- Second price auctions (2PA) are a type of auction where the highest bidder pays the second highest bid
- In contrast to first price auctions (FPA), where the highest bidder pays her own bid
- Why 2PA work better than FPA
- Why you should care
- Some game theory behind all of this
- You probably know already that all of our DSP data comes from auctions
- A webpage has some space for an ad, they issue an RFP (request for proposals), multiple advertisers bid for that space, and the winner gets displayed
- What you might not know is: these auctions are all 2PA
- In fact, 2PA underlie most ads on the internet
- So if you want to understand how ads on the internet work, 2PA are a big part of that
- In a nutshell: 2PAs incentivize bidders to bid truthfully
- Optimal strategy in 2PA is for everyone to bid what they actually value for the object - no matter what anyone else bids
- FPAs incentivize underbidding
Before seeing why 2PA is efficient, let's look at why FPA are not
- Easy to see by looking at the payoffs:
- When you win:
- If bid = value, payoff = 0, just breaking even
- For example, if you value a good at $10, and you pay $10 for it, on net, you've just broken even. You haven't made a net profit or loss.
- If bid > value, payoff < 0
- For example, if you value a good at $10 and you pay $12 for it, you've actually lost value
- If bid < value, payoff > 0
- For example, if you value a good at $10 and you pay $8 for it, you've gained a net profit of $2
- If bid = value, payoff = 0, just breaking even
- When you lose: payoff = 0
- And you can't improve that payoff by bidding non-truthfully:
- In the graph, you can see that:
- At
B1
, when you bid your true value, you lose and payoff = 0 - If you decrease your bid below your value to
B2
, you still lose, and payoff = 0 - If you increase your bid slightly to
B3
, above your value but below the price, you lose and payoff = 0 - If you increase your bid all the way to
B4
, you're now the winner, but you pay more than the good is worth; so payoff < 0
- At
- And you can't improve that payoff by bidding non-truthfully:
- So underbidding is always your best strategy
- When you win:
To prove this:1
- Assume you bid truthfully. There are two possible cases: you win or you lose
- In either case, deviating from truthful bid will hurt you
- So, bidding truthfully must be your best strategy
- Case 1: you win the auction by bidding honestly
- At
B1
, you bid your value, and you pay the next highest bid, theprice
. Your payoff isB1 - price
, which is positive - If you bid higher, at
B2
, then you still pay the same price. Your payoff is stillB1 - price
- Nothing has changed, except that you've added more risk: you might have had to pay more than your value
- If you underbid slightly, at
B3
, then again nothing changes. You payprice
, and your payoff is stillB1 - price
. You've just added the risk that someone would outbid you when you would have been willing to pay more. - If you drastically underbid, at
B4
, then you lose the auction. Your payoff is 0, and you feel regret because you would have been willing to pay more.
- At
- Case 2: you lose the auction by bidding honestly
- Like in the FPA case, at
B1
when you bid your value, you lose the auction and your payoff is 0 - If you bid lower, at
B2
, then you still lose and your payoff is 0. Also, you've added more risk: there are bids that beatB2
which you would have been willing to outbid - If you slightly increase your bid to
B3
, again you still lose and payoff = 0. You've added more risk, though: if you had won, your payoff would be negative. - If you drastically increase your bid to
B4
, you win the auction. But you would prefer to lose in this case, since your bid is higher than your value. Your payoff is negative. - So, no deviations from truthful bidding would have made you better off!
- Like in the FPA case, at
- So: any time you don't bid truthfully, you either hurt yourself or take on more risk
OK so now the seller knows people's true values. So what? Why does this mean the 2PA is better?
- Isn't the seller leaving money on the table with a 2PA? The winner pays less than what they were willing to bid
- Ex: bids =
{11, 50, 88, 94}
. The winner was willing to pay $94, but only paid $88, so $6 is left "on the table" - But this reasoning requires us to think that people would bid the same way in a
FPA and 2PA
- But they don't, because what someone is willing to pay for an object is different from what they're willing to bid for that object, depending on the type of auction
- So, in a sense, that $6 would not have been "on the table" in a FPA at all
- Does this mean that 2PA earns the seller more money?
- No -- 2PA and FPA are actually revenue equivalent.
- BUT: there are still reasons sellers might prefer 2PA
- Because participants bid their true value, there is no strategy involved in 2PA. FPA requrie strategic underbidding. Therefore, 2PA is simpler
- 2PA can provide useful information for the seller:
- For example, say the seller wants to figure out how much something is worth. Since 2PA encourage truthful bidding, they are a good way to answer this question. FPA, not so much.
1: See this video