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Williams Transco leak history
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<script id="md_template" type="text/template">```
-baseurl: "https://cartocdn_a.global.ssl.fastly.net/base-midnight/{z}/{x}/{y}.png"
-title: "Williams Transco Leak History"
-author: "<a href='http://nyc.surfrider.org/' target='_blank'>nyc.surfrider.org</a>"
- vizjson: "http://andrew.cartodb.com/api/v2/viz/f76b0f82-093a-11e4-8918-0e73339ffa50/viz.json"
```
# A look at Williams Transco leak history
```
- center: [34.8859, -92.4854]
- zoom: 5
```
![](http://gothamist.com/attachments/nyc_chrisrobbins/61914pipe2.jpg)
A quick look at all Leak incidents reported by Williams Transco. This is only the last 3.5 years of data pulled from [PRIMIS](http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/safety/SIDA.html?nocache=3964)
Williams is the same group that will operate the pipeline currently being placed under Rockaway Beach. A good overview of the situation can be read in [A Massive Rockaway Gas Pipeline Is Being Built Right Under Our Beaches](http://gothamist.com/2014/06/19/rockaway_beach_gas_pipeline.php)
# Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company
```
- center: [29.748412, -95.46726601]
- zoom: 10
```
As stated in the [Gothamist write-up](), Williams Transco is a company with a troubling safety record. The company runs out of Houston and controls pipelines and facilities in several states. To explore the data, head over to the [standalone interactive map](http://cdb.io/1owMA7L). If you are interested in more than just Williams Transco, we've put together a map of all pipeline leaks reported around the country over the past 3.5 years, [see that here](http://cdb.io/1owMKvV)
# OTHER (2/10/2010 3:58)
```
- center: [29.46089,-93.38698]
- zoom: 10
```
**Johnson Bayou, LA**
**Equipment failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
6" striner lid (yale cap closure) failed allowing condensate and gas to escape to the atmosphere. Operator on duty isolated strainer pot with valving upstream and downstream. Gas loss with condensate/saltwater was released. Metalurgical report revealed the following findings: several circumstances worked in combination to allow the cap to fail and come off of the barrel. There was a loss of fit-up between the mating threads on the cap and barrel as a result of corrosion, wear, and prior mechanical damage (possible over-tightening and/or crossthreading). · the cap was tightened by hammer blows to its damaged ears, which resulted in the cap being installed off-center relative to the barrel. · the number of threads capable of caring loads was reduced by prior damage to no more than two. · the threads on one side of the connection were fully engaged and the trheads on the opposite side were only slightly engaged. · the threads located 90° relative to the engaged threads were only partially engaged; these were overloaded and sheared off at the time of failure.
,
# LEAK (4/26/2010 6:08)
```
- center: [27.51171,-97.9847]
- zoom: 10
```
**Kingsville, TX**
**Corrosion failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
A call from a williams employee was received at 6:15pm stating that a leak on 24" mainline a has been discovered. After having notified gas control in houston, several south texas district employees were contacted and requested that they close both block valves 10-a-70 and 10-a 80, which would isolate the section of pipeline where the leak was located. The pipeline was isolated and had been made secure by 7:15 pm. Nrc was contacted at 7:37 pm and any other agencies that would normally be included in the notification process. These notifications were completed by 8:00 pm that evening. A gas handling plan and a work plan were generated early on tuesday morning and the section of pipeline between the two block valve settings was blown down. A contractor was dispatched to the location and once the pipeline was made safe, started excavating the line to expose the area of the leak. During the excavation process, an old and mostly corroded 2" pipeline which was already in pieces was uncovered. This 2" pipeline was located approximately 2 ½" above our 24" pipeline. This 2" pipe was abandoned and been out of service for some time. The soil around the 2" pipeline and down to our pinhole leak was saturated with some type of product that smelled very much like condensate. The pinhole leak was located and after close inspection, a 30' section of pipe was cut out and replaced with new pretested pipe. The original 24" pipe at both ends of the 30' section was in excellent condition both internally and externally. Soil samples were taken of the immediate area and were shipped overnight to a lab for further analysis. Williams had a metallurgical test of the pipe that was cut out in order that it can identify the root cause of the corrosion at that particular site. The 24" pipeline was purged, packed and placed back in service at 11:00 am on thursday, april 29th, 2010. Metallurgical analysis confirmed that the reason for the leas was microbiological on 6/2/2010. The metallurgical report found the following; the coal tar corrosion protection that coated the pipeline when it was originally installed had been severely degraded in the area around the leak, probably by a chemical substance that had apparently leaked from the 2-inch pipeline installed over the 24-inch line. Visual examination of the leak showed corrosion pitting on the outside surface. Some of the pits had a fibrous appearance indicating preferential attack following the pipe axis. The fibrous appearance was characteristic of microbiologically-influenced corrosion (mic). Metallographic analysis of the corrosion pits showed undercutting and pits within pits, which are also unique characteristics of mic. The leak was caused by mic, which occured after the coal tar coating had been degraded exposing the bare pipe. The presence of sulfur and moisture in the soil around the leak created an ideal environment for mic to occur.
,
# LEAK (6/21/2010 9:24)
```
- center: [28.466111,-95.728056]
- zoom: 10
```
**Equipment failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
Factual information leak was reported to operator at 8:28 a.m. June 21, 2010. It was reported to him by district team in route to platform. The leak source was found to be from a grease fitting on a 4" valve in ssti of stub of sub sea tie-in assembly that was left in place after the pipeline was previously abandoned. There was no sheen associated with the leak. The ssti is connected to williams 30" line that runs from ba 538 to shore line. Notifications of the leak were made to wgp management, nrc (no. 944879 was assigned), coast guard, and mms. Wgp employees contracted a diving company, that repaired the leak by installing blind flange between leaking plug and 30" pipeline on june 24th, 2010. Root cause analysis was performed & attached.
,
# LEAK (10/19/2010 15:45)
```
- center: [29.48841667,-90.97752778]
- zoom: 10
```
**Houma, LA**
**Material failure of pipe or weld. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
Pipe was excavated and examined on november 7th and 8th of 2011. A lack of fusion manufacturing anomaly was located in the center of the erw long seam. The length of the anomaly was found to be 0.45 inches. A 24" pressure containing type "b" steel sleeve, centered at the anomaly location was installed as a permanent repair.
,
# LEAK (12/30/2010 10:45)
```
- center: [29.11111111,-94.40416667]
- zoom: 10
```
**Equipment failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
On 12/30/2010 at 10:45, gas control was notified by uscg that bubbles were reported near a williams pipeline in block hi206. A dive boat was mobilized to investigate bubbles. Divers found a 1" pleeco bleeder valve leaking gas from valve lw856 blind flange. Sub-sea assembly valve lw855 & lw856 were closed and piping bled down. Threads were damaged/cut by gas leak that increased in severity over time. 1" pleeco bleeder valve was replaced. Sub-sea assembly was repressured, verified no leaks and job was completed. This is a rare ocurrence and if future similar failures occur the assessment of comprehensive corrective action will be revisited.
,
# LEAK (9/8/2011 18:34)
```
- center: [28.1002,-91.80138]
- zoom: 10
```
**Equipment failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
Investigation of a leak confirmation on a 16" offshore gathering pipeline owned by transco, was determined to be a 1" pleeco bleeder port plug. Attempts to stop the leak by tightening the plug did not work. The plug was removed and replaced with a1" stainless steel ball valve and plug. The line was pressureized, checked for leaks. The line was put back into service.
,
# LEAK (10/30/2011 18:55)
```
- center: [29.1451,-90.89953333]
- zoom: 10
```
**Dulac, LA**
**Corrosion failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
On the evening of october 30th, williams received a call from the uscg stating that there were bubbles seen coming from coordinates 90 53.92n ¿ 29 08.750w. The transco district manager determined that it was safer to wait until morning before sending a crew offshore. At the time of the leak, transco could not verify whether it was their line leaking or not. When crews arrived at the leak site, a determination was made that it was in fact transco¿s pipeline. The valves were closed, the line was blown down, and a clamp was installed. The leak was determined to be a pinhole leak at the 6 o¿clock position on the girth weld. The pipeline was restored to service on november 8, 2011.
,
# RUPTURE (12/3/2011 15:07)
```
- center: [32.2578,-87.8536]
- zoom: 10
```
**Sweetwater, AL**
**Corrosion failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
On saturday, december 3, 2011, transco experienced a rupture on its 36 inch mainline c approximately 7 miles downstream of station 90 near linden, al. The rupture did ignite, however there were no injuries. There was approximately 8 acres of forested area burned. Operations personnel responded and had the segment isolated within 45 minutes of the rupture. Mainline b was partially exposed by the rupture and was taken out of service and phmsa ordered that the adjacent mainlines (mainlines a, d, and e) be operated with a 20% reduction in pressure. A subsequent conference call with phmsa on monday, december 5th, 2011, resulted in phmsa allowing wgp to operate mainlines 30 inch a, 36 inch d, and 42 inch e without any pressure limitations. A root cause analysis was completed and approved by phmsa. The cause of the accident was due to external corrosion.
,
# LEAK (12/12/2011 10:40)
```
- center: [29.53533,-90.92194]
- zoom: 10
```
**Gibson, LA**
**Other incident cause. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
This line was out of service due to a prior incident and was being prepared for service restoration when this leak was detected. The crew responsible for repressuring the pipe segment noticed bubbles in the marsh water where the pipe segment was located. No determination has been made yet on the cause of the leak. The pipe segment where this leak has occurred is located in a class 1 area in a marsh environment, upstream of the system processing/compressor station. A decision has been made by division engineers to keep this pipe segment isolated until a final determination has been made on whether or not to abandon this segment. The right of way, including pipeline continues to be maintained as prescribed per 49 cfr 192 a supplemental report(s) will be submitted as updated information becomes available or the repair/abandonment decision has been finalized.
,
# LEAK (4/2/2012 2:00)
```
- center: [40.79801737,-74.01659992]
- zoom: 10
```
**North Bergen, NJ**
**Other incident cause. **
**Reasons other than release of gas. **
Operator employees and third party contractors were on site of an anomaly investigation dig, operator employees were removing soil around the pipeline when operator employees smelled an odor coming from the anamoly pie. The pipeline was taken out of service and an investigation was initiated. The results of the leak investigation showed a dent on the pipe due to a rock underneath the pipe. The rock underneath the pipe was the cause of a small crack where the leak initiated. The pipe anamoly segment was cutout and replaced with new pipe.
,
# LEAK (6/9/2012 12:00)
```
- center: [29.07527778,-92.18194444]
- zoom: 10
```
**Equipment failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
6/8/12 @ 7:40am- stone energy verm 131 observed a sheen nw of their production platform, the observed a sheen along with bubbles. Stone energy reported leak to es&h, they made notifications to uscg, nrc. Nrc #1013919. 6/8/12 @ 9:40am stone energy notified wgp operations of bubbles and sheen nw of verm 131 platform. 6/8/12- wgp operations notified wgp district manager of bubbles and sheen near verm 131 platform. 6/8/12- wgp operations notified wgp area engineer of possible leak at verm 131, area engineer started looking for dive boat to respond to bubbles. 6/9/12@2:00am- dive boat mobbed out of cameron at 2:00am, arrived on location at verm 131 at 12:40pm. 6/9/12@ 4:30am- made notification to wgp gas control lead of leak on our 16¿ pipeline, wgp gas control made notifications to nrc, uscg and external notifications. New nrc# 1014068 6/9/12@ 6:30am- 3 producers on 16¿ pipeline have been notified and shut in. Verm 131, verm 129 & verm 87. 6/9/12@ 8:40pm- confirmed that leak was coming from 16¿ check valve on 16¿ pipeline segment #1584. Leak was on flange on top of check valve. Currently, wgp area engineer working on a repair plan to make repairs to 16¿ check valve. ***update 10/30/2012*** producer still working to fix leak at check valve. Producer has gone to valve site twice to try to fix check valve both times valve has leaked. The pipe is filled with water. Next option will be replacing check valve with blind flange and bring the pipeline back to service by the end of november. ***repair completed*** the leaking check valve was repaired by replacing a damaged gasket. The line resumed active status on january 1, 2013.
,
# LEAK (8/20/2012 15:25)
```
- center: [29.25633,-91.17833]
- zoom: 10
```
**Houma, LA**
**Corrosion failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
While performing ariel patrols, bubbles were spotted on a transco row, where transco operates 4 pipelines. Immediatley, the nrc was contacted along with the louisiana state police. Transco operators have isolated the line. The current status of the incident investigation is in the preliminary stage. This report will be updated as more data is recieved. Suplemental leak report update: - on 9/27/2012 the leak was investigated the leak was located on a pipeline located in a inlet to the gom. - divers exposed the line and removed external coating (mastic and concrete). - we identified an isolated pinhole leak at the six o'clock position in a girth weld, - we then removed coating and cleaned pipe 3' on both sides of the girth weld - the pipe was visually inspected and a ut inspection of leak area was also preformened.the inspections confirmed an isolated pinhole leak. - the divers installed a mechanical leak clamp. - the are affected was recoated and checked for leaks. - the line was then returned to service on 10-1-2012. We determined that the cause of the leak was an isolated pinhole leak at 6'oclock position, on a girth weld due to internal corrosion. This conclusion is consistant with tgpl's field technicians experience with previous incidents of this nature.
,
# LEAK (1/8/2013 10:20)
```
- center: [30.99534118,-90.04752906]
- zoom: 10
```
**Greensburg, LA**
**Equipment failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
Primary cause of leak was loss of support on flange resulting in a cracked gasket.two concrete supports immediately upstream and downstream (distance from center of support to center of flange approximately 4'-6") of the flange was inspected after the leak was identified and both were found in good condition with no soil settlement. However, soil settlement did occur in an area 50' to 60' downstream of the flange set which contributed to the flange gasket crack. The flange gasket was replaced and one additional concrete pipe support was installed 50' downstream of flange to provide additional support. Please see attached document for sequence of leak investigation events.
,
# LEAK (5/13/2013 8:45)
```
- center: [29.24083,-91.179]
- zoom: 10
```
**Houma, LA**
**Other incident cause. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
Wgp employee flying on regular flight to work offshore spotted bubbles in floatation canal between mosquito bay platform and the shoreline. The bubbles measured approximately 2 foot in diameter, about 2 inches high. Wgp employee called in to office to report leak. He was asked to go to ss 28-d1 to isolate 16 inch, go to ss 28-c to re-route gas around leak and to isolate 16 inch at mosquito bay then start de-pressuring of 16 inch. Environmental company was sent out to place boom around leak to prevent any potential liquid hydrocarbons from damaging the surrounding marsh. Absorbent boom was installed the afternoon of 5/13/13; blow down to zero was completed about noon on 5/14/13. Division engineer is exploring different repair methods and\or abandonment options. Repair versus abandonment will be decided by upper management depending upon costs of either. No producers are affected by the leak at this time. Note: two different leaks about 1/4 mile apart on the same pipeline were discovered at the same time. This report is for the leak that is the farthest to the north. Note: i attempted to create 2 different leak reports using the same nrc, date of leak and address, but i unintentionally over rode the original leak report. I decided to add note describing the 2 leaks. Fyi - the milepost for the other leak is mp 2.375. All of the pipe data for the other leak is the same including the total cost of leak in dollars.
,
# OTHER (5/31/2013 19:44)
```
- center: [40.440382,-74.471522]
- zoom: 10
```
**Neshanic Station, NJ**
**Incorrect operation. **
**Reasons other than release of gas. **
Williams construction and contractor henkels and mccoy were performing construction work at compressor station 505 in neshanic station, nj. The incident occurred while workers were installing a temporary weld cap on a 30"out of service section of pipe at 505 compressor station yard piping. During the installation process, a contract welder's helper was pre-heating the pipe when either gas vapors or liquid vapors ignited causing the weld cap to dislodge from the line up clamp but not from the harness of the side boom that was holding it. No visible fire was witnessed nor needed to be extinguished. 3 henkels and mccoy employees were transported to local hospitals with minor injuries and were released later the same evening. No damaged occurred to the facility and the pipe that the cap was being installed on is being removed and scrapped at a later date as part of the project. Phmsa inspected the job site, the gas handling plan, and the construction installation procedures the following day and gave williams the ok to install the temporary cap and continue with the job.
,
# LEAK (6/24/2013 18:52)
```
- center: [28.985938,-91.493719]
- zoom: 10
```
**Equipment failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
Locating and verifing the leak (june 24, 2013) - transco received information from apache corp at 7:30pm on the evening the leak was identified. Apache plotted over transco's 10 " offshore pipeline between the ei 119 - ei 120 platform, which ties-in at the 16" ss128 - ei 129a. Apache's message to transco was sighting of bubbles, no sheen reported. Gas control was notified (apache already had notified the nrc # 1051561) and transco responded with scheduling the investigation the next morning. Field investigation and the repair of the leak (feburary 2014) - transco plotted the 16" line, located and identified the leak as being a 16" check valve. The leaking valve was retrieved and disassembled, results showed that debris was found in the valve flange ring joint grooves, identified as the orgin of the leak. The valve flange ring joint grooves were cleaned and the valve reassembled. In summary, the transco rca concluded that the 16" check valve leak was the result of improper installation of the 16" check valve cover flange, more than likely associated with the valve clapper removal during a 1980 repair. The 16" line was repessured and the check valve showed no signs of leaking. The line is now in full operation.
,
# LEAK (6/24/2013 18:52)
```
- center: [28.985938,-91.493719]
- zoom: 10
```
**Equipment failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
Locating and verifing the leak (june 24, 2013) - transco received information from apache corp at 7:30pm on the evening the leak was identified. Apache plotted over transco's 10 " offshore pipeline between the ei 119 - ei 120 platform, which ties-in at the 16" ss128 - ei 129a. Apache's message to transco was sighting of bubbles, no sheen reported. Gas control was notified (apache already had notified the nrc # 1051561) and transco responded that an investigate will begin the next morning. Transco operators reported the following information to gas control - bubbles were sighted 1.1 miles wsw of the ei-120 platform. The coordinates are 28 degrees 59.099 north and 91 degrees 29.551 west. The areas is believed to be about 18" - 24" in diameter. The water is not boiling and there is no sheen. Field investigation and repair of the leak (feburary 2014) - transco plotted the 16" line, located and identified the leak as being a 16" check valve. The leaking valve was retrieved and disassembled, debris was found on the valve flange ring joint grooves, identified as the orgin of the leak. The valve flange ring joint grooves were cleaned and the valve reassembled. In summary, the transco rca concluded that the 16" check valve leak were the results of improper installation of the 16" check valve cover flange more than likely associated with the valve clapper removal during a 1980 repair. The 16" line was repessured and the check valve showed no signs of leaking.
,
# OTHER (6/24/2013 18:52)
```
- center: [28.985938,-91.493719]
- zoom: 10
```
**Other incident cause. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
Transco received information from apache corp at 7:30pm on the evening the leak was identified. Apache plotted over transco's 10¿ offshore pipeline between theei 119 - ei 120 platform, which ties-in at the 16" ss128 - ei 129a. Apache's message to transco was sighting bubbles, no sheen reported. Gas control was notified (apache already had notified the nrc # 1051561) and transco responded that an investigate will begin the next morning. Transco operators reported the following information to gas control - bubbles were sighted 1.1 miles wsw of the ei-120 platform. The coordinates are 28 degrees 59.099 north and 91 degrees 29.551 west. The areas is believed to be about 18" - 24" in diameter. The water is not boiling and there is no sheen. Transco plotted the line and an investigation is still ongoing.
,
# LEAK (12/31/2013 10:30)
```
- center: [28.31609,-91.99708]
- zoom: 10
```
**Equipment failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
On 12-31-13, at 10:30 am cst, an offshore vessel contracted by producer, ert, stationed at nearby smi 130-a platform reported to williams schriever district office that they sited bubbles with no sheen on the surface of the water. Williams operations dispatched a helicopter to investigate the report. The helicopter confirmed bubbles at the same coordinates given by the vessel. The coordinates were plotted on alignments sheets, the supporting data source was bsee's owl program. As indicated, there were bubbles in the vicinity of the williams pipeline and a producer line. Due to rough seas and weather conditions williams could not send a dive boat to confirm that the bubbles were coming from its pipeline. In the meantime, operations made a decision to isolate the williams pipeline, suspend gas receipts into the line and lower the pressure on the pipeline. At 7:55 am cst, on 1-6-14, eventually weather conditions permitted the flyover of the leak area and operations was able to confirm that the leak was coming from the williams pipeline. At 9:50 am cst gas control notified the nrc. A dive boat was sent to the leak location and the source of the gas leak was identified as a ½-inch threaded swivel connector on a subsea assembly. The connector was replaced, the pipeline was pressured up and put back into service on 1-30-14 at 9:22 pm cst.
,
# LEAK (3/10/2014 13:00)
```
- center: [40.80833,-74.06222]
- zoom: 10
```
**East Rutherford, NJ**
**Other incident cause. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
Measurement personel detected a strong gas odor while at the east rutherford m&r on 3/10/2014. It was determined that the leak was coming from below ground near a main line "a" tap valve feed for the m&r station. Management was notified and began the investigation. Soil was removed from the leak area and a gas detector was used to determine that a leak was infact present. The line was drawn down to 150 psig through the east rutherford m&r and then blown down to 0 psig. A contractor was brought in to fully excavate and make the necessary repairs (leaking pipe section was cut-out and replaced with new pipe). It was determined that a crack had formed on the main line pipe in the area where the hot tap nipple was attached to the main line piping. Once the repair was complete, the line was purged of air, packed to line pressure and returned to service on 3/13/2014. The pipe cut-out was sent out to be analyzied and a rca will be completed to determine the apparent cause of the leak. Once the results have been recieved and the cause of leak has been determined a supplemental incident report will be submitted.
,
# LEAK (3/18/2014 14:50)
```
- center: [28.65390737,-91.0014229]
- zoom: 10
```
**Corrosion failure. **
**Unintentional release of gas. **
We (transco) received a call from producer (fieldwood) at approximately 2:50pm on 3-18-14 reporting that they spotted bubbles from platform ss 182, at lat:28 deg. 39 min.n; lon: -91.00 min. W. We plotted coordinates and the leak appeared to be about 500 feet west of our 10 inch line (sela 10 inch at ss 169), directly on producer's 6 inch line which connected to our 10 inch line. At 3:00 pm, a helicopter was dispatched to investigate. A helicopter plotted coordinates, but no sheen or pollution was evident. We plotted the new coordinates and they showed bubbles east of our 10 inch line. After reviewing updated information a further investigation was executed. At 4:30 pm, we re-directed a dive vessel from another project location to ss 169 area as soon as possible (eta to ss 169 is approximately midnight). At 5:30 pm 3-18-2014, we notified all four producers flowing into our 10" pipeline to shut in their gas flow to us. At 7:30 am on 3-19-14, the dive vessel notified us that the bubbles had originated from our 10" line. Transco gas control and the coast guard were immediately notified. We requested the dive vessel to re-position itself over subsea valve (le 3100). Closing the subsea valve would isolate the leak and minimize the amount of 10" line that would need to be blown down from 20 miles to 3 miles, also allowing 2 producers to resume flow. The dive vessel determined that the area where the subsea valve was located was very congested with foreign pipelines. Precautions were taken, and an anchor tug was ordered to safely deploy their anchors. The anchor tug & utility boat arrived at dive vessel with repair equipment between 3-4 am on 3-20-14. The dive vessel had anchors set over subsea valve at 10:00 am on 3-20-14. The subsea valve was closed at 7:00 am on 3-21-14 and 3 miles of the 10 inch line pressure was reduced to 60 psi at 1:15 pm on 3-21-14, (60 psi was left on pipeline so divers could find the pinhole leak). There were still no signs of sheen and/or pollution since bubbles had first originated. After the divers removed the concrete coating from the 10 inch line leak area they confirmed that the leak was at the 7 o'clock position and 10 feet from girth weld at 3:00 pm on 3-21-14. The divers were instructed to finish cleaning the 10" line to accept repair clamp and to take ut readings. The divers verified that there was no wall loss, except for pinhole leak. The divers sent the ut readings to transco¿s division engineer, corrosion specialist & schriever operations for analysis at 1:20 pm on 3-22-14. All ut readings were determined to be acceptable. The divers were instructed to start the installation of repair clamp at 2:45 pm on 3-22-14. The repair clamp installation & coating of pipeline near the clamp were completed at 5:15 pm on 3-22-14. The divers opened the subsea valve at 9:50 pm on 3-22-14. After the 10 inch line was re-pressured and no bubbles were reported the divers covered the subsea valve and the repair clamp. At 10:15 pm on 3-22-14, transco¿s gas control and the two producers are notified that transco¿s 10 inch pipeline is back in service and that gas flow can resume.
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