no choice" but "must immediately resign."647 Priebus replied that if they | |
fired Sessions, they would never get a new Attorney General confirmed and that the Department | |
of Justice and Congress would turn their backs on the President, but the President suggested he | |
could make a recess appointment to replace Sessions.648 | |
Priebus believed that the President's request was a problem, so he called McGahn and | |
asked for advice, explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was "all | |
wrong."649 Although the President tied his desire for Sessions to resign to Sessions's negative | |
press and poor performance in congressional testimony, Priebus believed that the President's | |
desire to replace Sessions was driven by the President's hatred of Sessions's recusal from the | |
Russia investigation.65° McGahn told Priebus not to follow the President's order and said they | |
should consult their personal counsel, with whom they had attorney-client privilege.65! McGahn | |
642 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23-24, Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1-2. | |
643 @real DonaldTrump 7/22/17 (6:33 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
644 @real DonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:44 a.m. ET) Tweet. Three minutes later, the President tweeted, | |
"What about all of the Clinton ties to Russia, including Podesta Company, Uranium deal, Russian Reset, | |
big dollar speeches etc." @real DonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:47 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
645 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 13-14. | |
646 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14, Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4-5, see RP_000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes). | |
647 R_P000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes). | |
648 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. | |
649 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4-5. | |
650 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. | |
651 R_P000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes); McGahn 12/14/17 302, at II; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14. | |
Priebus followed McGahn's advice and called his personal attorney to discuss the President's request | |
because he thought it was the type of thing about which one would need to consult an attorney. Priebus | |
1/18/18 302, at 14. | |
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and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the | |
President's order to fire Sessions.652 | |
That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions's | |
resignation, using words to the effect of, "Did you get it? Are you working on it?"653 Priebus said | |
that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions, | |
although the President did not directly say s0.654 Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out | |
the President's directive, he told the President he would get Sessions to resign.655 Later in the day, | |
Priebus called the President and explained that it would be a calamity if Sessions resigned because | |
Priebus expected that Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand would also resign | |
and the President would be unable to get anyone else confirmed.656 The President agreed to hold | |
off on demanding Sessions's resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day, to prevent the | |
shows from focusing on the firing.657 | |
By the end of that weekend, Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to | |
ask Sessions to resign.658 Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. On | |
the morning of Monday, July 24, 2017, the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to | |
investigate Clinton and called him "beleaguered."659 On July 25, the President tweeted, "Attorney | |
General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E- | |
mails & DNC server) & Intel leakers!"660 The following day, July 26, the President tweeted, "Why | |
didn't A.G. Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in | |
charge of Clinton investigation."66' According to Hunt, in light of the President's frequent public | |
attacks, Sessions prepared another resignation letter and for the rest of the year carried it with him | |
in his pocket every time he went to the White House.662 | |
652 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11, RP_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) ("discuss resigning | |
together"). | |
653 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 14, Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4. | |
654 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4. | |
655 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. | |
656 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. | |
657 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. | |
658 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15. | |
659 @realDonaldTrLlmp 7/24/17 (8:49 a.m. ET) Tweet ("So why aren't the Committees and | |
investigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes & Russia | |
relations'?"). | |
660 @real DonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:12 a.m. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortly | |
before this one asking "where is the investigation A.G." @real DonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:03 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
661 @real DonaldTrump 7/26/17 (9:48 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
662 Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 24-25. | |
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Analysis | |
In analyzing the President's efforts to have Lewandowski deliver a message directing | |
Sessions to publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future | |
election interference, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: | |
a. Obstructive act. The President's effort to send Sessions a message through | |
Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the investigation | |
and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. | |
The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President "shouldn't have a | |
Special Prosecutor/Counsel" and that Sessions was going to "meet with the Special Prosecutor to | |
explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election | |
meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections." The President wanted | |
Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ | |
ethics review, and have Sessions declare that he knew "for a fact" that "there were no Russians | |
involved with the campaign" because he "was there." The President further directed that Sessions | |
should explain that the President should not be subject to an investigation "because he hasn't done | |
anything wrong." Taken together, the President's directives indicate that Sessions was being | |
instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his | |
campaign, with the Special Counsel being permitted to "move forward with investigating election | |
meddling for future elections." | |
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by the time of the President's | |
initial one-on-one meeting with Lewandowski on June 19, 2017, the existence of a grand jury | |
investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was ublic knowled Bv the time of the | |
President's follow-un meeting with Lewandowski | |
See Volume II, Section II.G, infra. To satisfy the nexus requirement | |
it would be necessary to show that limiting the Special Counsel's investigation would have the | |
natural and probable effect of impeding that grand jury proceeding. | |
c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's effort to have Sessions | |
limit the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation to future election interference was intended | |
to prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President's and his campaign's conduct. | |
As previously described, see Volume II, Section IIB, supra, the President knew that the | |
Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign, and he perceived allegations of Russian | |
interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election. The President further knew that the | |
investigation had broadened to include his own conduct and whether he had obstructed justice. | |
Those investigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel's jurisdiction were limited to future | |
election interference only. | |
The timing and circumstances of the President's actions support the conclusion that he | |
sought that result. The President's initial direction that Sessions should limit the Special CoLlnsel's | |
investigation came just two days after the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special | |
Counsel removed, which itself followed public reports that the President was personally under | |
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investigation for obstruction ofjustice. The sequence of those events raises an inference that after | |
seeking to terminate the Special Counsel, the President sought to exclude his and his campaign's | |
conduct from the investigation's scope. The President raised the matter with Lewandowski again | |
on July 19, 2017, just days after emails and information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between | |
Russians and senior campaign officials had been publicly disclosed, generating substantial media | |
coverage and investigative interest. | |
The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence of his intent. Rather | |
than rely on official channels, the President met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office. The | |
President selected a loyal "devotee" outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting | |
an inference that he was working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who had | |
previously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The President | |
also did not contact the Acting Attorney General, who had just testified publicly that there was no | |
cause to remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and | |
redirect the Special CoLlnsel's investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly | |
take any action on it. | |
The July 19, 2017 events provide further evidence of the President's intent. The President | |
followed up with Lewandowski in a separate one-on-one meeting one month after he first dictated | |
the message for Sessions, demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request. And just hours after | |
Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to Sessions, the | |
President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked | |
Sessions and raised questions about his job security. Four days later, on July 22, 2017, the | |
President directed Priebus to obtain Sessions's resignation. That evidence could raise an inference | |
that the President wanted Sessions to realize that his job might be on the line as he evaluated | |
whether to comply with the President's direction that Sessions publicly announce that, | |
notwithstanding his recusal, he was going to confine the Special Counsel's investigation to future | |
election interference. | |
G. The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9, 2016 | |
Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials | |
Overview | |
By June 2017, the President became aware of emails setting up the June 9, 2016 meeting | |
between senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary | |
Clinton as "part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump." On multiple occasions | |
in late June and early July 2017, the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails, | |
and he then dictated a statement about the meeting to be issued by Donald Trump Jr. describing | |
the meeting as about adoption. | |
Evidence | |
l. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June 9, | |
2016 Trump Tower Meeting | |
In mid-June 2017-the same week that the President first asked Lewandowski to pass a | |
message to Sessions-senior Administration officials became aware of emails exchanged during | |
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the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald Trump Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and | |
a Russian attorney.663 As described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra, the emails stated that the | |
"Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia" had offered "to provide the Trump campaign with some official | |
documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia" as part | |
of "Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump."664 Trump Jr. responded, "[I]f it's what | |
you say I love it,"665 and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several | |
other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June 9, 2016.666 At the meeting, the Russian attorney | |
claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and | |
other Democrats, and the Russian attorney then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S. statute | |
that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that had resulted in a retaliatory | |
ban in Russia on U.S. adoptions of Russian children.667 | |
According to written answers submitted by the President in response to questions from this | |
Office, the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or the emails setting it up at the | |
time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the election.668 | |
The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from SSCI that called | |
for the production of various information, including, "[a] list and a description of all meetings" | |
between any "individual affiliated with the Trump campaign" and "any individual formally or | |
informally affiliated with the Russian government or Russian business interests which took place | |
between June 16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017," and associated records.669 Trump | |
Organization attorneys became aware of the June 9 meeting no later than the first week of June | |
2017, when they began interviewing the meeting participants, and the Trump Organization | |
attorneys provided the emails setting up the meeting to the President's personal counsel.670 Mark | |
Corallo, who had been hired as a spokesman for the President's personal legal team, recalled that | |
he learned about the June 9 meeting around June 21 or 22, 2017.671 Priebus recalled learning about | |
the June 9 meeting from Fox News host Sean Hannity in late June 2017.672 Priebus notified one | |
ess Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1, Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2. | |
664 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.), @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/1 1/17 (11:01 a.m. | |
ET) Tweet. | |
ses RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone), @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (11:01 a.m. | |
ET) Tweet. | |
666 Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4. | |
667 See Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra (describing meeting in detail). | |
668 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I, Parts (a) | |
through (c)). The President declined to answer questions about his knowledge of the June 9 meeting or | |
other events after the election. | |
669 DJTFP _SCO_PDF_00000001-02 (5/17/ 17 Letter, SSC1 to Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.). | |
670 Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 12; 6/2/17 and 6/5/17 Emails, Goldstone & Garten, Raffel 2/8/18 302, | |
at 3, Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. | |
671 Corallo 2/15/1 s 302, at 3. | |
672 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7. | |
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of the President's personal attorneys, who told Priebus he was already working on it*673 By late | |
June, several advisors recalled receiving media inquiries that could relate to the June 9 meeting.674 | |
2. The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose | |
Information About the June 9 Meeting | |
Communications advisors Hope Hicks and Josh Raffel recalled discussing with Jared | |
Kushner and Ivanka Trump that the emails were damaging and would inevitably be leaked.675 | |
Hicks and Rafael advised that the best strategy was to proactively release the emails to the press.676 | |
On or about June 22, 2017, Hicks attended a meeting in the White House residence with the | |
President, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump.677 According to Hicks, Kushner said that he wanted to fill | |
the President in on something that had been discovered in the documents he was to provide to the | |
congressional committees involving a meeting with him, Manafort, and Trump Jr.678 Kushner | |
brought a folder of documents to the meeting and tried to show them to the President, but the | |
President stopped Kushner and said he did not want to know about it, shutting the conversation | |
d0Wn.679 | |
On June 28, 2017, Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner's attorney's office.6*l0 She recalled | |
being shocked by the emails because they looked "really bad."681 The next day, Hicks spoke | |
privately with the President to mention her concern about the emails, which she understood were | |
soon going to be shared with Congress.682 The President seemed upset because too many people | |
knew about the emails and he told Hicks that just one lawyer should deal with the matter.683 The | |
President indicated that he did not think the emails would leak, but said they would leak if everyone | |
had access to them.68'* | |
673 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7. | |
674 Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 3, Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8, Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 3. | |
675 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3, Hicks 3/13/1 s 302, at 2. | |
676 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3, 5, Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. | |
677 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6-7, Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1. | |
678 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7, Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1. | |
679 Hicks 12/7/ I7 302, at 7, Hicks 3/13/ I8 302, at 1. Counsel for Ivanka Trump provided an attorney | |
proffer that is consistent with Hicks's account and with the other events involving Ivanka Trump set forth | |
in this section of the report. Kushner said that he did not recall talking to the President at this time about | |
the June 9 meeting or the underlying emails. Kushner 4/1 l/l8 302, at 30. | |
680 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1-2. | |
681 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. | |
682 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. | |
683 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3, Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. | |
684 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8. | |
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Later that day, Hicks, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump went together to talk to the President.685 | |
Hicks recalled that Kushner told the President the June 9 meeting was not a big deal and was about | |
Russian adoption, but that emails existed setting up the meeting.68° Hicks said she wanted to get | |
in front of the story and have Trump Jr. release the emails as part of an interview with "softball | |
questions."687 The President said he did not want to know about it and they should not go to the | |
press.688 Hicks warned the President that the emails were "really bad" and the story would be | |
"massive" when it broke, but the President was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and | |
said he did not want details."89 Hicks recalled that the President asked Kushner when his document | |
production was du€.690 Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President | |
said, "then leave it alone."691 Hicks also recalled that the President said Kushner's attorney should | |
give the emails to whomever he needed to give them to, but the President did not think they would | |
be leaked to the press.692 Raffel later heard from Hicks that the President had directed the group | |
not to be proactive in disclosing the emails because the President believed they would not leak.693 | |
3. The President Directs Trump Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries About the | |
June 9 Meeting | |
The following week, the President departed on an overseas trip for the G20 summit in | |
Hamburg, Germany, accompanied by Hicks, Raffel, Kushner, and lvanka Trump, among others.69'* | |
On July 7, 2017, while the President was overseas, Hicks and Raffel learned that the New York | |
Times was working on a story about the June 9 meeting.695 The next day, Hicks told the President | |
about the story and he directed her not to comment.696 Hicks thought the President's reaction was | |
odd because he usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin_697 Later that | |
day, Hicks and the President again spoke about the 5t0ry.698 Hicks recalled that the President asked | |
ess Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2. | |
686 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2, Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. | |
687 Hicks 3/13/1 s 302, at 2-3. | |
ess Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3, Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. | |
689 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3, Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. | |
690 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. | |
691 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. | |
692 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9. | |
693 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 5. | |
694 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 6. | |
695 Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 6-7, Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. | |
696 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10, Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. | |
697 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10. | |
698 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3. | |
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her what the meeting had been about, and she said that she had been told the meeting was about | |
Russian adoption.699 The President responded, "then just say that."700 | |
On the flight home from the G20 on July 8, 2017, Hicks obtained a draft statement about | |
the meeting to be released by Trump Jr. and brought it to the President.70l The draft statement | |
began with a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the | |
meeting: "I was asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe | |
pageant with an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign."702 | |
Hicks again wanted to disclose the entire story, but the President directed that the statement not be | |
issued because it said too much.703 The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr. took a brief | |
meeting and it was about Russian adoption.7°4 After speaking with the President, Hicks texted | |
Trump Jr. a revised statement on the June 9 meeting that read: | |
It was a short meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We discussed a program about | |
the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years | |
ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issue at | |
that time and there was no follow up.705 | |
Hicks's text concluded, "Are you ok with this? Attributed to you."706 Trump Jr. responded by | |
text message that he wanted to add the word "primarily" before "discussed" so that the statement | |
would read, "We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children."707 Trump | |
Jr. texted that he wanted the change because "[t]hey started with some Hillary thing which was bs | |
and some other nonsense which we shot down fast."708 Hicks texted back, "I think that's right too | |
but boss man worried it invites a lot of questions[.] [U]ltimately [d]efer to you and [your attorney] | |
on that word Bc I know it's important and l think the mention of a campaign issue adds something | |
to it in case we have to go further."709 Trump Jr. responded, "If I don't have it in there it appears | |
as though I'm lying later when they inevitably leak sornething."710 Trump Jr.'s statement-adding | |
699 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3, Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10. | |
700 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3, see Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10. | |
701 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at4. | |
702 Hicks 7/8/17 Notes. | |
703 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 4-5, Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 11. | |
704 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 11. | |
705 SCROI la __000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.). | |
706 SCR01 la _000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.). | |
707 SCROl la _000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks). | |
7013 scR01 la _000005 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks). | |
709 SCR01 la _000005 (7/8n 7 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.). | |
710 SCROl la _000006 (7/8/17 Text Message, Trump Jr. to Hicks). | |
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the word "primarily" and making other minor additions-was then provided to the New York | |
Times.7II The full statement provided to the Times stated: | |
It was a short introductory meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We primarily | |
discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular | |
with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it | |
was not a campaign issue at the time and there was no follow up. I was asked to attend the | |
meeting by an acquaintance, but was not told the name of the person I would be meeting | |
with beforehand.7'2 | |
The statement did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton or any discussion | |
of the Magnitsky Act or U.S. sanctions, which were the principal subjects of the meeting, as | |
described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra. | |
A short while later, while still on Air Force One, Hicks learned that Priebus knew about | |
the emails, which further convinced her that additional information about the June 9 meeting would | |
leak and the White House should be proactive and get in front of the story.7!3 Hicks recalled again | |
going to the President to urge him that they should be fully transparent about the June 9 meeting, | |
but he again said no, telling Hicks, "You've given a statement. We're done."7'4 | |
Later on the flight home, Hicks went to the President's cabin, where the President was on | |
the phone with one of his personal attorneys.7l5 At one point the President handed the phone to | |
Hicks, and the attorney told Hicks that he had been working with Circa News on a separate story, | |
and that she should not talk to the New York Times.7!6 | |
4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meetin_g | |
Before the President's flight home from the G20 landed, the New York Times published | |
its story about the June 9, 2016 meeting.717 In addition to the statement from Trump Jr., the Times | |
story also quoted a statement from Corallo on behalf of the President's legal team suggesting that | |
the meeting might have been a setup by individuals working with the firm that produced the Steele | |
reporting.7!8 Corallo also worked with Circa News on a story published an hour later that | |
711 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6, see Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin | |
During Campaign, New York Times (July 8, 20 l 7). | |
712 See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met I/Wrh Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New | |
York Times (July 8, 2017). | |
713 Hicks 3/1 snag 302, at 6, Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 9-10. | |
714 Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 12, Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10. | |
715 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 7. | |
716 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 7. | |
717 See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Mel With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New | |
York Times (July 8, 2017); Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 10. | |
718 See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New | |
York Times (July 8, 2017). | |
103 | |
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inaccurately denied that the President played any role in drafting Trump Jr.'s statement.729 After | |
consulting with the President on the issue, White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the | |
media that the President "certainly didn't dictate" the statement, but that "he weighed in, offered | |
suggestions like any father would d0."730 Several months later, the President's personal counsel | |
stated in a private communication to the Special Counsel's Office that "the President dictated a | |
short but accurate response to the New York Times article on behalf of his son, Donald Trump, | |
Jr.n73l The President later told the press that it was "irrelevant" whether he dictated the statement | |
and said, "It's a statement to the New York Times.... That's not a statement to a high tribunal of | |
judges."732 | |
On Julv 12. 2017. the Special Counsel's Office | Trump Jr. | |
related to the June 9 meeting and those who attended the | |
June 9 meeting. | |
On July 19, 2017, the President had his follow-up meeting with Lewandowski and then | |
met with reporters for the New York Times. In addition to criticizing Sessions in his Times | |
interview, the President addressed the June 9, 2016 meeting and said he "didn't know anything | |
about the meeting" at the time.734 The President added, "As I've said-most other people, you | |
know, when they call up and say, 'By the way, we have information on your opponent,' I think | |
most politicians - I was just with a lot of people, they said ... , 'Who wouldn't have taken a | |
meeting like that?"'735 | |
Analysis | |
In analyzing the President's actions regarding the disclosure of information about the June | |
9 meeting, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction ofjustice: | |
a. Obstructive act. On at least three occasions between June 29, 2017, and July 9, | |
20 I7, the President directed Hicks and others not to publicly disclose information about the June | |
729 See, e.g., David Wright, Trump lawyer: President was aware of "nothing", CNN (July 12, 2017) | |
(quoting the President's personal attorney as saying, "I wasn't involved in the statement drafting at all nor | |
was the President."), see also Good Morning America, ABC (July 12, 2017) ("The President didn't sign | |
off on anything.... The President wasn't involved in that."), Meet the Press, NBC (July 16, 2017) ("1 do | |
want to be clear-the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement."). | |
730 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. l, 2017), Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 9 | |
(the President told Sanders he "weighed in, as any father would" and knew she intended to tell the press | |
what he Said). | |
731 1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 18. | |
732 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle (June 15, 2018). | |
733 I | |
734 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July | |
19, 2017)- | |
735 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July | |
19, 2017). | |
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9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney. On June 29, Hicks | |
warned the President that the emails setting up the June 9 meeting were "really bad" and the story | |
would be "massive" when it broke, but the President told her and Kushner to "leave it alone." | |
Early on July 8, after Hicks told the President the New York Times was working on a story about | |
the June 9 meeting, the President directed her not to comment, even though Hicks said that the | |
President usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin. Later that day, the | |
President rejected Trump Jr.'s draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was | |
with "an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign." The | |
President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption | |
(which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting). The statement dictated | |
by the President did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton. | |
Each of these efforts by the President involved his communications team and was directed | |
at the press. They would amount to obstructive acts only if the President, by taking these actions, | |
sought to withhold information from or mislead congressional investigators or the Special Counsel. | |
On May 17, 2017, the President's campaign received a document request from SSCI that clearly | |
covered the June 9 meeting and underlying emails, and those documents also plainly would have | |
been relevant to the Special Counsel's investigation. | |
But the evidence does not establish that the President took steps to prevent the emails or | |
other information about the June 9 meeting from being provided to Congress or the Special | |
Counsel. The series of discussions in which the President sought to limit access to the emails and | |
prevent their public release occurred in the context of developing a press strategy. The only | |
evidence we have of the President discussing the production of documents to Congress or the | |
Special Counsel is the conversation on June 29, 2017, when Hicks recalled the President | |
acknowledging that Kushner's attorney should provide emails related to the June 9 meeting to | |
whomever he needed to give them to. We do not have evidence of what the President discussed | |
with his own lawyers at that time. | |
b. gcustp an official procee_dg. As described above, by the time of the President's | |
attempts to prevent the public release of the emails regarding the June 9 meeting, the existence of | |
a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge, and the | |
President had been told that the emails were responsive to congressional inquiries. To satisfy the | |
nexus requirement, however, it would be necessary to show that preventing the release of the | |
emails to the public would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury | |
proceeding or congressional inquiries. As noted above, the evidence does not establish that the | |
President sought to prevent disclosure of the emails in those official proceedings. | |
c. Intent. The evidence establishes the President's substantial involvement in the | |
communications strategy related to information about his campaign's connections to Russia and | |
his desire to minimize public disclosures about those connections. The President became aware | |
of the emails no later than June 29, 2017, when he discussed them with Hicks and Kushner, and | |
he could have been aware of them as early as June 2, 2017, when lawyers for the Trump | |
Organization began interviewing witnesses who participated in the June 9 meeting. The President | |
thereafter repeatedly rejected the advice of Hicks and other staffers to publicly release information | |
about the June 9 meeting. The President expressed concern that multiple people had access to the | |
emails and instructed Hicks that only one lawyer should deal with the matter. And the President | |
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dictated a statement to be released by Trump Jr. in response to the first press accounts of the June | |
9 meeting that said the meeting was about adoption. | |
But as described above, the evidence does not establish that the President intended to | |
prevent the Special Counsel's Office or Congress from obtaining the emails setting up the June 9 | |
meeting or other information about that meeting. The statement recorded by Corallo-that the | |
emails "will never get out"-can be explained as reflecting a belief that the emails would not be | |
made public if the President's press strategy were followed, even if the emails were provided to | |
Congress and the Special Counsel. | |
H. The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over the | |
Investigation | |
Overview | |
From summer 2017 through 2018, the President attempted to have Attorney General | |
Sessions reverse his recusal, take control of the Special Counsel's investigation, and order an | |
investigation ofHillary Clinton. | |
Evidence | |
l. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal | |
After returning Sessions's resignation letter at the end of May 2017, but before the | |
President's July 19, 2017 New York Times interview in which he publicly criticized Sessions for | |
recusing from the Russia investigation, the President took additional steps to have Sessions reverse | |
his recusal. In particular, at some point after the May l 7, 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel, | |
Sessions recalled, the President called him at home and asked if Sessions would "unrecuse" | |
himself.736 According to Sessions, the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions | |
could direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton, and the "gist" | |
of the conversation was that the President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from "al1 of it," including | |
the Special Counsel's Russia investigation.737 Sessions listened but did not respond, and he did | |
not reverse his recusal or order an investigation of C1inton.738 | |
In early July 2017, the President asked Staff Secretary Rob Porter what he thought of | |
Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand.739 Porter recalled that the President asked him if Brand | |
was good, tough, and "on the team."7'*° The President also asked if Porter thought Brand was | |
interested in being responsible for the Special Counsel's investigation and whether she would want | |
736 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. That was the second time that the President asked Sessions to | |
reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations. See Volume II, Section ILC. l , supra (describing | |
President's March 2017 request at Mar-a-Lago for Sessions to unrecuse). | |
737 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. | |
738 Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15. | |
739 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11, Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. | |
740 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11, Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. | |
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to be Attorney General one day.741 Because Porter knew Brand, the President asked him to sound | |
her out about taking responsibility for the investigation and being Attorney General.742 | |
Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show that the President told Porter to "Keep in touch with | |
your friend," in reference to Brand.743 Later, the President asked Porter a few times in passing | |
whether he had spoken to Brand, but Porter did not reach out to her because he was uncomfortable | |
with the task.744 In asking him to reach out to Brand, Porter understood the President to want to | |
find someone to end the Russia investigation or fire the Special Counsel, although the President | |
never said so explicitly.7'*5 Porter did not contact Brand because he was sensitive to the | |
implications of that action and did not want to be involved in a chain of events associated with an | |
effort to end the investigation or fire the Special CounseL746 | |
McGahn recalled that during the summer of 2017, he and the President discussed the fact | |
that if Sessions were no longer in his position the Special Counsel would report directly to a non- | |
recused Attorney GeneraL7'*7 McGahn told the President that things might not change much under | |
a new Attorney General.748 McGahn also recalled that in or around July 2017, the President | |
frequently brought up his displeasure with Sessions.749 Hicks recalled that the President viewed | |
Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation as an act ofdisloyalty.750 In addition to criticizing | |
Sessions's recusal, the President raised other concerns about Sessions and his job performance | |
with McGahn and Hicks."' | |
741 Porter 4/13/18 302, at l 1, Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. Because of Sessions's recusal, if Rosenstein | |
were no longer in his position, Brand would, by default, become the DOJ official in charge of supervising | |
the Special Counsel's investigation, and if both Sessions and Rosenstein were removed, Brand would be | |
next in line to become Acting Attorney General for all DOJ matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 508. | |
742 Porter 4/13/18 302, at l l, Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. | |
743 SC _RRP000020 (Porter 7/10/17 Notes). | |
744 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 1 1-12. | |
745 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11-12. | |
746 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11-12. Brand confirmed that no one ever raised with her the prospect of | |
taking over the Russia investigation or becoming Attorney General. Brand 1/29/19 302, at 2. | |
747 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11. | |
748 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at l l. | |
749 McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9. | |
750 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. | |
751 MCG3hH 12/14/17 302, at 9, Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. | |
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2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations Covered | |
by his Recusal | |
Later in 2017, the President continued to urge Sessions to reverse his recusal from | |
campaign-related investigations and considered replacing Sessions with an Attorney General who | |
would not be recused. | |
On October 16, 2017, the President met privately with Sessions and said that the | |
Department of Justice was not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the | |
Department should be investigating.752 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, who | |
was at the meeting, the President mentioned Clinton's emails and said, "Don't have to tell us, just | |
take [a] look."753 Sessions did not offer any assurances or promises to the President that the | |
Department of Justice would comply with that request.754 Two days later, on October 18, 2017, | |
the President tweeted, "Wow, FBI confirms report that James Comey drafted letter exonerating | |
Crooked Hillary Clinton long before investigation was complete. Many people not interviewed, | |
including Clinton herself. Comey stated under oath that he didn't do this-obviously a fix? Where | |
is Justice Dept?"755 On October 29, 2017, the President tweeted that there was "ANGER & | |
UNITY" over a "lack of investigation" of Clinton and "the Comey six," and concluded: "DO | |
SOMETH1NG!"756 | |
On December 6, 20 17, five days after Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his contacts with | |
the Russian government, the President asked to speak with Sessions in the Oval Office at the end | |
of a cabinet meeting.757 During that Oval Office meeting, which Porter attended, the President | |
again suggested that Sessions could "Llnrecuse," which Porter linked to taking back supervision of | |
the Russia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton.758 According to | |
contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, the President said, "l don't know if you could un-recuse | |
yourself. You'd be a hero. Not telling you to do anything. Dershowitz says POTUS can get | |
involved. Can order AG to investigate. I don't want to get involved. I'm not going to get involved. | |
I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly."759 | |
According to Porter's notes, Sessions responded, "We are taking steps, whole new leadership | |
752 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10. | |
753 so RRP000024 (Porter 10/16/17 Notes), see Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10. | |
754 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10. | |
755 @real DonaldTrump 10/18/17 (6:21 a.m. ET) Tweet, @realDonaldT111mp 10/18/17 (6:27 a.m. | |
ET) Tweet. | |
756 @realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (9:53 a.m. ET) Tweet, @real DonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:02 a.m. | |
ET) Tweet, @real DonaldTrump 10/29/17 (IO: 17 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
75V Porter 4/13/18 302, at 5-6, see SC_RRP00003 l (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) ("l2:45pm with the | |
President, Gen. Kelly, and Sessions (who I pulled in after the Cabinet meeting)"), SC_RRP000033 (Porter | |
12/6/17 Notes) ("Post-cabinet meeting - POTUS asked me to get AG Sessions. Asked me to stay. Also | |
COS Kelly."). | |
158 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12, Porter 4/13/18 302, at 5-6. | |
759 so RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes), see Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6, Porter 5/8n 8 302, at 12. | |
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Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. F. 6(e) | |
tweeted, "The Russian Witch Hunt Hoax continues, all because Jeff Sessions didn't tell me he was | |
going to recuse himself.... I would have quickly picked someone else. So much time and money | |
wasted, so many lives ruined ... and Sessions knew better than most that there was No | |
Collusion!"769 On August l, 2018, the President tweeted that'"Attorney General Jeff Sessions | |
should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now."77° On August 23, 2018, the President publicly | |
criticized Sessions in a press interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of | |
Justice were politically motivated because Paul Manafort had been prosecuted but Democrats had | |
not.77! The President said, "I put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice | |
Department, JeffSessions."772 That day, Sessions issued a press statement that said, "I took control | |
of the Department of Justice the day I was sworn in .... While I am Attorney General, the actions | |
of the Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations."773 The | |
next day, the President tweeted a response: '"Department of Justice will not be improperly | |
influenced by political considerations.' Jeff, this is GREAT, what everyone wants, so look into | |
all of the corruption on the 'other side' including deleted Emails, Comey lies & leaks, Mueller | |
conflicts, McCabe, Strzok, Page, Ohr, FISA abuse, Christopher Steele & his phony and corrupt | |
Dossier, the Clinton Foundation, illegal surveillance of Trump campaign, Russian collusion by | |
Dems - and so much more. Open up the papers & documents without redaction? Come on Jeff, | |
you can do it, the country is waitingl"774 | |
On November 7, 2018, the day after the midterm elections, the President replaced Sessions | |
with Sessions's chief of staff as Acting Attorney General.775 | |
Analysis | |
In analyzing the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse himself and regain control | |
of the Russia investigation, the following considerations and evidence are relevant to the elements | |
of obstruction of justice: | |
a. Obstructive . To determine if the President's efforts to have the Attorney General | |
unrecuse could qualify as an obstructive act, it would be necessary to assess evidence on whether | |
those actions would naturally impede the Russia investigation. That inquiry would take into | |
account the supervisory role that the Attorney General, if unrecused, would play in the Russia | |
investigation. It also would have to take into account that the Attorney General's recusal covered | |
("Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first | |
place!"). | |
769 @real DonaldTrump 6/5/18 (7:31 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
770 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
771 Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018). | |
772 Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018). | |
773 Sessions 8/23/18 Press Statement. | |
774 @realDonaldTrump 8/24/18 (6: 17 a.m. ET) Tweet, @ realDona1dTrump 8/24/18 (6:28 a.m. ET) | |
Tweet. | |
775 @real DonaldTrump 11/7/18 (2:44 p.m. ET) Tweet. | |
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other campaign-related matters. The inquiry would not tum on what Attorney General Sessions | |
would actually do if unrecused, but on whether the efforts to reverse his recusal would naturally | |
have had the effect of impeding the Russia investigation. | |
On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his | |
recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and | |
prosecution of Hillary Clinton. For example, in early summer 2017, Sessions recalled the | |
President asking him to unrecuse, but Sessions did not take it as a directive. When the President | |
raised the issue again in December 2017, the President said, as recorded by Porter, "Not telling | |
you to do anything.... I'm not going to get involved. I'm not going to do anything or direct you | |
to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly." The duration of the President's efforts-which | |
spanned from March 2017 to August 2018-and the fact that the President repeatedly criticized | |
Sessions in public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would have to recuse is | |
relevant to assessing whether the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify as | |
obstructive acts. | |
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by mid-June 2017, the existence | |
of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. In addition, | |
in July 2017, a different grand jury supervised by the Special Counsel was empaneled in the | |
District of Columbia, and the press reported on the existence of this grand jury in early August | |
2017.776 Whether the conduct towards the Attorney General would have a foreseeable impact on | |
those proceedings turns on much of the same evidence discussed above with respect to the | |
obstructive-act element. | |
c. Intent. There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President's conduct toward | |
Sessions was to have Sessions assume control over the Russia investigation and supervise it in a | |
way that would restrict its scope. By the summer of 2017, the President was aware that the Special | |
Counsel was investigating him personally for obstruction of justice. And in the wake of the | |
disclosures of emails about the June 9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the | |
campaign, see Volume II, Section lI.G, supra, it was evident that the investigation into the | |
campaign now included the President's son, son-in-law, and former campaign manager. The | |
President had previously and unsuccessfully sought to have Sessions publicly announce that the | |
Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election interference. Yet Sessions | |
remained recused. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty, the President spoke to | |
Sessions in the Oval Office with only Porter present and told Sessions that he would be a hero if | |
he unrecused. Porter linked that request to the President's desire that Sessions take back | |
supervision of the Russia investigation and direct an investigation of Hillary Clinton. The | |
President said in that meeting that he "just want[ed] to be treated fairly," which could reflect his | |
perception that it was unfair that he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not. But a | |
principal effect of that act would be to restore supervision of the Russia investigation to the | |
Attorney General-a position that the President frequently suggested should be occupied by | |
someone like Eric Holder and Bobby Kennedy, who the President described as protecting their | |
776 Fig., Del Quentin Wilbur & Byron Tau, Special Counsel Robert Mueller Impanels Washington | |
Grand Jury in Russia Probe, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 3, 2017), Carol D. Leon rig et al., Special Counsel | |
Mueller using grandjury in federal court in Washington as part of Russia investigation, Washington Post | |
(Aug. 3, 20l'1). | |
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presidents. A reasonable inference from those statements and the President's actions is that the | |
President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could | |
shield the President from the ongoing Russia investigation. | |
1. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the | |
Special Counsel | |
Overview | |
In late January 2018, the media reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered | |
McGahn to have the Special Counsel fired based on purported conflicts of interest but McGahn | |
had refused, saying he would quit instead. After the story broke, the President, through his | |
personal counsel and two aides, sought to have McGahn deny that he had been directed to remove | |
the Special Counsel. Each time he was approached, McGahn responded that he would not refute | |
the press accounts because they were accurate in reporting on the President's effort to have the | |
Special Counsel removed. The President later personally met with McGahn in the Oval Office | |
with only the ChiefofStaffpresent and tried to get McGahn to say that the President never ordered | |
him to fire the Special Counsel. McGahn refused and insisted his memory of the President's | |
direction to remove the Special Counsel was accurate. In that same meeting, the President | |
challenged McGahn for taking notes of his discussions with the President and asked why he had | |
told Special Counsel investigators that he had been directed to have the Special Counsel removed. | |
Evidence | |
l. The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel | |
On January 25, 2018, the New York Times reported that in June 2017, the President had | |
ordered McGahn to have the Department of Justice fire the Special Counsel.777 According to the | |
article, "[a]mid the first wave of news media reports that Mr. Mueller was examining a possible | |
obstruction case, the president began to argue that Mr. Mueller had three conflicts of interest that | |
disqualified him from overseeing the investigation."778 The article further reported that "[a]fter | |
receiving the president's order to fire Mr. Mueller, the White House counsel ... refused to ask the | |
Justice Department to dismiss the special counsel, saying he would quit instead."779 The article | |
stated that the president "ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to | |
resign rather than carry out the directive."78° After the article was published, the President | |
777 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When | |
While House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 20 l 8). | |
77s Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie I-Iaberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Of When | |
While House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 20 l 8). | |
779 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired but Backed Off When | |
White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018). | |
780 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired but Backed Qff When | |
White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25. 2018). | |
113 | |
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114 | |
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Attorney Work Produc* // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. F. 6(0) | |
Also on January 26, 2017, Hicks recalled that the President asked Sanders to contact | |
McGahn about the story.789 McGahn told Sanders there was no need to respond and indicated that | |
some of the article was accurate.79° Consistent with that position, McGahn did not correct the | |
Times story. | |
On February 4, 2018, Priebus appeared on Meet the Press and said he had not heard the | |
President say that he wanted the Special Counsel fired.79! After Priebus's appearance, the | |
President called Priebus and said he did a great job on Meet the Press.792 The President also told | |
Priebus that the President had "never said any of those things about" the Special Counsel.793 | |
The next day, on February 5, 2018, the President complained about the Times article to | |
Poder.794 The President told Porter that the article was "bullshit" and he had not sought to | |
terminate the Special Counsel.795 The President said that McGahn leaked to the media to make | |
himself look g00d.796 The President then directed Porter to tell McGahn to create a record to make | |
clear that the President never directed McGahn to fire the Special Counsel.797 Porter thought the | |
matter should be handled by the White House communications office, but the President said he | |
wanted McGahn to write a letter to the file "for our records" and wanted something beyond a press | |
statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate.798 The President referred to McGahn | |
as a "lying bastard" and said that he wanted a record from him.799 Porter recalled the President | |
789 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at II. Sanders did not recall whether the President asked her to speak to | |
McGahn or if she did it on her own. Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 2. | |
790 Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 1-2. | |
791 Meet the Press Interview with Rance Priebus, NBC (Feb. 4, 2018). | |
792 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10. | |
793 Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10. | |
794 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 16-17. Porter did not recall the timing of this discussion with the | |
President. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. Evidence indicates it was February 5, 2018. On the back of a pocket | |
card dated February 5, 2018, Porter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion: | |
"COS: (1) Letter from DM - Never threatened to quit - DJT never told him to fire M." SC_RRP000053 | |
(Porter Undated Notes). Porter said it was possible he took the notes on a day other than February 5. Porter | |
4/13/ 18 302, at 17. But Porter also said that "COS" referred to matters he wanted to discuss with Chief of | |
Staff Kelly, Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17, and Kelly took notes dated February 5, 2018, that state "POTUS - | |
Don McGahn letter .- Mueller + resigning." WH000017684 (Kelly 2/5/18 Notes). Kelly said he did not | |
recall what the notes meant, but thought the President may have "mused" about having McGahn write a | |
letter. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 3. McGahn recalled that Porter spoke with him about the President's request | |
about two weeks after the New York Times story was published, which is consistent with the discussion | |
taking place on or about February 5. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. | |
795 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. | |
796 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. | |
797 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17. | |
798 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17, Porter 5/8/18 302, at is. | |
799 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 18. | |
115 | |
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116 | |
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In response, McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the President directly that he | |
planned to resign, but said that the story was otherwise accLlrate."!3 The President asked McGahn, | |
"Did I say the word 'fire'?"8l4 McGahn responded, "What you said is, 'Call Rod [Rosenstein], | |
tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel."'8!5 The President responded, | |
"I never said that."8I6 The President said he merely wanted McGahn to raise the conflicts issue | |
with Rosenstein and leave it to him to decide what to d0_8l7 McGahn told the President he did not | |
understand the conversation that way and instead had heard, "Call Rod. There are conflicts. | |
Mueller has to g0_'»>8lB The President asked McGahn whether he would "do a correction," and | |
McGahn said n0.819 McGahn thought the President was testing his mettle to see how committed | |
McGahn was to what happened.820 Kelly described the meeting as "a little tense."82! | |
The President also asked McGahn in the meeting why he had told Special Counsel's Office | |
investigators that the President had told him to have the Special Counsel removed.822 McGahn | |
responded that he had to and that his conversations with the President were not protected by | |
attorney-client privilege.823 The President then asked, "What about these notes? Why do you take | |
notes? Lawyers don't take notes. I never had a lawyer who took notes."824 McGahn responded | |
that he keeps notes because he is a "real lawyer" and explained that notes create a record and are | |
not a bad thing.825 The President said, "I've had a lot of great lawyers, like Roy Cohn. He did not | |
take notes."82° | |
After the Oval Office meeting concluded, Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn | |
and the President "did have that conversation" about removing the Special Counsel.827 McGahn | |
recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed out to the President after the Oval Office that McGahn | |
813 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4. | |
814 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4, Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. | |
815 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. | |
816 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. | |
811 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. | |
818 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. | |
819 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5, Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. | |
820 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. | |
821 Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. | |
822 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. | |
823 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. | |
824 McGahn 3/8/ I8 302, at 5. McGahn said the President was referring to Donaldson's notes, which | |
the President thought of as McGahn's notes. McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5. | |
825 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. | |
aze McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. | |
827 Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. | |
I 17 | |
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Attorney WQr'< Froduet // May Contain Material Frotcctcd Under Fed. R. Crim. F. 6(c) | |
had not backed down and would not budge.828 Following the Oval Office meeting, the President's | |
personal counsel called McGahn's counsel and relayed that the President was "fine" with | |
McGahn.829 | |
Analysis | |
In analyzing the President's efforts to have McGahn deny that he had been ordered to have | |
the Special Counsel removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of | |
justice : | |
a. Obstructive act. The President's repeated efforts to get McGahn to create a record | |
denying that the President had directed him to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an | |
obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahn from testifying truthfully or to | |
undermine his credibility as a potential witness if he testified consistently with his memory, rather | |
than with what the record said. | |
There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories | |
were published in late January 2018, the President believed the stories were wrong and that he had | |
never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. The President correctly | |
understood that McGahn had not told the President directly that he planned to resign. In addition, | |
the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel, and | |
in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn, the President said, "I never said to fire Mueller. l never | |
said 'fire."' That evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade | |
McGahn to change his story but was instead offering his own-but different-recollection of the | |
substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn's reaction to them. | |
Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President's conduct. As previously | |
described, see Volume II, Section II.E, supra, substantial evidence supports McGahn's account | |
that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed, including the timing and | |
context of the President's directive, the manner in which McGahn reacted, and the fact that the | |
President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department | |
of Justice, and should be raised with the President's personal counsel rather than brought to | |
McGahn. In addition, the President's subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the | |
Special Counsel removed were carefully worded. When first asked about the New York Times | |
story, the President said, "Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical New York Times fake story." | |
And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had | |
I used the word "fire," saying, "I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire"' and "Did I say the | |
word 'fire"?" The President's assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed | |
McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence. | |
In addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with McGahn's memory of the June | |
17, 2017 events, the evidence indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval Office | |
828 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Office meeting with the | |
President after the fact. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2. Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state, "Don[:] Mueller | |
discussion in June. - Bannon Priebus - came out okay." WH0000 I 7685 (Kelly 2/6/ l8 Notes). | |
$29 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent note). | |
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meeting that McGahn's account differed and that McGahn was firm in his views. Shortly after the | |
story broke, the President's counsel told McGahn's counsel that the President wanted McGahn to | |
make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded | |
through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply | |
with the President's request. The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the | |
story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the | |
President's order. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a | |
week later, the President brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the | |
President thought McGahn had leaked the story, and directed Porter to have McGahn create a | |
record denying that the President had tried to fire the Special Counsel. At that point, the President | |
said he might "have to get rid of" McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and | |
told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the President's counsel, that the | |
President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence | |
indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not | |
think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying | |
facts that McGahn believed to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to | |
repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate. | |
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. By January 2018, the Special Counsel's use of a | |
grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments. The President also | |
was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating obstruction-related events because, among | |
other reasons, on January 8, 2018, the Special Counsel's Office provided his counsel with a | |
detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President.830 The President knew that | |
McGahn had personal knowledge of many of the events the Special Counsel was investigating and | |
that McGahn had already been interviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval | |
Office meeting, the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel's | |
Office about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel. The President challenged | |
McGahn for disclosing that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating | |
unnecessary legal exposure. That evidence indicates the President's awareness that the June 17, | |
2017 events were relevant to the Special Counsel's investigation and any grand jury investigation | |
that might grow out of it. | |
To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the President's actions would have | |
the natural tendency to affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay, or prevent the | |
communication of information to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel | |
investigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seeking to influence his prior | |
statements in those interviews. But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and | |
the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again | |
on obstruction-related topics. If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking | |
to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further | |
investigative interviews would not be shown. But the President's efforts to have McGahn write a | |
letter "for our records" approximately ten days after the stories had come out-well past the typical | |
830 1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 1-2 ("In our | |
conversation of January 8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with | |
the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of | |
justice", listing 16 topics). | |
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time to issue a correction for a news story-indicates the President was not focused solely on a | |
press strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings | |
arising from it. | |
c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute | |
that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated, the President acted for the purpose of | |
influencing McGahn's account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President's | |
conduct towards the investigation. | |
Several facts support that conclusion. The President made repeated attempts to get | |
McGahn to change his story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence | |
suggests that the President had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the President | |
had ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his encounter with | |
the President in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle and see how committed he was to | |
his memory of what had occurred. The President had already laid the groundwork for pressing | |
McGahn to alter his account by telling Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did | |
not deny the story, and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additional evidence of the | |
President's intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the | |
prospect of the President's meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn's counsel and said that | |
McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the Oval Office that day. The President's | |
counsel was well aware of McGahn's resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account | |
of events despite the President's request. Finally, as noted above, the President brought up the | |
Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahn and criticized him for | |
telling this Office about the June 17, 2017 events. The President's statements reflect his | |
understanding-and his displeasure-that those events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice | |
inquiry. | |
J. The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort,l | |
Overview | |
In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the President has taken other | |
actions dire W cted Iat possible witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation, including Flynn, | |
Manafort, and as described in the next section, Cohen. When Flynn withdrew from a joint | |
defense agreement with the President, the President's personal counsel stated that Flynn's actions | |
would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards the President. During Manafort's prosecution | |
and while the jury was deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafoit.wa.s being treated | |
unfairly and made it known that Manafort could receive a pardon | |
Evidence | |
l. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn | |
As previously noted, see Volume II, Section II.B, supra, the President asked for Flynn's | |
resignation on February 13, 2017. Following Flynn's resignation, the President made positive | |
public comments about Flynn, describing him as a "wonderful man," "a fine person," and a "very | |
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good person."83I The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying | |
that the President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.832 | |
In late November 20 17, Flynn began to cooperate with this Office. On November 22, 2017, | |
Flynn withdrew from ajoint defense agreement he had with the President.833 Flynn's counsel told | |
the President's personal counsel and counsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have | |
confidential communications with the White House or the President.83'* Later that night, the | |
President's personal counsel left a voicemail for Flynn's counsel that said: | |
I understand your situation, but let me see if I can't state it in starker terms.... [l]t | |
wouldn't surprise me if you've gone on to make a deal with ... the government.... [I]f | |
... there's information that implicates the President, then we've got a national security | |
issue, ... so, you know, ... we need some kind of heads up. Um, just for the sake of | |
protecting all our interests if we can.... [R]emember what we've always said about the | |
President and his feelings toward Flynn and, that still remains ....835 | |
On November 23, 2017, Flynn's attorneys returned the call from the President's personal | |
counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail.836 Flynn's attorneys reiterated that they were no | |
longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege.837 According to Flynn's | |
attorneys, the President's personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement.838 The | |
President's personal counsel said that he interpreted what they said to him as a reflection of Flynn's | |
al See, kg., Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2018) | |
(stating that "Flynn is a fine person" and "I don't think [Flynn] did anything wrong. If anything, he did | |
something right ... You know, he was just doing his job"), Interview ofDonald J Trump, NBC (May l l, | |
2017) (stating that Flynn is a "very good person"). | |
832 See Priebus l/l8/17 302, at 9-10 (the President asked Priebus to contact Flynn the week he was | |
terminated to convey that the President still cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him, | |
Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him), McFarland 12/22/17 302, | |
at 18 (about a month or two after Flynn was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with | |
Flynn and tell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the President felt bad for him), Flynn | |
l/l9/18 302, at 9 (recalling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks who said she wanted to | |
relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay), Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3 | |
(describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day after Flynn was fired where Kushner | |
said, "You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. I'll get the President to send | |
out a positive tweet about you later," and the President nodded his assent to KLlshner's comment promising | |
a tweet). | |
333 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at l. | |
834 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at l. | |
835 11/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President's Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn. | |
836 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at l. | |
837 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at l. | |
838 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at l. | |
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hostility towards the President and that he planned to inform his client of that interpretation.83" | |
Flynn's attorneys understood that statement to be an attempt to make them reconsider their position | |
because the President's personal counsel believed that Flynn would be disturbed to know that such | |
a message would be conveyed to the President."4° | |
On December 1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements pursuant to a | |
cooperation agreement.ll4I The next day, the President told the press that he was not concerned | |
about what Flynn might tell the Special Counsel.8"2 In response to a question about whether the | |
President still stood behind Flynn, the President responded, "We'll see what happens."843 Over | |
the next several days, the President made public statements expressing sympathy for Flynn and | |
indicating he had not been treated fairly.844 On December 15, 2017, the President responded to a | |
press inquiry about whether he was considering a pardon for Flynn by saying, "I don't want to talk | |
about pardons for Michael Flynn yet. We'll see what happens. Let's see. I can say this: When | |
you look at what's gone on with the FBI and with the Justice Department, people are very, very | |
an8fv-"2 5 | |
2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort | |
On October 27, 2017, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and former | |
deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiple felony counts, and on February 22, 2018, a | |
grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony | |
839 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/ 18 302, at 2. Because of attorney-client privilege issues, we did not seek | |
to interview the President's personal counsel about the extent to which he discussed his statements to | |
Flynn's attorneys with the President. | |
840 Counsel for Flynn 3/1/18 302, at 2. | |
$41 Information, United States v. Michael to Flynn, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. l, 2017), Doc. l, Plea | |
Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, l:l7-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. l, 2017), Doc. 3. | |
842 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn 's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2, | |
2017). | |
843 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn 's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2, | |
2017). | |
844 See @realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 (9:06 p.m. ET) Tweet ("So General Flynn lies to the FBI and | |
his life is destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBI holiday 'interrogation' with | |
no swearing in and no recording, lies many times ... and nothing happens to her? Rigged system, or just | |
a double standard?"), President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Dec. 4, 2017) ("We11, I feel badly | |
for General Flynn. I feel very badly. He's led a very strong life. And I feel very badly."). | |
345 President Trump White House Departure, C-SPAN (Dec. 15, 2017). | |
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counts."46 The charges in both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as | |
2005 and continued through 2018.847 | |
In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counsel | |
and they were "going to take care ofus."848 Manafort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that | |
he had been in touch with the President's personal counsel and repeating that they should "sit tight" | |
and "we'll be taken care 0f."849 Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardons and | |
Manafort said no one used that word.85o | |
As the proceedings against Manafort progressed in court, the President told Porter that he | |
never liked Manafort and that Manafort did not know what he was doing on the campaign.851 The | |
President discussed with aides whether and in what way Manafort might be cooperating with the | |
Special Counsel's investigation, and whether Manafort knew any information that would be | |
harmful to the President.852 | |
In public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that | |
Manafort was being treated unfairly. On June 15, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day | |
on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered | |
with witnesses while out on bail, the President told the press, "l feel badly about a lot of them | |
846 Indictment, United States v. Pauli Manafort, Jr. and Richard W Gates 111, l:l7-cr-201 (D.D.c. | |
Oct, 27, 2017), Doc. 13 ("Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment"), Indictment, United States v. Paul J | |
Manafort, Jr. and Richard W Gates III, l:l8~cr-83 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2018), Doc. 9 ("Manafort and Gates | |
E.D. Va. Indictment") | |
B47 Manajbrt and Gates D.D.C. Indictment, Manafort and Gates ED. Va. Indictment. | |
$48 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a cooperation plea | |
agreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit | |
multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent | |
of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our | |
Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Richard W Gates III, l:l7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. | |
23, 2018), Doc. 195, Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W Gates III, l:l7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, | |
2018), Doc. 205. Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be | |
reliable. | |
849 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. | |
$50 Gates 4/18/18 302, at 4. Manafort told this Office that he never told Gates that he had talked to | |
the President's personal counsel or suggested that they would be taken care of. Manafort also said he hoped | |
for a pardon but never discussed one with the President, although he noticed the President's public | |
comments about pardons. Manafort 10/1/ l8 302, at II. As explained in Volume l, Section IV.A.8, supra, | |
Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. The U.S. District Court for the District of | |
Columbia determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the | |
grand jury. Order, United States v. Manafort, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 503. | |
851 Porter 5/8/18 302, at II. Priebus recalled that the President never really liked Manafort. See | |
Priebus 4/3/18 302, at l l. Hicks said that candidate Trump trusted Manafort's judgment while he worked | |
on the Campaign, but she also once heard Trump tell Gates to keep an eye on Manafort. Hicks 3/13/18 | |
302, at 16. | |
$52 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 1 1, McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 14. | |
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because I think a lot of it is very unfair. I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12 | |
years. Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign. But I feel so--I tell you, I feel a little | |
badly about it. They went back 12 years to get things that he did 12 years ago? ... I feel badly | |
for some people, because they've gone back 12 years to find things about somebody, and I don't | |
think it's right."853 In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for | |
Manafort or other individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation, the President said, | |
"I don't want to talk about that. No, I don't want to talk about that.... But look, I do want to see | |
people treated fairly. That's what it's all about." 354 Hours later, Manafort's bail was revoked and | |
the President tweeted, "Wow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented | |
Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn't know | |
Manafort was the head of the Mob. What about Comey and Crooked Hillary and all the others? | |
Very unfair!"855 | |
Immediately following the revocation of Manafort's bail, the President's personal lawyer, | |
Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in which he raised the possibility of a pardon for | |
Manafort. Giuliani told the New York Daily News that "[w]hen the whole thing is over, things | |
might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons."856 Giuliani also said in an interview that, | |
although the President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel's investigation was | |
ongoing, "when the investigation is concluded, he's kind of on his own, right'?"857 In a CNN | |
interview two days later, Giuliani said, "l guess I should clarify this once and for all.... The | |
president has issued no pardons in this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons | |
in this investigation.... When it's over, hey, he's the president of the United States. He retains | |
his pardon power. Nobody is taking that away from him."858 Giuliani rejected the suggestion that | |
his and the President's comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a | |
criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow, saying the comments were "certainly not | |
intended that way."859 Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual involved | |
in the investigation would not be "excluded from [a pardon, fin fact the president and his advisors | |
... come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly."8°° Giuliani observed that pardons | |
were not unusual in political investigations but said, "That doesn't mean they're going to happen | |
853 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018). | |
$54 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018). | |
855 @rea1DonaldTrump 6/15/18 (1141 p.m. ET) Tweet. | |
856 Chris Sommerfeldt, Rudy Giuliani says Mueller probe 'might get cleaned up ' with 'presidential | |
pardons ' in light of Paul Manafort going to jail, New York Daily News (June 15, 20 I 8). | |
857 Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing New Obstruction | |
Charges, New York Times (June 15, 2018) (quoting Giuliani). | |
ass State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018), see Karoun Demirjian, | |
Giuliani suggests Trump may pardon Manafort after Mueller 's probe, Washington Post (June 17, 2018). | |
859 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). | |
860 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). | |
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here. Doesn't mean that anybody should rely on it.... Big signal is, nobody has been pardoned | |
yet ,,861 | |
On July 31, 2018, Manafort's criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia, | |
generating substantial news coverage.862 The next day, the President tweeted, "This is a terrible | |
situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before | |
it continues to stain our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry | |
Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!"863 Minutes later, the President | |
tweeted, "Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other highly prominent | |
and respected political leaders. He worked for- me for a very short time. Why didn't government | |
tell me that he was under investigation. These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion-a | |
Hoaxl"864 Later in the day, the President tweeted, "Looking back on history, who was treated | |
worse, Alfonse Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and 'Public Enemy Number One,' or Paul | |
Manafort, political operative & Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary confinement-although | |
convicted of nothing? Where is the Russian Collusion?""5 The President's tweets about the | |
Manafort trial were widely covered by the press.866 When asked about the President's tweets, | |
Sanders told the press, "Certainly, the President's been clear. He thinks Paul Manafort's been | |
treated unfairly."867 | |
On August 16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to the jury and deliberations began. | |
At that time, Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation | |
needed to be "done in the next two or three weeks,"868 and media stories reported that a Manafort | |
acquittal would add to criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not worth the time and | |
expense, whereas a conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature.869 | |
set State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018). | |
862 See, kg., Katelyn Polantz, Takeaways from day one of the Paul Manafort trial, CNN (July 31, | |
2018), Frank Bruni, Paul Manafort's Trial Is Donald Trump 's, Too, New York Times Opinion (July 31, | |
20 l 8), Rachel Weiner et al., Paul Manafort trial Day 2: Witnesses describe extravagant clothingpurchases, | |
home remodels, lavish cars paid with wire transfers, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018). | |
863 @realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet. Later that day, when Sanders was asked | |
about the President's tweet, she told reporters, "It's not an order. It's the President's opinion." Sarah | |
Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018). | |
364 @rea1DonaldTrump 8n/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
865 @realDona1dTrump 8/1/18 (11 :35 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
a66 See, e.g., Carol D. Leon rig et al., Trump calls Manafort prosecution "a hoax, " says Sessions | |
should stop Mueller investigation "right now", Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018), Louis Nelson, Trump | |
claims Manafort case has "nothing to do with collusion ", Politico (Aug. 1. 2018). | |
B67 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018). | |
868 Chris Strohm & Shannon Pettypiece, Mueller Probe Doesn't Need to Shut Down Before | |
Midterms, Of icials Say, Bloomberg (Aug. 15, 2018). | |
869 See, e.g., Katelyn Polantz et al., Manafortjury ends/irst day ofdeliberations without a verdict, | |
CNN (Aug. 16, 2018), David Voreacos, What Mueller's Manafort Case Means for the Trump Battle to | |
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On August 17, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, the President commented on the trial from | |
the South Lawn of the White House. In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted | |
approximately five minutes, the President twice called the Special Counsel's investigation a | |
"rigged witch hunt."870 When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the | |
President said, "I don't talk about that now. I don't talk about that."871 The President then added, | |
without being asked a further question, "I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look | |
at what's going on there. I think it's a very sad day for our country. He worked for me for a very | |
short period of time. But you know what, he happens to be a very good person. And I think it's | |
very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort."872 The President did not take further questions.873 | |
In response to the President's statements, Manafort's attorney said, "Mr. Manafort really | |
appreciates the support of President Trump."874 | |
On August 21, 2018, the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. Also on | |
August 21, Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses, including a campaign-finance | |
violation that he said had occurred "in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate for | |
federal office."875 The President reacted to Manafort's convictions that day by telling reporters, | |
"Paul Manafort's a good man" and "it's a very sad thing that happened."876 The President | |
described the Special Counsel's investigation as "a witch hunt that ends in disgrace."877 The next | |
day, the President tweeted, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. 'Justice' | |
took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike | |
Michael Cohen, he refused to 'break'-make up stories in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for | |
a brave man!"878 | |
In a Fox News interview on August 22, 2018, the President said: "[Cohen] makes a better | |
deal when he uses me, like everybody else. And one of the reasons I respect Paul Manafort so | |
much is he went through that trial-you know they make up stories. People make up stories. This | |
Come, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2018), Gabby Morrongiello, What a guilty verdict for Marzafort would mean | |
for Trump and Mueller, Washington Examiner (Aug. 18, 2018). | |
870 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). | |
871 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). | |
872 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). | |
873 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018). | |
874 Trump calls Manafort "very goadperson, " All In with Chris Hayes (Aug. 17, 2018) (transcript), | |
Manafort lawyer: We appreciate Trump 's support, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018) | |
(https://www.cnn.comlvideos/politics/20l 8/08/ l 7/paul-manafort-attorney-trump-jury-deliberations- | |
schneider-lead-vpx.cnn). | |
875 Transcript at 23, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-602 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018), Doc. | |
7 (Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript). | |
ave President Trump Remarks on Manafbrt Trial, C-SPAN (Aug. 21, 2018). | |
877 President Trump Remarks on Manaforz Trial, C-SPAN (Aug. 21, 2018). | |
878 @realDonaldTrump 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
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whole thing about flipping, they call it, I know all about flipping."879 The President said that | |
flipping was "not fair" and "almost ought to be outlawed."880 In response to a question about | |
whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President said, "I have great respect for | |
what he's done, in terms of what he's gone through.... He worked for many, many people many, | |
many years, and I would say what he did, some of the charges they threw against him, every | |
consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does."88l Giuliani told journalists that the | |
President "really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated" and that he and the President had | |
discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort.882 The next day, Giuliani told | |
the Washington Post that the President had asked his lawyers for advice on the possibility of a | |
pardon for Manafort and other aides, and had been counseled against considering a pardon until | |
the investigation concluded.883 | |
On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the District of Columbia | |
and signed a plea agreement that required him to cooperate with investigators.884 Giuliani was | |
reported to have publicly said that Manafort remained in a joint defense agreement with the | |
President following Manafort's guilty plea and agreement to cooperate, and that Manatlort's | |
attorneys regularly briefed the President's lawyers on the topics discussed and the information | |
Manafort had provided in interviews with the Special Counsel's Office.885 On November 26, 2018, | |
the Special Counsel's Office disclosed in a public court filing that Manafort had breached his plea | |
agreement by lying about multiple subjects.!'86 The next day, Giuliani said that the President had | |
been "upset for weeks" about what he considered to be "the un-American, horrible treatment of | |
879 Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded | |
the previous day). | |
so Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded | |
the previous day). | |
881 Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded | |
the previous day). | |
882 Maggie Haberman & Katie Rogers, "How Did We End Up Here? " Trump Wonders as the White | |
House Soldiers On, New York Times (Aug. 22, 2018). | |
ass Carol D. Leon rig & Josh Dawsey, Trump recently sought his lawyers ' advice on possibility of | |
pardoning Manafort, Giuliani says, Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2018). | |
884 Plea Agreement, United States v. Paul .I Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), | |
Doc. 422. | |
B85 Karen Freifeld & Nathan Layne, Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Mueller | |
interviews, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2018), Michael S. Schmidt et al., Manafort's Lawyer Said to Brief Trump | |
Attorneys on What He Told Mueller, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2018), Dana Bash, Manaforl team briefed | |
Giuliani on Mueller meetings, CNN, Posted 1 1/28118, available at | |
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/1 l/28/manafort-lawyers-keeping-trump-lawyers-giuliani- | |
updated-mueller-probe-bash-sot-nr-vpx.cnn, see Sean Hannity, Interview with Rudy Giuliani, Fox News | |
(Sept. 14, 2018) (Giuliani: "[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the plea | |
agreement has, and cooperation agreement has, nothing to do with the Trump campaign.... Now, I know | |
that because 1've been privy to a lot of facts 1 can't repeat."). | |
ssc Joint Status Report, United Stales v. Paul J Manaforl, Jr., (D.D.C Nov. 26, 2018), Doc. 455. | |
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Manafort.""7 In an interview on November 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was "very | |
brave" that Manafort did not "flip": | |
If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know this flipping stuffs terrible. You Hip and | |
you lie and you get-the prosecutors will tell you 99 percent of the time they can get people | |
to flip. it's rare that they can't. But I had three people: Manafort, Corsi-I don't know | |
Corsi, but he refuses to say what they demanded.888 Manafort, Cors . It's | |
actually very brave.889 | |
In response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President said, "It was never | |
discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I take it off the table?"890 | |
lolllllllo* | |
887 Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge, CNN | |
(Nov. 29, 2018). | |
888 "Corsi" is a reference to Jerome Corsi, who was involved in efforts | |
to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea | |
offer from th e S ecl . a I C ou nsel's Office because he was "not going to sign a lie." Sara Murray & Eli | |
Watkins, says he won 'I agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018). | |
889 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says | |
pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018). That same day, the President | |
tweeted: "While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way, | |
at least 3 major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang of Dems is viciously telling witnesses | |
to lie about facts & they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy Era!" @realDonaldTrump l 1/28/18 | |
(8:39 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
890 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump: | |
Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 20 18). | |
891 ' l L _ l Ll.I | |
892 II | |
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Analysis | |
In analyzing the President's conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, the following | |
evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice: 5 | |
a. Obstructive act. The President's actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel's | |
investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent particular | |
witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing, | |
delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement. | |
With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging | |
him to stay strong and conveying that the President still cared about him before he began to | |
cooperate with the government. When Flynn's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense | |
agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the | |
government, the President's personal counsel initially reminded Flynn's counsel of the President's | |
warm feelings towards Flynn and said "that still remains." But when Flynn's counsel reiterated | |
that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement, the President's | |
personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn's hostility | |
towards the President. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn's | |
decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation. Because of privilege issues, | |
however, we could not determine whether the President was personally involved in or knew about | |
the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn's counsel. | |
With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the President's actions had the potential to | |
influence Manafort's decision whether to cooperate with the government. The President and his | |
personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort, | |
while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to "flip" and cooperate with | |
the government. On June 15, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort's D.C. case was | |
considering whether to revoke his bail, the President said that he "felt badly" for Manafort and | |
stated, "I think a lot of it is very unfair." And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the | |
President said, "I do want to see people treated fairly. That's what it's all about." Later that day, | |
after Manafort's bail was revoked, the President called it a "tough sentence" that was "Very | |
unfair!" Two days later, the President's personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the | |
Special Counsel's investigation could receive a pardon "if in fact the [P]resident and his advisors | |
... come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly"-using language that paralleled | |
how the President had already described the treatment of Manatlort. Those statements, combined | |
with the President's commendation of Manafort for being a "brave man" who "refused to 'break'," | |
suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Manafort continued not to cooperate with | |
the government. And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation | |
agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to investigators. | |
The President's public statements during the Manafort trial, including during jury | |
deliberations, also had the potential to influence the trial jury. On the second day of trial, for | |
example, the President called the prosecution a "terrible situation" and a "hoax" that "continues to | |
stain our country" and referred to Manafort as a "Reagan/Dole darling" who was "serving solitary | |
confinement" even though he was "convicted of nothing." Those statements were widely picked | |
up by the press. While jurors were instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and | |
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are presumed to follow those instructions, the President's statements during the trial generated | |
substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements | |
or learned about them from others. And the President's statements during jury deliberations that | |
Manafort "happens to be a very good person" and that "it's very sad what they've done to Paul | |
Manafort" had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President | |
made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort. | |
WI b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The President's actions towards Flynn, Manafort, | |
appear to have been connected to pending or antic ated official proceedings involving | |
each individual. The President's conduct towards FlynnE--L7 principally occurred when both | |
were under criminal investigation by the Special Counsel's Office and press reports speculated | |
about whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel's investigation. And the President's | |
conduct towards Manafort was directly connected to the official proceedings involving him. The | |
President made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort's criminal | |
trial. And the President's comments about the prospect of Manafort "flipping" occurred when it | |
was clear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings. | |
c. In_tent. Evidence concerning the President's intent related to Flynn as a potential | |
witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of privilege issues we do not have evidence | |
establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel's communications | |
with Flynn's counsel stating that Flynn's decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement | |
and cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting "hostility" towards the | |
President. And regardless of what the President's personal counsel communicated, the President | |
continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation | |
agreement, stating that Flynn had "led a very strong life" and the President "fe[lt] very badly" | |
about what had happened to him. | |
Evidence concerning the President's conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President | |
intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was | |
convicted, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. One day after | |
Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term, the | |
President said that Manafort was "a brave man" for refusing to "break" and that "flipping" "almost | |
ought to be outlawed." At the same time, although the President had privately told aides he did | |
not like Manafort, he publicly called Manafort "a good man" and said he had a "wonderful family." | |
And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the | |
President did not respond directly and instead said he had "great respect for what [Manafort]'s | |
done, in terms of what he's gone through." The President added that "some of the charges they | |
threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does." In light of the | |
President's counsel's previous statements that the investigations "might get cleaned up with some | |
presidential pardons" and that a pardon would be possible if the President "come[s] to the | |
conclusion that you have been treated unfairly," the evidence supports the inference that the | |
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President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make | |
cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary. | |
We also examined the evidence of the President's intent in making public statements about | |
Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence supports | |
a conclusion that the President intended, at least in part, to influence the jury. The trial generated | |
widespread publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal | |
would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel's investigation. By publicly stating on the second | |
day of deliberations that Manafort "happens to be a very good person" and that "it's very sad what | |
they've done to Paul Manafort" right after calling the Special Counsel's investigation a "rigged | |
witch hunt," the President's statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to | |
engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a faultfinder could infer that the President | |
intended that result. But there are alternative explanations for the President's comments, including | |
that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to | |
influence public opinion. The President's comments also could have been intended to continue | |
sending a message to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, the President | |
made his comments about Manafort being "a very good person" immediately after declining to | |
answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort. | |
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K. The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen | |
Overview | |
The President's conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the full period of our | |
investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf | |
of the Trump Organization. Cohen briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times, | |
including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. After the media | |
began questioning Trump's connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a "party line" that publicly | |
distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there. Cohen continued to adhere | |
to that party line in 2017, when Congress asked him to provide documents and testimony in its | |
Russia investigation. In an attempt to minimize the President's connections to Russia, Cohen | |
submitted a letter to Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower | |
Moscow project three times, that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia, that Cohen | |
had not received a response to an outreach he made to the Russian government, and that the project | |
ended in January 2016, before the first Republican caucus or primary. While working on the | |
congressional statement, Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel, | |
who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President and should keep the | |
statement short and "tight." After the FBI searched Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the | |
President publicly asserted that Cohen would not "flip" and privately passed messages of support | |
to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if | |
he stayed on message, he would get a pardon or the President would do "something else" to make | |
the investigation end. But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in July 2018, the | |
President publicly criticized him, called him a "rat," and suggested his family members had | |
committed crimes. | |
Evidence | |
1. Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower | |
Moscow P_r9jeg | |
The President's interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the background of | |
the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project. | |
As described in detail in Volume I, Section lV.A.1, supra, from September 2015 until at | |
least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project in Russia, with | |
negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and | |
special counsel to Donald J. Trump.909 The Trump Organization had previously and | |
909 In August 2018 and November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception, | |
including making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, as described later | |
in this section. When Cohen first met with investigators from this Office, he repeated the same lies he told | |
Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project. Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 12-17. But after Cohen pleaded | |
guilty to offenses in the Southern District of New York on August 2 l , 2018, he met with investigators again | |
and corrected the record. The Office found Cohen's testimony in these subsequent proffer sessions to be | |
consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Office's investigation. | |
The Office's sentencing submission in Cohen's criminal case stated: "Starting with his second meeting with | |
the [Special Counsel's Office] in September 2018, the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for | |
134 | |
as | |
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917 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5. | |
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recalled briefing Donald Trump Jr. in the spring-a conversation that Cohen said was not "idle | |
chit chat" because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a $1 billion deal.930 | |
Cohen recalled that around May 2016, he again raised with candidate Trump the possibility | |
of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project.93' At that time, Cohen had | |
received several texts from Sater seeking to arrange dates for such a trip.932 On May 4, 2016, Sater | |
wrote to Cohen, "I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is | |
before or after the convention..... Obviously the premeeting trip (you only) can happen anytime | |
you want but the 2 big guys [is] the question. I said I would confirm and revert."°33 Cohen | |
responded, "My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the | |
convention."934 On May 5, 2016, Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably | |
read to Trump: | |
Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is | |
Russia's Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly | |
introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev.... This is perfect. The entire business | |
class of Russia will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss including | |
dates and subjects are on the table to discuss.935 | |
Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum with | |
candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be | |
there.936 Cohen remembered that Trump said that he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen | |
could "lock and load" on the deal.937 In June 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St. Petersburg | |
Economic Forum because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from Peskov.938 | |
Cohen said he had a quick conversation with Tramp at that time but did not tell him that the project | |
was over because he did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on-again-off-again if it | |
were feviv€d_939 | |
During the summer of20l 6, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he | |
had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen about the | |
status of the Trump Tower Moscow project, which Cohen found "interesting."940 At some point | |
930 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10. | |
931 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. | |
932 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. | |
933 FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Safer to Cohen). | |
034 Fs00015 <5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Safer). | |
935 Fs00016-17 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). | |
930 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. | |
937 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7. | |
938 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7-8. | |
939 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8. | |
940 Cohen an9/19 302, at 2. | |
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that summer, Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the | |
Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere because the Russian development company | |
had not secured a piece of property for the project.9'*! Trump said that was "too bad," and Cohen | |
did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that.942 Cohen said that at no time during | |
the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be | |
abandoned.943 | |
2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a "Patty Line" Distancing Candidate Trump | |
From Russia | |
As previously discussed, see Volume II, Section II.A, supra, when questions about possible | |
Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump | |
denied having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen described | |
as the "party line" or "message" to follow for Trump and his senior advisors.9'*4 | |
After the election, the Trump Organization sought to formally close out certain deals in | |
advance of the inauguration." Cohen recalled that Trump Tower Moscow was on the list ordeals | |
to be closed 0ut.946 In approximately January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the | |
media about Trump Tower Moscow, and he recalled speaking to the President-Elect when those | |
inquiries came in_947 Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow | |
project might not be consistent with the "message" that the President-Elect had no relationship | |
with Russia.948 | |
In an effort to "stay on message," Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump | |
Tower Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016.949 Cohen recalled that this | |
was part of a "script" or talking points he had developed with President-Elect Trump and others to | |
941 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. Cohen could not recall the precise timing of this conversation, but said | |
he thought it occulTed in June or July 20 l6. Cohen recalled that the conversation happened at some point | |
after candidate Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to do with Russia. Cohen 3/19/19 302, at | |
2. | |
942 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. | |
943 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. | |
944 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 1, Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3, 5, Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. | |
945 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2; see also Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 8-9. | |
946 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2. | |
947 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3. | |
948 Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 4. | |
949 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5. The article was published on February 19, 2017, and reported that | |
Sater and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow "as recently as the fall of 2015" | |
but had come to a halt because of the presidential campaign. Consistent with Cohen's intended party line | |
message, the article stated, "Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project | |
in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not | |
feasible." Megan Two fey & Scott Shane,A Back-Channel Planfor Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump | |
Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017). | |
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dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia.950 Cohen said that he | |
discussed the talking points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they | |
were untrue because Trump already knew they were L1ntrue.951 Cohen thought it was important to | |
say the deal was done in January 2016, rather than acknowledge that talks continued in May and | |
June 2016, because it limited the period when candidate Trump could be alleged to have a | |
relationship with Russia to an early point in the campaign, before Trump had become the party's | |
presumptive nominee.952 | |
3. Qohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower | |
Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line | |
In early May 2017, Cohen received requests from Congress to provide testimony and | |
documents in connection with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 | |
election.953 At that time, Cohen understood Congress's interest in him to be focused on the | |
allegations in the Steele reporting concerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russian officials | |
in Prague during the campaign.95'* Cohen had never traveled to Prague and was not concerned | |
about those allegations, which he believed were provably fa1se.955 On May 18, 2017, Cohen met | |
with the President to discuss the request from Congress, and the President instructed Cohen that | |
he should cooperate because there was nothing there.956 | |
Cohen eventually entered into ajoint defense agreement (IDA) with the President and other | |
individuals who were part of the Russia investigation.957 In the months leading up to his | |
congressional testimony, Cohen frequently spoke with the President's personal counsel.958 Cohen | |
950 Cohen 9/1 an8 302, at 5-6. | |
951 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 6. | |
952 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10. | |
953 P-SCO-000000328 (5/9/l7 Letter, HPSC1 to Cohen), P-SCO-000000331 (5/I2/17 Letter, SSCI | |
to Cohen). | |
954 Cohen 1 U20/18 302, at 2-3. | |
955 Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 2-3. | |
956 Cohen 1 1/12/18 302, at 2, Cohen 1 1/20/19 302, at 3. | |
957 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2. | |
958 Cohen I 1/12/18 302, at 2-3, Cohen I 1/20/18, at 2-6. Cohen told investigators about his | |
conversations with the President's personal counsel after waiving any privilege of his own and after this | |
Office advised his counsel not to provide any communications that would be covered by any other privilege, | |
including communications protected by a joint defense or common interest privilege. As a result, most of | |
what Cohen told us about his conversations with the President's personal counsel concerned what Cohen | |
had communicated to the President's personal counsel, and not what was said in response. Cohen described | |
certain statements made by the President's personal counsel, however, that are set forth in this section. | |
Cohen and his counsel were better positioned than this Office to evaluate whether any privilege protected | |
those statements because they had knowledge of the scope of their joint defense agreement and access to | |
privileged communications that may have provided context for evaluating the statements they shared. After | |
interviewing Cohen about these matters, we asked the President's personal counsel if he wished to provide | |
information to us about his conversations with Cohen related to Cohen's congressional testimony about | |
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said that in those conversations the President's personal counsel would sometimes say that he had | |
just been with the President.959 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel told him the | |
IDA was working well together and assured him that there was nothing there and if they stayed on | |
message the investigations would come to an end S00IL960 At that time, Cohen's legal bills were | |
being paid by the Trump Organization,96I and Cohen was told not to worry because the | |
investigations would be over by summer or fall of 2017.962 Cohen said that the President's | |
personal counsel also conveyed that, as part of the JDA, Cohen was protected, which he would not | |
be if he "went rogue."963 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel reminded him that | |
"the President loves you" and told him that if he stayed on message, the President had his back.964 | |
In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump Tower Moscow to submit | |
to Congress along with his document production.965 The final version of the statement contained | |
several false statements about the project.966 First, although the Trump Organization continued to | |
pursue the project until at least June 2016, the statement said, "The proposal was under | |
consideration at the Trump Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By | |
the end of January 2016, I determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business | |
reasons and should not be pursued further. Based on my business determinations, the Trump | |
Organization abandoned the proposal."967 Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had | |
discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said, "Despite | |
overtures by Mr. Sater, I never considered asking Mr. Trump to travel to Russia in connection with | |
this proposal. I told Mr. Sater that Mr. Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a | |
definitive agreement in place."968 Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the status | |
Trump Tower Moscow. The President's personal counsel declined and, through his own counsel, indicated | |
that he could not disaggregate information he had obtained from Cohen from information he had obtained | |
from other parties in the JDA. in view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen's counsel to withhold | |
communications that could be covered by privilege, the President's personal counsel's uncertainty about | |
the provenance of his own knowledge, the burden on a privilege holder to establish the elements to support | |
a claim of privilege, and the substance of the statements themselves, we have included relevant statements | |
Cohen provided in this report. If the statements were to be used in a context beyond this report, further | |
analysis could be warranted. | |
959 Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 6. | |
960 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2, 4. | |
961 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. | |
962 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 8, Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 3-4. | |
963 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. | |
964 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11, Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2. | |
965 P-SCO-000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/l6/17 Email and Attachment, Michael Cohen's | |
Counsel to Cohen). Cohen said it was not his idea to write a letter to Congress about Trump Tower Moscow. | |
Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7. | |
966 P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). | |
967 P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017)). | |
968 P-SC0-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Au8- 28, 2017)). | |
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message to Trump.979 Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Trump- | |
Putin meeting when he testified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting | |
on Sean Hannity's radio show.980 Cohen recalled explaining to the President's personal counsel | |
the "whole story" of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump's role | |
in it.981 Cohen recalled that he and the President's personal counsel talked about keeping Trump | |
out of the nan'ative, and the President's personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and | |
should not be included in his statement to Congress.982 | |
Cohen said that his "agenda" in submitting the statement to Congress with false | |
representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project | |
and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before the first presidential | |
primaries, and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow, with the aim of limiting the | |
ongoing Russia investigations.983 Cohen said he wanted to protect the President and be loyal to | |
him by not contradicting anything the President had said.984 Cohen recalled he was concerned that | |
if he told the truth about getting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to candidate Trump about | |
travel to Russia to pursue the project, he would contradict the message that no connection existed | |
between Trump and Russia, and he rationalized his decision to provide false testimony because | |
the deal never happened.985 He was not concerned that the story would be contradicted by | |
individuals who knew it was false because he was sticking to the party line adhered to by the whole | |
group.986 Cohen wanted the support of the President and the White House, and he believed that | |
following the party line would help put an end to the Special Counsel and congressional | |
investigations.987 | |
Between August 18, 2017, when the statement was in an initial draft stage, and August 28, | |
2017, when the statement was submitted to Congress, phone records reflect that Cohen spoke with | |
the President's personal counsel almost daily.988 On August 27, 2017, the day before Cohen | |
I | |
979 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5. | |
980 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11. | |
981 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2. | |
982 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2, see Cohen 9/18/18 302, at It (recalling that he was told that if he | |
stayed on message and kept the President out of the narrative, the President would have his back). | |
983 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8, Information at 4-5, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 | |
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (Cohen Information). | |
984 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. | |
985 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4, Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3, 4, 6. | |
986 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9. | |
987 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9. | |
988 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3, Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5, Call Records of Michael Cohen | |
(Reflecting three contacts on August 18, 2017 (24 seconds, 5 minutes 25 seconds, and 10 minutes 58 | |
seconds), two contacts on August 19 (23 seconds and 24 minutes 26 seconds), three contacts on August 23 | |
(8 seconds, 20 minutes 33 seconds; and 5 minutes 8 seconds); one contact on August 24 (I 1 minutes 59 | |
seconds); 14 contacts on August 27 (28 seconds, 4 minutes 37 seconds, l minute 16 seconds, 1 minutes 35 | |
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submitted the statement to Congress, Cohen and the President's personal counsel had numerous | |
contacts by phone, including calls lasting three, four, six, eleven, and eighteen minutes.989 Cohen | |
recalled telling the President's personal counsel, who did not have first-hand knowledge of the | |
project, that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement, | |
including that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with | |
candidate Trump than the statement reflected.99° Cohen stated that the President's personal | |
counsel responded that it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project | |
did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and "tight" and the matter would | |
soon come to an end.99l Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel said "his client" | |
appreciated Cohen, that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the President, that there | |
was no need to muddy the water, and that it was time to move 0n.992 Cohen said he agreed because | |
it was what he was expected to d0.993 After Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false statements | |
to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, this Office sought to speak with the | |
President's personal counsel about these conversations with Cohen, but counsel declined, citing | |
potential privilege COIlC€I°l'lS.994 | |
At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a | |
source for a Washington Post story published on August 27, 2017, that reported in depth for the | |
first time that the Trump Organization was "pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower | |
in Moscow" at the same time as candidate Trump was "running for president in late 2015 and early | |
2016."995 The article reported that "the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016, just | |
before the presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal said."996 Cohen | |
recalled that in speaking to the Post, he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased | |
in January 2016.997 | |
seconds, 6 minutes 16 seconds, I minutes 10 seconds, 3 minutes 5 seconds, 18 minutes 55 seconds, 4 | |
minutes 56 seconds, l I minutes 6 seconds, 8 seconds, 3 seconds, 2 seconds, 2 seconds). | |
989 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5, Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting 14 contacts on August | |
27, 2017 (28 seconds, 4 minutes 37 seconds, I minute 16 seconds, I minutes 35 seconds; 6 minutes 16 | |
seconds, I minutes 10 seconds, 3 minutes 5 seconds, 18 minutes 55 seconds, 4 minutes 56 seconds, II | |
minutes 6 seconds, 8 seconds, 3 seconds, 2 seconds, 2 seconds)). | |
990 Cohen 11/20/1 8 302, at 5. | |
991 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. Cohen also vaguely recalled telling the President's personal counsel | |
that he spoke with a woman from the Kremlin and that the President's personal counsel responded to the | |
effect of "so what'?" because the deal never happened. Cohen l 1/20/18 302, at 5. | |
992 Cohen 1 U20/I 8 302, at 5. | |
993 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5. | |
994 2/8/19 email, Counsel for personal counsel to the President to Special Counsel's Office. | |
995 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7, Carol D. Leon rig et al., Trump 's business sought deal on a Trump | |
Tower in Moscow while he ranforpresidenl, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017). | |
996 Carol D. Leon rig et al., Trump 's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he | |
ranforpresident, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017). | |
997 Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7. | |
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U.S. Department of Justice | |
Attorney Work Froduct // May Contain Material Frotcctcd Under Fed. R. Crim. F. 6(0) | |
stand for."!014 Cohen said that after the searches he was concerned that he was "an open book," | |
that he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to "come out," and that his false | |
statements to Congress were "a big concern."!°!5 | |
A few days after the searches, the President called Cohen.1016 According to Cohen, the | |
President said he wanted to "check in" and asked if Cohen was okay, and the President encouraged | |
Cohen to "hang in there" and "stay strong."1°l7 Cohen also recalled that following the searches he | |
heard from individuals who were in touch with the President and relayed to Cohen the President's | |
support for him.1018 Cohen recalled that_, a friend of the President's, reached out | |
to say that he was with "the Boss" in Mar-a-La o and the President had said "he loves you" and | |
not to W0n.y.I019 Cohen recalled that for the Trump | |
Organization, told him, "the boss loves you And Cohen said that , a friend | |
of the President's, told him, "everyone knows the boss has your back. | |
On or about April 17, 2018, Cohen began speaking with an attorney, Robert Costello, who | |
had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, one of the President's personal lawyers.1022 | |
Costello told Cohen that he had a "back channel of communication" to Giuliani, and that Giuliani | |
had said the "channel" was "crucial" and "must be maintained."!023 On April 20, 2018, the New | |
York Times published an article about the President's relationship with and treatment ofCohen.I024 | |
The President responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not "flip": | |
The New York Times and a third rate reporter ... are going out of their way to destroy | |
Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will 'flip.' They use non- | |
existent 'sources' and a drunk/drugged up loser who hates Michael, a fine person with a | |
wonderful family. Michael is a businessman for his own account/lawyer who I have always | |
liked & respected. Most people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble, even | |
1014 Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House | |
(Apr. 9, 2018). | |
1015 Cohen, 10/17/18 302, at 11. | |
1016 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4. | |
1017 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4. | |
1018 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. | |
1019 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. | |
1020 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1 1. | |
1021 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11. | |
1022 4/17/18 Email, Citron to Cohen, 4/19/18 Email, Costello to Cohen, MC-SCO-001 (ww18 | |
redacted billing statement from Davidoff, Hutcher & Citron to Cohen). | |
1023 4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen. | |
1024 See Maggie Haberman et al., Michael Cohen Has Said He Would Take a Bullet for Trump. | |
Maybe Not Anymore., New York Times (Apr. 20, 2018). | |
146 | |
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if it means lying or making up stories. Sorry, I don't see Michael doing that despite the | |
horrible Witch Hunt and the dishonest media!1025 | |
In an email that day to Cohen, Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuliani.l026 Costello told | |
Cohen the conversation was "Very Very Positive[.] You are 'loved'... they are in our corner.... | |
Sleep well tonight[], you have friends in high places."1027 | |
Cohen said that following these messages he believed he had the support of the White | |
House if he continued to toe the party line, and he determined to stay on message and be part of | |
the team.l028 At the time, Cohen's understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump | |
Organization, which he said was important to h1m_l029 Cohen believed he needed the power of the | |
President to take care of him, so he needed to defend the President and stay on message.!°3° | |
Cohen also recalled speaking with the President's personal counsel about pardons after the | |
searches of his home and office had occurred, at a time when the media had reported that pardon | |
discussions were occurring at the White House.l03l Cohen told the President's personal counsel | |
he had been a loyal lawyer and servant, and he said that after the searches he was in an | |
uncomfortable position and wanted to know what was in it for him.1032 According to Cohen, the | |
President's personal counsel responded that Cohen should stay on message, that the investigation | |
was a witch hunt, and that everything would be 5i€.1033 Cohen understood based on this | |
conversation and previous conversations about pardons with the President's personal counsel that | |
as long as he stayed on message, he would be taken care of by the President, either through a | |
pardon or through the investigation being shut down.!034 | |
1025 @realDonaldTrump 4/21/18 (9:l0 a.m. ET) Tweets. | |
1026 4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen. | |
4/21/18 Email. Costello to Cohen | |
1028 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1 1. | |
'°2" Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10. | |
1030 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 10. | |
1031 Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 7. At a White House press briefing on April 23, 2018, in response to a | |
question about whether the White House had "close[d] the door one way or the other on the President | |
pardoning Michael Cohen," Sanders said, "It's hard to close the door on something that hasn't taken place. | |
I don't like to discuss or comment on hypothetical situations that may or may not ever happen. I would | |
refer you to personal attorneys to comment on anything specific regarding that case, but we don't have | |
anything at this point." Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Apr. 23, 2018). | |
1032 Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 7, Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3. | |
1033 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3. | |
1034 Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3-4. | |
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Attorney Work Profiuet // May-Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. F. 6(0) | |
stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?) He even retained Bill | |
and Crooked Hillary's lawyer. Gee, I wonder if they helped him make the choice!"I043 | |
On August 21 , 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to eight | |
felony charges, including two counts of campaign-finance violations based on the payments he | |
had made during the final weeks of the campaign to women who said they had affairs with the | |
President.I044 During the plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked "at the direction of" the | |
candidate in making those payments.l°45 The next day, the President contrasted Cohen's | |
cooperation with Manafort's refusal to cooperate, tweeting, "I feel very badly for Paul Manafort | |
and his wonderful family. 'Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied | |
tremendous pressure on him and, unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to 'break'-make up stories | |
in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for a brave man!"'°4° | |
On September 17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to the President that | |
included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and attached Cohen's written | |
statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed by the President.1047 Among other issues, | |
the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with | |
Cohen about the project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the | |
President "at any time direct[ed] or suggest[ed] that discussions about the Trump Moscow project | |
should cease," or whether the President was "informed at any time that the project had been | |
abandoned."I048 | |
On November 20, 2018, the President submitted written responses that did not answer those | |
questions about Trump Tower Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the | |
timing of the candidate's discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he participated in | |
any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued.'°49 Instead, the | |
President's answers stated in relevant part: | |
I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and | |
they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not recall any | |
discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with | |
1043 @realDonaldTrump 7/27/ I 8 (7:26 a.m. ET) Tweet, @realDonaldTrump7/27/18 (7:38 a.m. ET) | |
Tweet, @real DonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56 a.m. ET) Tweet. At the time of these tweets, the press had | |
reported that Cohen's financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by investigators. | |
See, kg. , Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model, | |
New York Times (July 20, 2018). | |
1044 Cohen Information. | |
1045 Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript, at 23 . | |
1046 @realDonaldTrump 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
1047 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written | |
questions for the President, with attachments). | |
1048 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written | |
questions for the President), Question III, Parts (a) through (g). | |
1049 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 20]8). | |
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anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware | |
at the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian | |
government official regarding the Letter of Intent.'°°° | |
On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress | |
based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project.!05l In a plea agreement with this | |
Office, Cohen agreed to "provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which | |
this Office deems relevant."!052 Later on November 29, after Cohen's guilty plea had become | |
public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project, saying: | |
I decided not to do the project.... I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have | |
been nothing wrong iI did do it. If] did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That | |
was my business.... It was an option that I decided not to do.... I decided not to do it. | |
The primary reason ... I was focused on running for President.... I was running my | |
business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn't have won, in | |
which case I would've gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of | |
opportunities'?l053 | |
The President also said that Cohen was "a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people | |
that you watch-he is a weak person. And what he's trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So | |
he's lying about a project that everybody knew about."'°54 The President also brought up Cohen's | |
written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project: "So here's the story: | |
Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and/or | |
Senate. It talked about his position."I055 The President added, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it | |
doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign."l056 | |
In light of the President's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea that he "decided | |
not to do the project," this Office again sought information from the President about whether he | |
participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including | |
when he "decided not to do the project," who he spoke to about that decision, and what motivated | |
1050 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 20 I 8), at 15 (Response to Question III, Parts | |
(a) through (g)). | |
1051 Cohen Information, Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript. | |
1052 Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (s.D.n.y. Nov. 29, 2018). | |
1053 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). In contrast to the President's | |
remarks following Cohen's guilty plea, Cohen's August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen, | |
not the President, "decided to abandon the proposal" in late January 2016, that Cohen "did not ask or brief | |
Mr. Trump ... before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal", and that the decision | |
to abandon the proposal was "unrelated" to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D. | |
Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 20l7)). | |
1054 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). | |
1055 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). | |
1056 President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). | |
150 | |
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family members had committed crimes. In an interview on Fox on January 12, 2019, the President | |
was asked whether he was worried about Cohen's testimony and responded: | |
[I]n order to get his sentence reduced, [Cohen] says "I have an idea, I'll ah, tell-I'll give | |
you some information on the president." Well, there is no information. But he should give | |
information maybe on his father-in-law because that 's the one that people want to look at | |
because where does that money-that's the money in the family. And I guess he dion 't | |
want to talk abou! his father-in-law, he's trying to get his sentence reduced. So it's ah, | |
pretty sad. You know, it's weak and it's very sad to watch a thing like that.!065 | |
On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted, "Kevin Corke, @Fox news 'Don't forget, | |
Michael Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the | |
Wall Street Journal has suggested that he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars....' Lying | |
to reduce his jail time! Watchfather-in-law!"l066 | |
On January 23, 2019, Cohen postponed his congressional testimony, citing threats against | |
his family.!°67 The next day, the President tweeted, "So interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen, | |
who sadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of Crooked Hillary Clinton | |
to represent him-Gee, how did that happen?"!068 | |
Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen's | |
account that the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project well past January | |
2016. Giuliani stated that "it's our understanding that [discussions about the Trump Moscow | |
project] went on throughout 2016. Weren't a lot of them, but there were conversations. Can't be | |
sure of the exact date. But the president can remember having conversations with him about it. | |
... The president also remembers-yeah, probably up--could be up to as far as October, | |
November."1069 In an interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the President as saying | |
that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were "going on from the day I | |
announced to the day I won."'°7° On January 21 , 2019, Giuliani issued a statement that said: "My | |
recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and | |
I candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow 'project' were hypothetical and not | |
based on conversations I had with the president."1071 | |
1065 Jeanine Pirro Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Jan. 12, 2019) (emphasis added). | |
1066 @real DonaldTrump 1/18/19 (10:02 a.m. ET) Tweet (emphasis added). | |
1067 Statement by Lanny Davis, Cohen's personal counsel (Jan. 23, 2019). | |
was @real DonaldTrump 1/24/19 (7:48 a.m. ET) Tweet. | |
1069 Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani, NBC (Jan. 20, 2019). | |
1070 Mark Mazzetti et al., Moscow Skyscraper Talks Continued Through "the Day I Won, " Trump | |
Is Said to Acknowledge, New York Times (Jan. 20, 2019). | |
1071 Maggie Haberman, Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments Were "Hypothetical ", | |
New York Times (Jan. 21, 2019). In a letter to this Office, the President's counsel stated that Giuliani's | |
public comments "were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge of the existence or timing | |
152 | |
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Analysis | |
In analyzing the President's conduct related to Cohen, the following evidence is relevant | |
to the elements of obstruction of justice. | |
a. Obstructive act. We gathered evidence of the President's conduct related to Cohen | |
on two issues: (i) whether the President or others aided or participated in Cohen's false statements | |
to Congress, and (ii) whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to | |
prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to the government. | |
i. First, with regard to Cohen's false statements to Congress, while there is | |
evidence, described below, that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress | |
about the Trump Tower Moscow project, the evidence available to us does not establish that the | |
President directed or aided Cohen's false testimony. | |
Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a "party line" that developed within | |
the campaign to align with the President's public statements distancing the President from Russia. | |
Cohen also recalled that, in speaking with the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear | |
that he would stay on message-which Cohen believed they both understood would require false | |
testimony. But Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen's | |
testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false, and the President did | |
not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the | |
specifics of his planned testimony. During the time when his statement to Congress was being | |
drafted and circulated to members of the JDA, Cohen did not speak directly to the President about | |
the statement, but rather communicated with the President's personal counsel-as corroborated by | |
phone records showing extensive communications between Cohen and the President's personal | |
counsel before Cohen submitted his statement and when he testified before Congress. | |
Cohen recalled that in his discussions with the President's personal counsel on August 27, | |
2017-the day before Cohen's statement was submitted to Congress-Cohen said that there were | |
more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the | |
statement reflected. Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen, | |
the President's personal counsel-who did not have first-hand knowledge of the project- | |
responded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water, that it was unnecessary to include | |
those details because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short | |
and tight, not elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen's recollection | |
of the content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen's | |
draft statement that appeared to come from members of the JDA. For example, Cohen omitted | |
any reference to his outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump | |
and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of | |
of conversations beyond that contained in the President's [written responses to the Special Counsel's | |
Office]." 2/6/19 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office. | |
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the JDA to delete the sentence, "The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian | |
government officials." | |
The President's personal counsel declined to provide us with his account of his | |
conversations with Cohen, and there is no evidence available to us that indicates that the President | |
was aware of the information Cohen provided to the President's personal counsel. The President's | |
conversations with his personal counsel were presumptively protected by attorney-client privilege, | |
and we did not seek to obtain the contents of any such communications. The absence of evidence | |
about the President and his counsel's conversations about the drafting of Cohen's statement | |
precludes us from assessing what, if any, role the President played. | |
ii. Second, we considered whether the President took actions that would have | |
the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal | |
investigators or to Congress. | |
Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately | |
urged Cohen to stay on message and not "flip." Cohen recalled the President's personal counsel | |
telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go "rogue." In the days and weeks | |
that followed the April 2018 searches of Cohen's home and office, the President told reporters that | |
Cohen was a "good man" and said he was "a fine person with a wonderful family ... who I have | |
always liked & respected." Privately, the President told Cohen to "hang in there" and "stay | |
strong." People who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that | |
"the President loves you," "the boss loves you," and "everyone knows the boss has your back." | |
Through the President's personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen "thanks | |
for what you do" after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that, | |
according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew was false. At that time, the Trump | |
Organization continued to pay Cohen's legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohen also | |
recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the President's personal counsel, who told him | |
to stay on message and everything would be fine. The President indicated in his public statements | |
that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated publicly that "[m]ost people will flip if the | |
Government lets them out of trouble" but that he "d[idn't] see Michael doing that." | |
After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the | |
President accused Cohen of "mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam | |
(Taxi cabs maybe?)," called Cohen a "rat," and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that | |
Cohen's family members had committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events | |
could support an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages | |
in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the | |
provision of information or undermine Cohen's credibility once Cohen began cooperating. | |
b. Nexus to an official proceeding. The Fresident's relevant conduct towards Cohen | |
occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel's Office, Congress, and the U.S. Attorney's | |
Office for the Southern District of New York were investigating Cohen's conduct. The President | |
acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate | |
with the government investigations. | |
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c. Intent. In analyzing the President's intent in his actions towards Cohen as a | |
potential witness, there is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to | |
discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen's information would shed | |
adverse light on the President's campaign-period conduct and statements. | |
i. Cohen's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow | |
project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit | |
the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations-a goal that was in the President's interest, as | |
reflected by the President's own statements. During and after the campaign, the President made | |
repeated statements that he had "no business" in Russia and said that there were "no deals that | |
could happen in Russia, because we've stayed away." As Cohen knew, and as he recalled | |
communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen's pursuit of the Trump Tower | |
Moscow project cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements. | |
In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with | |
candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow project, that the | |
conversations continued through at least June 2016, and that he discussed with Trump possible | |
travel to Russia to pursue the project. The conversations were not off-hand, according to Cohen, | |
because the project had the potential to be so lucrative. In addition, text messages to and from | |
Cohen and other records further establish that Cohen's efforts to advance the project did not end | |
in January 2016 and that in May and June 2016, Cohen was considering the timing for possible | |
trips to Russia by him and Trump in connection with the project. | |
The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the | |
time of Cohen's false statements to Congress. Cohen discussed the project with the President in | |
early 2017 following media inquiries. Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, the day after | |
he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress-which said the project "was terminated | |
in January of 20l 6"-the President's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with | |
what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow. And after Cohen's guilty plea, the President | |
told reporters that he had ultimately decided not to do the project, which supports the inference | |
that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period during the Campaign | |
in which the project W2lS being pursued. | |
ii. The President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also suggest | |
that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump | |
Tower Moscow project. At the time the President submitted written answers to questions from | |
this Office about the project and other subjects, the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating | |
with the government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress. | |
Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided | |
to the government. In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing | |
and substance of his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had | |
decided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the President publicly | |
stated that he had personally made the decision to abandon the project. The President then declined | |
to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our Office or answer additional questions. The content and | |
timing of the President's provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the | |
Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the | |
information that Cohen could provide as a witness. | |
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iii. The President's concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed | |
at the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings | |
with Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There also is some evidence | |
that the President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's stated belief | |
that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser | |
sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct. The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen, | |
refused to "break" and "make up stories in order to get a 'deal."' And after Cohen pleaded guilty | |
to making false statements to Congress, the President said, "what [Cohen]'s trying to do is get a | |
reduced sentence. So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about." But the President | |
also appeared to defend the underlying conduct, saying, "Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't | |
matter because l was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign." As described above, | |
there is evidence that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump | |
Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize the President's | |
connections to Russia during the campaign. | |
iv. Finally, the President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's | |
family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as | |
an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen | |
or others. It is possible that the President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen "ma[d]e[] | |
up stories" in order to get a deal for himself and "get his wife and father-in-law ... off Scott Free." | |
lt also is possible that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-law were not intended | |
to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting | |
Cohen and deflecting attention away from the President on Cohen-related matters. But the | |
President's suggestion that Cohen's family members committed crimes happened more than once, | |
including just before Cohen was sentenced (at the same time as the President stated that Cohen | |
"should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence") and again just before Cohen was | |
scheduled to testify before Congress. The timing of the statements supports an inference that they | |
were intended at least in part to discourage Cohen from further cooperation. | |
L. Overarching Factual Issues | |
Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination | |
decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of the facts | |
concerning the President's course of conduct. | |
1. Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction-of- | |
justice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. | |
First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate | |
the President's constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-of-justice issues. | |
Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the President's Article II authority, which | |
raised constitutional issues that we address in Volume II, Section IILB, infra. A factual analysis | |
of that conduct would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially lawful | |
and that his position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with unique and powerful | |
means of influencing official proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses. | |
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Second, many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying | |
crime. Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper | |
obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (Zd Cir. l988), or that | |
he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding, see, e.g., United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d | |
558, 591 (2d Cir. 2015). But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense. | |
See United States v. Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating, in applying the obstruction | |
sentencing guideline, that "obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the | |
prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying | |
crime"). Obstruction of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal | |
interests, to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area, | |
or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same | |
regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong. | |
In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an | |
underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range | |
of other possible personal motives animating the President's conduct. These include concerns that | |
continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential | |
uncertainty about whether certain events-such as advance notice of WikiLeaks's release of` | |
hacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians- | |
could be seen as criminal activity by the President, his campaign, or his family. | |
Third, many of the President's acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of | |
cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, occurred in public | |
view. While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were motivated by a | |
corrupt intent, the President's power to influence actions, persons, and events is enhanced by his | |
unique ability to attract attention through use of mass communications. And no principle of law | |
excludes public acts from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to | |
intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony, the justice system's integrity is equally threatened. | |
2. Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts-e.g., the President's | |
statement to Comey about the Flynn investigation, his termination of Comey, and his efforts to | |
remove the Special Counsel-it is important to view the President's pattern of conduct as a whole. | |
That pattern sheds light on the nature of the President's acts and the inferences that can be drawn | |
about his intent. | |
a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exerting | |
undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and | |
obstruction investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in | |
which the President sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions | |
ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney | |
General's recusal, to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation, to | |
direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing | |
the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. For example, the President's | |
direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediately by | |
his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia | |
investigation to prospective election-interference only-a temporal connection that suggests that | |
both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation. | |
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The President's efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is | |
largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede | |
to his requests. Comey did not end the investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn's | |
prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI. McGahn did not tell the Acting Attorney General | |
that the Special Counsel must be removed, but was instead prepared to resign over the President's | |
order. Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President's message to Sessions that he | |
should confine the Russia investigation to future election meddling only. And McGahn refused to | |
recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President's direction to have the Special | |
Counsel removed, despite the President's multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that | |
pattern, the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the | |
President's aides and associates beyond those already filed. | |
b. In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, the President's actions can | |
be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. In the | |
first phase, before the President fired Comey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not | |
opened an investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make | |
public that he was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination | |
letter to Comey after other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful. | |
Soon after he fired Comey, however, the President became aware that investigators were | |
conducting an obstruction-of-justice inquiry into his own conduct. That awareness marked a | |
significant change in the President's conduct and the start of a second phase of action. The | |
President launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could | |
possess evidence adverse to the President, while in private, the President engaged in a series of | |
targeted efforts to control the investigation. For instance, the President attempted to remove the | |
Special Counsel, he sought to have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself and limit the | |
investigation, he sought to prevent public disclosure of information about the June 9, 20 16 meeting | |
between Russians and campaign officials, and he used public forums to attack potential witnesses | |
who might offer adverse information and to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the | |
government. Judgments about the nature of the President's motives during each phase would be | |
informed by the totality of the evidence. | |
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III. LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To | |
THE PRESIDENT | |
The President's personal counsel has written to this Office to advance statutory and | |
constitutional defenses to the potential application of the obstruction-of-justice statutes to the | |
President's conduct.l°72 As a statutory matter, the President's counsel has argued that a core | |
obstruction-of-justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § l5l2(c)(2), does not cover the President's actions.1073 | |
As a constitutional matter, the President's counsel argued that the President cannot obstructjustice | |
by exercising his constitutional authority to close Department of Justice investigations or terminate | |
the FBI Director.1074 Under that view, any statute that restricts the President's exercise of those | |
powers would impermissibly intrude on the President's constitutional role. The President's | |
counsel has conceded that the President may be subject to criminal laws that do not directly involve | |
exercises of his Article II authority, such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborning | |
perjury.1075 But counsel has made a categorical argument that "the President's exercise of his | |
constitutional authority here to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot | |
constitutionally constitute obstruction ofjustice."'076 | |
In analyzing counsel's statutory arguments, we concluded that the President's proposed | |
interpretation of Section l5l2(c)(2) is contrary to the litigating position of the Department of | |
Justice and is not supported by principles of statutory construction. | |
As for the constitutional arguments, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the | |
courts have not definitively resolved these constitutional issues. We therefore analyzed the | |
President's position through the framework of Supreme Court precedent addressing the separation | |
of powers. Under that framework, we concluded, Article It of the Constitution does not | |
categorically and permanently immunize the President from potential liability for the conduct that | |
we investigated. Rather, our analysis led us to conclude that the obstruction-of-justice statutes can | |
1072 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, see also 1/29/18 | |
Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, 2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal | |
Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's | |
Office, at 4. | |
1073 2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2-9. Counsel has | |
also noted that other potentially applicable obstruction statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1505, protect only | |
pending proceedings. 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 7-8. | |
Section 15l2(c)(2) is not limited to pending proceedings, but also applies to future proceedings that the | |
person contemplated. See Volume II, Section lll.A, supra. | |
1074 6/23/ 17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at l ("[T]he President | |
cannot obstruct ... by simply exercising these inherent Constitutional powers."). | |
1075 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n. 1. | |
1076 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n.l (dashes | |
omitted), see also 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 4 ("[T]he | |
obstruction-of-j ustice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potential liability based on facially | |
lawful acts undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article 11 discretionary authority to | |
remove principal officers or carry out the prosecution function."). | |
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validly prohibit a President's corrupt efforts to use his official powers to curtail, end, or interfere | |
with an investigation. | |
A. Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justiee Provisions to | |
the Conduct Under Investigation | |
The obstruction-of-justice statute most readily applicable to our investigation is 18 U.S.C. | |
§ 1512(c)(2). Section l5l2(c) provides: | |
(c) Whoever corruptly- | |
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or | |
attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for | |
use in an official proceeding, or | |
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts | |
to do so, | |
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. | |
The Department of Justice has taken the position that Section l512(c)(2) states a broad, | |
independent, and unqualified prohibition on obstruction of justice.!077 While defendants have | |
argued that subsection (c)(2) should be read to cover only acts that would impair the availability | |
or integrity of evidence because that is subsection (c)(l)'s focus, strong arguments weigh against | |
that proposed limitation. The text of Section l5l2(c)(2) confirms that its sweep is not tethered to | |
Section l5l2(c)(l); courts have so interpreted it, its history does not counsel otherwise, and no | |
principle of statutory construction dictates a contrary view. On its face, therefore, Section | |
l5l2(c)(2) applies to all corrupt means of obstructing a proceeding, pending or contemplated- | |
including by improper exercises of official power. In addition, other statutory provisions that are | |
potentially applicable to certain conduct we investigated broadly prohibit obstruction of | |
proceedings that are pending before courts, grand juries, and Congress. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, | |
1505. Congress has also specifically prohibited witness tampering. See 18 U.S.C. § 15 l2(b). | |
l. The Text of Section l512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts | |
Several textual features of Section l5l2(c)(2) support the conclusion that the provision | |
broadly prohibits corrupt means of obstructing justice and is not limited by the more specific | |
prohibitions in Section 15 l2(c)(l), which focus on evidence impairment. | |
First, the text of Section l5l2(c)(2) is unqualified: it reaches acts that "obstruct[], | |
influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding" when committed "corruptly." Nothing in Section | |
l5l2(c)(2)'s text limits the provision to acts that would impair the integrity or availability of | |
evidence for use in an official proceeding. In contrast, Section l5l2(c)(l) explicitly includes the | |
requirement that the defendant act "with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability | |
1077 See U.S. Br., United States v. Kumar, Nos. 06-5482-cr(L), 06-5654~cr(CON) (2d Cir. filed | |
Oct. 26, 2007), at pp. 15-28, United States v. Singleton, Nos. H-04-CR-5 l4SS, H-06-cr-80 (S.D. Tex. filed | |
June 5, 2006). | |
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for use in an official proceeding," a requirement that Congress also included in two other sections | |
of Section 1512. See 18 U.S.C. §§ l 5l2(a)(2)(B)(ii) (use of physical force with intent to cause a | |
person to destroy an object "with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use | |
in an official proceeding"), l 5l2(b)(2)(B) (use of intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, or | |
misleading conduct with intent to cause a person to destroy an object "with intent to impair the | |
integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding"). But no comparable intent | |
or conduct element focused on evidence impairment appears in Section l5l2(c)(2). The intent | |
element in Section l5l2(c)(2) comes from the word "corruptly." See, e.g., United States v. | |
McKibbins, 656 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 201 l) ("The intent element is important because the word | |
'corruptly' is what serves to separate criminal and innocent acts of obstruction.") (internal | |
quotation marks omitted). And the conduct element in Section l5l2(c)(2) is "obstruct[ing], | |
in fluenc[ing], or imped[ing]" a proceeding. Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in | |
the disparate inclusion and exclusion of evidence-impairment language. See Lo ughrin v. United | |
States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (20l4) ("[W]hen 'Congress includes particular language in one section | |
of a statute but omits it in another'-let alone in the very next provision-this Court 'presume[s] ' | |
that Congress intended a difference in meaning") (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, | |
23 (1983)), accord Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (20l8). | |
Second, the structure of Section 1512 supports the conclusion that Section l5l2(c)(2) | |
defines an independent offense. Section l5l2(c)(2) delineates a complete crime with different | |
elements from Section l5l2(c)(l)-and each subsection of Section l512(c) contains its own | |
"attempt" prohibition, underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. The two subsections | |
of Section l5l2(c) are connected by the conjunction "or," indicating that each provides an | |
alternative basis for criminal liability. See Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357 ("ordinary use [of 'or'] is | |
almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings") | |
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Lo ughrin, for example, the Supreme Court relied on the use | |
of the word "or" to hold that adjacent and overlapping subsections of the bank fraud statute, 18 | |
U.S.C. § 1344, state distinct offenses and that subsection l 344(2) therefore should not be | |
interpreted to contain an additional element specified only in subsection l344(l). Id, see also | |
Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 465-469 (2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the | |
bank fraud statute "overlap substantially" but identifying distinct circumstances covered by | |
each).I078 And here, as in Loughrin, Section 15 l2(c)'s "two clauses have separate numbers, line | |
breaks before, between, and after them, and equivalent indentation-thus placing the clauses | |
visually on an equal footing and indicating that they have separate meanings." 573 U.S. at 359. | |
Third, the introductory word "otherwise" in Section l5l2(c)(2) signals that the provision | |
covers obstructive acts that are different from those listed in Section 15 l2(c)( l). See Black's Law | |
Dictionary l lol (6th ed. 1990) ("othewvise" means "in a different manner, in another way, or in | |
other ways"), see also, e.g., American Heritage College Dictionary Online ("l. In another way, | |
1078 The Office of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interpretive principles in | |
concluding that language that appeared in the first clause of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, restricting its | |
prohibition against certain betting or wagering activities to "any sporting event or contest," did not apply | |
to the second clause of the same statute, which reaches other betting or wagering activities. See | |
Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling (Nov. 2, 2018), slip op. 7 (relying | |
on plain language), id. at II (finding it not "tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier 'on any | |
sporting event or contest' that appears in the first clause"), id. at 12 (relying on Digital Realty). | |
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differently, 2. Under other circumstances"), see also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 | |
(1936) (characterizing "otherwise" as a "broad term" and holding that a statutory prohibition on | |
kidnapping "for ransom or reward or otherwise" is not limited by the words "ransom" and | |
"reward" to kidnappings for pecuniary benefits), Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 200 (2d | |
Cir. 2004) (construing "otherwise" in 28 U.S.C. § 2466(l)(C) to reach beyond the "specific | |
examples" listed in prior subsections, thereby covering the "myriad means that human ingenuity | |
might devise to permit a person to avoid the jurisdiction of a court"), of Begay v. United States, | |
553 U.S. 137, 144 (2006) (recognizing that "otherwise" is defined to mean "in a different way or | |
manner," and holding that the word "otherwise" introducing the residual clause in the Armed | |
Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), can, but need not necessarily, "refer to a crime | |
that is similar to the listed examples in some respects but different in others").!°79 The purpose of | |
the word "otherwise" in Section l5l2(c)(2) is therefore to clarify that the provision covers | |
obstructive acts other than the destruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its | |
integrity or availability, which is the conduct addressed in Section l5l2(c)(l). The word | |
"otherwise" does not signal that Section l5l2(c)(2) has less breadth in covering obstructive | |
conduct than the language of the provision implies. | |
2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section l512(c)(2) | |
Courts have not limited Section l5l2(c)(2) to conduct that impairs evidence, but instead | |
have read it to cover obstructive acts in any form. | |
As one court explained, "[t]his expansive subsection operates as a catch-all to cover | |
'otherwise' obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific offense like document | |
destruction, which is listed in (c)(l)." United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 286 (7th Cir. | |
2014) (some quotation marks omitted). For example, in United States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d | |
195 (D.D.C. 2009), the court rejected the argument that "§ l512(c)(2)'s reference to conduct that | |
'otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding' is limited to conduct that is | |
similar to the type of conduct proscribed by subsection (c)(l)-namely, conduct that impairs the | |
integrity or availability of 'record[s], documents[s], or other object[s] for use in an official | |
proceeding." Id. at 224. The court explained that "the meaning of § l5l2(c)(2) is plain on its | |
face." Id (alternations in original). And courts have upheld convictions under Section 1512(c)(2) | |
that did not involve evidence impairment, but instead resulted from conduct that more broadly | |
thwarted arrests or investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. | |
2017) (police officer tipped off suspects about issuance of arrest warrants before "outstanding | |
warrants could be executed, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury | |
proceeding"), United States v. Ahrensfeld, 698 F.3d 1310, 1324-1326 (10th Cir. 2012) (officer | |
disclosed existence of an undercover investigation to its target), United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d | |
1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009) (defendant disclosed identity of an undercover officer thus preventing | |
him from making controlled purchases from methamphetamine dealers). Those cases illustrate | |
that Section l5l2(c)(2) applies to corrupt acts-including by public officials-that frustrate the | |
1079 In Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. I, 15 (201 I), the Supreme Court substantially abandoned | |
Begay's reading of the residual clause, and in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Court | |
invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Begay's analysis of the word "otherwise" is | |
thus of limited value. | |
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commencement or conduct of a proceeding, and not just to acts that make evidence unavailable or | |
impair its integrity. | |
Section 15 l2(c)(2)'s breadth is reinforced by the similarity of its language to the omnibus | |
clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which covers anyone who "corruptly ... obstructs, or impedes, or | |
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice." That clause of | |
Section 1503 follows two more specific clauses that protect jurors, judges, and court officers. The | |
omnibus clause has nevertheless been construed to be "far more general in scope than the earlier | |
clauses of the statute." United State5 v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). "The omnibus clause | |
is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due | |
administration ofjustice." United.S'tates v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1275 (1 lth Cir. 1997). Courts | |
have accordingly given it a "non-restrictive reading." United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 620 | |
(2d Cir. 2010), id at 620 n.7 (collecting cases from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh | |
Circuits). As one court has explained, the omnibus clause "prohibits acts that are similar in result, | |
rather than manner, to the conduct described in the first part of the statute." United States v. | |
Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978). While the specific clauses "forbid certain means | |
of obstructing justice ... the omnibus clause aims at obstruction ofjustice itself, regardless of the | |
means used to reach that result." Id (collecting cases). Given the similarity of Section 1512(c)(2) | |
to Section 1503's omnibus clause, Congress would have expected Section 15 l 2(c)(2) to cover acts | |
that produced a similar result to the evidence-impairment provisions-i.e., the result of obstructing | |
justice-rather than covering only acts that were similar in manner. Read this way, Section | |
l5l2(c)(2) serves a distinct function in the federal obstruction-of-justice statutes: it captures | |
corrupt conduct, other than document destruction, that has the natural tendency to obstruct | |
contemplated as well as pending proceedings. | |
Section l512(c)(2) overlaps with other obstruction statutes, but it does not render them | |
superfluous. Section 1503, for example, which covers pending grand jury and judicial | |
proceedings, and Section 1505, which covers pending administrative and congressional | |
proceedings, reach "endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede" the proceedings-a broader test | |
for inchoate violations than Section 15l2(c)(2)'s "attempt" standard, which requires a substantial | |
step towards a completed offense. See United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir. 20 l8) | |
("[E]fforts to witness tamper that rise to the level of an 'endeavor' yet fall short of an 'attempt' | |
cannot be prosecuted under § l5l2."), United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th | |
Cir. 1988) (collect ,en the "endeavor" and "attempt" | |
standards). And 9 lotion of documents or records in lllm | |
contemplation of as uire the "nexus" showing under | |
Aguilar, which Se ella Muni States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, | |
I 712 (8th Cir. 2011) Section 1519] can be present even | |
I if the accused lack Iillnl . h .. obstructing the matter."), United | |
States v. Gray, 6421 acting § 1519, Congress rejected | |
any requirement that the government prove a link between a defendant's conduct and an imminent | |
or pending official proceeding."). The existence of even "substantial" overlap is not "uncommon" | |
in criminal statutes. Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 359 n.4, see Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 458-469, Aguilar, 5 15 | |
U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The fact that there is now some overlap between § 1503 and | |
§ 1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause | |
of § 1503 and the other provisions of § 1503 itself."). But given that Sections 1503, 1505, and | |
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1519 each reach conduct that Section 15 l 2(c)(2) does not, the overlap provides no reason to give | |
Section 15 l 2(c)(2) an artificially limited construction. See Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 469.1080 | |
3. The Legislative History of Section 15 l 2(c)(2) Does Not Jus_tify Narrowing Its | |
Text | |
"Given the straightforward statutory command" in Section 15 l2(c)(2), "there is no reason | |
to resort to legislative history." United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. l, 6 (I997). In any event, the | |
legislative history of Section I 5l2(c)(2) is not a reason to impose extratextual limitations on its | |
reach. | |
Congress enacted Section 15 12(c)(2) as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. | |
107-204, Tit. XI, § 1102, 116 Stat. 807. The relevant section of the statute was entitled | |
"Tampering with a Record or Otherwise Impeding an Official Proceeding." 116 Stat. 807 | |
(emphasis added). That title indicates that Congress intended the two clauses to have independent | |
effect. Section 1512(c) was added as a floor amendment in the Senate and explained as closing a | |
certain "loophole" with respect to "document shredding." See 148 Cong. Rec. $6545 (July 10, | |
2002) (Sen. Lott), id. at S6549-S6550 (Sen. Hatch). But those explanations do not limit the enacted | |
text. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988) ("[1]t is not the law that a | |
statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history."), see also | |
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (2018) ("Even if Congress did not | |
foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair | |
reading."). The floor statements thus cannot detract from the meaning of the enacted text. See | |
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) ("Floor statements from two Senators | |
.cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason to give greater | |
weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses, which are | |
memorialized in the unambiguous statutory text."). That principle has particular force where one | |
of the proponents of the amendment to Section 1512 introduced his remarks as only "briefly | |
e1aborat[ing] on some of the specific provisions contained in this bill." 148 Cong. Rec. $6550 | |
(Sen. Hatch). | |
Indeed, the language Congress used in Section l5l2(c)(2)-prohibiting "corruptly ... | |
obstruct[ing], in fluenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding" or attempting to do so- | |
parallels a provision that Congress considered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen | |
protections against witness tampering and obstruction ofjustice. While the earlier provision is not | |
a direct antecedent of Section l5l2(c)(2), Congress's understanding of the broad scope of the | |
10s0 The Supreme Court's decision in Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 110] (2018), does not | |
support imposing a non-textual limitation on Section 15 l2(c)(2). Marinello interpreted the tax obstruction | |
statute, 26 U.S.C. § '7212(a), to require "a 'nexus' between the defendant's conduct and a particular | |
administrative proceeding." Id at I 109. The Court adopted that construction in light of the similar | |
interpretation given to "other obstruction provisions," al (citing Aguilar and Arthur Andersen), as well as | |
considerations of context, legislative history, structure of the criminal tax laws, fair warning, and lenity. Id | |
at l 106-1 108. The type of "nexus" element the Court adopted in Marine llo already applies under Section | |
1512(c)(2), and the remaining considerations the Court cited do not justify reading into Section 1512(c)(2) | |
language that is not there. See Bates v. United Stafes, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (the Court "ordinarily resist[s] | |
reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face."). | |
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earlier provision is instructive. Recognizing that "the proper administration of justice may be | |
impeded or thwarted" by a "variety of corrupt methods ... limited only by the imagination of the | |
criminally inclined," S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (l982), Congress considered a | |
bill that would have amended Section 1512 by making it a crime, inter alia, when a person | |
"corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes ... [t]he enforcement and prosecution of federal | |
law," "administration of a law under which an official proceeding is being or may be conducted," | |
or the "exercise of a Federal legislative power of inquiry." Id at 17-19 (quoting S. 2420). | |
The Senate Committee explained that: | |
[T]he purpose of preventing an obstruction of or miscarriage of justice cannot be fully | |
carried out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction offenses. | |
There must also be protection against the rare type of conduct that is the product of the | |
inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice. | |
Id. at 18. The report gave examples of conduct "actually prosecuted under the current residual | |
clause [in 18 U.S.C. § 1503], which would probably not be covered in this series [of provisions] | |
without a residual clause." ld One prominent example was "[a] conspiracy to cover up the | |
Watergate burglary and its aftermath by having the Central Intelligence Agency seek to interfere | |
with an ongoing FBI investigation of the burglary." Id. (citing United States v. Haldeman, 559 | |
F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. l 976)). The report therefore indicates a congressional awareness not only that | |
residual-clause language resembling Section l5l2(c)(2) broadly covers a wide variety of | |
obstructive conduct, but also that such language reaches the improper use of governmental | |
processes to obstruct justice-specifically, the Watergate cover-up orchestrated by White House | |
officials including the President himself. See Haldeman, 559 F.3d at 51, 86-87, 120-129, 162.1081 | |
4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section | |
1512(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation | |
The requirement of fair warning in criminal law, the interest in avoiding due process | |
concerns in potentially vague statutes, and the rule of lenity do not justify narrowing the reach of | |
Section I5 l 2(c)(2)'s text.l°82 | |
a. As with other criminal laws, the Supreme Court has "exercised restraint" in interpreting | |
obstruction-of-justice provisions, both out of respect for Congress's role in defining crimes and in | |
the interest of providing individuals with "fair warning" of what a criminal statute prohibits. | |
Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, l 106 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 703, | |
1081 The Senate ultimately accepted the House version of the bill, which excluded an omnibus | |
clause. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 382-383 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (tracing history of the | |
proposed omnibus provision in the witness-protection legislation). During the floor debate on the bill, | |
Senator Heinz, one of the initiators and primary backers of the legislation, explained that the omnibus clause | |
was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely "duplicative" of other | |
obstruction laws, 128 Cong. Rec. 26,810 (1982) (Sen. Heinz), presumably referring to Sections 1503 and | |
1505. | |
1082 In a separate section addressing considerations unique to the presidency, we consider principles | |
of statutory construction relevant in that context. See Volume It, Section III.B. 1, infra. | |
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Aguilar, 5 15 U.S. at 599-602. In several obstruction cases, the Court has imposed a nexus test that | |
requires that the wrongful conduct targeted by the provision be sufficiently connected to an official | |
proceeding to ensure the requisite culpability. Marine llo, 138 S. Ct. at 1109, Arthur Andersen, | |
544 U.S. at 707-708, Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600-602. Section l512(c)(2) has been interpreted to | |
require a similar nexus. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019), | |
United States v. Petruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015), United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d | |
1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009), United Slates v. Reich, 479 F |
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