Created
December 17, 2016 12:15
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Source: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13198567 | |
Always, always, always generate your own SSH moduli. | |
reply | |
notyourwork 4 hours ago [-] | |
For those uninformed you should expand on this to. It is a great suggestion but a statement like this to a uninformed isn't very helpful. | |
reply | |
poisonarena 4 hours ago [-] | |
please elaborate! | |
reply | |
knweiss 1 hour ago [-] | |
From the OpenSSH moduli(5) man page: | |
"When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, sshd(8) | |
first estimates the size of the modulus required to | |
produce enough Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently | |
key the selected symmetric cipher. sshd(8) then randomly | |
selects a modulus from /etc/ssh/moduli that best meets | |
the size requirement." | |
The problem is | |
a) OS distributions ship pre-computed moduli in the /etc/ssh/moduli file. I.e. most users don't change these moduli. This facilitates pre-computation attacks. | |
b) These moduli are often too short (<2048 bit). | |
You can create your own moduli with ssh-keygen (see the "MODULI GENERATION" section in the ssh-keygen manpage). | |
FWIW: Here's my open bug for RHEL7 where I try to convince Red Hat to improve the situation (including more details and references): | |
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1396943 |
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