tor-journalctl.log

Mar 08 15:50:49 raspberrypi tor[18252]: Mar 08 15:50:49.912 [notice] Tor 0.4.7.13 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.12-stable, OpenSSL 3.0.2, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.5, Libzstd 1.4.8 and Glibc 2.35 as libc.
Mar 08 15:50:49 raspberrypi tor[18252]: Mar 08 15:50:49.913 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi tor[18253]: Mar 08 15:50:50.116 [notice] Tor 0.4.7.13 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.12-stable, OpenSSL 3.0.2, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.5, Libzstd 1.4.8 and Glibc 2.35 as libc.
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi tor[18253]: Mar 08 15:50:50.116 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: We compiled with OpenSSL 30000020: OpenSSL 3.0.2 15 Mar 2022 and we are running with OpenSSL 30000020: 3.0.2. These two versions should be binary compatible.
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Tor 0.4.7.13 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.12-stable, OpenSSL 3.0.2, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.5, Libzstd 1.4.8 and Glibc 2.35 as libc.
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9051
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Opened Control listener connection (ready) on 127.0.0.1:9051
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Opening OR listener on 0.0.0.0:9001
Mar 08 15:50:50 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Opened OR listener connection (ready) on 0.0.0.0:9001
Mar 08 15:50:51 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
Mar 08 15:50:52 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
Mar 08 15:50:52 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now.
Mar 08 15:50:54 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Your Tor server's identity key  fingerprint is 'AngerIsAGift 22E18CAE329939AC3038B6B8A210FD58415FCC53'
Mar 08 15:50:54 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Your Tor server's identity key ed25519 fingerprint is 'AngerIsAGift he3WLjZVvNi59vcPLNe9+toDj+AQb58ehs8LrynpM+4'
Mar 08 15:50:54 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Bootstrapped 0% (starting): Starting
Mar 08 15:50:56 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Starting with guard context "default"
Mar 08 15:51:37 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Signaled readiness to systemd
Mar 08 15:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay
Mar 08 15:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Opening Control listener on /run/tor/control
Mar 08 15:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Opened Control listener connection (ready) on /run/tor/control
Mar 08 15:51:41 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a relay
Mar 08 15:51:42 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking with a relay
Mar 08 15:51:42 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done
Mar 08 15:51:42 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info to build circuits
Mar 08 15:51:42 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake finished with a relay to build circuits
Mar 08 15:51:42 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit
Mar 08 15:51:43 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done
Mar 08 15:51:43 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Now checking whether IPv4 ORPort 177.16.117.60:9001 is reachable... (this may take up to 20 minutes -- look for log messages indicating success)
Mar 08 15:51:46 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Self-testing indicates your ORPort 177.16.117.60:9001 is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor.
Mar 08 15:55:05 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: New control connection opened.
Mar 08 15:57:41 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Performing bandwidth self-test...done.
Mar 08 18:29:17 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: New control connection opened.
Mar 08 21:24:58 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: New control connection opened.
Mar 08 21:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Heartbeat: It seems like we are not in the cached consensus.
Mar 08 21:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 6:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 859 kB and received 6.06 MB. I've received 27 connections on IPv4 and 0 on IPv6. I've made 186 connections with IPv4 and 0 with IPv6.
Mar 08 21:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: While not bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: 3688304 (server descriptor fetch); 354 (server descriptor upload); 358156 (consensus network-status fetch); 67746 (microdescriptor fetch)
Mar 08 21:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 9/9 NTor.
Mar 08 21:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Since startup we initiated 0 and received 0 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v4 connections; initiated 12 and received 26 v5 connections.
Mar 08 21:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 0 marked addresses for max queue, 0 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 0 single hop clients refused, 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected.
Mar 08 23:00:20 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: New control connection opened.
Mar 08 23:10:55 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: New control connection opened.
Mar 08 23:15:18 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: New control connection opened.
Mar 09 01:05:44 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: New control connection opened.
Mar 09 03:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Heartbeat: It seems like we are not in the cached consensus.
Mar 09 03:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 12:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 1.05 MB and received 9.79 MB. I've received 49 connections on IPv4 and 0 on IPv6. I've made 327 connections with IPv4 and 0 with IPv6.
Mar 09 03:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: While not bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: 7122675 (server descriptor fetch); 708 (server descriptor upload); 712461 (consensus network-status fetch); 100878 (microdescriptor fetch)
Mar 09 03:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 0/0 NTor.
Mar 09 03:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Since startup we initiated 0 and received 0 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v4 connections; initiated 12 and received 43 v5 connections.
Mar 09 03:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 0 marked addresses for max queue, 0 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 0 single hop clients refused, 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected.
Mar 09 09:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Heartbeat: It seems like we are not in the cached consensus.
Mar 09 09:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 18:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 1.26 MB and received 13.42 MB. I've received 68 connections on IPv4 and 0 on IPv6. I've made 478 connections with IPv4 and 0 with IPv6.
Mar 09 09:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: While not bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: 10475881 (server descriptor fetch); 1062 (server descriptor upload); 1052820 (consensus network-status fetch); 133969 (microdescriptor fetch)
Mar 09 09:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 0/0 NTor.
Mar 09 09:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Since startup we initiated 0 and received 0 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v4 connections; initiated 12 and received 61 v5 connections.
Mar 09 09:51:38 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 0 marked addresses for max queue, 0 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 0 single hop clients refused, 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected.
Mar 09 13:21:37 raspberrypi Tor[18253]: New control connection opened.

torrc

## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc

## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
SocksPort 0

## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *

## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr

## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
#RunAsDaemon 1

## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor

## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
CookieAuthentication 1

############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###

## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.

#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80

#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22

################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.

## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
ORPort 9001 IPv4Only
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows.  You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise

## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
Address home.michel.io

## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5

## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
Nickname AngerIsAGift
#
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB  # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
RelayBandwidthRate 500 KB
RelayBandwidthBurst 1 MB

## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00

## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
ContactInfo tse8udp6@anonaddy.me
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>

## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows.  below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html

## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...

## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed

## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
#BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0

ExitRelay 0

MaxMemInQueues 256 MB