Despite best intentions, for my own failings, I found the exchange between my good friend David Pearce and the influential Connor Leahy hard to follow so I had GPT-4o translate and summarise it for me, including some extracts David pointed to from his sites.
You can see how it was made here: https://chatgpt.com/share/fe5493d7-b725-4c30-abe1-763bb4bd5eab
This explains a conversation between Connor Leahy and David Pearce about quantum consciousness. It also breaks down David Pearce’s ideas on how our perception of reality might be distorted.
Connor Leahy is curious about the connection between quantum mechanics and consciousness. He finds existing theories confusing and suggests a simple way to phrase these theories.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1:20 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | I have been thinking a little bit about quantum and consciousness lately (god help me) (unrelated to my dayjob, just for fun) | I’ve been thinking a little bit about quantum mechanics and consciousness recently (oh dear!) This is not related to my job, just something I’m curious about. |
| 2 | 1:20 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | My first impressions of quantum theories of consciousness it that they are mostly confusion around "inequality of mysteries" | My initial thoughts on quantum theories of consciousness are that they mix up two confusing things. |
| 3 | 1:20 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | (just because there are two things that are mysteries, that doesn't mean they are related, or that one explains the other, and explaining one mystery with another is usually a no-op) | Just because two things are mysterious doesn’t mean they are connected or that one solves the other. Using one mystery to explain another usually doesn’t help. |
| 4 | 1:20 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | or confusion about what quantum/math means (Penrose's claim about the Gödel thing is so bafflingly nonsensical that it just invalidates everything else out of hand imo) | People are also confused about what quantum mechanics and math actually mean. Penrose’s idea involving Gödel’s theorem is so confusing that it makes everything else he says seem wrong to me. |
| 5 | 1:20 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | Trying to be maximally charitable without accepting what I think is demonstrably/provably wrong, I would try to phrase the claim these theories make, in generality as: | I want to be as fair as possible without agreeing with what I believe is clearly wrong, I would summarize these theories as saying: |
| 6 | 1:20 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | The algorithm which is implemented by/implements consciousness is (fully or in part) in BQP, and (presumably) not in P | The process that creates consciousness can be done by a quantum computer but not by a regular computer. |
| 7 | 1:20 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | Is this a fair rephrasing? Am I missing something? @algekalipso David Pearce | Is this a fair way to describe it? Am I missing anything? @algekalipso David Pearce |
Connor Leahy shares thoughts on the confusion around quantum mechanics and consciousness, suggesting they are separate mysteries and using one to explain the other is unhelpful.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | 1:57 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | The connection between consciousness and QM is tighter than two naively unrelated mysteries somehow cancelling each other out. | The link between consciousness and quantum mechanics is stronger than just two unrelated mysteries cancelling each other out. |
| 10 | 1:57 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | Rather, we're faced with two classically impossible forms of holism, namely the phenomenal binding of our minds (cf. https://binding-problem.com/) | Instead, we are dealing with two things that regular physics can’t explain: how our minds create a unified experience (see https://binding-problem.com/) |
| 11 | 1:57 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | and the existence of individual quantum-coherent superpositions in the CNS - "cat states" that have no classical analogue. | and the presence of quantum states in the brain that don’t have a counterpart in regular physics. |
| 12 | 1:57 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | For sure, common sense says that decoherence in the warm, wet CNS is too powerful and uncontrolled for quantum coherence to explain phenomenal binding. | Common sense suggests that the brain’s environment is too messy for quantum states to explain how we experience things. |
| 13 | 1:57 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | Maybe so. But as far as I can tell, we are quantum minds running classical world-simulations (cf. "What is a quantum mind?" https://hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#quantummind). | That might be true. But I believe our minds are quantum, creating a regular simulation of the world. (see 'What is a quantum mind?' https://hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#quantummind). |
| 14 | 1:57 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | In a fundamentally quantum world, decoherence makes digital computing physically feasible AND simultaneously prevents classical computers supporting unified minds like us - phenomenally-bound subjects of experience. | In a quantum world, the messy environment makes digital computers possible but stops regular computers from having minds like ours. |
| 15 | 1:57 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | The entire empirical realm is computationally inaccessible to digital zombies. | Regular computers can't understand the world the way we do. |
| 16 | 1:57 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | In my view, the future belongs to supersentient full-spectrum superintelligences - our biological descendants - not insentient classical AI. | I think the future will belong to highly intelligent beings that evolve from us, not to emotionless classical AIs. |
David Pearce responds, arguing that the connection between quantum mechanics and consciousness is stronger, involving unique brain states and challenging classical physics.
From https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#quantummind
| ID | Subsection | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 150 | Dualist Objection | Naturally, dualist philosophers of mind like David Chalmers disagree. | Dualist philosophers like David Chalmers disagree. |
| 151 | Dualist Objection | According to Chalmers, neither classical or quantum physics can explain phenomenal binding, | Chalmers says neither classical nor quantum physics can explain how we have unified experiences |
| 152 | Dualist Objection | even if some form of panpsychism or non-materialist physicalism is true. | even if some form of mind-in-matter theory is true. |
| 153 | Dualist Objection | The “structural mismatch” between the formalism of physics and our phenomenally bound classical world-simulations can’t be bridged. | He believes there is a fundamental gap between physics and our unified experiences. |
| 154 | Dualist Objection | Maybe Chalmers is right. | Maybe Chalmers is right. |
| 155 | Dualist Objection | Yet to prove his case, it’s not enough for the dualist to demonstrate a structural mismatch, | But to prove this, dualists must show there is a fundamental gap |
| 156 | Dualist Objection | between our minds and some cheesy wet lump of neural porridge occupying the four-dimensional space-time of classical physics. | between our minds and the physical brain in normal space-time. |
| 157 | Dualist Objection | The dualist must demonstrate a structural mismatch between the bound phenomenology of our minds, | They must show a gap between our unified experiences |
| 158 | Dualist Objection | and the fundamental high-dimensional space required by the dynamics of the wavefunction. | and the complex space described by quantum mechanics. |
| 159 | Dualist Objection | Whether such a structural match does or doesn’t exist isn’t a “philosophical” opinion. | Whether this gap exists is not just a philosophical question. |
| 160 | Dualist Objection | It’s an empirical question to be settled by tomorrow’s molecular matter wave-interferometry. | It’s a scientific question to be answered by future experiments. |
| 161 | Future Research and Conclusion | What will the non-classical interference signature reveal? | What will future experiments show? |
| 162 | Future Research and Conclusion | As a non-materialist physicalist, I predict – tentatively – that interferometry will yield a perfect structural match, | I predict that future experiments will show no gap between quantum mechanics and our experiences, |
| 163 | Future Research and Conclusion | and the Hard Problem of consciousness will be solved. | and the problem of understanding consciousness will be solved. |
| 164 | Future Research and Conclusion | Perhaps Cicero had a point. | Maybe Cicero was right. |
David Pearce notes that dualist philosophers like David Chalmers disagree with the idea that quantum physics can explain unified experiences. David believes future experiments will show no gap between quantum mechanics and our experiences, potentially solving the problem of consciousness.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 18 | 2:07 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | This was unfortunately not helpful for my understanding (I have read your books). | Unfortunately, your explanation didn’t help me understand better (I’ve read your books). |
| 19 | 2:07 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | Do you agree that you are claiming "The algorithm I call consciousness is in BQP, but not P?" | Are you saying that "the process creating consciousness can be done by a quantum computer, but not a regular one"? |
Connor Leahy finds David Pearce's explanation unhelpful and seeks clarification on whether he believes consciousness is a quantum process.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 21 | 2:22 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | Sorry. Our background assumptions are likely different. | Sorry. We probably have different basic assumptions. |
| 22 | 2:22 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | For example, I wouldn't call consciousness an algorithm. | For example, I wouldn't say consciousness is an algorithm. |
| 23 | 2:22 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | Consider how the ghastly raw feels of pain are sometimes functionless (cf. neuropathic pain). | Think about how awful pain can sometimes be useless (like neuropathic pain). |
| 24 | 2:22 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | Yes, the ghastly raw feels have also been recruited by natural selection typically to play an information-signalling role. | Yes, the terrible feelings of pain have been used by natural selection to signal information. |
| 25 | 2:22 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | But pain is ghastly whether it's playing an algorithmic role or otherwise... | But pain is terrible whether it has a role or not... |
David Pearce disagrees with describing consciousness as an algorithm, using the example of pain to illustrate his point.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 27 | 2:26 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | algorithm is just one frame to describe information/processes of computation/whatever | Algorithm is just one way to describe information or computation processes. |
| 28 | 2:26 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | We can talk about proof systems, turning machines, rocks falling down in precise order I don't really care. Ultimately, the Schrödinger equation (and friends) describes "quantum physics"... | We can talk about proof systems, Turing machines, or even rocks falling in order. The Schrödinger equation describes quantum physics. |
| 29 | 2:27 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | Key word being "describes". If you ask "is the Schrödinger equation REAL?" My answer is "depends on what you mean by 'real'??" | The key word is "describes". If you ask if the Schrödinger equation is real, it depends on what you mean by "real". |
| 30 | 2:27 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | If pain as you describe it has structure that can, even in principle, be understood, it must be describable with some process, algorithm or otherwise | If pain has a structure that can be understood, it must be describable by some process or algorithm. |
| 31 | 2:28 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | The whole Gödel/Halting Problem/etc stuff ultimately must be able to describe everything that can be described, at risk of paradox. | Gödel's theorem, the Halting Problem, etc., must ultimately describe everything that can be described, even if it risks creating a paradox. |
| 32 | 2:31 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | If consciousness is describable even in principle (which you clearly must agree it is?), there must be some process/algorithm somewhere that can describe it. Where is it? We have these lovely complexity classes as great sign posts! | If consciousness can be described (which you must agree with), then there must be some process or algorithm that can describe it. Where is it? We have these useful complexity classes to guide us! |
Connor Leahy argues that any describable phenomenon, including consciousness, must be explainable by some process or algorithm.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 33 | 5:42 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | As far as I can tell, we already have a formally adequate mathematical description of consciousness: https://hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#nonmat | As far as I know, we already have a good mathematical description of consciousness: https://hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#nonmat |
David Pearce claims that we already have a good mathematical description of consciousness.
From https://hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#nonmat
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| What is non-materialist physicalism? Is it a scientific theory? | What is non-materialist physicalism? Is it a scientific theory? |
| “Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. | "Even if there is one unified theory, it's just rules and equations. |
| What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe? | What makes these equations create a universe? |
| The usual approach of science of constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there should be a universe for the model to describe. | Science can't explain why there is a universe at all. |
| Why does the universe go to all the bother of existing?” | Why does the universe exist? |
| (Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time, 1988) | (Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time, 1988) |
| Physicalism is a conceptual framework for understanding the world. | Physicalism is a way to understand the world. |
Summary of Section 1: Non-materialist physicalism questions the nature of the universe and its existence. Hawking’s quote highlights science's limitation in explaining why the universe exists.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| Two types of physicalism are worth distinguishing: materialist physicalism and non-materialist physicalism. | There are two types of physicalism: materialist and non-materialist. |
| Physicalists of both flavours agree that: | Both types agree on certain points: |
| only the physical is real; | Only physical things are real. |
| only the physical has causal power; | Only physical things can cause changes. |
| all the “special sciences” (chemistry, molecular biology, etc) reduce to physics; | All sciences (like chemistry and biology) are based on physics. |
| no “element of reality” is missing from the mathematical formalism of physics, more strictly, the currently elusive TOE beyond the Standard Model that unites quantum field theory (QFT) and General Relativity. | Physics doesn't miss any part of reality, especially the theory that combines QFT and General Relativity. |
| Where materialist physicalism and non-materialist physicalism part company is over ontology – the essence of physical reality that the mathematical straitjacket of physics describes. | The difference is in their view of reality's nature. |
Summary of Section 2: Materialist and non-materialist physicalism agree on basic principles about the physical world but differ in their views on the nature of reality.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| What is the intrinsic nature of the world’s fundamental quantum fields, the mysterious “fire” in the formalism of QFT to which Stephen Hawking alludes above? | What is the true nature of the world's quantum fields, the "fire" Hawking mentions? |
| Materialist physicalists make a plausible metaphysical assumption: the “fire” in the equations of physics is non-experiential. | Materialists assume the "fire" in physics equations is non-experiential. |
| QFT describes fields of insentience. It’s not like anything to be a quantum field. | QFT describes non-feeling fields; quantum fields don’t experience anything. |
| This assumption, sometimes thought too trivial to warrant stating explicitly, gives rise to the so-called Hard Problem of consciousness, i.e. how can fields of insentience give rise to consciousness? | This assumption leads to the Hard Problem of consciousness: how can non-feeling fields create consciousness? |
Summary of Section 3: Materialist physicalism views quantum fields as non-feeling, which leads to questions about how consciousness arises from these fields.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| How can water turn into wine, so to speak? | How can non-feeling fields create consciousness? |
| Materialist physicalism breeds further mysteries in turn. Consider the causal-functional efficacy of consciousness. | Materialist physicalism leads to more mysteries. Consider how consciousness causes things to happen. |
| Physics is supposedly causally closed and effectively complete. | Physics is thought to be complete in explaining causes. |
| So how can the “raw feels” of subjective experience – irrespective of how these “raw feels” arise – exert causal-functional power in the physical world? | How can feelings cause physical events? |
Summary of Section 4: Materialist physicalism struggles to explain how non-feeling quantum fields can create conscious experiences and cause physical events.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| How can subjective experience have the causal efficacy to inspire discussion of its existence – as now? Such causal efficacy ought to be physically impossible. | How can consciousness cause discussions about itself? This should be impossible in physics. |
| Other mysteries abound within a materialist ontology. | There are more mysteries in materialist physicalism. |
| For example, how can the extraordinarily rich diversity of conscious experience be derived from the relatively homogeneous neuronal constituents of the brain – what philosophers call the palette problem? | How can diverse conscious experiences come from the similar neurons in the brain? This is the palette problem. |
| And how can a pack of discrete, effectively decohered membrane-bound neurons of textbook neuroscience generate the phenomenal unity of waking consciousness – the binding / combination problem? | How can separate neurons create unified consciousness? This is the binding problem. |
| Why aren’t we, at most, just micro-experiential zombies, mere aggregates of classical Jamesian “mind-dust”? | Why aren't we just collections of tiny experiences, like "mind-dust"? |
Summary of Section 5: Materialist physicalism faces multiple challenges, including explaining how diverse and unified consciousness arises from similar and separate neurons.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| I could go on. But materialism simply has no answer to these proliferating mysteries (“anomalies”, as Kuhnians might say) – or even the ghost of an explanation-space where we might begin searching for answers. | Materialism has no solutions to these problems or even a way to start finding answers. |
| In desperation, some materialists are reduced to denying the empirical (“relating to experience”) evidence itself: so-called eliminative materialism or "illusionism". | Some materialists deny the existence of consciousness itself, called eliminative materialism. |
| Consciousness anti-realism is about as desperate a philosophical move as it gets. | Denying consciousness is a desperate philosophical move. |
| Materialism is a degenerating research program that has made no progress in explaining consciousness since Democritus. | Materialism hasn't progressed in explaining consciousness. |
Summary of Section 6: Materialism has not solved the problems of consciousness and some materialists deny consciousness itself, leading to a need for alternatives like non-materialist physicalism.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| Yet what is the scientific alternative? Most materialists assume there can be none. But this isn’t strictly true. | What's the alternative? Many materialists think there isn't one, but that's not true. |
| Non-materialist physicalism just drops the metaphysical assumption that spawns these unfathomable mysteries in the first instance. | Non-materialist physicalism drops the assumption that creates these mysteries. |
| According to non-materialist physicalism, the intrinsic nature of the world's fundamental quantum fields doesn't differ inside and outside your head. | Non-materialist physicalism says quantum fields are the same inside and outside your head. |
| During waking life, you are indeed special, but not ontologically different from the rest of physical reality. | When you're awake, you're special but not fundamentally different from the rest of reality. |
Summary of Section 7: Non-materialist physicalism avoids the mysteries of materialism by suggesting that the nature of quantum fields is the same everywhere, including in our minds.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| Consciousness is around 13.8 billion years old. | Consciousness is as old as the universe. |
| What makes post-Cambrian animal minds unique isn’t consciousness per se, but rather, the phenomenal binding of fields of consciousness into fitness-enhancing virtual worlds like the island-universe you’re experiencing now. | Animal minds are unique because they combine consciousness into useful virtual worlds. |
| Unless dreamlessly asleep, you instantiate an immense, phenomenally-bound world-simulation. | When awake, your mind creates a large, unified simulation of the world. |
| Naïve realists call this world-simulation “perception”. | Some people call this simulation "perception". |
| Your world-simulation tracks fitness-relevant patterns in an otherwise inaccessible local external environment. | Your mind's simulation helps you navigate and survive in your environment. |
| What naively seems the external world is really you. | What seems like the outside world is actually your mind's simulation. |
| To the naive realist, this idea sounds like solipsism, but no: “external worlds” are ten-a-penny, albeit with differing protagonists. | This idea may sound like solipsism ( |
only one's own mind is sure to exist), but it's not. Many external worlds exist, each with different main characters. |
Summary of Section 8: Consciousness is ancient, and animal minds are unique because they create complex simulations of the world to help with survival, often mistaken for direct perception.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| In organisms with a capacity for rapid self-propelled motion, the local and global binding of consciousness into quasi-unified phenomenal minds running egocentric world-simulations has vast computational-functional power, as partial binding deficit syndromes such as integrative agnosia, simultanagnosia and schizophrenia illustrate. | Animals that move quickly bind consciousness into unified minds, creating powerful world-simulations. Disorders like integrative agnosia and schizophrenia show what happens when this binding fails. |
| On this account, non-psychotic phenomenal binding, not consciousness per se, is the distinguishing feature of mental life. | The key feature of mental life is binding consciousness into a unified experience, not just consciousness itself. |
Summary of Section 9: The unique aspect of animal minds is their ability to bind consciousness into unified, functional simulations, crucial for mental life.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| Naively, consciousness fundamentalism is the recipe for ubiquitous minds, maybe even a cosmic Über-Mind. | Consciousness fundamentalism might suggest minds are everywhere, even a cosmic super-mind. |
| But this assumption is unjustified. | But this idea isn't justified. |
| Most of reality, and even most information-processors, aren’t unified subjects of experience. | Most of reality and information processors don't have unified experiences. |
| Scientists are fond of the computer metaphor of mind. All organisms are indeed information-processors. | Scientists often compare minds to computers. All organisms process information. |
| But plants and other sessile organisms have not evolved energetically expensive nervous systems. | But plants and stationary organisms don't have complex nervous systems. |
| So they can’t support phenomenally-bound consciousness, i.e., minds. | So they can't have unified consciousness, or minds. |
| And nor can digital computers. Unlike organic minds, implementations of abstract classical Turing machines can’t phenomenally bind precisely in virtue of their digital architecture. | Digital computers can't have unified consciousness because of their design. |
| The mindlessness of classical computers isn’t incidental. Quantum decoherence makes digital computing possible. | Digital computers' lack of mind is due to their nature. Quantum decoherence allows digital computing. |
Summary of Section 10: Consciousness isn't everywhere. Most of reality, including digital computers, don't have unified experiences or minds.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| Decoherence explains why reality itself isn’t one vast psychotic mega-mind. | Decoherence explains why reality isn't one big, unified mind. |
| So classical computers are, at most, micro-experiential zombies, no more (or less) conscious than the rest of the physical world outside your head. | Classical computers are like "micro-experiential zombies," not conscious. |
| Therefore, the ubiquitous consciousness posited by non-materialist physicalism isn’t synonymous with any traditional idealist world of ubiquitous minds. | Non-materialist physicalism doesn't mean there are minds everywhere, like in traditional idealism. |
| And non-materialist physicalism certainly isn’t pre-scientific animism. | Non-materialist physicalism isn't the same as animism (the belief that objects have spirits). |
| The technological success story of science is best explained by physicalism (1 to 4 above) and the Standard Model. | Science's success is best explained by physicalism and the Standard Model. |
Summary of Section 11: Non-materialist physicalism doesn't mean everything has a mind. It explains consciousness without invoking traditional idealism or animism, and it aligns with scientific success.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| Non-materialist physicalism is sometimes conflated with panpsychism, more specifically, with constitutive panpsychism. | Non-materialist physicalism is sometimes confused with panpsychism. |
| But panpsychism is a species of property-dualism. | Panpsychism is a type of property-dualism. |
| On a panpsychist account, what is the supposed relationship between mental and physical properties? | Panpsychism asks how mental and physical properties relate. |
| Property-dualism inherits the defects of its older ontological cousin. | Property-dualism has the same problems as its predecessor. |
| By contrast, non-materialist physicalism is monist to the core. | Non-materialist physicalism believes in only one type of substance. |
| For sure, both non-materialist physicalism and panpsychism are forms of consciousness fundamentalism insofar as neither attempt to derive consciousness from non-consciousness. | Both believe consciousness is fundamental and not derived from non-consciousness. |
Summary of Section 12: Non-materialist physicalism differs from panpsychism by being monist (believing in one substance) and viewing consciousness as fundamental.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| But panpsychism claims that primordial consciousness is inseparable from the physical properties of matter and energy. | Panpsychism says consciousness is always linked to physical matter. |
| By contrast, non-materialist physicalism doesn’t propose that consciousness is inseparably bound up with physical properties, but rather, consciousness is the essence of the physical itself, the intrinsic nature of a quantum field – presumably the very high-dimensional field demanded by the universal wave function of post-Everett quantum mechanics. | Non-materialist physicalism says consciousness is the essence of physical reality itself, especially in quantum fields. |
Summary of Section 13: Non-materialist physicalism suggests that consciousness is the essence of physical reality, not just linked to it like in panpsychism.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| According to non-materialist physicalism, the diverse solutions to the equations of QFT encode the diverse textures (“what it feels like”) of consciousness. | Non-materialist physicalism says QFT equations describe different experiences of consciousness. |
| Our lack of a notional cosmic Rosetta stone to “read off” the values of consciousness from the solutions to the equations of QFT isn’t indicative of any “element of reality” missing from the formalism, but instead reflects our human cognitive limitations. | We can't directly read consciousness from QFT equations due to our cognitive limits, not because physics is missing something. |
| So on this story, the Standard Model in physics describes fields of consciousness, not unphysical insentience – superfluous metaphysical baggage doomed to go the way of luminiferous aether. | The Standard Model describes fields of consciousness, not non-feeling fields, avoiding unnecessary metaphysical ideas. |
Summary of Section 14: Non-materialist physicalism views the Standard Model as describing fields of consciousness, and our inability to fully understand this reflects our cognitive limits, not a flaw in physics.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| Hence too the otherwise inexplicable causal power of consciousness – it’s the essence of the physical. | This explains the causal power of consciousness – it's the essence of the physical world. |
| Only the physical has causal efficacy. | Only physical things can cause changes. |
| And hence too the non-classicality of phenomenal binding and therefore our minds: compare how notional classical fields populating four-dimensional space-time could support only micro-experiential zombies, not phenomenally-bound subjects of experience like you or me. | This also explains the unique nature of our minds, unlike classical fields which would only support basic experiences. |
| The superposition principle of QM underpins our minds and (maybe!) existence itself. | Quantum mechanics' superposition principle, where particles can be in multiple states at once, might be fundamental to how our minds work and could even be the basis of reality. |
Summary of Section 15: Non-materialist physicalism explains the causal power of consciousness and the unique nature of our minds as part of the physical world.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| Materialists sometimes criticise consciousness fundamentalism for not truly explaining the existence of consciousness in any deep sense, just shifting the mystery elsewhere. | Materialists say consciousness fundamentalism doesn't really explain consciousness, just moves the mystery. |
| Contrast biological life, which thanks to the Modern Synthesis can now be derived from physics via quantum chemistry and molecular biology. | Unlike life, which we can explain through physics and chemistry |
| And this criticism is true – as far as it goes. | This criticism is partly true. |
| But if experience discloses the essence of the physical, as proposed by non-materialist physicalism, then the real mystery is why there is something rather than nothing, i.e., why does physical reality exist at all? | But if consciousness is the essence of the physical, the mystery is why anything exists at all. |
| This mystery is shared by materialism and non-materialist physicalism alike. | Both materialism and non-materialist physicalism share this mystery. |
| The difference in rival ontologies is that materialist physicalism posits the existence of two fundamental mysteries, i.e., why does physical reality exist; and how does physical reality generate something as ontologically alien as consciousness? | Materialism has two mysteries: why physical reality exists and how it creates consciousness. |
| Non-materialist physicalism posits only one. | Non-materialist physicalism has only |
one mystery. | | Mysteries should not be multiplied beyond necessity. | We shouldn't have more mysteries than needed. |
Summary of Section 16: Critics say non-materialist physicalism shifts the mystery of consciousness. However, it actually reduces the mysteries compared to materialism, focusing on why anything exists at all.
| Original Text | Simplified Translation |
|---|---|
| In short, non-materialist physicalism offers an empirically adequate conceptual framework with immense explanatory and predictive power. | Non-materialist physicalism provides a useful framework with great explanatory power. |
| Non-materialist physicalism is modern science minus the speculative metaphysical postulate, i.e., hypothetical fields of insentience. | It's modern science without the assumption of non-feeling fields. |
| In effect, non-materialist physicalism just transposes the entire mathematical apparatus of physics onto an idealist ontology. | It applies physics to an idealist view of reality. |
| For what it's worth, my working assumption combines physicalism and idealism – a fusion that (at first blush) sounds like schizophrenic word-salad, not a formally conservative reinterpretation of modern science. | My view combines physicalism and idealism, which might sound confusing, but it's a reinterpretation of modern science. |
Summary of Section 17: Non-materialist physicalism combines the strengths of modern science with a new understanding of consciousness, avoiding unnecessary metaphysical assumptions.
Overall Summary: Non-materialist physicalism offers a way to understand consciousness as an intrinsic part of physical reality, addressing many of the mysteries left unsolved by materialist physicalism. It suggests that consciousness is fundamental to the physical world, aligning scientific understanding with a new ontology that avoids unnecessary metaphysical assumptions.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 35 | 5:42 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | What makes animal minds special isn't subjective experience per se, but rather phenomenal binding into virtual worlds of experience ("perception"). | What makes animal minds special isn't just personal experience, but how they combine experiences into a unified world ("perception"). |
| 36 | 6:15 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | I have only skimmed the linked answer, but I don't see anything I would call "adequate" or "mathematical". There is some hand waving about "fire" and taken as axiomatic truth that that means anything, which I don't see how it does. | I skimmed your answer but didn't find anything "adequate" or "mathematical". There's some vague talk about "fire" assumed to be true, but I don't understand it. |
Connor Leahy criticises David Pearce's linked explanation for lacking adequate mathematical descriptions and making unfounded assumptions.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 38 | 6:24 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | I explore the quantum-theoretic version of what philosophers call the intrinsic nature argument. The (entirely unoriginal!) mathematical formalism doesn’t appear until the fourth paragraph. | I explore the quantum version of what philosophers call the intrinsic nature argument. The mathematical details (not original!) appear in the fourth paragraph. |
David Pearce explains that his approach explores the quantum-theoretic version of the intrinsic nature argument, with the mathematical formalism appearing later in his explanation.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 40 | 6:33 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | I read it a bit more carefully. I see one copy pasted screenshot of standard model equations, no other formal descriptions, sorry if I am missing something, the whole page is huge so I only read the linked question. | I read it more carefully. I saw one screenshot of standard model equations, but no other formal descriptions. Sorry if I missed something, the page is very large, and I only read the linked question. |
| 41 | 6:35 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | I see more assumptions that are stated as obviously true (such as "unity" in the mind. I think this just not true at all, human minds are extremely fragmented and GWT and similar theories of attention mechanisms are more than good enough to point at models) | I see more assumptions stated as obviously true, like "unity" in the mind. I don't think this is true; human minds are very fragmented. Global Workspace Theory (GWT) and similar theories explain it well. |
| 42 | 6:37 PM · Jun 16, 2024 | While I definitely agree that we are not somehow separate from physics, the jump from that to "world models can only work if quantum" just seems, apologies for being blunt, like a complete non-sequitur. With all due respect, do you know the mathematics of QM? What BQP means? | I agree we are not separate from physics, but saying "world models can only work if quantum" seems like a complete non-sequitur. Do you know the maths of Quantum Mechanics (QM)? What BQP (Bounded Quantum Polynomial time) means? |
Connor Leahy questions the necessity of quantum mechanics for explaining world models, suggesting that David Pearce may lack understanding of quantum mechanics and related concepts.
| ID | Date and Time | Original Text | Simplified translation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 44 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | If you don't grok the phenomenal binding problem, then nothing I say will be of the slightest interest. | If you don't understand the problem of how experiences are unified, nothing I say will be interesting. |
| 45 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | No worries! But if textbook neuroscience is correct, then even if effectively decohered membrane-bound neurons in the CNS support rudimentary pixels of micro-experience, then we should be micro-experiential zombies. | No worries! But if neuroscience is correct, then if neurons in the brain support basic pieces of experience, we should be micro-experiential zombies. |
| 46 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | Phenomenally-bound minds should be impossible. | Unified minds should be impossible. |
| 47 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | I'm interested in possible solutions - however crazy - without departing from the unitary Schrödinger dynamics, i.e. no new physics. | I'm interested in possible solutions - however crazy - without changing the basic rules of quantum mechanics, i.e. no new physics. |
| 48 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | If phenomenal binding by synchronous activation of distributed neuronal features-processors - a mere restatement of the binding problem - were binding via individual superpositions of distributed neuronal features-processors, then the phenomenal binding problem wouldn't arise. | If the binding of experiences by simultaneous activation of different parts of the brain - just restating the binding problem - was done by individual quantum states in different parts of the brain, then the binding problem wouldn't exist. |
| 49 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | For superpositions are individual states, not classical aggregates. | Because superpositions are individual states, not classical groups. |
| 50 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | But theorists have done the math of decoherence timescales. | But scientists have calculated the decoherence timescales. |
| 51 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | The effective lifetime of neuronal superpositions in the warm wet CNS must be femtoseconds(!) or less. | The effective lifetime of these states in the brain must be femtoseconds(!) or less. |
| 52 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | Case closed? Well maybe. | Case closed? Maybe. |
| 53 | 8:11 AM · Jun 17, 2024 | One man's reductio ad absurdum is another man's experimentally falsifiable prediction. | One person's absurd idea is another person's testable prediction. |
David Pearce states that understanding the problem of unified experiences (phenomenal binding) is crucial for the discussion.
Conversation
David Pearce concludes the discussion on quantum mechanics and consciousness by expressing hope that future research will reveal a structural match between quantum mechanics and our conscious experience, potentially solving the hard problem of consciousness. The discussion with Connor Leahy covered various viewpoints, with David Pearce arguing that quantum processes play a crucial role in explaining consciousness, while Connor Leahy remained sceptical. Despite their differences, David Pearce is optimistic that upcoming scientific advancements will validate the quantum perspective and provide new insights into the nature of consciousness.