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Notes from the SEP article on Argument and Argumentation Theory

Argument and Argumentation Theory

Terminology

  1. An argument can be defined as a complex symbolic structure where some parts, known as the premises, offer support to another part, the conclusion.
  2. The relation of support between premises and conclusion can be cashed out in different ways: the premises may guarantee the truth of the conclusion, or make its truth more probable; the premises may imply the conclusion; the premises may make the conclusion more acceptable (or assertible).
  3. Argumentation is the exchange of arguments.
  4. The study of arguments and argumentation is also closely connected to the study of reasoning, understood as the process of reaching conclusions on the basis of careful, reflective consideration of the available information, i.e., by an examination of reasons.

Types of Arguments

  1. Deductive arguments: truth of the premises guarantees truth of the conclusion. Valid deductive arguments are those where the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion: the conclusion cannot but be true if the premises are true. Arguments having this property are said to be deductively valid. A valid argument whose premises are also true is said to be sound.
  2. Inductive arguments: truth of the premises increases the probability of the truth of the conclusion, while not ensuring complete certainty. They are based on statistical frequencies, which then lead to generalizations beyond the sample of cases initially under consideration: from the observed to the unobserved. In a good, i.e., cogent, inductive argument, the truth of the premises provides some degree of support for the truth of the conclusion. In contrast with a deductively valid argument, in an inductive argument the degree of support will never be maximal, as there is always the possibility of the conclusion being false given the truth of the premises.
  3. Abductive arguments: from the observation of a few relevant facts, a conclusion is drawn as to what could possibly explain the occurrence of these facts. Abduction is not necessarily truth-preserving. It is significantly different from induction in that it does not only concern the generalization of prior observation for prediction (though it may also involve statistical data): rather, abduction is often backward-looking in that it seeks to explain something that has already happened. The key notion is that of bringing together apparently independent phenomena or events as explanatorily and/or causally connected to each other, something that is absent from a purely inductive argument that only appeals to observed frequencies.
  4. Analogical arguments: if two things are similar, what is true of one of them is likely to be true of the other as well.
  5. Fallacious arguments: The thought is that, to argue well, it is not sufficient to be able to produce and recognize good arguments; it is equally (or perhaps even more) important to be able to recognize bad arguments by others, and to avoid producing bad arguments oneself.

Types of Argumentation

What's the point of arguing?

  1. Adversarial and cooperative argumentation: A question that has received much attention in the literature of the past decades pertains to whether the activity of argumentation is primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative. This question in fact corresponds to two sub-questions: the descriptive question of whether instances of argumentation are on the whole primarily adversarial or cooperative; and the normative question of whether argumentation should be (primarily) adversarial or cooperative. A number of authors have answered “adversarial” to the descriptive question and “cooperative” to the normative question, thus identifying a discrepancy between practices and normative ideals that must be remedied.

  2. Argumentation as an epistemic practice: the primary purpose of such argumentation is that of improving our beliefs and increasing knowledge, or of fostering understanding. When our ideas are challenged by engagement with those who disagree with us, we are forced to consider our own beliefs more thoroughly and critically. The result is that the remaining beliefs, those that have survived critical challenge, will be better grounded than those we held before such encounters. The view that argumentation aims at epistemic improvement is in many senses appealing, but it is doubtful that it reflects the actual outcomes of argumentation in many real-life situations. People typically do not like to change their minds about firmly entrenched beliefs, and so when confronted with arguments or evidence that contradict these beliefs, they tend to either look away or to discredit the source of the argument as unreliable --- a phenomenon also known as "confirmation bias".

  3. Consensus-oriented argumentation: its purpose is to eliminate or resolve a difference of opinion. However, consensus-oriented views need not presuppose that argumentation is truth-conducive: the ultimate goal of such instances of argumentation is that of social coordination, and for this tracking truth is not a requirement. Consensus-oriented argumentation seems to work well in cooperative contexts, but not so much in situations of conflict. In particular, the discussing parties must already have a significant amount of background agreement—especially agreement on what counts as a legitimate argument or compelling evidence—for argumentation and deliberation to lead to consensus.

    Sources

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