(draft; work in progress)
See also:
- Compilers
- Program analysis:
- Dynamic analysis - instrumentation, translation, sanitizers
(draft; work in progress)
See also:
XML processing modules may be not secure against maliciously constructed data. An attacker could abuse XML features to carry out denial of service attacks, access logical files, generate network connections to other machines, or circumvent firewalls.
The penetration tester running XML tests against application will have to determine which XML parser is in use, and then to what kinds of below listed attacks that parser will be vulnerable.
| Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00 | |
| [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions\Default%20Settings] | |
| "UseSystemColours"=dword:00000000 | |
| "TryPalette"=dword:00000000 | |
| "ANSIColour"=dword:00000001 | |
| "Xterm256Colour"=dword:00000001 | |
| "BoldAsColour"=dword:00000001 | |
| "Colour0"="211,215,207" | |
| "Colour1"="238,238,236" |
The following Lua program generates a Lua bytecode program called ignore-unsigned-sga.fnt, which in turn loads a DLL from within an extremely locked down Lua 5.1 sandbox in a program called RelicCOH2.exe. The remainder of this document attempts to explain how this program works by a whirlwind tour of relevent bits of the Lua 5.1 virtual machine.
if string.dump(function()end):sub(1, 12) ~= "\27Lua\81\0\1\4\4\4\8\0" then
error("This generator requires a 32-bit version of Lua 5.1")
end
local function outer()
local magic -- In bytecode, the stack slot corresponding to this local is changed