L-o-A (LPStaking and ZapLOA) v.2 Security Audit Report

BSC_LOA_report_v2.md

L-o-A (LPStaking and ZapLOA) v.2 Security Audit Report

1. Summary

L-o-A (LPStaking and ZapLOA) smart contract security audit report performed by Callisto Security Audit Department

2. In scope

Commit 1e2e81fef4bc8b8703f0d29482934ea0f09d34e5

• LPStaking.sol
• ZapLOA.sol

2.1. Excluded

Calculation formulas excluded from audit due to lack of contract documentation.

Standard OpenZeppelin contracts were excluded from audit:

• @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Counters.sol
• @openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol
• @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol
• @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/utils/ERC1155Holder.sol

3. Findings

In total, 1 issues were reported, including:

• 0 high severity issues.

• 0 medium severity issues.

• 1 low severity issues.

In total, 1 notes were reported, including:

• 1 notes.

• 0 owner privileges.

3.1. Incorrect function

Severity: low

Description

In the function withdraw to transfer tokens from contract should be used function transfer instead of transferFrom.

3.2. Private state variables

Severity: note

Description

In the ZapLOA contract the state variables are declared as private. So there isn't easy way to check their value outside from contract (for example in the block explorer the values of this variables will not be shown). To make contract more transparent for users we recommend to declare these variables as public.

4. Security practices

• Open-source contact.
• The contract should pass a bug bounty after the completion of the security audit.
• Public testing.
• Automated anomaly detection systems. - NOT IMPLEMENTED. A simple anomaly detection algorithm is recommended to be implemented to detect behavior that is atypical compared to normal for this contract. For instance, the contract must halt deposits in case a large amount is being withdrawn in a short period of time until the owner or the community of the contract approves further operations.
• Multisig owner account.
• Standard ERC20-related issues. - NOT IMPLEMENTED. It is known that every contract can potentially receive an unintended ERC20-token deposit without the ability to reject it even if the contract is not intended to receive or hold tokens. As a result, it is recommended to implement a function that will allow extracting any arbitrary number of tokens from the contract.
• Crosschain address collisions. ETH, ETC, CLO, etc. It is possible that a transaction can be sent to the address of your contract at another chain (as a result of a user mistake or some software fault). It is recommended that you deploy a "mock contract" that would allow you to withdraw any tokens from that address or prevent any funds deposits. Note that you can reject transactions of native token deposited, but you can not reject the deposits of ERC20 tokens. You can use this source code as a mock contract: extractor contract source code. The address of a new contract deployed using CREATE (0xf0) opcode is assigned following this scheme keccak256(rlp([sender, nonce])). Therefore you need to use the same address that was originally used at the main chain to deploy the mock contract at a transaction with the nonce that matches that on the original chain. Example: If you have deployed your main contract with address 0x010101 at your 2021th transaction then you need to increase your nonce of 0x010101 address to 2020 at the chain where your mock contract will be deployed. Then you can deploy your mock contract with your 2021th transaction, and it will receive the same address as your mainnet contract.

5. Conclusion

The audited smart contract can be deployed. Only low severity issues were found during the audit.

Correctness of formulas to calculate staking rewards excluded from audit due to lack of contract documentation.

It is recommended to adhere to the security practices described in pt. 4 of this report to ensure the contract's operability and prevent any issues that are not directly related to the code of this smart contract.