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b'This truth, of course, is embedded deeply into our constitutional ideas. Thus, the Supreme Court applies rational basis review to every legislative act, even those not impinging on a fundamental right or protected class (e.g. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). But the idea goes deeper: positive law is purpose-driven activity (the legislature is trying to bring something about by its enactments), and purpose-driven activity is under a rational requirement to take the means necessary to achieve its ends (Kant 2002, 31-34). \n  Davidson, 2001, chs. 9-10; Lewis 1974.\n  The quote, along with the principles of coherence and charity, come from Davidson (2001).\n  Ordinarily, these attitudes will be beliefs, however the expressive meaning of a law could comprise some other propositional attitude. Nothing in the argument turns on this. Beliefs might be about social, physical, or normative truths, or some combination of them1FOREIGNa law may require attributions of beliefs about, e.g., economic theories, moral claims, the character traits of particular persons or groups, etc. Multiple sets of attitudes may supply the expressive meaning of a law1FOREIGNfor example, we may attribute to the legislature that enacts a regressive tax the inclusive disjunction of hatred of the poor and/or a belief in supply-side economic theory. In such a case, both would count in the candidate reasons by which the law might be justified; if either is public, the law is general. \n  Street, 2010, 363.\nThus, Locke (2002, IX.123-127) argues that the state1FOREIGNs primary end is the protection of property rights.\n  Rawls (2001, 114, 138) describes the normative space for 1FOREIGNliberal socialism,1FOREIGN which preserves private property rights in personal property in order to facilitate individual autonomy, but does not permit private property in the means of production.\n  Consider Hobbes1FOREIGNs argument in chapter 15 of Leviathan.\n  Ripstein 2009, 280.\n  Cf. Sepielli (2013, 698) who points out that wealth and poverty can be understood as state-imposed distributions of the burdens of complying with the property laws.\n  Allan (2001) makes this suggestion first.\n  I thank Patricia Broussard for suggesting this interpretation.\n  Note that we can1FOREIGNt be sure that a decision is non-general just because it fails the test of decision maker independence1FOREIGNtwo decision makers may come out to different results because they interpret facts or exercise discretion differently, within a range of reasonable variation; by contrast, a single decision maker may vary in obviously non-general fashions (as by flipping a coin). For this reason, this doesn1FOREIGNt work as a (formal) conception of generality. However, a decision that isn1FOREIGNt decision maker independent is at least suspicious.\n  Curtis (1991) provides a good discussion. I thank Elizabeth Anderson for suggesting I discuss the Levellers.\nEur Supp. 429-443. In the last line, Euripides uses the comparative adjective form of isos, the general term for equality, which does not have any particular political or legal connotation, in contrast to isegoria, referring to political equality, and isonomia, discussed infra at 194 referring to legal equality. 1FOREIGNEqual justice1FOREIGN is 1FOREIGN1FOREIGN1FOREIGN1FOREIGN1FOREIGN 1FOREIGN1FOREIGN1FOREIGN1FOREIGN, which could also be translated as 1FOREIGNequal rights.1FOREIGN N.b., no inferences should be drawn from the use of 1FOREIGNreviled1FOREIGN in the given translation, which is rather too strong (the greek is 1FOREIGN1FOREIGN1FOREIGN1FOREIGN1FOREIGN): I would have preferred 1FOREIGNmistreated.1FOREIGN\n  Aeschylus, Eum. 680-710. See also Rottleuthner1FOREIGNs (2005, 38) description of that passage, which he sees as a creation myth for the law, and particularly for the law captured in the notion of the impartial judge: on his account, it 1FOREIGNlays the foundations for the precedence of the polis over the genos. On the world1FOREIGNs stage there has now appeared a court that is formed by persons not related to the parties and that is vested with the competence to pass a binding judgment.1FOREIGN \n  Plato, Crito 53b-c. I discuss Crito and the strength topos at length in Gowder (2015d).\n  Herod. 3.80.\n  Herod., 3.80.5-6.\n'