Last update: Tue Jan 14 23:15:49 UTC 2020 by @luckylittle
- Understand, identify, and work with containerization features
- Deploy a preconfigured application and identify crucial features such as namespaces, SELinux labels, and cgroups
- Deploy a preconfigured application with security context constraint capabilities and view the application’s capability set
- Configure security context constraints
- Use trusted registries
- Load images into a registry
- Query images in a registry
- Work with trusted container images
- Identify a trusted container image
- Sign images
- View signed images
- Scan images
- Load signed images into a registry
- Build secure container images
- Perform simple S2I builds
- Implement S2I build hooks
- Automate builds using Jenkins
- Automate scanning and code validations as part of the build process
- Control access to OpenShift Container Platform clusters
- Configure users with different permission levels, access, and bindings
- Configure OpenShift Container Platform to use Red Hat Identity Management services (IdM) for authentication
- Query users and groups in IdM
- Log into OpenShift Container Platform using an IdM managed account
- Configure single sign-on (SSO)
- Install SSO authentication
- Configure OpenShift Container Platform to use SSO
- Integrate web applications with SSO
- Automate policy-based deployments
- Configure policies to control the use of images and registries
- Use secrets to provide access to external registries
- Automatically pull and use images from a registry
- Use triggers to verify that automated deployments work
- Manage orchestration
- Restrict nodes on which containers may run
- Use quotas to limit resource utilization
- Use secrets to automate access to resources
- Configure network isolation
- Create software-defined networks (SDN)
- Associate containers and projects with SDNs
- Configure and manage secure container storage
- Configure and secure file-based container storage
- Configure and secure block-based container storage
INTRODUCING THE RHEL AND CRI-O CONTAINER TOOLS
- invoke the
crictllocally from an OpenShift master or node, not remotely likeoc crictl= tool to interface with the CRI-O container engine from Kubernetes
NAME:
crictl - client for CRI
USAGE:
crictl [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]
VERSION:
unknown
COMMANDS:
attach Attach to a running container
create Create a new container
exec Run command in a running container
version Display runtime version information
images List images
inspect Display the status of one or more containers
inspecti Return the status of one or more images
inspectp Display the status of one or more pods
logs Fetch the logs of a container
port-forward Forward local port to a pod
ps List containers
pull Pull an image from registry
runp Run a new pod
rm Remove one or more containers
rmi Remove one or more images
rmp Remove one or more pods
pods List pods
start Start one or more created containers
info Display information of the container runtime
stop Stop one or more running containers
stopp Stop one or more running pods
update Update one or more running containers
config Get and set crictl options
stats List container(s) resource usage statistics
completion Output bash shell completion code
help, h Show a list of commands or help for one command
GLOBAL OPTIONS:
--config value, -c value Location of the client config file (default: "/etc/crictl.yaml") [$CRI_CONFIG_FILE]
--debug, -D Enable debug mode
--image-endpoint value, -i value Endpoint of CRI image manager service [$IMAGE_SERVICE_ENDPOINT]
--runtime-endpoint value, -r value Endpoint of CRI container runtime service (defaul: "unix:///var/run/dockershim.sock") [$CONTAINER_RUNTIME_ENDPOINT]
--timeout value, -t value Timeout of connecting to the server (default: 10s)
--help, -h show help
--version, -v print the version
skopeo= tool to manage container images stored in the local file system and in container registries
NAME:
skopeo - Various operations with container images and container image registries
USAGE:
skopeo [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]
VERSION:
0.1.32
COMMANDS:
copy Copy an IMAGE-NAME from one location to another
inspect Inspect image IMAGE-NAME
delete Delete image IMAGE-NAME
manifest-digest Compute a manifest digest of a file
standalone-sign Create a signature using local files
standalone-verify Verify a signature using local files
GLOBAL OPTIONS:
--debug enable debug output
--policy value Path to a trust policy file
--insecure-policy run the tool without any policy check
--registries.d DIR use registry configuration files in DIR (e.g. for container signature storage)
--override-arch ARCH use ARCH instead of the architecture of the machine for choosing images
--override-os OS use OS instead of the running OS for choosing images
--command-timeout value timeout for the command execution (default: 0s)
--help, -h show help
--version, -v print the version
podman= tool to start and manage standalone containers on OCI-compliant container engines (podman build=buildah)
NAME:
podman - manage pods and images
USAGE:
podman [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]
VERSION:
1.0.5
COMMANDS:
attach Attach to a running container
commit Create new image based on the changed container
container Manage Containers
build Build an image using instructions from Dockerfiles
create Create but do not start a container
diff Inspect changes on container's file systems
exec Run a process in a running container
export Export container's filesystem contents as a tar archive
history Show history of a specified image
image Manage images
images List images in local storage
import Import a tarball to create a filesystem image
info Display podman system information
inspect Displays the configuration of a container or image
kill Kill one or more running containers with a specific signal
load Load an image from docker archive
login Login to a container registry
logout Logout of a container registry
logs Fetch the logs of a container
mount Mount a working container's root filesystem
pause Pauses all the processes in one or more containers
list, ls, ps List containers
pod Manage pods
port List port mappings or a specific mapping for the container
pull Pull an image from a registry
push Push an image to a specified destination
restart Restart one or more containers
rm Remove one or more containers
rmi Removes one or more images from local storage
run Run a command in a new container
save Save image to an archive
search Search registry for image
start Start one or more containers
stats Display percentage of CPU, memory, network I/O, block I/O and PIDs for one or more containers
stop Stop one or more containers
tag Add an additional name to a local image
top Display the running processes of a container
umount, unmount Unmounts working container's root filesystem
unpause Unpause the processes in one or more containers
version Display the Podman Version Information
volume Manage volumes
wait Block on one or more containers
help, h Shows a list of commands or help for one command
GLOBAL OPTIONS:
--cgroup-manager value cgroup manager to use (cgroupfs or systemd, default systemd)
--cni-config-dir value path of the configuration directory for CNI networks
--conmon value path of the conmon binary
--cpu-profile value path for the cpu profiling results
--hooks-dir value set the OCI hooks directory path (may be set multiple times)
--log-level value log messages above specified level: debug, info, warn, error (default), fatal or panic (default: "error")
--namespace value set the libpod namespace, used to create separate views of the containers and pods on the system
--root value path to the root directory in which data, including images, is stored
--tmpdir value path to the tmp directory
--runroot value path to the 'run directory' where all state information is stored
--runtime value path to the OCI-compatible binary used to run containers, default is /usr/bin/runc
--storage-driver value, -s value select which storage driver is used to manage storage of images and containers (default is overlay)
--storage-opt value used to pass an option to the storage driver
--syslog output logging information to syslog as well as the console
--help, -h show help
--version, -v print the version
buildah= tool to build container images
NAME:
buildah - an image builder
USAGE:
buildah [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]
VERSION:
1.5 (image-spec 1.0.0, runtime-spec 1.0.0)
COMMANDS:
add Add content to the container
build-using-dockerfile, bud Build an image using instructions in a Dockerfile
commit Create an image from a working container
config Update image configuration settings
containers List working containers and their base images
copy Copy content into the container
from Create a working container based on an image
images List images in local storage
inspect Inspects the configuration of a container or image
mount Mount a working container's root filesystem
pull Pull an image from the specified location
push Push an image to a specified destination
rename Rename a container
rm, delete Remove one or more working containers
rmi removes one or more images from local storage
run Run a command inside of the container
tag Add an additional name to a local image
umount, unmount Unmounts the root file system on the specified working containers
unshare Run a command in a modified user namespace
version Display the Buildah Version Information
help, h Shows a list of commands or help for one command
GLOBAL OPTIONS:
--debug print debugging information
--registries-conf value path to registries.conf file (not usually used) [$REGISTRIES_CONFIG_PATH]
--registries-conf-dir value path to registries.conf.d directory (not usually used)
--root value storage root dir (default: "/home/lmaly/.local/share/containers/storage")
--runroot value storage state dir (default: "/run/user/104536")
--storage-driver value storage driver (default: "overlay")
--storage-opt value storage driver option (default: "overlay.override_kernel_check=true")
--userns-uid-map ctrID:hostID:length default ctrID:hostID:length UID mapping to use
--userns-gid-map ctrID:hostID:length default ctrID:hostID:length GID mapping to use
--help, -h show help
--version, -v print the version
INSPECTING THE LINUX NAMESPACES
unshare= command to create new namespaces
Usage:
unshare [options] [<program> [<argument>...]]
Run a program with some namespaces unshared from the parent.
Options:
-m, --mount[=<file>] unshare mounts namespace
-u, --uts[=<file>] unshare UTS namespace (hostname etc)
-i, --ipc[=<file>] unshare System V IPC namespace
-n, --net[=<file>] unshare network namespace
-p, --pid[=<file>] unshare pid namespace
-U, --user[=<file>] unshare user namespace
-C, --cgroup[=<file>] unshare cgroup namespace
-f, --fork fork before launching <program>
--kill-child[=<signame>] when dying, kill the forked child (implies --fork); defaults to SIGKILL
--mount-proc[=<dir>] mount proc filesystem first (implies --mount)
-r, --map-root-user map current user to root (implies --user)
--propagation slave|shared|private|unchanged
modify mount propagation in mount namespace
-s, --setgroups allow|deny control the setgroups syscall in user namespaces
-h, --help display this help
-V, --version display version
unshare --uts --net /bin/sh # starts a shell in new UTS and network namespaces
unshare --ipc --uts --net --mount sleep 1h & # starts a sleep command in the background in four namespaces: IPC, UTS, network, and mount, returns PID e.g. 8672lsns= command to list all the namespaces on the system
Usage:
lsns [options] [<namespace>]
List system namespaces.
Options:
-J, --json use JSON output format
-l, --list use list format output
-n, --noheadings don't print headings
-o, --output <list> define which output columns to use
-p, --task <pid> print process namespaces
-r, --raw use the raw output format
-u, --notruncate don't truncate text in columns
-W, --nowrap don't use multi-line representation
-t, --type <name> namespace type (mnt, net, ipc, user, pid, uts, cgroup)
-h, --help display this help
-V, --version display version
Available output columns:
NS namespace identifier (inode number)
TYPE kind of namespace
PATH path to the namespace
NPROCS number of processes in the namespace
PID lowest PID in the namespace
PPID PPID of the PID
COMMAND command line of the PID
UID UID of the PID
USER username of the PID
NETNSID namespace ID as used by network subsystem
NSFS nsfs mountpoint (usually used network subsystem)
lsns -p 8672 # similar to ls -l /proc/8672/nsnsenter= command to run a program in an existing namespace, if you do not provide a command as argument,nsenterruns/bin/bash
Usage:
nsenter [options] [<program> [<argument>...]]
Run a program with namespaces of other processes.
Options:
-a, --all enter all namespaces
-t, --target <pid> target process to get namespaces from
-m, --mount[=<file>] enter mount namespace
-u, --uts[=<file>] enter UTS namespace (hostname etc)
-i, --ipc[=<file>] enter System V IPC namespace
-n, --net[=<file>] enter network namespace
-p, --pid[=<file>] enter pid namespace
-C, --cgroup[=<file>] enter cgroup namespace
-U, --user[=<file>] enter user namespace
-S, --setuid <uid> set uid in entered namespace
-G, --setgid <gid> set gid in entered namespace
--preserve-credentials do not touch uids or gids
-r, --root[=<dir>] set the root directory
-w, --wd[=<dir>] set the working directory
-F, --no-fork do not fork before exec'ing <program>
-Z, --follow-context set SELinux context according to --target PID
-h, --help display this help
-V, --version display version
nsenter -t 8672 --net ip addr # lists the network devices and addresses in a network namespace
nsenter -t 8672 --ipc --uts --net --mount # execute a shell in multiple namespaces at the same timerunc= Open Container Initiative runtime
USAGE:
runc [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]
VERSION:
spec: 1.0.1-dev
COMMANDS:
checkpoint checkpoint a running container
create create a container
delete delete any resources held by the container often used with detached container
events display container events such as OOM notifications, cpu, memory, and IO usage statistics
exec execute new process inside the container
init initialize the namespaces and launch the process (do not call it outside of runc)
kill kill sends the specified signal (default: SIGTERM) to the container's init process
list lists containers started by runc with the given root
pause pause suspends all processes inside the container
ps ps displays the processes running inside a container
restore restore a container from a previous checkpoint
resume resumes all processes that have been previously paused
run create and run a container
spec create a new specification file
start executes the user defined process in a created container
state output the state of a container
update update container resource constraints
help, h Shows a list of commands or help for one command
GLOBAL OPTIONS:
--debug enable debug output for logging
--log value set the log file path where internal debug information is written (default: "/dev/null")
--log-format value set the format used by logs ('text' (default), or 'json') (default: "text")
--root value root directory for storage of container state (this should be located in tmpfs) (default: "/run/user/1000/runc")
--criu value path to the criu binary used for checkpoint and restore (default: "criu")
--systemd-cgroup enable systemd cgroup support, expects cgroupsPath to be of form "slice:prefix:name" for e.g. "system.slice:runc:434234"
--rootless value ignore cgroup permission errors ('true', 'false', or 'auto') (default: "auto")
--help, -h show help
--version, -v print the version
When you create a pod, OpenShift runs the 'pod' process to create these namespaces and place the container processes in them. This means that all containers in a pod share the same network, the same System V IPC objects, and have the same host name.
How to find PID in OpenShift?
oc describe pod myweb-1-bmmwq | grep 'Container ID' # 7084...383d
runc state 7084...383d | grep "pid" # 8997
nsenter -t 8997 -p -r ps -ef # To use the ps command in a container namespace, also specify the -r or --root option to get the same file systems as the container. This is because the ps command uses the /proc file system to list the processes, and it needs to use the one from the container hierarchy and not the one from the host system.SECURING CONTAINERS WITH SELINUX
- With OpenShift, containers processes always get the
container_tcontext type when they start, and the files and directories the containers need to access on the host system gets thecontainer_file_tcontext type. - MCS (Multi Category Security) is a SELinux feature that solves issue of containers protect themselves from other container by taking advantage of the level part of the context:
system_u:system_r:container_t:s0:c4,c9(s0=sensitives, c4,c9=categories). Sensitivity is not used, but categories are. Category values are betweenc0andc1023each. When a container starts, the system assigns two random categories to the processes in the container. But OpenShift behaves differently when assigning the SELinux categories - OpenShift allocates the two random categories at the project level. Therefore, and by default, all pods and containers in a project get the same category pair. This is useful when multiple containers in the project need to access the same shared volume.
MANAGING RESOURCES WITH CGROUPS
cat /proc/1938/cgroup # Systemd automatically organizes its services in control group hierarchies. It places all services under the /system.slice control groups
ls -l /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/system.slice/rsyslog.service/ # this is the standard structure
systemd-cgls # list all the control groups on the system
tree -d /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/kubepods.slice/ # this is OpenShift/Kube specific structurelab host-isolation start
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project host-isolation
oc new-app -f ~/DO425/labs/host-isolation/host-isolation.yml # isol pod contains postgresql & httpd containers
oc describe pod isol | grep 'Node:\|Container ID:' # returns node1 and IDs
ssh root@node1.lab.example.com
runc state <ID1,2> | grep pid # returns PID1, PID2
lsns -p <PID1,2> # lists the namespaces associated with the two containers, compare 'uts', 'ipc', 'net' numbers - they are the same for both
nsenter -t <PID1> -n ip addr
nsenter -t <PID1> -p -r ps -ef # container only sees its processes, and the PIDs start at 1 inside the container
nsenter -t <PID1> -u hostname # isol
nsenter -t <PID1> -u hostname mynewname # change hostname to 'mynewname'
nsenter -t <PID2> -u hostname # mynewname, because the two containers share the same UTS namespace
ps -Z -p <PID1>,<PID2> # both have the same categories - e.g. c5,c11
runc state <ID1> | grep rootfs # /var/lib/containers/storage/overlay/<ID>/merged/
ls -Zd </var/lib/containers/storage/overlay...> # same categories c5,c11
oc get pod isol -o yaml | grep uid # on the workstation get UID of the pod, e.g. 8a8285dc-e350-11e8-88a6-52540000fa0a
oc get pod isol -o yaml | grep containerID # also look for a containerID of the container you want (e.g. httpd)
cd /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/kubepods.slice/kubepods-burstable.slice/ # on the node
cd kubepods-burstable-pod<UID>.slice/ # or cd *8a8285dc*
cd crio-<containerID>.scope/
grep <PID1 or 2> tasks # returns PID1 or 2
cat memory.limit_in_bytes # e.g. 67108864
cat memory.usage_in_bytes # e.g. 9691136
lab host-isolation finishLISTING AVAILABLE LINUX CAPABILITIES & LIMITING THEM
capsh --print # capsh (Capabilities Shell) is a utility for viewing the available capabilities on a system for user running it
cat /proc/<PID>/status | grep Cap # capabilities for process: CaCapInh (inheritable), CapPrm (permitted), CapEff (permission checks), CapBnd (bounding set), CapAmb (ambient)
capsh --decode=0000003fffffffff # decode HEX
capsh --print -- -c "ping -c 1 localhost" # contains cap_net_raw among other things
capsh --drop=cap_net_raw --print -- -c "ping -c 1 localhost" # drops the cap_net_raw capability which makes the ping failMANAGING CAPABILITIES IN CONTAINERS
- Podman possess a set of two options for managing capabilities:
--cap-addand--cap-drop - Default common capabilities by podman:
cap_chown,cap_mknod,cap_dac_override,cap_audit_write,cap_setfcap,cap_fsetid
podman run --rm -it --name=capabilities rhel7/7.5 capsh --print
podman run --rm -it --cap-add=sys_time --name=test_caps rhel7/7.5 capsh --print # adds change system time capabilityAvoid CAP_SYS_ADMIN, which is too broad.
INTRODUCING SECURE COMPUTING MODE seccomp
- If a process attempts to perform a system call that it is not allowed to performed, the process is terminated according the policy that is in place
- Two modes:
- A) allows a process to make only four system calls:
read(),write(),_exit(), andsigreturn(). With this seccomp mode enabled, processes cannot fork new threads, nor monitor network activity. - B) seccomp-bpf Kernel extension allows generic system call filtering. For example, you can define a rule that allows a process to only access certain files. seccomp allows you to define a profile that contains a set of filters, which are applied to every system call that submitted from a process to the kernel.
- A) allows a process to make only four system calls:
RESTRICTING PROCESSES WITH seccomp
- To enable seccomp protection, a parent process sets a profile right before forking a child process
- Podman allows you to use the
--security-optoption to attach a security profile to your container - Two annotations:
- A)
seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/pod - B)
container.seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/<container_name>
- A)
An example of the custom_policy.json:
{
"defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
"architectures": [
"SCMP_ARCH_X86_64",
"SCMP_ARCH_X86",
"SCMP_ARCH_X32"
],
"syscalls": [
{
"names": [
"chroot"
],
"action": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
"args": [],
"comment": "",
"includes": {
"caps": [
"CAP_SYS_CHROOT"
]
},
"excludes": {}
}
]
}Attach this policy to a container using Podman and test it:
sudo podman run --rm -it --security-opt seccomp=custom_policy.json --name chroot rhscl/httpd-24-rhel7 chroot / # not permitted
grep Seccomp /proc/10/status # inspect the status file of any child process running inside the containerAnother example:
. . .
"syscalls": [
{ "name": "fchmodat",
"action": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
"args": []
},
{ "name": "fchownat",
"action": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
"args": []
}
]Default seccomp profile
- Provides a sane default for running containers with seccomp and disables around 44 system calls out of 300+. It is moderately protective while providing wide application compatibility. The default Docker profile can be found:
less /etc/docker/seccomp.json - defaultAction is deny
# 3 actions:
SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
SCMP_ACT_KILL
SCMP_ACT_ERRNO
In effect, the profile is a whitelist which denies access to system calls by default, then whitelists specific system calls. The profile works by defining a defaultAction of SCMP_ACT_ERRNO and overriding that action only for specific system calls. The effect of SCMP_ACT_ERRNO is to cause a Permission Denied error. Next, the profile defines a specific list of system calls which are fully allowed, because their action is overridden to be SCMP_ACT_ALLOW. Finally, some specific rules are for individual system calls such as personality, and others, to allow variants of those system calls with specific arguments.
strace -cf ping 172.25.250.13 shows table with used system calls
# It is not recommended to change the default seccomp profile, but rather --cap-add or --cap-drop:
podman run --name testsec -dit --security-opt=seccomp=seccomp.json --cap-drop NET_BIND_SERVICE hello-world
podman attach testsecLimitations:
- Filtering policies apply to the entire pod or container, and not only to the application running inside a container. Consider also the system calls that the container runtime makes when starting the container.
- OpenShift does not support yet policy precedence. If developer defines custom profile for their containers, it overrides the default profile by OpenShift.
Identifying System Calls that Processes Invoke:
- Creating a container with the
SYS_PTRACEcapability. This capability allows a container to trace arbitrary processes using ptrace - Invoking the strace command from inside the container.
- Locating the commands that are invoked.
- Updating the security policy to include all relevant system calls.
- Instantiating a new container with the updated security profile.
lab host-privilege start
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project host-privilege
podman search registry.lab.example.com/http # 4 images
oc new-app -f ~/DO425/labs/host-privilege/host-privilege.yml
oc get pods # ensure httpd pod is running
oc rsh httpd bash # open bash on the pod
capsh --print # list current capabilities, cap_chown is listed
touch test-cap
chown nobody test-cap # it works
exit
oc describe pod httpd | grep Node: # retrieve the node where the pod is running
oc describe pod httpd | grep cri-o # get the container ID
ssh root@node1 # connect to the node on which your container is running
runc state <containerID> | grep pid # inspect the container, get PID
grep Cap /proc/<PID>/status | grep CapInh # check the capabilities
capsh --decode=00000000000425fb # obtain the list of capabilities of the CapInh - inherited set, cap_chown is present
exit
oc delete pod httpd
cd ~/DO425/labs/host-privilege/
cat host-privilege-drop.yml
containers:
- image: rhscl/httpd-24-rhel7:latest
name: httpd
securityContext:
runAsUser: 0
capabilities:
drop:
- CHOWN
oc new-app -f host-privilege-drop.yml # recreate the application with this template
oc rsh httpd bash
capsh --print # cap_chown is not present
touch test-cap
chown nobody test-cap # operation not permitted
exit
oc delete pod httpd
sudo podman run -dit --name dev-seccomp --hostname seccomp-unrestricted registry.lab.example.com/rhel7/rhel-tools # create a container dev-seccomp
sudo podman exec dev-seccomp bash # log in to the container
ps # bash PID is 13
grep Seccomp /proc/13/status # Seccomp: 2 = enabled & filtering mode
chmod 400 /etc/hosts # works
chown nobody /etc/hosts # works
exit
cat ~/DO425/labs/host-privilege/seccomp-profile.json # fchmodat & fchownat are SCMP_ACT_ERRNO
sudo podman run -dit --name dev-seccomp-restricted --hostname seccomp-restricted --security-opt seccomp=seccomp-profile.json registry.lab.example.com/rhel7/rhel-tools:latest # second container called dev-seccomp-restricted and attach it the security profile by using the --security-opt
sudo podman exec dev-seccomp-restricted bash # log in to the container
chmod 400 /etc/hosts # operation not permitted
chown nobody /etc/hosts # operation not permitted
exit
sudo podman stop dev-seccomp && sudo podman rm dev-seccomp # cleanup
sudo podman stop dev-seccomp-restricted && sudo podman rm dev-seccomp-restricted
lab host-privilege finishRed Hat OpenShift Platform v3.11 points to the new registry.redhat.io registry by default
podman login registry.redhat.io # Podman stores your encrypted credentials in a file called /run/user/<UID>/containers/auth.json
skopeo inspect --creds developer1:MyS3cret! docker://registry.redhat.io/rhscl/postgresql-96-rhel7 # Skopeo uses the auth.json file from podman login, but you can alternatively do --creds (or --src-creds/--dest-creds for copy)
podman logout registry.redhat.io
podman logout --allQUAY
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com
podman pull quay.apps.lab.example.com/developer2/rhel-tools:latest # or have the rhel-tools public and then you don't need authConfiguring Jenkins to support Quay integration
To use Quay as the container image registry, some requirements must be addressed: The Quay repository must use a valid SSL certificate to communicate with OpenShift and Jenkins. If you are using self-signed certificates, each node from OpenShift must have the self-signed certificate in the Quay's certificate directory (/etc/docker/certs.d/<quay-URI>). Furthermore, the Jenkins slave container must have the certificate to sign the container image as well as the skopeo command line to push changes to the registry.
lab containers-registries start
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc project quay-enterprise # groups all resources of Quay
oc get pods # Quay does not support running the database on OpenShift, but in the lab it does (you'll see clair, clair-postgresql, quay, quay-postgresql, redis)
oc get routes # e.g. https://quay.apps.lab.example.com
# Configure Quay here via web GUI (admin/redhat123) - create user, change password, create organisation
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # on the workstation
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/httpd:latest docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/exampledev/httpd:latest
podman logout quay.apps.lab.example.com
sudo -i
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # as developer1
podman pull quay.apps.lab.example.com/exampledev/httpd:latest
podman logout quay.apps.lab.example.com
lab containers-registries finishUsing Images Annotations for Security
<namespace containing image's quality>/<vulnerability|policy>.<provider ID>
quality.images.openshift.io/vulnerability.redhatcatalog: {SEE THE EXAMPLE BELOW}
quality.images.openshift.io/vulnerability.jfrog: {SEE THE EXAMPLE BELOW}
quality.images.openshift.io/license.blackduck: {SEE THE EXAMPLE BELOW}
quality.images.openshift.io/vulnerability.openscap: {SEE THE EXAMPLE BELOW}
Each annotation supports these fields:
- name (provider display name),
- timestamp of the scan,
- description (not required),
- reference,
- scannerVersion,
- compliant (yes x no),
- summary (label [critical/important], data, severityIndex, reference)
Example:
{
"name": "Red Hat Container Catalog",
"description": "Container health index",
"timestamp": "2016-09-08T05:04:46Z",
"reference": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2016:1566",
"compliant": null,
"scannerVersion": "1.2",
"summary": [
{
"label": "Health index",
"data": "B",
"severityIndex": 1,
"reference": null
}
]
}oc describe is <image stream> -n openshift # read the status of an image stream to see the annotationThe annotation images.openshift.io/deny-execution=true is added by a security scanner, to define a policy that admission plugin prevents images from being retrieved if they are not marked as compliant: vim /etc/origin/master/master-config.yml:
admissionConfig:
pluginConfig:
openshift.io/ImagePolicy:
configuration:
kind: ImagePolicyConfig
apiVersion: v1
resolveImages: AttemptRewrite
executionRules:
- name: execution-denied
onResources:
- resource: pods
reject: true
matchImageAnnotations: # <-- important
- key: images.openshift.io/deny-execution # <-- important
value: "true" # <-- important
skipOnResolutionFailure: truemaster-restart api
master-restart controllers
Image signing and verification
- Signer server is the host responsible for generating the signature that embeds the image manifest digest and publish the signature to the signatures server
- On the server, the
/etc/containers/registries.d/registry.yamllocation contains configuration files that specify where signatures are stored after their generation and where to download signature for each registry - e.g.registry.yaml:
docker:
registry.example.com:
sigstore-staging: file:///var/lib/atomic/sigstore # stores new sigs under the filesystem
sigstore: http://sigstore.lab.example.com # retrieves them from webConfigure clients (nodes pulling images) - you can have different policies for different nodes:
vim /etc/containers/policy.json # images require signatures?Allow only images from the registry.lab.example.com server. All other images are rejected:
{
"default": [
{
"type": "reject"
}
],
"transports": {
"docker-daemon": {
"": [
{
"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
}
]
},
"docker": {
"registry.lab.example.com": [
{
"type": "signedBy",
"keyType": "GPGKeys",
"keyPath": "/home/signer/pub/image-signer-pub.gpg"
}
]
}
}
}lab containers-images start
sudo rngd -r /dev/urandom -o /dev/random # ignore warnings, they are harmless
ps ax | grep rngd # see if the previous command is running
gpg2 --gen-key # generate GPG key pair as a student, do not 'su'
RSA
1024
0
y
Real name # "Image Signer"
Email address # student@lab.example.com
O # (O)kay
reset
gpg2 --list-keys # /home/student/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
# Export the public key to the application nodes (import signer_key.pub to node1, 2)
lab containers-images configure
# Signatures are stored by default in the /var/lib/atomic/sigstore directory - this is exposed as http://sigstore.lab.example.com
ssh node1 cat /etc/containers/registries.d/registry.yaml
docker:
registry.lab.example.com:
sigstore-staging: file:///var/lib/atomic/sigstore
sigstore: http://sigstore.lab.example.com
# SSH to connect to node1 in order to ensure that the node can access the signatures over HTTP
ssh node1 curl http://sigstore.lab.example.com # ensure that the node can access the signatures over HTTP
ssh node2 curl http://sigstore.lab.example.com
podman search registry.lab.example.com/mongodb-32-rhel7 # ensure that the mongodb-32-rhel7 image is present
skopeo copy --sign-by student@lab.example.com docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/mongodb-32-rhel7:latest docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/mongodb-32-rhel7:signed # --sign-by option allows you to generate a detached signature
firefox http://sigstore.lab.example.com # look at the signature in rhscl folder
skopeo inspect docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/mongodb-32-rhel7:signed | grep Digest # same signature
ssh root@node1
vim /etc/containers/policy.json # unsigned images rejected
...output omitted...
{
"default": [
{
"type": "reject"
}
],
...output omitted...
"docker": {
"registry.lab.example.com": [
{
"type": "signedBy",
"keyType": "GPGKeys",
"keyPath": "/root/.gnupg/pubring.gpg"
}
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project containers-images
oc new-app -f ~/DO425/labs/containers-images/containers-images.yaml # contains unsigned httpd and signed mongo
oc get pods # httpd will be ImagePullBackOff, because it isn't signed
oc describe pod httpd | grep 'Source image rejected'
oc delete project containers-images
lab containers-images finishInspecting image layers
mkdir /tmp/mongo
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/mongodb-32-rhel7 dir:/tmp/mongo # extracts the rhscl/mongodb-32-rhel7 image in the /tmp/mongo/ directory
ls /tmp/mongo
cat /tmp/mongo/manifest.json
schemaVersion # 2 for OCI
config # image metadata, location of the config in the folder structure
layers # base layer first (size, digest ...)
mkdir /tmp/layer
tar xf /tmp/mongo/9205...f599 -C /tmp/layer # layer is a compressed tar file
ls /tmp/layer # bin/ boot/ dev/ ..., other layers only contain additions or modifications to those base directories# Examining Packages with rpm
rpm -qa # query all packages installed
rpm -qi <PACKAGE> # info about the package
rpm -ql <PACKAGE> # files installed by the specified package
rpm -q --scripts # install/remove scripts
# Listing the RPM Packages in an Image Layer
rpm -q -a --root /tmp/layer # list all packages in layer
rpm -q bash --root /tmp/layer # list package bash in layer
rpm -q bash -i --root /tmp/layer # info about bash in layerIntroducing Clair
oc logs clair-2-bfp2c | grep fetching # Clair log shows the retrieval of the vulnerability metadata from the Internet- Clair only analyses images based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Alpine Linux, Debian, Oracle Linux, and Ubuntu because it only retrieves the vulnerabilities from these system vendors or projects
- Clair also limits its scan to the distribution packages and does NOT check vulnerabilities in your application code, or libraries or artifacts retrieved from other sources
lab containers-scanning start
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # admin/redhat123
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/mongodb-32-rhel7 docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin/mongodb-32-rhel7
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/php-56-rhel7 docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin/php-56-rhel7
podman logout quay.apps.lab.example.com
# While Quay is scanning, inspect the layers
mkdir /tmp/php
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/php-56-rhel7 dir:/tmp/php
cat /tmp/php/manifest.json
{
"schemaVersion": 2,
"config": {
"digest": "sha256:520f...f381"
},
},
"layers": [
{
...
},
{
"digest": "sha256:e0b3...4dad"
}
]
}
# Object containing more details (build, author, ports, env) about the image is located in:
cat /tmp/php/520f...f381 | python -m json.tool # config digest = config folder
# Extract the lowest layer of the image:
mkdir /tmp/php/layer
sudo tar xf e0b3...4dad -C /tmp/php/layer # extract lowest layer (last entry), must be sudo
ls /tmp/php/layer
rpm -qa --root /tmp/php/layer
rpm -q patch --root /tmp/php/layer # retrieve the version of the patch package in the layer
sudo rm -rf /tmp/php
# See if Quay found vulnerabilities in the 'patch' package 2.7.1-8.el7 - yes, fixable by updating to 2.7.1-10.el7
lab containers-scanning finishTBAImplementing Image Change Triggers
oc set triggers bc build-config-name --from-image="image:tag" # change made to that image stream automatically starts a build process, this configures image change trigger in an existing build config.
# The hook fails if the script or command returns a non-zero exit code or if starting the temporary container fails. In that case, the image is not pushed to the registry.
oc set build-hook bc/build-config-name --post-commit --command -- <command> # create build hook in an existing bc (or instead of --command, use --script="/path/to/script")lab build-s2i start
git clone http://services.lab.example.com/openshift-tasks
cat home/student/DO425/labs/build-s2i/security.txt # It uses findbugs-maven-plugin profile
cat /home/student/openshift-tasks/pom.xml # append to the last closing element the content of security.txt (last <profile> section in <profiles>)
cd openshift-tasks
git add .
git commit -m "Added Security support"
git push
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project build-s2i
oc new-app --build-env MAVEN_MIRROR_URL=http://services.lab.example.com:8081/nexus/content/groups/training-java jboss-eap71-openshift:latest~http://services.lab.example.com/openshift-tasks # start a S2I build, MAVEN_MIRROR_URL parameter is used by the build to download the dependencies from an internal repository as the Internet is not available; creates is/bc/dc/svc
oc logs -f builds/openshift-tasks-1 # check the build is running - found pom.xml, attempted to build using mvn, builds war and cretes image + pushes it to OCR
oc set build-hook bc/openshift-tasks --post-commit --script="cd /tmp/src; mvn test -Psecurity" # update hook to invoke the security check plugin as part of build
oc export bc/openshift-tasks | grep -A1 postCommit # inspect build configuration
postCommit:
script: cd /tmp/src; mvn test -Psecurity
oc start-build openshift-tasks # test the build hook, starts build 2
oc logs -f builds/openshift-tasks-2 # inspect if the web hook was executed. It shows mvn not found + cannot set terminal process group (-1): Inappropriate ioctl for device
oc set triggers bc openshift-tasks --from-image='jboss-eap71-openshift:latest' # configure the build configuration to execute the build process again when the IS is updated (this was already created by bc)
oc export bc/openshift-tasks | grep -A5 "ImageChange" # ensure that the image change trigger is created
# Unpack the container image to push the update the classroom registry:
cd ~/DO425/labs/build-s2i/
tar xzf eap71-openshift.tar.gz # unpack the container
skopeo copy oci:eap71-openshift-1.3-17 docker://registry.lab.example.com/jboss-eap-7/eap71-openshift:latest
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc import-image jboss-eap71-openshift:latest --confirm -n openshift # update the internal registry with the container image from the classroom registry
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc get builds # build 3 is running automatically
oc logs -f build/openshift-tasks-3 # running post-commit hook works
oc expose svc openshift-tasks
firefox http://openshift-tasks-build-s2i.apps.lab.example.com # if you see website, it is OK
lab build-s2i finishEnsure Jenkins is deployed
oc new-app jenkins --param ENABLE_OAUTH=true # deploy Jenkins container with persistent storage and use the OCP credentials to log in to itTo create Jenkins pipeline, you have to create this resource:
apiVersion: v1
kind: BuildConfig
//omitted
strategy:
jenkinsPipelineStrategy:
jenkinsfile: |-
def mvnCmd = "mvn -s configuration/cicd-settings.xml"
pipeline {
agent {
label 'maven'
}
//stages omitted
}
}
type: JenkinsPipelineoc create -f definition.yaml
oc start-build buildconfig-nameIntegration point in a Jenkins Pipeline - slave hosts are started as containers using a Jenkins Kubernetes plugin:
<name>is the name of the slave used in Jenkinsfile (agent - label) # image used to start build process
# configuration omitted
</org.csanchez.jenkins.plugins.kubernetes.ContainerTemplate># An example of the step in Jenkins pipeline - integrating security check tools:
stage('Validate source code') {
steps {
sh "${mvnCmd} deploy -DskipTests=true -P nexus3"
}
}
lab build-pipeline start # takes 20mins
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc project cicd
oc get pods # ensure Jenkins & SonarQube are running
cat /home/student/DO425/labs/build-pipeline/pipeline-template.yaml
# Pipeline is part of 'kind: BuildConfig' resource: spec.strategy.jenkinspipelinestrategy.jenkinsfile def mvnCmd = "mvn -s configuration/cicd-settings.xml"
pipeline {
agent {
label 'maven'
}
. . . omitted "Build app", "Test", "Archive app", "Build image", "Deploy DEV"
stages {
stage('Promote to STAGE?') {
agent {
label 'skopeo'
}
// Add skopeo call below.
}
. . . ommitted "Deploy STAGE"
# Skopeo call:
# Implement the image tagging step that tags the image on Quay for the stage environment:
steps {
script {
openshift.withCluster() {
withCredentials([usernamePassword(credentialsId:"${openshift.project()}-quay-cicd-secret", usernameVariable: "QUAY_USER", passwordVariable: "QUAY_PWD")]) { sh "skopeo copy docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin/tasks-app:latest docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin/tasks-app:stage --src-creds \"$QUAY_USER:$QUAY_PWD\" --dest-creds \"$QUAY_USER:$QUAY_PWD\" --src-tls-verify=false --dest-tls-verify=false"
}
}
}
}
# Note: Command is also located in /home/student/DO425/labs/build-pipeline/command.txt
cd ~/DO425/labs/build-pipeline
oc new-app pipeline-template.yaml # deploying template cicd/cicd for pipeline-template.yaml to project cicd
oc start-build bc/tasks-pipeline
oc logs build/tasks-pipeline-1 # logs are available on Jenkins
# open Jenkins (log in with OCP credentials) and promote to stage, inspect security metrics:
https://sonarqube-cicd.apps.lab.example.com
https://quay.apps.lab.example.com # in the admin organisation
lab build-pipeline finishTBARBAC resources:
- Users = can make requests to OpenShift API
- Service Accounts = used for delegating certain tasks to OpenShift
- Groups
- Roles = collections of rules
- Rules = define verbs that users/groups can use with a given resource
- Security Context Constraints = control the actions pod/container can perform
- Role bindings = roles to users/groups
oc describe clusterrole admin
Name: admin
Created: 5 weeks ago
Labels: kubernetes.io/bootstrapping=rbac-defaults
Annotations: openshift.io/description=A user that has edit rights within the project and can change the project's membership.
openshift.io/reconcile-protect=false
Verbs (...) Resources
[delete get patch update] (...) [projects] # user can retrieve list of projects, delete/modify them
[get list watch] (...) [namespaces]
Two levels:
- Cluster-wide RBAC - applicable across all projects
- Local RBAC - apply to a given project
oc describe rolebinding admin -n developer # access local role bindings
Name: admin
Namespace: developer
Created: 9 minutes ago
Labels: <none>
Annotations: <none>
Role: /admin
Users: developer
Groups: <none>
ServiceAccounts: <none>
Subjects: <none>
Verbs (...) Resources
[get list watch] (...) [namespaces]
[impersonate] (...) [serviceaccounts]
...output omitted...
The following excerpt shows how to include a SCC to a role. This gives privileges to the user or the group that uses this role to access the restricted-scc security context constraint:
rules:
apiGroups:
- security.openshift.io
resources:
- securitycontextconstraints # name of the resource group that allows you to include a SCC in the role
verbs:
- use
resourceNames:
- restricted-scc # name of the SCC that is applied to all pods or containers that inherit this role# Some of the defaults cluster roles that are available in OpenShift - e.g.:
oc describe clusterrole self-provisioner
# Groups & users
oc adm groups new <group_name> <user_name>
oc create user <user_name>
# Managing Roles
oc create role <name> --verb=<verb> --resource=<resource type> -n <project> # local role for a project
oc create clusterrole <name> --verb=<verb> --resource=<resource> # cluster role
oc create role manager --verb=create,get,delete --resource=pod,service -n cicd
oc adm policy add-role-to-user manager developer -n cicdA good list with all resources and verbs: oc describe clusterrole.rbac
Some examples of the role definition:
- This "Role" is allowed to read the resource "Pods" in the core API group:
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: read-pods-within-ns
namespace: default
rules:
- apiGroups:
- ''
resources:
- pods
verbs:
- get
- list
- watch- This "Role" is allowed to read and write the "Deployments" in both the "extensions" and "apps" API groups:
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: read-write-deployment-in-ext-and-apps-apis
namespace: default
rules:
- apiGroups:
- extensions
- apps
resources:
- deployments
verbs:
- get
- list
- watch
- create
- update
- patch
- delete- This "Role" is allowed to read "Pods" and read/write "Jobs" resources in API groups:
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: read-pods-and-read-write-jobs
namespace: default
rules:
- apiGroups:
- ''
resources:
- pods
verbs:
- get
- list
- watch
- apiGroups:
- batch
- extensions
resources:
- jobs
verbs:
- get
- list
- watch
- create
- update
- patch
- delete- This "Role" is allowed to read a "ConfigMap" named "my-config" (must be bound with a "RoleBinding" to limit to a single "ConfigMap" in a single namespace):
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: read-configmap-within-ns
namespace: default
rules:
- apiGroups:
- ''
resources:
- configmaps
resourceNames:
- my-config
verbs:
- get- This "ClusterRole" is allowed to read the resource "nodes" in the core group (because a Node is cluster-scoped, this must be bound with a "ClusterRoleBinding" to be effective):
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: read-nodes
rules:
- apiGroups:
- ''
resources:
- nodes
verbs:
- get
- list
- watch- This "ClusterRole" is allowed to "GET" and "POST" requests to the non-resource endpoint "/healthz" and all subpaths (must be in the "ClusterRole" bound with a "ClusterRoleBinding" to be effective):
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: get-and-post-to-non-resource-endpoints
rules:
- nonResourceURLs:
- /healthz
- /healthz/*
verbs:
- get
- post# Managing Role Bindings - cluster level
oc adm policy add-cluster-role-to-user role user # Binds a given role to specified users for all projects in the cluster
oc adm policy remove-cluster-role-from-user role user # Removes a given role from specified users for all projects in the cluster.
oc adm policy add-cluster-role-to-group role group # Binds a given role to specified groups for all projects in the cluster.
oc adm policy remove-cluster-role-from-group role group # Removes a given role from specified groups for all projects in the cluster.
# Managing Role Bindings - local/project level (-n <PROJECT>, otherwise in current project)
oc adm policy who-can verb resource # Indicates which users can perform an action on a resource.
oc adm policy add-role-to-user role user # Binds a given role to specified users in the current project.
oc adm policy remove-role-from-user role user # Removes a given role from specified users in the current project.
oc adm policy remove-user user # Removes specified users and all of their roles in the current project.
oc adm policy add-role-to-group role group # Binds a given role to specified groups in the current project.
oc adm policy remove-role-from-group role group # Removes a given role from specified groups in the current project.
oc adm policy remove-group group # Removes specified groups and all of their roles in the current project.
oc adm policy add-role-to-user edit manager -n developer # Give the manager user the edit role in the developer project
oc describe rolebinding manager -n developerDetermining User Privileges
oc auth can-i delete pods # yes
oc auth can-i create deploymentconfigs # yes
oc auth can-i delete users # no - no RBAC policy matched
oc policy can-i --list # determine all the actions that you can performINTRODUCING TOKENS
cat ~/.kube/config
oc whoami --show-token # only for 24 hours
oc sa get-token registry # long-lived token of the registry service account
oc sa get-token default # same as "oc describe secret default-token-z62lg | grep 'token:'"lab auth-access start
oc login -u developer1 -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project project1
oc new-app -f /home/student/DO425/labs/auth-access/auth-access.yaml # The application deploys an httpd pod
oc login -u developer2 -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project project2
oc new-app -f /home/student/DO425/labs/auth-access/auth-access.yaml # The application deploys an httpd pod
oc login -u manager -p redhat
oc get pods -n project1 # User "manager" cannot list pods in the namespace "project1": no RBAC policy matched
oc get pods -n project2 # same error
firefox https://master.lab.example.com # log in as admin to cluster console
Administration -> Projects -> project1 -> Role bindings -> Subject name: developer1
Administration -> Projects -> project2 -> Role bindings -> Subject name: developer2
# grant read access to the manager user for the project1 project and read and write accesses for the project2 project:
project1 -> Role Bindings -> Creating Binding -> Namespace role binding:
Role Binding Name: viewer
Namespace: project1
Role Name: view
Subject: User
Subject Name: manager
project2 -> Role Bindings -> Creating Binding -> Namespace role binding:
Role Binding Name: editor
Namespace: project2
Role Name: edit
Subject: User
Subject Name: manager
# delete the role binding that gives the developer1 user administrative privileges in the project1 project
project1 -> Role Bindings -> admin [gear] -> Delete Role Binding
# Test if it worked:
oc login -u developer1 -p redhat
oc delete pod httpd -n project1 # forbidden
oc login -u manager -p redhat
oc get pods -n project1 # works this time
oc delete pod httpd -n project1 # forbidden (only view role in project 1)
oc delete pod httpd -n project2 # works (edit role in project 2)
oc delete project project2 # forbidden, manager only had edit role
Administration -> Projects -> project2 -> Role Bindings -> Creating binding
Role Binding Name: admin-1
Namespace: project2
Role Name: admin
Subject: User
Subject Name: manager
oc delete project project2 # works now
oc delete user developer2 # forbidden, requires cluster-wide priv
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc delete project project1 # works
lab auth-acces finishCONFIGURING AN OPENSHIFT IDENTITY PROVIDER FOR RED HAT IDENTITY MANAGEMENT (IdM)
- OpenShift masters can be configured with different identity providers that allow an OpenShift cluster to delegate user authentication and group membership management to different identity stores.
- To configure an OpenShift
LDAPPasswordIdentityProvideridentity provider to integrate with an IdM domain, you need the following information about your IdM domain and servers:- DNS domain name of your IdM domain (
organization.example.com) - FQDN of one of your IdM servers (
ldap1.organization.example.com) - LDAP user name with read access of the entire user accounts tree (
uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com) - LDAP container of the user accounts tree (
cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com) - public key TLS certificate of your IdM domain (
/etc/ipa/ca.crtfile in any server or client of your IdM domain)
- DNS domain name of your IdM domain (
- Example stanza under the
identityProvidersattribute on the OpenShift master configuration file/etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml:
. . .
identityProviders:
- challenge: true
login: true
mappingMethod: claim
name: idm_ldap_auth # can be anything
provider:
apiVersion: v1
kind: LDAPPasswordIdentityProvider
attributes:
id:
- dn
preferredUsername:
- uid
insecure: false # use TLS, refuse invalid certs
ca: /etc/origin/master/idm-domain-ca.crt # public key TLS cert of the IdM domain
url: "ldaps://server1.organization.example.net:636/cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com?uid" # LDAP search URL for user accounts
bindDN: "uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com" # username
bindPassword: "secret" # passwordSYNCHRONIZING GROUPS BETWEEN OPENSHIFT AND IdM
oc adm groups sync --confirm # run regularly to keep OpenShift and LDAP groups in sync
oc adm groups sync --help # whitelist & blacklist!
# Sync all groups from an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync --sync-config=/path/to/ldap-sync-config.yaml --confirm # see LDAPSyncConfig
# Sync all groups except the ones from the blacklist file from an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync --blacklist=/path/to/blacklist.txt --sync-config=/path/to/ldap-sync-config.yaml --confirm
# Sync specific groups specified in a whitelist file with an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync --whitelist=/path/to/whitelist.txt --sync-config=/path/to/sync-config.yaml --confirm
# Sync all OpenShift Groups that have been synced previously with an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync --type=openshift --sync-config=/path/to/ldap-sync-config.yaml --confirm
# Sync specific OpenShift Groups if they have been synced previously with an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync groups/group1 groups/group2 groups/group3 --sync-config=/path/to/sync-config.yaml --confirm
Options:
--blacklist='': path to the group blacklist file
--confirm=false: if true, modify OpenShift groups; if false, display results of a dry-run
--sync-config='': path to the sync config
--type='ldap': which groups white- and blacklist entries refer to: ldap,openshift
--whitelist='': path to the group whitelist file
oc adm groups prune --confirm # deletes all current orphan groups from OpenShiftConfiguring LDAP Synchronization Connection Parameters (similar to LDAPPasswordIdentityProvider):
kind: LDAPSyncConfig
apiVersion: v1
url: ldaps://server1.organization.example.com:636 # LDAP URI FQDN
bindDN: uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com # username
bindPassword: secret # plaintext password
insecure: false # not allowing insecure communication and thus forcing TLS
ca: /home/student/idm-ca.crt # must exist on the client where you run the 'oc'
augmentedActiveDirectory: # variation of MS AD schema
groupsQuery:
baseDN: "cn=groups,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com" # user account container
scope: sub
derefAliases: never
pageSize: 0
groupUIDAttribute: dn
groupNameAttributes: [ cn ]
usersQuery:
baseDN: "cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com" # groups container
scope: sub
derefAliases: never
filter: (objectclass=inetOrgPerson)
pageSize: 0
userNameAttributes: [ uid ]
groupMembershipAttributes: [ memberOf ]MANAGING OPENSHIFT USERS AND IDENTITIES
- You may need to delete the identity resource for a user if the same user name exists on different identity providers.
oc get user
NAME ... IDENTITIES
admin ... htpasswd_auth:admin
idmuser ... idm_ldap_auth:uid=idmuser,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=...OpenShift retains identities for deleted users, and these identities may prevent a new user from logging in, if that user has the same name of an old user:
oc delete user idmuser
oc delete identity idm_ldap_auth:uid=idmuser,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=...lab auth-idm start
scp root@idm:/etc/ipa/ca.crt ~/idm-ca.crt # copy the public certificate of root CA of the IdM server to the student user home folder on the workstation
export LDAPTLS_CACERT=~/idm-ca.crt
ldapsearch -x -H ldaps://idm.lab.example.net:636 -D "uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=example,dc=net" -w RedHat123^ -b "cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=example,dc=net" -s sub= '(objectClass=posixaccount)' uid # see existing users
ldapsearch -x -H ldaps://idm.lab.example.net:636 -D "uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=example,dc=net" -w RedHat123^ -b "cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=example,dc=net" -s sub= '(objectClass=posixgroup)' cn member # see existing groups
scp ~/idm-ca.crt root@master:/etc/origin/master/ # copy the root CA to master
ssh root@master
# Copy & paste LDAPPasswordIdentityProvider from ~/DO425/labs/auth-idm/idm-identity-provider.yaml to the master configuration /etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml under "oauthConfig" section as one of the "identityProviders"
master-restart api # restart master pods ...
master-restart controllers # ... and the node service
systemctl restart atomic-openshift-node
systemctl status atomic-openshift-node # look for errors
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc get user # only admin & developer
oc get group # no resources
oc login -u jrdev1 -p redhat # successfull
oc project internalapp # not a member of this project
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc get user # now contains also jrdev1
oc get group # no resources
oc adm groups sync --confirm --sync-config ~/DO425/labs/auth-idm/idm-sync-config.yaml # synchronize OpenShift and IdM groups
oc get group # ipausers, juniordevs, seniordevs
oc login -u jrdev1 -p redhat
oc project internalapp
oc create cm myconfig --from-literal key1=value1
oc project externalapp # not a member of this project
oc login -u srdev1 -p redhat
oc project externalapp # works
oc create cm myconfig --from-literal key2=value2
oc project internalapp # not a member of this project
ssh root@idm
kinit admin # RedHat123^
ipa user-add srdev2 --first=Developer2 --last=Senior
ipa user-mod srdev2 --password # redhat
ipa user-mod srdev2 --setattr=krbPasswordExpiration=20250606060606Z # far in the future (year 2025)
ipa group-add-member seniordevs --users=srdev2 # make srdev2 member of the group
oc login -u srdev2 -p redhat # back on the workstation
oc project externalapp # you are not member of the project
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc adm groups sync --confirm --sync-config ~/DO425/labs/auth-idm/idm-sync-config.yaml # sync again
oc get group # seniordevs = srdev1, srdev2
oc login -u srdev2 -p redhat
oc project externalapp # now it works
oc create cm myconfig2 --from-literal key3=value3
lab auth-idm finishDEPLOYING SINGLE SIGN-ON ON OPENSHIFT
Passthrough vs. re-encryption SSO templates
Typically coming from registry.redhat.io/redhat-sso-7/sso72-openshift:1.0 (or v1.1, v1.2 ...)
To integrate an application with Red Hat's SSO server you define and configure, at minimum, one 'realm', one or more 'clients', and one or more 'users':
- Web console:
https://sso-fqdn/auth/admin /bin/kadm.sh
CONFIGURING AN OPENSHIFT IDENTITY PROVIDER FOR SSO
The OpenIDIdentityProvider identity provider allows OpenShift to delegate authentication to a SSO server using the OpenID Connect standard (master-config.yml):
. . .
identityProviders:
- challenge: true
login: true
mappingMethod: claim
name: sso_realm # name of your choice
provider:
apiVersion: v1
kind: OpenIDIdentityProvider
clientID: MyApp # client ID of existing client on the SSO realm
clientSecret: 41b5677d-09b1-4ffc-890a-99f10204bde9 # secret of the SSO client
ca: /etc/origin/master/ca-bundle.crt # absolute path on the master
urls:
authorize: https://sso.server.example.com/auth/realms/MyRealm/protocol/openid-connect/auth
token: https://sso.server.lab.example.com/auth/realms/MyRealm/protocol/openid-connect/token
userInfo: https://sso.server.lab.example.com/auth/realms/MyRealm/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo
claims:
id:
- sub
preferredUsername:
- preferred_username
name:
- name
email:
- emailThe OpenID Connect API endpoints of your SSO realm, that follow the format: https://<sso-server-fqdn>/auth/realms/<RealmName>/protocol/openid-connect/<operation>
operation = Name of an OpenID Connect API operation, such as 'auth', 'token', and 'userinfo'
curl -sk https://sso-server-fqdn/auth/realms/RealmName /.well-known/openid-configuration | python -m json.tool # lists all URLs for a SSO realm, for example the RealmName realmlab auth-sso start
git clone http://services.lab.example.com/sso72-dev # copy of the sso folder of the jboss-openshift/application-templates project
less sso72-dev/sso72-https.json | grep sso72-openshift # sample template to deploy the sign-on containerized server
less sso72-dev/sso72-image-stream.json | grep sso72-openshift # image stream that points to the single sign-on container image
podman search registry.lab.example.com/sso # is the image available on the classroom registry? Yes, ../redhat-sso-7/sso72-openshift
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc project openshift
for f in ~/sso72-dev; do oc delete -f $f; done # delete existing SSO resources, SSO image stream and templates may already exist
for f in ~/sso72-dev; do oc create -f $f; done # create new IS and template resources for SSO
oc describe istag redhat-sso72-openshift:1.2 | head -n 3 # did IS import container 'redhat-sso72-openshift'? Yes, also try 'oc get is | grep sso'
~/DO425/labs/auth-sso/provision-storage.sh sso-db # provision NFS storage for SSO DB and create PV
oc get pv | grep sso-db # verify that the sso-db persistent volume is available - Yes, 512Mi
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc new-project websso
oc new-app --template sso72-x509-postgresql-persistent -p APPLICATION_NAME=sso -p DB_USERNAME=sso -p DB_PASSWORD=redhat -p VOLUME_CAPACITY=512Mi -p SSO_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin -p SSO_ADMIN_PASSWORD=redhat # use the sso72-x509-postgresql-persistent template to deploy a containerized PostgreSQL database and a containerized SSO server
oc get pvc | grep sso-postgresql-claim # bound volume sso-db
#oc rollout cancel dc/sso # if it takes too long and sso pod is in error state
oc get pod | grep sso # 'sso-1-XYZW' and 'sso-postgresql-1-XYZW' should be running
oc logs sso-1-XYZW | tail -n 2 # should say started, must not say "with errors" or "X services failed or missing dependencies"
firefox https://sso-websso.apps.lab.example.com/auth/admin 1. Add realm OpenShift ("Select realm" - "Add realm")
2. Create the contractordev1 user in the OpenShift realm ("Manage" - "Users")
3. Assign a non-temporary password to the contractordev1 user ("Credentials")
4. Create the "MasterAPI" client ID in the OpenShift realm with openid-connect client protocol ("Clients" - "Create")
5. In MasterAPI settings, select Confidential in the 'Access Type' field and type https://master.lab.example.com:443/* in the Valid Redirect URIs.
6. Retrieve the client secret for the MasterAPI client's credential tab
7. Log off from the single sign-on web console.
firefox https://sso-websso.apps.lab.example.com/auth/realms/OpenShift/account 1. Login as contractordev1 and retype the password to activate the account.
2. Sign out
ssh root@master
cat ~/DO425/labs/auth-sso/sso-identity-provider.yaml # copy the content, but change clientSecret
vim /etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml # paste it here = add a new OpenIDIdentityProvider, do not delete HTPAsswdPasswordIdentityProvider
master-restart api
master-restart controllers
systemctl restart atomic-openshift-node
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc login -u contractordev1 -p redhat # verify that OpenShift can authenticate users from single sign-on
oc project contractorapp
oc create cm myconfig --from-literal key1=value1 # create ConfigMap in the contractorapp project to prove user has write access
oc project internalapp # error = You are not a member of project "internalapp"
lab auth-sso finishTBAREVIEWING SECRETS AND CONFIGMAPS
- You can store the registry credentials in a secret and instruct OpenShift to use that secret when it needs to push and pull images from the registry.
SECRETS
Individual secrets are limited to 1MB in size.
oc create secret generic secret_name --from-literal=username=operator --from-literal=password=MyS3cr3TOr in YAML:
echo operator | base64 # b3BlcmF0b3IK
echo MyS3cr3T | base64 # TXlTM2NyM1QK
vim secret.yamlapiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: secret_name
data:
username: b3BlcmF0b3IK # must be base64 encoded
password: TXlTM2NyM1QK # must be base64 encodedoc create -f secret.yamlapiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: test-secret
namespace: my-namespace
type: Opaque # bypasses any validation
data:
password: dmFsdWUtMQ0K # must be base64 encoded
stringData:
hostname: myapp.mydomain.com
admin_password: redhat123 # plain text value will automatically be converted to base64How to use the above secret in the deployment config:
...output omitted...
env:
- name: APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD # environment variable retrieves value from test-secret secret
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef: # similarly to configMapKeyRef
name: test-secret
key: admin_passwordAnother use case is the passing of data, such as TLS certificates, to an application by using the --from-file=file option. This exposes a sensitive file to an application. The pod definition can reference the secret, which creates the secret as files in a volume mounted on one or more of the application containers.
...output omitted...
spec:
containers:
...output omitted...
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /conf/app/extra_ca_certs # mounts certs_volume to /conf/app/extra_ca_certs
name: certs_volume
volumes:
- name: certs_volume
secret:
defaultMode: 420
secretName: application-certificates # maps the volume to application_certificates secretCONFIGURATION MAP
oc create configmap special-config --from-literal=serverAddress=172.20.30.40Or in YAML:
vim special-config.yamlapiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: special-config
data:
serverAddress: 172.20.30.40oc create -f special-config.yamlPopulate the APISERVER environment variable inside a pod definition from the above configuration map:
env:
- name: APISERVER
valueFrom:
configMapKeyRef: # similarly to secretKeyRef
name: special-config
key: serverAddressEncrypting Secrets in Etcd
- On master nodes, define the experimental-encryption-provider-config in the
/etc/origin/master/master-config.yamlfile:
...output omitted...
kubernetesMasterConfig:
apiServerArguments:
experimental-encryption-provider-config: # <-- important
- /etc/origin/master/encryption-config.yaml # <-- important
storage-backend:
- etcd3
...output omitted...- Create
encryption-config.yamlfile:vim /etc/origin/master/encryption-config.yaml
kind: EncryptionConfig
apiVersion: v1
resources:
- resources:
- secrets:
providers:
- aescbc: # algorithm used, strongest cypher
keys:
- name: key1
secret: hifzYhVwbOFYL7X+oGoEqwblf94sJFoVg7IOECcCk+Q= # base64 encoded and 32-byte length
- identity: {}head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 # random secret used above as key1
master-restart api
master-restart controllers
# From now on, new secret object are encrypted:
etcdctl3 get /kubernetes.io/secrets/mytest/mysecret2 -w fields --cacert=/etc/etcd/ca.crt --key=/etc/etcd/peer.key --cert=/etc/etcd/peer.crt --endpoints 'https://172.25.250.10:2379' | grep Value
# If you need to encrypt already existing secrets:
oc adm migrate storage --include=secrets --confirm # reads all secrets then updates them to apply server-side encryptionPreparing Secrets for Accessing Authenticated Registry
oc create secret docker-registry <secret_name> --docker-username=<user> --docker-password=<pass> --docker-server=<registry_full_host_name>With Quay, you can create robot accounts (tokens) and grant them access to the repositories in an organization. Quay can generate a YAML Kubernetes resource file that you can also use with OpenShift (oc create -f ~/Downloads/myorg-openshift-secret.yml).
Configuring Project Service Account for Image PUSHING
The build process uses the OpenShift builder service account in your project. For the builder service account to automatically use that secret for authentication, link it to the secret:
oc secrets link serviceaccount/builder secret/<secret_name>
oc new-build GIT_project_URL --push-secret=<secret_name> --to-docker --to=<remote_registry>/<namespace>/<image> # S2I build process will now push to another registryConfiguring Project Service Account for Image PULLING
oc secrets link serviceaccount/default secret/<secret_name> --for=pull # link default SA in your project to the secretConfiguring OpenShift for Accepting Certificates Signed by a Private CA
- Install CA's certificate on each node, under the
/etc/docker/certs.d/<registry_full_host_name>/directory:
mkdir /etc/docker/certs.d/quay.apps.lab.example.com/
mv -v ca.crt /etc/docker/certs.d/quay.apps.lab.example.com/- And on the master you need to do:
# v3.10 and later:
# Configure the OpenShift API Server to use the CA's certificate, on the master you do:
cat myca.crt >> /etc/origin/master/ca-bundle.crt
# Path to the /etc/origin/master/ca-bundle.crt file is defined by the 'additionalTrustedCA' variable in /etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml. So if there is a reference to 'additionalTrustedCA' in the 'imageImportPolicy' section of the master config, you need to do for example:
cat myca.crt >> /etc/origin/master/additional_ca.crt
master-restart apiOr:
# v3.11.43 and later:
oc version # v3.11?
# in addition to the certificates in /etc/origin/master/ca-bundle.crt, the API server also trusts the certificates in the system /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.trust.crt file, to automatically append:
mv -v ca.crt /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/
update-ca-trust extract # this will append the CA to the fileLIMITING REGISTRIES, PROJECTS, AND IMAGES
cat /etc/containers/policy.json # on all nodes, no need to restart when changed, default file accepts any image:{
"default": [
{
"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
}
],
"transports":
{
"docker-daemon":
{
"": [{"type":"insecureAcceptAnything"}]
}
}
}- system uses the default entry when no other rule matches
insecureAcceptAnything= accept any imagereject= refuse all images (usually set this requirement in the default entry and add specific rules to allow your images)signedBy= accept signed images (provide additional parameters such as the public GPG key to use to verify signatures)- Using wildcards or partial names does NOT work!
- Under the
transportssection file groups registries by type:docker(Registry v2 API),atomic(OCR),docker-daemon(local daemon storage):
Another example:
{
"default": [
{
"type": "reject" <-- reject all images if no other rule matches
}
],
"transports": {
"docker": {
"registry.access.redhat.com": [ <-- use any images from registr.access.redhat.com as long as they are GPG signed
{
"type": "signedBy",
"keyType": "GPGKeys",
"keyPath": "/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release"
}
],
"quay.apps.lab.example.com/production": [ <-- use any image from the production organization in Quay
{
"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
}
],
"quay.apps.lab.example.com/staging/mypostgres-95:latest": [ <-- pull latest tag of the mypostgresl image in the staging of Quay
{
"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
}
]
},
"atomic": {
"172.30.13.172:5000": [ <-- pull any image from the local OpenShift Container Registry (OCR)
{
"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
}
]
},
"docker-daemon": {
"": [
{
"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
}
]
}
}
}Configuring Signature Transports
That above configuration ("type", "keyType", "keyPath") is not enough; you also need to indicate the URL to the web server that stores the detached image signatures. To declare that URL, create a file under /etc/containers/registries.d/ such as:
cat /etc/containers/registries.d/redhat.yaml
docker:
registry.access.redhat.com:
sigstore: https://access.redhat.com/webassets/docker/content/sigstoreFor the OpenShift Container Registry, that you define with the 'atomic' transport type, you do not need to perform this extra configuration. The OCR has API extensions to store the signatures, and the atomic transport type consumes them.
USING DEPLOYMENT TRIGGERS
oc get dc # look at 'TRIGGERED BY' columnFor example if it says config,image(redis:latest), there are two types of triggers:
- A configuration change trigger causes a new deployment to be created any time you update the deployment configuration object itself.
- An image change trigger causes OpenShift to redeploy the application each time a new version of the redis:latest image is available in the registry
When you create an application with the oc new-app command, or from the web interface, OpenShift creates a deployment configuration object with the above two triggers already defined.
This is how it looks like in the YAML:
apiVersion: apps.openshift.io/v1
kind: DeploymentConfig
...output omitted...
triggers:
- type: ConfigChange
- type: ImageChange
imageChangeParams:
automatic: true
containerNames:
- <container_name>
from:
kind: ImageStreamTag
name: <image_stream_name>:latest
namespace: <image_stream_project>
template:
...output omitted...# Use the oc set triggers command on an existing deployment configuration object:
oc set triggers dc/<dc_name> --from-image=<image_stream_project>/<image_stream_name>:latest -c <container_name>
# Use the oc import-image command to create an image stream object from an image in a remote repository (and poll regularly):
oc import-image <image_stream_name> --from=<registry_full_host_name>/<namespace>/<image_name> --confirm --scheduled=true
# Follow the triggering of new deployments (similar to 'Events' column in oc describe dc <dc_name>):
oc rollout history dc/<dc_name>CUSTOMIZING OPENSHIFT PIPELINES
- Clone a Git repository and execute a Maven build and installation:
stage('Build App') {
steps {
git url: 'http://services.lab.example.com/bookstore'
sh "mvn install -DskipTests=true"
}
}
- Submit the code for analysis to a SonarQube instance:
stage('Code Analysis') {
steps {
script {
sh "mvn sonar:sonar -Dsonar.host.url=http://sonarqube:9000 -DskipTests=true"
}
}
}
- Input command asks the user for confirmation:
stage('Promote to QA?') {
steps {
timeout(time:15, unit:'MINUTES') {
input message: "Promote to QA?", ok: "Promote"
}
}
}
- Pipeline can also make calls to OpenShift - this rolls out the deployment of the application latest image in the
bookstore-qaproject:
stage('Deploy QA') {
steps {
script {
openshift.withCluster() {
openshift.withProject('bookstore-qa') {
openshift.selector('dc', 'bookstore').rollout().latest()
}
}
}
}
}
lab deployment-policy start
# Use the Red Hat Quay Enterprise web interface to create the operator2 user account and set its password to redhat123. Also create the deploymentpolicy organization and a robot account named openshift with read access to the organization's repositories. In a later step, you configure OpenShift to use this account to authenticate with Quay. This way, you do not expose the credentials of a real user account.
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # operator2/redhat123
# Push the local /home/student/DO425/labs/deployment-policy/v1/intranetphpv1.tar image to Quay, under the deploymentpolicy organization, use GPG key operator2@lab.example.com:
skopeo copy --sign-by operator2@lab.example.com docker-archive:/home/student/DO425/labs/deployment-policy/v1/intranetphpv1.tar docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/deploymentpolicy/intranetphp
ssh root@master vim /etc/containers/policy.json # limit registries - allow OCR, allow admin org in Quay, allow signed from deploymentpolicy org, reject all others:
{
"default": [
{
"type": "reject"
}
],
"transports": {
"atomic": {
"172.30.13.172:5000": [
{
"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
}
]
},
"docker": {
"quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin": [
{
"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
}
],
"quay.apps.lab.example.com/deploymentpolicy": [
{
"type": "signedBy",
"keyType": "GPGKeys",
"keyPath": "/etc/containers/operator2.pub" <-- this has to be local to the master/node
}
],
"registry.lab.example.com": [
{
"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
}
]
}
}
}
scp /etc/containers/policy.json node1:/etc/containers/policy.json
scp /etc/containers/policy.json node2:/etc/containers/policy.json
gpg2 --armor --export operator2@lab.example.com > operator2.pub # from the workstation extract a copy of operator2's public key and distribute it everywhere
scp operator2.pub root@master:/etc/containers/ # must match keyPath
scp operator2.pub root@node1:/etc/containers/ # keyPath
scp operator2.pub root@node2:/etc/containers/ # keyPath
vim quay.yaml
docker:
quay.apps.lab.example.com: # URL of the host with detached sigs
sigstore: http://signatures.lab.example.com
scp quay.yaml root@master:/etc/containers/registries.d/
scp quay.yaml root@node1:/etc/containers/registries.d/
scp quay.yaml root@node2:/etc/containers/registries.d/
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project deployment-policy
oc create -f /home/student/Downloads/deploymentpolicy-openshift-secret.yml # create the secret that contains the credentials to authenticate to Quay
oc secrets link serviceaccount/default secret/deploymentpolicy-openshift-pull-secret --for=pull # associate the secret to the default service account in the deployment-policy project. Three SAs are automatically created in every project: builder, deployer, default. 'default' is used to run all pods.
cat ~/DO425/labs/deployment-policy/intranetphp.yaml # file creates the intranetphp application, notice that the deployment uses your image in Quay (intranetphp:latest)
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/deployment-policy/intranetphp.yaml # contains image from Quay
oc get pods
oc get routes
curl intranetphp-deployment-policy.apps.lab.example.com # version 1
oc set triggers dc/intranetphp # only the configuration change trigger is defined (TYPE: config)
# Create an image stream to monitor the deploymentpolicy/intranetphp image in Quay. Add the --scheduled=true option to instruct OpenShift to regularly poll Quay to detect new versions of the image:
oc import-image intranetphp --from=quay.apps.lab.example.com/deploymentpolicy/intranetphp --confirm --scheduled=true
oc set triggers dc/intranetphp --from-image=deployment-policy/intranetphp:latest -c intranetphp
oc set triggers dc/intranetphp # image trigger is there now
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # as operator2 again
skopeo copy --sign-by operator2@lab.example.com docker-archive:/home/student/DO425/labs/deployment-policy/v2/intranetphpv2.tar docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/deploymentpolicy/intranetphp
oc rollout history dc/intranetphp # new deployment automatically triggered caused by image change
curl intranetphp-deployment-policy.apps.lab.example.com # version 2
podman logout quay.apps.lab.example.com
oc delete project deployment-policy
lab deployment-policy finishSECURITY CONTEXT CONSTRAINTS (SCCs)
- SCCs define conditions that a pod must satisfy in order to be created
- Similar to policies, which enforce certain actions or prevent others from a service or a user (or service account)
- By default resources get
restrictedSCC (no root, mknod, setuid) - Create your own SCC rather than modifying a predefined SCC
Control:
- Privileged mode - running privileged containers should be avoided at all costs
- Privileges escalation - on/off privileges escalation inside a container
- Linux capabilities - Linux capabilities to and from your containers (e.g. KILL)
- Seccomp profiles - allow or block certain system calls (e.g. CAP_CHOWN)
- Volume types - permit or prevent certain volume types (e.g. emptyDir)
- System control (Sysctl) settings - modify kernel parameters at runtime
- Host resources - permit or prevent a pod for accessing the following host resources: IPC namespaces, host networks, host ports, and host PID namespaces
- Read-only root file system - forces users to mount a volume if they need to store data
- User and group IDs - restricting users to a certain set of ID or GIDs. Each project gets assigned its own range, as defined by a project annotation, such as
openshift.io/sa.scc.uid-range=1000190000/10000andopenshift.io/sa.scc.supplemental-groups=1000190000/10000./=number of allowed values (e.g. 1000190000 up to 1000200000). - SELinux labels - define an SELinux label to the pods
- File system groups - allows you to define supplemental groups for the user, which is usually required for accessing a block device
Introducing SCC Strategies
Categories:
- Boolean (
Allow Privileged: true) - Allowable set (
RequiredDropCapabilites: KILL,MKNOD,SETUID,SETGID) - Controlled by a strategy, SCC Strategies:
-
RunAsAny- any ID defined in the pod definition (or image) is allowed (security issue), no SELinux labels -
MustRunAsRange- the project or the pod must provide a range within an allowable set, lowest value is default-
Run As User Strategy:
MustRunAsRange UID: <none> UID Range Min: 10000000 UID Range Max:10000100
-
-
MustRunAs- project or the pod must provide a single value, for example SELinux context
-
Managing Supplemental Groups - shared storage example (e.g. NFS)
# You should not be running containers as root, only containers with an UID of 100001 or members of the group with the ID of 100099 are permitted to access the NFS storage:
oc describe demo-project
...output omitted...
Annotations: openshift.io/sa.scc.supplemental-groups=1000190000/10000 # default range in OpenShift
...output omitted...
ls -lZ /opt/app/nfs -d # NFS server defines a directory accessible by the user ID 100001 and the group ID 100099Annotation is used by OpenShift to determine the range for supplemental groups.
I. One way to allow access to the NFS share is to be explicit in the pod definition by defining a supplemental groups that all containers inherit. All containers that are created in the project are then members of the group 100099, which grants access to the volume, regardless of the container's user ID:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
...output omitted...
spec:
containers:
- name: application
securityContext:
supplementalGroups: [ 100099 ] # arra of supplemental group(s)
...output omitted...oc rsh application-pod id
uid=1000190000 gid=0(root) groups=0(root),100099,1000190000
# You must also ensure that the value is within the allowable range. This is enforced if the strategy for supplemental groups is set to MustRunAsRange. You must then ensure that the SCC applied to the pod allows this value.II. Another solution is the creation of a custom SCC that defines a range for the group IDs, enforces the usage of a value inside the range, allows the GID 100099:
kind: SecurityContextConstraints
...output omitted...
priority: 10 # larger number = higher priority
supplementalGroups:
type: MustRunAs # strategy
ranges: # allowed range
- min: 100050
max: 100100
...output omitted...Managing File System Groups - block storage example (e.g. iSCSI)
Unlike shared storage, block storage is taken over by a pod, which means that the user and group IDs supplied in the pod definition are applied to the physical block device. If the pod uses a restricted SCC that defines a fsGroup with a strategy of MustRunAs, then the pod will fail to run. OpenShift doesn't allocate any GID to block storage, so if the pod definition doesn't explicitly set fsGroup and SCC uses RunAsAny, permission may still be denied! Define a file system group in the pod definition:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
...output omitted...
spec:
containers:
- name: application
securityContext:
fsGroup: [ 600 ] # filesystem group applied to the block storage
...output omitted...Managing SELinux context with SCCs
Restricted SCC defines a strategy of MustRunAs, the project must define the options, such as user, role, type, and level otherwise pod will not be created
At creation time, OpenShift assigns a SELinux type to containers' main process, container_runtime_t
Define the values for the SELinux context in SCC and relationship with the project:
oc describe scc restricted
...output omitted..
SELinux Context Strategy: MustRunAs
User: <none>
Role: <none>
Type: <none>
Level: <none>
oc describe project default
...output omitted...
Annotations: openshift.io/sa.scc.mcs=s0:c1,c0
If the pod needs to access a volume, the same categories must be defined for the volume. Define the SELinux context for a pod:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
spec:
containers:
...output omitted...
securityContext:
seLinuxOptions:
level: "s0:c123,c456" # sensitivity 0, categories 123,456 = same must be on the volumeMANAGING SCCS
oc describe scc restrictedName: restricted
Priority: <none>
Access:
Users: <none>
Groups: system:authenticated # <-- members of SCC
Settings:
Allow Privileged: false
Default Add Capabilities: <none>
Required Drop Capabilities: <none> # <-- e.g. KILL,MKNOD,SETUID,SETGID
Allowed Capabilities: <none>
Allowed Volume Types: awsElasticBlockStore,configMap,emptyDir,iscsi,nfs,persistentVolumeClaim,rbd,secret
Allow Host Network: false # <-- access to host network
Allow Host Ports: false
Allow Host PID: false
Allow Host IPC: false
Read Only Root Filesystem: false
Run As User Strategy: MustRunAsRange # <-- project using this SCC must define range for user IDs
UID: <none>
UID Range Min: <none>
UID Range Max: <none>
SELinux Context Strategy: MustRunAs
User: <none>
Role: <none>
Type: <none>
Level: <none>
FSGroup Strategy: RunAsAny
Ranges: <none>
Supplemental Groups Strategy: RunAsAny
Ranges: <none>
oc get scc
NAME PRIV CAPS SELINUX RUNASUSER FSGROUP SUPGROUP PRIORITY READONLYROOTFS VOLUMES
anyuid false [] MustRunAs RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny 10 false [..omitted..]
hostaccess false [] MustRunAs MustRunAsRange MustRunAs RunAsAny <none> false [..omitted..]
hostmount-anyuid false [] MustRunAs RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny <none> false [..omitted..]
hostnetwork false [] MustRunAs MustRunAsRange MustRunAs MustRunAs <none> false [..omitted..]
nonroot false [] MustRunAs MustRunAsNonRoot RunAsAny RunAsAny <none> false [..omitted..]
privileged true [*] RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny RunAsAny <none> false [..omitted..]
restricted false [] MustRunAs MustRunAsRange MustRunAs RunAsAny <none> false [..omitted..]Custom SCC (only cluster admin can create it):
kind: SecurityContextConstraints
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
name: custom-scc
allowHostNetwork: True <-- access to the host namespaces and network stack
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true <-- read-only file system
requiredDropCapabilities: <-- two Linux capabilities to drop
- KILL
- SYS_CHROOT
seccompProfiles:
- unconfined <-- can be docker/default, unconfined or localhost/profile name (e.g. - localhost/my-restricted-profile) installed in node's SecComp profile root dir
runAsUser:
type: RunAsAny <-- mandatory strategy for the user
seLinuxContext:
type: RunAsAny <-- mandatory SELinux contextoc create -f custom-scc.yaml
oc describe scc custom-scc
# In order to use a custom seccomp profile, you need to enable the seccomp-profile-root directive in the kubeletArguments section of the nodes' configuration file /etc/origin/node/node-config.yml to point to a directory that contains seccomp profiles. The file must be present on all nodes + systemctl restart origin-node:
# kubeletArguments:
# seccomp-profile-root:
# - "/path/to/profile"
oc delete scc custom-sccManaging Service Accounts for SCCs
Service accounts can be member of an SCC, similarly to users. This restricts all resources created by a service account to inherit the restrictions of the SCC. By default, pods run with the default service account, unless you specify a different service account. All authenticated users are automatically added to the system:authenticated group. As such, all authenticated users inherit the restricted SCC:
oc describe scc restricted | grep 'Groups:' # system:authenticatedIf a container requires elevated privileges or special privileges, create a new service account and make it member of an existing SCC, or create your own SCC and make the service account member of that SCC. Every service account has an associated user name, so it can be added to any specific SCC.
Creating a custom service account and make it member of the anyuid SCC, which allows pods to use any UID:
oc create serviceaccount app-sa
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user anyuid -z app-sa # -z=service account in the current project
# If you need to add a SCC to the service account from another project (demo-project):
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user anyuid system:serviceaccount:demo-project:app-sa
# Update an existing deployment configuration or pod definition:
...output omitted...
spec:
containers:
- image: registry-demo.lab.example.com/my-app:latest
name: my-app
spec:
serviceAccountName: app-sa # <--lab deployment-scc start
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc get scc | grep restricted # inspect existing SCCs
oc describe scc restricted # shows members (users & groups). 'system:authenticated' group is what applies the restricted SCC to all user projects
oc get clusterrolebinding | awk 'NR == 1 || /system:authenticated/' # list all cluster role bindings that apply for the system:authenticated group (this shows which capabilities authenticated user have)
NAME ROLE
basic-users /basic-user
cluster-status-binding /cluster-status
self-access-reviewers /self-access-reviewer
self-provisioners /self-provisioner # <-- allows to create projects
servicecatalog-serviceclass-viewer-binding /servicecatalog-serviceclass-viewer
system:basic-user /system:basic-user
system:build-strategy-docker-binding /system:build-strategy-docker
system:build-strategy-jenkinspipeline-binding /system:build-strategy-jenkinspipeline
system:build-strategy-source-binding /system:build-strategy-source
system:discovery /system:discovery
system:oauth-token-deleters /system:oauth-token-deleter
system:openshift:discovery /system:openshift:discovery
system:scope-impersonation /system:scope-impersonation
system:webhooks /system:webhook
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project deployment-scc
oc describe project deployment-scc # verify that projects provide a default range 1000130000 up to 1000139999 (as openshift.io/sa.scc.uid-range annotation)
# To ensure that the UID allocated to containers are in the range, create a deployment configuration by using the file located at ~/DO425/labs/deployment-scc/deployment-scc.yaml:
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/deployment-scc/deployment-scc.yaml # creates 1 httpd pod in deployment-scc project
oc get pods # deployment-scc-1-wkv5r
oc rsh deployment-scc-1-wkv5r id # uid=1000130000 gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1000130000
# Create a service account and edit the deployment configuration to define the new service account and to force the UID to allocate:
oc create sa deployment-scc-sa # create service account in project
oc get sa # shows deployment-scc-sa + default SCCs
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc describe scc anyuid | grep 'Run As' -A3 # RunAsAny strategy, <none> values
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user anyuid -z deployment-scc-sa # scc anyuid added to sa - WARNING: it succeeds even if the user does not exist!
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc edit dc/deployment-scc
...output omitted...
template:
spec:
serviceAccountName: deployment-scc-sa # use the SA we created
containers:
- image: registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/httpd-24-rhel7:latest
securityContext: # <--
runAsUser: 600 # <-- ID of 600 for the pod's user
oc get pods # deployment-scc-2-d7hj5 running
oc rsh deployment-scc-2-d7hj5 id # uid=600 gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
# User is no longer member of any supplemental group, as the pod overrides the project settings but does not define any supplemental group
cat ~/DO425/labs/deployment-scc/deployment-scc-host-mount.yaml # mount a host volume
...output omitted...
spec:
volumes:
- name: httpd
hostPath:
path: /opt/DO425/deployment-scc/
...output omitted...
ssh root@node1 ls /opt/DO425/deployment-scc # Hello.txt
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/deployment-scc/deployment-scc-host-mount.yaml
oc get pods # deployment-scc-host-mount-1-deploy is running but NOT working!
oc get events # hostPath volumes are not allowed to be used
oc create sa deployment-scc-host-sa
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc describe scc hostaccess # "Allowed Volume Types: ..., hostPath, ..." default SCC that shows all the allowed plugins, also MustRunAsRange
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user hostaccess -z deployment-scc-host-sa # attach this SCC to the deployment-scc-host-sa service account
# Another way of updating a deployment configuration is by using the oc patch verb:
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc patch dc/deployment-scc-host-mount -p '{"spec":{"template":{"spec":{"serviceAccountName": "deployment-scc-host-sa"}}}}' # or 'oc edit'
oc get pods # deployment-scc-hot-mount-2-pvs55
oc rsh deployment-scc-host-mount-2-pvs55
mount | grep www # that is where it is mounted
ls /var/www/html # Hello.txt
exit
# Delete the service accounts and the project:
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc adm policy remove-scc-from-user anyuid -z deployment-scc-sa # remove SCC from SA
oc adm policy remove-scc-from-user hostaccess -z deployment-scc-host-sa
oc delete project deployment-scc
lab deployment-scc finishTBAMANAGING APPLICATION HEALTH
- Liveness Probe - is the pod healthy?
- Readiness Probe - is the pod ready to serve requests?
MANAGING APPLICATION SCHEDULING
Scheduler filters the list of running nodes by the availability of node resources, such as host ports or memory
A common use for affinity rules is to schedule related pods to be close to each other for performance reasons.
A common use case for anti-affinity rules is to schedule related pods not too close to each other for high availability reasons.
Rules can be: mandatory (required) or best-effort (preferred)
Define 8 nodes, two regions, us-west and us-east, and a set of two zones in each region:
oc label node node1 region=us-west zone=power1a # west
oc label node node2 region=us-west zone=power1a
oc label node node3 region=us-west zone=power2a
oc label node node4 region=us-west zone=power2a
oc label node node5 region=us-east zone=power1b # east
oc label node node6 region=us-east zone=power1b
oc label node node7 region=us-east zone=power2b
oc label node node8 region=us-east zone=power2b
oc get nodes -L zone -L region # inspect the labels assigned to nodesRule that requires the pod be placed on a node with a label whose key is compute-CA-NorthSouth and whose value is either compute-CA-North or compute-CA-South:
oc label node9 compute-CA-NorthSouth=compute-CA-North
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: with-node-affinity
spec:
affinity: # different from nodeSelector
nodeAffinity: # defines usage of affinity
requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution: # it requires rule to enforce placement. 'required' can also be 'preferred', but then you also need 'weight' value
nodeSelectorTerms:
- matchExpressions: # must match this
- key: compute-CA-NorthSouth
operator: In # In, NotIn, Exists, DoesNotExist, Lt, Gt
values:
- compute-CA-North # first value that must match
- compute-CA-South # second value that must match to apply the rule
containers:
- name: with-node-affinity
image: registry.access.redhat.com/openshift3/jenkins-2-rhel7Node selector can be part of pod definition or deployment config (the below triggers new deployment):
oc patch dc dev-app --patch '{"spec":{"template":{"nodeSelector":{"env":"dev"}}}}' # configure the dev-app deployment configuration so that its pods only run on nodes that have the env=dev labelSame in YAML:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
spec:
nodeSelector: # different from affinity
env: dev
containers:
- image: registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/httpd-24-rhel7:latest
...output omitted...Node maintenance/availability
oc adm manage-node --schedulable=false <node> # mark a node as unschedulable
oc adm drain <node> --delete-local-data --ignore-daemonsets # destroys (evicts) all pods running on the node and instructs OpenShift to recreate the pods, --delete-local-data is for emptyDir podsMANAGING RESOURCE USAGE
Define limits in a deployment configuration instead of a pod definition
- Resource requests - indicate that a pod cannot run with less than the specified amount of resources (essentially requirements)
- Resource limits - prevent a pod from using up all compute resources from a node
Managing Quotas
ResourceQuota resource object specifies hard resource usage limits for a project; all attributes of a quota are optional, meaning that any resource that is not restricted by a quota can be consumed without bounds (you can restrict e.g. pods, rc, svc, secrets, pvcs, CPU, memory, storage).
ClusterResourceQuota resource is created at the cluster level, uses openshift.io/requester annotation:
oc create clusterquota user-prod --project-annotation-selector openshift.io/requester=production --hard pods=12 --hard secrets=20 # create a cluster quota for all projects owned by the production user
oc create clusterquota env-qa --project-label-selector environment=qa --hard pods=10 --hard services=5 # create a cluster quota for all the projects with a label of environment=qa
oc delete clusterquota <quota>ResourceQuota resource object that defines limits for CPU and memory:
apiVersion: v1
kind: ResourceQuota
metadata:
name: my-quota
spec:
hard:
limits.memory: "400Mi" # by default quota attributes track resource request
limits.cpu: "1200m" # ...prefix the attribute with 'limits.' to track resource limitsoc describe quota
Name: my-quota
Namespace: dev-env # If a quota that restricts the use of compute resources for a project is set, OpenShift refuses to create pods that do not specify resource requests or resource limits
Resource Used Hard
-------- ---- ----
limits.cpu 400m 1200m # millicores
limits.memory 128Mi 400Mi # mebibytes (1MiB=1,048,576b)Managing Limit Ranges
LimitRange resource, also called a limit, defines the default, minimum, and maximum values for compute resource requests and limits (also storage - default, min, max capacity requested by image, is, pvc) for a single pod or for a single container defined inside the project. A resource request or limit for a pod is the sum of its containers.
To understand the difference between a limit range and a resource quota resource, consider that a limit range defines valid ranges and default values for a single pod, while a resource quota defines only maximum values for the sum of all pods in a project.
The following listing shows a limit range defined using YAML syntax:
apiVersion: "v1"
kind: "LimitRange"
metadata:
name: "limit-range"
spec:
limits:
- type: "Pod"
max:
cpu: "400m" # maximum CPU allowed across all containers in a pod
memory: "256Mi"
min:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "64Mi"
- type: "Container"
max:
cpu: "400m" # maximum CPU allowed per container
memory: "256Mi" # maximum memory allowed per container
min:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "64Mi"
default:
cpu: "200m"
memory: "64Mi"
defaultRequest:
cpu: "200m"
memory: "64Mi"
- type: "PersistentVolumeClaim"
min:
storage: 2Gi
max:
storage: 50Gi # maximum capacity of the volume that can be requested by one claim
- type: openshift.io/Image # maximum size of an image that can be pushed to OCR
max:
storage: 1Gioc create -f limits.yml
oc get limits
Name: limit-range
Namespace: dev-project
Type Resource Min Max Default Request Default Limit
---- -------- --- --- --------------- -------------
Pod cpu 100m 400m - -
Pod memory 64Mi 256Mi - -
Container cpu 100m 400m 200m 200m
Container memory 64Mi 256Mi 64Mi 64MiAfter creating a limit range in a project, all resource create requests are evaluated against each limit range resource in the project. If the new resource violates the minimum or maximum constraint enumerated by any limit, OpenShift rejects the resource. If the new resource does not set an explicit value, and the constraint supports a default value, then the default value is applied to the new resource as its usage value.
lab orchestration-scheduling start
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc get nodes -L region # region label has no value on any node (doesn't exist)
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com # or just 'oc login -u developer' if you have used existing credentials before
oc new-project orchestration-scheduling
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/dc-scale.yaml
oc get pods -o=custom-columns="name:metadata.name,node:.spec.nodeName" # orchestration-scheduling-1-g29wh on node2
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=6 # scaling of deployment config
oc get pods -o=custom-columns="name:metadata.name,node:.spec.nodeName" # pods are spread across the two application nodes 1 & 2
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc label node node2.lab.example.com region=apps --overwrite=true
oc get nodes -L region # label 'apps' is applied to node2
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc edit dc/orchestration-scheduling # Update the spec section of the template group, and not the spec section of the metadata group
...output omitted...
spec:
nodeSelector: # location: dc.spec.template.spec.nodeSelector
region: apps
containers:
- image: registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/httpd-24-rhel7:latest
...output omitted...
oc get pods -o=custom-columns="name:metadata.name,node:.spec.nodeName" # all pods should be scheduled on node2 only after a while
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc label node node1.lab.example.com region=apps --overwrite=true # it does not move pods to node1 automatically
oc get nodes -L region # 'apps' label is applied to node1 and node2
oc adm manage-node --schedulable=false node2.lab.example.com # mark node2 unschedulable
oc adm drain node2.lab.example.com --delete-local-data --ignore-daemonsets # drain all pods from node2
oc get pods -o=custom-columns="name:metadata.name,node:.spec.nodeName" # all the application pods are running on node1
oc adm manage-node --schedulable=true node2.lab.example.com # node2 schedulable again
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=2 # scale down to two
# Set resource quotas and limit ranges for your project, then verify that the project's pods consume resources from the project's quota:
cat ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/quota.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: ResourceQuota
metadata:
name: orchestration-scheduling
spec:
hard:
limits.memory: "400Mi"
limits.cpu: "1200m"
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/quota.yaml
oc describe quota # limits.memory used 128Mi, hard 400Mi
cat ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/limit-range.yaml
apiVersion: "v1"
kind: "LimitRange"
metadata:
name: "orchestration-scheduling"
spec:
limits:
- type: "Pod"
max:
cpu: "400m"
memory: "256Mi"
min:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "64Mi"
- type: "Container"
max:
cpu: "400m"
memory: "256Mi"
min:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "64Mi"
default: # default resource requirement limit value (if resource limit is ommitted)
cpu: "200m"
memory: "64Mi"
defaultRequest: # default resource requirement request value (if resource request is ommitted)
cpu: "200m"
memory: "64Mi"
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/limit-range.yaml
oc describe limits
Name: orchestration-scheduling
Namespace: orchestration-scheduling
Type Resource Min Max Default Request Default Limit
---- -------- --- --- --------------- -------------
Pod cpu 100m 400m - -
Pod memory 64Mi 256Mi - -
Container cpu 100m 400m 200m 200m
Container memory 64Mi 256Mi 64Mi 64Mi
oc describe node node1.lab.example.com | grep -A 5 Allocated # resources usage on node1
Allocated resources:
(Total limits may be over 100 percent, i.e., overcommitted.)
Resource Requests Limits
-------- -------- ------
cpu 595m (29%) 525m (26%)
memory 4916Mi (86%) 3864Mi (67%)
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc get pods
oc describe pod orchestration-scheduling-2-49flz| grep -A2 Requests # requests CPU 200m, memory 64Mi
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=3 # memory = 3x 64Mi (192)
oc describe quota # limits.memory Used 192Mi, Hard 440Mi
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=7 # memory = 7x 64Mi (448)
oc get pod # seventh pod is never created because the sum of the pod memory exceeds 400 MiB (only 6 are running = 6x64Mi (384))
oc describe dc orchestration-scheduling | grep Replicas # Replicas 6 current/7 desired
oc get events | grep -i error # exceeded quota
requested: limits.cpu=200m,limits.memory=64Mi,
used: limits.cpu=1200m,limits.memory=384Mi,
limited: limits.cpu=1200m,limits.memory=400Mi
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=1
oc get pod # ensure only 1 pod running
oc describe quota # limits.memory 64Mi used, Hard 400Mi
oc set resources dc orchestration-scheduling --requests=cpu=100m # Resource requests are not enforced by any quota
oc get pod # new pod orchestration-scheduling-3-4594c
oc describe pod orchestration-scheduling-3-4594c | grep -A2 Requests # Requests cpu: 100m
oc describe quota # CPU request is not evaluated against the project's quota
oc set resources dc orchestration-scheduling --requests=memory=16Gi # Invalid value: "16Gi": must be less than or equal to memory limit
cat ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/dc-secret.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: List
items:
- apiVersion: apps.openshift.io/v1
kind: DeploymentConfig
...output omitted...
containers:
- image: registry.lab.example.com/rhscl/mongodb-32-rhel7:latest
name: mongodb
env:
- name: MONGODB_ADMIN_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: orchestration-secret
key: admin_password
- name: MONGODB_USER
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: orchestration-secret
key: username
- name: MONGODB_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: orchestration-secret
key: password
...output omitted...
cat ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/secret.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: orchestration-secret
type: Opaque
stringData:
admin_password: redhat123
username: developer
password: redhat
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/secret.yaml
oc describe secret orchestration-secret # shows admin_password, username, password sizes
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/dc-secret.yaml # deploment config
oc get pods # orchestration-secrets-1-fs5n5
oc set env pod orchestration-secrets-1-fs5n5 --list # list environment variables that pod uses
oc rsh orchestration-secrets-1-fs5n5
mongo -u $MONGODB_USER -p $MONGODB_PASSWORD $MONGODB_DATABASE # connecting to orchestration-secrets
exit
mongo -u admin -p redhat123 admin --eval "db.version()" # MongoDB shell version is displayed
exit
oc delete project orchestration-scheduling
lab orchestration-scheduling finishYou can inspect the RESTful API calls:
oc create configmap special-config --from-literal=serverAddress=172.20.30.40 --loglevel=8 # 0 to 10
# Notice how the oc command sends the new resource details through a JSON object in the request bodylab orchestration-api start
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc project tracking
oc get pods # bus-1-xtjlw
oc get svc # bus, ClusterIP 172.30.56.233, port 8080/TCP
oc get route # none, not accessible from outside the cluster
curl http://bus.tracking.svc.cluster.local:8080/bustrack.php/api/v1/stations/ # could not resolve
ssh master curl http://bus.tracking.svc.cluster.local:8080/bustrack.php/api/v1/stations/ # returns "bus stations" JSON
firefox https://3scale-admin.apps.lab.example.com/
1. Log in as admin/redhat - "New API"
2. Name: Bus Tracking
Base URL: http://bus.tracking.svc.cluster.local:8080/bustrack.php
3. GET method: /api/v1/stations
4. Send request.
curl -k "https://api-3scale-apicast-staging.apps.lab.example.com:443/api/v1/stations/?user_key=a1b1dfeb9d7db608cf84770e621d1873"
# To protect the back-end application, limit the number of requests to five per minute. Hit API multiple times to confirm.
lab orchestration-api finishOPENSHIFT SECURITY MODEL
Infrastructure components, such as application nodes, use client certificates that OpenShift generates. Infrastructure components that run in containers use a token associated with their service account to connect to the API.
OpenShift Container Platform creates the PKI and generates the certificates at installation time. OpenShift uses an internal CA (openshift-signer) to generate and sign all the certificates that are listed in the master-config.yaml configuration file. This can be overriden in Ansible:
openshift_master_named_certificates=[{"certfile": "/path/to/certificate.crt", "keyfile": "/path/to/private-key.key", "cafile": "/path/to/ca.crt"}]
To override names:
openshift_master_overwrite_named_certificates=true
openshift_master_named_certificates=[{"certfile": "/path/to/certificate.crt", "keyfile": "/path/to/private-key.key", "names": ["public-master-host.com"], "cafile": "/path/to/ca.crt"}]
On the master server, there are ~20 certificates and keys that are generated at installation time:
ls -l /etc/origin/master/*.{crt,key}
additional_ca.crt # + .key
ca-bundle.crt # + .key
etcd.server.crt # + .key
master.kubelet-client.crt # + .key
registry.crt # + .key
. . .lab orchestration-certificates start
ssh root@master
cd /etc/origin/master # certs for etcd, master API, node to node, routers
vim master-config.yaml
...output omitted...
kubernetesMasterConfig:
proxyClientInfo:
certFile: master.proxy-client.crt
keyFile: master.proxy-client.key
...output omitted...
oauthConfig:
...output omitted...
masterPublicURL: https://master.lab.example.com:443
openssl x509 -in ca.crt -text -noout # locate the issuer of default CA
Issuer: CN=openshift-signer@1234567890
...output omitted...
CA:TRUE
openssl x509 -in etcd.server.crt -text -noout # same openshift-signer, CA:FALSE
exit
ssh root@node1
cd /etc/origin/node
ls -l # certificates/, client-ca.crt, node-config.yaml (grep -A1 -B2 certificates node-config.yaml - points to /etc/origin/node/certificates)
openssl x509 -in client-ca.crt -text -noout # CA generates and signs all certificates for the nodes (CA: TRUE) - issuer is again 'openshift-signer'
openssl x509 -in certificates/kubelet-client-current.pem -text -noout # CN common name, embeds the node name in the system:nodes organization (CN=system:node:node1.lab.example.com)
exit
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc project openshift-console
oc get routes # Termination: reencrypt/Redirect
oc get service # 172.30.11.194, console
oc describe secret console-serving-cert # secret type kubernetes.io/tls embeds service-signer.crt and service-signer.key
firefox https://console.apps.lab.example.com # openshift-signer is the CA, which signs the certificate that is valid for the *.apps.lab.example.com wildcard subdomain
oc get pods -o wide | awk '{print $7}' # name of the nodes on which console pod is = master.lab.example.com
ssh root@master
ip r # locate device that routes 172.30.0.0/16 = tun0
tcpdump -ni tun0 -vvvs 1024 -l -A "tcp port 443 and src host 172.30.0.1"
firefox https://console.apps.lab.example.com # log in as developer/redhat, everything is encrypted so no packets captured
Ctrl+C
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project orchestration-certificates
oc new-app ~/DO425/labs/orchestration-certificates/app.yaml # two httpd pods, each on different node
oc get pods -o wide # IP address of the pod running on node2 is 10.129.0.101
oc rsh httpd-node1 bash # at the same time, run tcpdump on node1: tcpdump -ni vxlan_sys_4789 -vvvs 1024 -l -A "src host 10.129.0.101" - you will see some activity on the terminal while you do the below - we're capturing traffic between two pods on different nodes
exec 3<>/dev/tcp/10.129.0.101/8080 # the IP address of the second pod
echo -e "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nhost: 10.129.0.101 \r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n" >&3 # fetch the web server and print its content. node1's tcpdump will show raw packets
Ctrl+C
exit
oc delete project orchestration-certificatesTBAISTIO
Sidecars sit alongside microservices and route requests to other proxies. These components form a mesh network.
- Definition of a
VirtualService:
apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: VirtualService
metadata:
name: reviews-route
spec:
hosts:
- production.prod.svc.cluster.local
http:
- route:
- destination:
host: production-v2.prod.svc.cluster.local
subset: v2
weight: 25
- destination:
host: production-v1.prod.svc.cluster.local
subset: v1
weight: 75- The
DestinationRuleassociated with this virtual service:
apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: DestinationRule
metadata:
name: production-destination
spec:
host: production.prod.svc.cluster.local
subsets:
- name: v1
labels:
version: v1
- name: v2
labels:
version: v2MANAGING SECURE TRAFFIC IN OPENSHIFT CONTAINER PLATFORM
OpenShift can manage certificates by generating an X.509 certificate and a key pair as a secret in your application name spaces. Certificates are valid for the internal DNS name service_name.namespace.svc.
The following Red Hat Single Sign-on template shows how the service resource defines the annotation service.alpha.openshift.io/serving-cert-secret-name for generating the certificate with a value of sso-x509-https-secret.
The pod mounts the volume that contains this certificate in /etc/x509/https, as referenced by secretName: sso-x509-https-secret in the volumes section:
kind: Template
apiVersion: v1
...output omitted...
objects:
- kind: Service # <--
spec:
metadata:
annotations:
service.alpha.openshift.io/serving-cert-secret-name: sso-x509-https-secret # <--
- kind: DeploymentConfig # <--
...output omitted...
spec:
template:
spec:
containers:
- name: "${APPLICATION_NAME}"
image: "${APPLICATION_NAME}"
...output omitted...
volumeMounts:
- name: sso-x509-https-volume
mountPath: "/etc/x509/https"
readOnly: true
volumes:
- name: sso-x509-https-volume
secret:
secretName: sso-x509-https-secret # <--Service serving certificates allow a pod to mount the secret and use them accordingly. The certificate and key are in PEM format, and stored as tls.crt and tls.key.
OpenShift automatically replaces the certificate when it gets close to expiration.
Pods can use these security certificates by reading the CA bundle located at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/service-ca.crt, which is automatically exposed inside pods.
If the service certificate generation fails, force certificate regeneration by removing the old secret, and clearing the following two annotations on the service:
service.alpha.openshift.io/serving-cert-generation-error-<error_number>
service.alpha.openshift.io/serving-cert-generation-error-num-<error_number>
The service serving certificates are generated on-demand, and thus are different from those used by OpenShift for node-to-node or node-to-master communication.
Managing Network Policies in OpenShift
3 SDNs:
ovs-subnet- flat network that spreads across all the cluster nodes and connects all the podsovs-multitenant- isolates each OpenShift project. By default, the pods in a project cannot access pods in other projects. The following command allows projectA to access pods and services in projectB, and vice versa:oc adm pod-network join-projects --to=projectA projectB- this give access to all pods & services in project.oc adm pod-network isolate-projects <project1> <project2>- nothing can access between the projectsovs-networkpolicy- To use network policies, you need to switch from the default SDN provider to theredhat/openshift-ovs-networkpolicyprovider. It allows you to create tailored policies between projects to make sure users can only access what they should (which conforms to the least privilege approach). By default, without any network policy resources defined, pods in a project can access any other pod.
To change, edit /etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml and /etc/origin/node/node-config.yaml:
. . .
networkConfig:
networkPluginName:
. . .Example: Both networks are separate projects - The following network policy, which applies to all pods in network-A, allows traffic from the pods in network-B whose label is role="back-end", but blocks all other pods:
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
name: network-A_policy
spec:
podSelector: {}
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
role: back-end
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: network-BExample: Both networks are separate projects - The following network policy, which applies to network-B, allows traffic from all the pods in network-A. This policy is less restrictive than the network-A policy, because it does not restrict traffic on any pods on the network-A project:
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
name: network-B_policy
spec:
podSelector: {}
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector: {}
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: network-AThe following excerpt shows how to allow external users to access an application whose labels match product-catalog over a TCP connection on port 8080:
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
name: external-access
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: product-catalog
ingress:
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080ovs-ofctl dump-flows br0 -O OpenFlow13 --no-stats # flow rules on the Open vSwitch bridge on the nodeThe following network policy allows traffic coming from pods that match the emails label to access a database whose label is db:
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
name: allow-3306
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: db # destination
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: emails # source
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 3306You can also define a default policy for your project. An empty pod selector means that this policy applies to all pods in this project. The following default policy blocks all traffic unless you define an explicit policy that overrides this default behavior:
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
name: default-deny
spec:
podSelector:To manage network communication between two projects, assign a label to the project that needs access to another project:
oc label namespace front-end project=frontend_project # assigns the frontend_project label to the front-end projectThe following network policy, which applies to a back-end project, allows any pods in the front-end project to access the pods labeled as app=user-registration through port 8080, in this back-end project:
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
name: allow-8080-user-registration
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: user-registration
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector: # can be also 'podSelector:'
matchLabels:
project: frontend_project
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080Node & Pod network
OpenShift configures each cluster node with an Open vSwitch bridge named br0. For each pod, OpenShift creates a veth device and connects one end to the eth0 interface inside the pod and the other end to the br0 bridge:
nsenter -t 13120 --net ip link show # run as root on the node, 13120 is PID of a process running inside the container. 'eth0@if36:' (connects eth0 inside container to the 36th interface on the node) is one of the links in the output.
ip link show | grep ^36: # retrieve the other end of that veth device - e.g. 'vetha4f3b73f@if3:'
yum install -y openvswitch # not installed by default, good for inspecting the network with ovs-vsctl
ovs-vsctl show | grep vetha4f3b73f # shows the 'br0' and all the connected ports.tun0 interface on the node is an Open vSwitch port on the br0 bridge, it is used for external cluster access
OpenShift uses the vxlan_sys_4789 interface on the node, or vxlan0 in br0, for building the cluster overlay network between nodes. Communications between pods on different nodes go through this interface.
CONTROLLING EGRESS TRAFFIC
By default, OpenShift allows egress traffic with no restrictions. You can control traffic with egress fw, routers, static IP. OpenShift allows traffic if no rule matches, checks rules in order.
- Egress FWs This object allows the egress traffic to the 192.168.12.0/24 network, and to the db-srv.example.com and analytics.example.com systems. The last rule denies everything else. The rules only apply to the egress traffic and do not affect inter-pod communication:
kind: EgressNetworkPolicy
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
name: myfirewall
spec:
egress:
- to:
cidrSelector: 192.168.12.0/24
type: Allow
- to:
dnsName: db-srv.example.com
type: Allow
- to:
dnsName: analytics.example.com
type: Allow
- to:
cidrSelector: 0.0.0.0/0
type: Denyoc create -f firewall.yaml -n myproject # only one per project, you must be cluster admin to create it- Egress Routers
3 modes:
- Redirect - image
openshift3/ose-pod(TCP and UDP) - HTTP proxy - image
openshift3/ose-egress-http-proxy(HTTP and HTTPS) - DNS proxy - image
openshift3/ose-egress-dns-proxy(TCP)
- Redirect - image
Can be used with any of the three SDN plugins, but underlying hosting platform may need to be reconfigured. Present a unique identifiable source IP address to the firewall and the external service.
Egress router is a particular pod running in your project with two interfaces (eth0, macvlan0). It acts as a proxy between your pods and the external service.
macvlan0 interfaces are special devices that directly expose node interfaces to the container and has a MAC address seen by the underlying network.
nsenter -t 14171 --net ip addr show # shows eth0@if22 and macvlan0@if2. IP address of the macvlan interface, 172.25.250.20 is not used by anything else and is the source IP address seen by the external firewall and service
ip link show | grep ^2: # "2: eth0: ..."In front of each egress router, you need to create an OpenShift service object. You use that service host name inside your application to access the external service through the router.
a/ Example - redirect mode (can only be created by cluster admin & application may need reconfiguration to access external service through egress router):
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod # <--
metadata:
name: egress-router-redirect
labels:
name: egress-router-redirect
annotations:
pod.network.openshift.io/assign-macvlan: "true"
spec:
initContainers: # <-- starts before application container egress-router-wait, creates NAT rules
- name: egress-router-setup
image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-router
securityContext:
privileged: true
env:
- name: EGRESS_SOURCE # source IP address
value: 172.25.250.20/24
- name: EGRESS_GATEWAY # IP of the gateway in the source subnet
value: 172.25.250.254
- name: EGRESS_DESTINATION # IP address of the external service
value: 23.21.165.246
- name: EGRESS_ROUTER_MODE
value: init
containers:
- name: egress-router-wait # application container
image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-pod
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service # <--
metadata:
name: egress-router
spec:
ports:
- name: postgres
port: 5432
- name: pgrest
port: 80
type: ClusterIP
selector:
name: egress-router-redirect # label of the router podb/ Example - HTTP proxy mode:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod # <--
metadata:
name: egress-router-http
labels:
name: egress-router-http
annotations:
pod.network.openshift.io/assign-macvlan: "true"
spec:
initContainers:
- name: egress-router-setup
image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-router
securityContext:
privileged: true
env:
- name: EGRESS_SOURCE
value: 172.25.250.20/24
- name: EGRESS_GATEWAY
value: 172.25.250.254
- name: EGRESS_ROUTER_MODE # that is the mode
value: http-proxy
containers:
- name: egress-router-proxy
image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-http-proxy # container image name
env:
- name: EGRESS_HTTP_PROXY_DESTINATION # Squid rules:
value: |
!*.example.com # except to example.com,
!10.1.2.0/24 # or 10.1.2.0 network,
* # forward requests to any external service
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service # <--
metadata:
name: egress-router
spec:
ports:
- name: http-proxy
port: 8080
type: ClusterIP
selector:
name: egress-router-http # label of the router podc/ Example - DNS proxy mode:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod # <--
metadata:
name: egress-router-dns
labels:
name: egress-router-dns
annotations:
pod.network.openshift.io/assign-macvlan: "true"
spec:
initContainers:
- name: egress-router-setup
image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-router
securityContext:
privileged: true
env:
- name: EGRESS_SOURCE
value: 172.25.250.20/24
- name: EGRESS_GATEWAY
value: 172.25.250.254
- name: EGRESS_ROUTER_MODE # indicates the egress mode
value: dns-proxy
containers:
- name: egress-router-proxy
image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-dns-proxy # container image name
env:
- name: EGRESS_DNS_PROXY_DESTINATION # HAProxy dameon rules:
value: | # source-port destination_host [destination-port]
80 23.21.165.246 # forward request coming on port 80 to 23.21.165.246
8080 www.example.com 80 # forward request coming on 8080 to www.example.com on port 80
2525 10.4.203.49 25
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service # <--
metadata:
name: egress-router
spec:
ports:
- name: web1
port: 80
- name: web2
port: 8080
- name: mail
port: 2525
type: ClusterIP
selector:
name: egress-router-dns # label of the router pod- Enabling Static IP Addresses for External Access
You can define a static IP address at the project level, in the
NetNamespaceobject. With such a configuration, all the egress traffic from the pods in the project originates from that IP address. OpenShift must use theovs-networkpolicySDN plug-in.
OpenShift automatically creates one NetNamespace object per project. First, associate IP with project and then node:
oc patch netnamespace myproject -p '{"egressIPs": ["172.25.250.19"]}' # associates the unused 172.25.250.19 address to the myproject project
oc get netnamespace myproject
NAME NETID EGRESS IPS
myproject 13508931 [172.25.250.19]
oc patch hostsubnet node1 -p '{"egressIPs": ["172.25.250.19"]}' # associates the 172.25.250.19 address to node1 (you must indicate on which node OpenShift should assign the address)
oc get hostsubnet node1 # shows EGRESS IPS [172.25.250.19]
ssh root@node1 ip addr show dev eth0 # OpenShift declares the address as an alias on the external network interface of node1When using the oc patch command to add a new address to a HostSubnet object that already has egress IP addresses defined for other projects, you must also specify those addresses in the egressIPs array:
oc patch hostsubnet node1 -p '{"egressIPs": ["172.25.250.19", "172.25.250.16", "172.25.250.15"]}' # otherwise new address replaces/overwrites all the existing oneslab network-isolation start
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project network-isolation
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/network-isolation/logic.yaml
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/network-isolation/presentation.yaml
oc get pods -o wide # logic-1-5nf56 on node2 & presentation-1-sg8cz on node1 running
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://services.lab.example.com # keep cURL running while you tail httpd log
ssh root@services.lab.example.com
tail -f /var/log/httpd/access_log # you will see the curl command GET from 172.25.250.12 (node2)
oc rsh presentation-1-sg8cz curl http://services.lab.example.com # run the same curl command from the second pod, it will be coming from 172.25.250.11 (node1)
vim ~/DO425/labs/network-isolation/router-redirect.yaml # Deploy an egress router to access the web server on services.lab.example.com (172.25.250.13). Use the available 172.25.250.15/24 IP
...output omitted...
env: # egress router in redirect mode
- name: EGRESS_SOURCE
value: 172.25.250.15/24
- name: EGRESS_GATEWAY
value: 172.25.250.254
- name: EGRESS_DESTINATION
value: 172.25.250.13 # =services.lab.example.com
- name: EGRESS_ROUTER_MODE
value: init
...output omitted...
oc login -u admin -p redhat # egress router needs admin
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/network-isolation/router-redirect.yaml # router pod
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/network-isolation/router-redirect-service.yaml # router service
oc get pods # egress-router running
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://egress-router.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local # the running tail will show request coming from 172.25.250.15
oc describe pod egress-router # config of egress-router shows it is running on node2.lab.example.com/172.25.250.12 and the Container ID of 'egress-router-wait' (not the init container!) is cri-o://6e56...af33
ssh root@node2.lab.example.com
runc state 6e56...af33 | grep pid # "pid": 22938,
nsenter -t 22938 --net ip addr show # eth0@if34 = 10.129.0.40/23 and macvlan0@if2 = 172.25.250.15/24 (if2 = mapped to the node's physical interface whose index is 2)
ip link show | grep ^2: # 2: eth0:
nsenter -t 22938 --net iptables -t nat -nvL # inspect NAT rules in the container
PREROUTING, ACCEPT, target = DNAT (replaces the destination address), in = eth0, destination to = 172.25.250.13 (services.lab.example.com)
POSTROUTING ACCEPT, target = SNAT (replaces the source address), out = macvlan0, destination to = 172.25.250.15
exit
oc get pods # on workstation, shows: presentation-1-sg8cz, logic-1-5nf56, egress-router
oc describe pod presentation-1-sg8cz # presentation Container ID cri-o://4cac...f7f0 running on node1.lab.example.com/172.25.250.11
ssh root@node1.lab.example.com
runc state 4cac...f7f0 | grep pid # "pid": 13120,
nsenter -t 13120 --net ip link show # eth0@if36 = eth0 interface in the container is a vEth device whose pair has the index 36 on the node
ip link show | grep ^36: # 36: vetha4f3b73f@if3:
ovs-vsctl show # Bridge "br0" = "vetha4f3b73f"; "tun0", "vxlan0" are also connected to "br0"
exit
oc login -u developer -p redhat # you're still in network-isolation project
oc rsh presentation-1-sg8cz curl http://logic.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # works
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://presentation.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # works
cat ~/DO425/labs/network-isolation/deny-all.yaml # blocks all communication between pods in the project
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
name: default-deny
spec:
podSelector: # means all the pods in the project
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/network-isolation/deny-all.yaml
oc rsh presentation-1-sg8cz curl http://logic.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # fails
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://presentation.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # fails
cat ~/DO425/labs/network-isolation/allow-pres2logic.yaml # allows pods with app=presentation to connect to app=logic on 8080
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
name: allow-pres-to-logic
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: logic # destination
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: presentation # source
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
oc get pods --show-labels # display all the labels
oc create -f ~/DO425/labs/network-isolation/allow-pres2logic.yaml
oc rsh presentation-1-sg8cz curl http://logic.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # presentation pod can now access the logic pod
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://presentation.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # logic pod still cannot access the presentation pod
oc get pods -o wide # logic-1-5nf56 = 10.129.0.39 (node2), presentation-1-sg8cz = 10.130.0.33 (node1)
ssh root@node1.lab.example.com
ovs-ofctl dump-flows br0 -O OpenFlow13 --no-stats | grep nw_src=10.130.0.33,nw_dst=10.129.0.39 # nw_src=10.130.0.33,nw_dst=10.129.0.82,tp_dst=8080 = rule that allows the 10.130.0.33 source IP address (nw_src) to access the 10.129.0.39 destination IP address (nw_dst) [presentation --> logic]
exit
lab network-isolation finishTBACATEGORIZING STORAGE TYPES IN OPENSHIFT
- Shared storage - GlusterFS, NFS, Ceph..
- Block storage - EBS, GCE disk, iSCSI..
Accessing Files in a Shared Storage Type in OpenShift If you need to access the same share from multiple pods, then you must configure each pod to use a default GID and define the group ownership of the share with a known GID:
chgrp test <directory> # configure dir with known GID
cat /etc/group | grep test # test:x:1012:userTo enforce that your pod use a group, you must create a service account in each project. Each service account must be assigned to the same security constraint context (SCC) and it must restrict the limitations to a specific GID. Additionally, because the built-in SCC takes precedence over a custom one, you must set a higher priority in the custom SCC (kind: SecurityContextConstraints, priority: XX):
oc create serviceaccount <sccName> -n <projectName> # create the service account that configures the project with the custom SCC
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user <sccName> system:serviceaccount:<projectName>:<serviceAccount> # associate the service account with the SCCAccessing Files in a Block Storage Type in OpenShift
Any OpenShift cluster can access block storage and even share the contents among pods in the same project. The first pod takes over ownership of the block storage, changing the GID and UID from that share. If any other pod running in the same project tries to access the same persistent volume bound to the block storage, the deployment fails due to lack of permissions.
To solve this problem, you must create a security constraint context that configures the fsGroup setting and allows any pod to access the same persistent volume.
lab storage-isolation start
ssh root@services
ls -lZ /exports # The secure-nfs directory is an NFS share that only has read and write permissions to users that belong to the secure-nfs group
grep secure-nfs /etc/group # secure-nfs:x:1200:nfsnobody
showmount -e services.lab.example.com # /exports/secure-nfs *
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc get pv pv0001 # pv0001, 5Gi, RWO
oc describe pv/pv0001 # NFS server: services.lab.example.com, path: /exports/secure-nfs
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc new-project secure-nfs
oc new-app postgresql-persistent -p POSTGRESQL_VERSION=9.5 -p VOLUME_CAPACITY=1Gi -o yaml > ~/database-secure-nfs.yaml
oc create -f ~/database-secure-nfs.yaml
oc get pvc # postgresql bound to pv0001
oc get pods # CrashLoopBackOff error
oc logs postgresql-1-4ptk4 # cannot create directory error
oc delete all -l app=postgresql-persistent
vim /home/student/DO425/labs/storage-isolation/restricted-scc.yaml # create an SCC to enable access using the group ID from the secure-nfs group
# 1. Remove the fields named groups and users so this SCC is not pre-linked to anyone.
# 2. Change the field named name to secure-nfs.
# 3. Delete runtime information fields such as creationTimestamp.
# 4. Also delete all annotations.
# 5. Change the supplementalGroups field to use MustRunAs, instead of RunAsAny.
# 6. Set the max value to 1300 and the min value to 1100.
...
defaultAddCapabilities: null
fsGroup:
type: MustRunAs
# delete this: groups:
# delete this: - system:authenticated
kind: SecurityContextConstraints
metadata:
# delete all annotations
# delete this: creationTimestamp: null name: secure-nfs
name: secure-nfs
priority: null
...
supplementalGroups:
type: MustRunAs
ranges:
- min: 1100
max: 1300
# delete this: users: []
volumes:
...
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc create -f /home/student/DO425/labs/storage-isolation/restricted-scc.yaml
oc create serviceaccount secure-nfs -n secure-nfs # can be just 'oc create sa secure-nfs'
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user secure-nfs -z secure-nfs -n secure-nfs # create SA in secure-nfs project and link with new SCC
oc describe scc secure-nfs # shows supplemental group range 1100-1300
oc login -u developer -p redhat
vim ~/database-secure-nfs.yaml
. . .
kind: DeploymentConfig
spec:
. . .
template:
spec:
. . .
name: postgresql
serviceAccountName: secure-nfs # delete securityContext, capabilities, privileged sections
securityContext:
supplementalGroups:
- 1200 # secure-nfs group
oc create -f ~/database-secure-nfs.yaml
oc get pods # now it works
lab storage-isolation finishTBA- Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0
- OpenID Connect
- JWT
Describing the OpenID Connect Authorization Code Flow
- The application redirects to the SSO server, which presents a login screen and validates the user's credentials.
- On successful authentication, the SSO redirects back to the application providing a 'code'.
- The application uses the code to request an access token from SSO server.
- The SSO server returns an access token that the application uses to authorize end user's requests and to submit requests to other applications that are clients of the same SSO realm.
CONFIGURING KEYCLOAK ADAPTERS FOR SINGLE SIGN-ON
The core technology of Red Hat's SSO solution is the Keycloak open source project.
DESCRIBING SSO CLIENT ACCESS TYPES
- 'client protocol' defines whether the application uses SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect
- 'access type' defines whether the application is required to authenticate itself or not
- 'valid Redirect URIs' protects the SSO server from sending tokens to applications other than the ones that initiated an authentication request
lab webapp start
# Access the SSO web console and create a realm for the Ntier application.
# Create the js and java clients in the java-js-realm realm and configure them for the Ntier application front end and back ends.
# Create a user for the Ntier application.
# Create and configure a project for the Ntier application:
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
cat ~/DO425/labs/webapp/create-cm.sh # Review the script that creates the Ntier application configuration map
~/DO425/labs/webapp/create-cm.sh
oc describe cm ntier-config # https://sso-websso.apps.lab.example.com/auth
cat ~/DO425/labs/webapp/deploy-pgsql.sh # Review the script that deploys the Ntier application database.
~/DO425/labs/webapp/deploy-pgsql.sh
oc get pod
cat ~/DO425/labs/webapp/deploy-eap.sh # Review the script that deploys the Java EE back end of the Ntier application.
~/DO425/labs/webapp/deploy-eap.sh
oc get pod # now we have postgresql-1-d9nfr and eap-app-2-ftm2q
oc logs eap-app-2-ftm2q
curl -ik https://eap-app-webapp.apps.lab.example.com/jboss-api
~/DO425/labs/webapp/deploy-springboot.sh
oc get pod # + springboot-app-2-7ktcv
curl -ik https://springboot-app-webapp.apps.lab.example.com/springboot-api/status # Access the Spring Boot back end REST API.
~/DO425/labs/webapp/deploy-nodejs.sh # Deploy the JavaScript front end of the Ntier application
oc get pod # + nodejs-app-2-vcfr7
firefox https://nodejs-app-webapp.apps.lab.example.com
lab webapp finishTBATBATo help create objects:
# http://materials.example.com/docs contains all of the documents that are also available during the exam
oc api-resources | grep <RESOURCE>
oc explain dc.spec.template.spec
oc new-app --docker-image=registry.lab.example.com/image -o yaml > resources.yml
cat resources.ymlTable of important files:
| Path | Purpose | Location |
|---|---|---|
| /etc/origin/master/master-config.yml | master config | masters |
| /etc/origin/node/node-config.yml | node config | nodes |
| /etc/containers/registries.d/[REGISTRY].yml | where to store new signatures and retrieve existing ones | everywhere |
| /etc/containers/policy.json | what registries are allowed | everywhere |
| /etc/docker/certs.d/[URL]/ca.crt | private CAs on each node | everywhere |
| /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors | automatically trusted CAs | masters |
| /etc/ipa/ca.crt | root CA of the IdM server | IdM |
| /var/lib/atomic/sigstore | locally stored image signatures | workstation |
Note: To generate beautiful PDF file, install latex and pandoc:
sudo yum install pandoc pandoc-citeproc texlive
And then use pandoc v1.12.3.1 to output Github Markdown to the PDF:
pandoc -f markdown_github -t latex -V geometry:margin=0.3in -o DO425.pdf DO425.md
For better result (pandoc text-wrap code blocks), you may want to try my listings-setup.tex:
pandoc -f markdown_github --listings -H listings-setup.tex -V geometry:margin=0.3in -o DO425.pdf DO425.md
PDF version:
DO425_20191210.pdf