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#!/bin/sh |
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# |
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# Generated iptables firewall script for the Linux 2.4 kernel |
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# Script generated by Easy Firewall Generator for IPTables 1.15 |
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# copyright 2002 Timothy Scott Morizot |
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# |
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# Redhat chkconfig comments - firewall applied early, |
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# removed late |
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# chkconfig: 2345 08 92 |
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# description: This script applies or removes iptables firewall rules |
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# |
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# This generator is primarily designed for RedHat installations, |
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# although it should be adaptable for others. |
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# |
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# It can be executed with the typical start and stop arguments. |
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# If used with stop, it will stop after flushing the firewall. |
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# The save and restore arguments will save or restore the rules |
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# from the /etc/sysconfig/iptables file. The save and restore |
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# arguments are included to preserve compatibility with |
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# Redhat's or Fedora's init.d script if you prefer to use it. |
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# Redhat/Fedora installation instructions |
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# |
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# 1. Have the system link the iptables init.d startup script into run states |
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# 2, 3, and 5. |
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# chkconfig --level 235 iptables on |
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# |
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# 2. Save this script and execute it to load the ruleset from this file. |
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# You may need to run the dos2unix command on it to remove carraige returns. |
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# |
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# 3. To have it applied at startup, copy this script to |
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# /etc/init.d/iptables. It accepts stop, start, save, and restore |
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# arguments. (You may wish to save the existing one first.) |
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# Alternatively, if you issue the 'service iptables save' command |
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# the init.d script should save the rules and reload them at runtime. |
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# |
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# 4. For non-Redhat systems (or Redhat systems if you have a problem), you |
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# may want to append the command to execute this script to rc.local. |
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# rc.local is typically located in /etc and /etc/rc.d and is usually |
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# the last thing executed on startup. Simply add /path/to/script/script_name |
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# on its own line in the rc.local file. |
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############################################################################### |
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# |
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# Local Settings |
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# |
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# sysctl location. If set, it will use sysctl to adjust the kernel parameters. |
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# If this is set to the empty string (or is unset), the use of sysctl |
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# is disabled. |
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SYSCTL="/usr/sbin/sysctl -w" |
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# To echo the value directly to the /proc file instead |
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# SYSCTL="" |
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# IPTables Location - adjust if needed |
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IPT="/usr/sbin/iptables" |
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IPTS="/usr/sbin/iptables-save" |
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IPTR="/usr/sbin/iptables-restore" |
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# Internet Interface |
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INET_IFACE="eth0" |
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INET_ADDRESS="REMOVED_FOR_PRIVACY" |
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# Local Interface Information |
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LOCAL_IFACE="ztly5vzbz3" |
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LOCAL_IP="172.29.100.168" |
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LOCAL_NET="172.29.0.0/16" |
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LOCAL_BCAST="172.29.255.255" |
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# Localhost Interface |
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LO_IFACE="lo" |
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LO_IP="127.0.0.1" |
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# Save and Restore arguments handled here |
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if [ "$1" = "save" ] |
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then |
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echo -n "Saving firewall to /etc/sysconfig/iptables ... " |
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$IPTS > /etc/sysconfig/iptables |
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echo "done" |
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exit 0 |
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elif [ "$1" = "restore" ] |
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then |
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echo -n "Restoring firewall from /etc/sysconfig/iptables ... " |
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$IPTR < /etc/sysconfig/iptables |
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echo "done" |
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exit 0 |
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fi |
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############################################################################### |
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# |
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# Load Modules |
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# |
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echo "Loading kernel modules ..." |
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# You should uncomment the line below and run it the first time just to |
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# ensure all kernel module dependencies are OK. There is no need to run |
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# every time, however. |
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# /sbin/depmod -a |
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# Unless you have kernel module auto-loading disabled, you should not |
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# need to manually load each of these modules. Other than ip_tables, |
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# ip_conntrack, and some of the optional modules, I've left these |
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# commented by default. Uncomment if you have any problems or if |
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# you have disabled module autoload. Note that some modules must |
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# be loaded by another kernel module. |
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# core netfilter module |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ip_tables |
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# the stateful connection tracking module |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack |
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# filter table module |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe iptable_filter |
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# mangle table module |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe iptable_mangle |
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# nat table module |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe iptable_nat |
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# LOG target module |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ipt_LOG |
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# This is used to limit the number of packets per sec/min/hr |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ipt_limit |
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# masquerade target module |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ipt_MASQUERADE |
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# filter using owner as part of the match |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ipt_owner |
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# REJECT target drops the packet and returns an ICMP response. |
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# The response is configurable. By default, connection refused. |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ipt_REJECT |
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# This target allows packets to be marked in the mangle table |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ipt_mark |
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# This target affects the TCP MSS |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ipt_tcpmss |
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# This match allows multiple ports instead of a single port or range |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe multiport |
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# This match checks against the TCP flags |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ipt_state |
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# This match catches packets with invalid flags |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ipt_unclean |
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# The ftp nat module is required for non-PASV ftp support |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ip_nat_ftp |
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# the module for full ftp connection tracking |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp |
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# the module for full irc connection tracking |
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/usr/sbin/modprobe ip_conntrack_irc |
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############################################################################### |
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# |
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# Kernel Parameter Configuration |
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# |
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# See http://ipsysctl-tutorial.frozentux.net/chunkyhtml/index.html |
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# for a detailed tutorial on sysctl and the various settings |
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# available. |
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# Required to enable IPv4 forwarding. |
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# Redhat users can try setting FORWARD_IPV4 in /etc/sysconfig/network to true |
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# Alternatively, it can be set in /etc/sysctl.conf |
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if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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then |
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echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward |
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else |
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$SYSCTL net.ipv4.ip_forward="1" |
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fi |
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# This enables dynamic address hacking. |
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# This may help if you have a dynamic IP address \(e.g. slip, ppp, dhcp\). |
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#if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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#then |
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# echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr |
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#else |
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# $SYSCTL net.ipv4.ip_dynaddr="1" |
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#fi |
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# This enables SYN flood protection. |
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# The SYN cookies activation allows your system to accept an unlimited |
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# number of TCP connections while still trying to give reasonable |
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# service during a denial of service attack. |
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if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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then |
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echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies |
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else |
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$SYSCTL net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies="1" |
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fi |
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# This enables source validation by reversed path according to RFC1812. |
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# In other words, did the response packet originate from the same interface |
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# through which the source packet was sent? It's recommended for single-homed |
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# systems and routers on stub networks. Since those are the configurations |
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# this firewall is designed to support, I turn it on by default. |
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# Turn it off if you use multiple NICs connected to the same network. |
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if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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then |
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echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter |
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else |
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$SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter="1" |
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fi |
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# This option allows a subnet to be firewalled with a single IP address. |
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# It's used to build a DMZ. Since that's not a focus of this firewall |
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# script, it's not enabled by default, but is included for reference. |
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# See: http://www.sjdjweis.com/linux/proxyarp/ |
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#if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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#then |
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# echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/proxy_arp |
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#else |
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# $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.proxy_arp="1" |
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#fi |
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# The following kernel settings were suggested by Alex Weeks. Thanks! |
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# This kernel parameter instructs the kernel to ignore all ICMP |
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# echo requests sent to the broadcast address. This prevents |
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# a number of smurfs and similar DoS nasty attacks. |
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if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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then |
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echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts |
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else |
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$SYSCTL net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts="1" |
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fi |
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# This option can be used to accept or refuse source routed |
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# packets. It is usually on by default, but is generally |
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# considered a security risk. This option turns it off. |
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if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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then |
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echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_source_route |
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else |
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$SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route="0" |
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fi |
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# This option can disable ICMP redirects. ICMP redirects |
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# are generally considered a security risk and shouldn't be |
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# needed by most systems using this generator. |
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#if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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#then |
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# echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects |
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#else |
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# $SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects="0" |
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#fi |
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# However, we'll ensure the secure_redirects option is on instead. |
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# This option accepts only from gateways in the default gateways list. |
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if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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then |
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echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/secure_redirects |
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else |
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$SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects="1" |
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fi |
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# This option logs packets from impossible addresses. |
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if [ "$SYSCTL" = "" ] |
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then |
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echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians |
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else |
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$SYSCTL net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians="1" |
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fi |
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############################################################################### |
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# |
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# Flush Any Existing Rules or Chains |
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# |
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echo "Flushing Tables ..." |
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# Reset Default Policies |
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$IPT -P INPUT ACCEPT |
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$IPT -P FORWARD ACCEPT |
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$IPT -P OUTPUT ACCEPT |
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$IPT -t nat -P PREROUTING ACCEPT |
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$IPT -t nat -P POSTROUTING ACCEPT |
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$IPT -t nat -P OUTPUT ACCEPT |
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$IPT -t mangle -P PREROUTING ACCEPT |
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$IPT -t mangle -P OUTPUT ACCEPT |
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# Flush all rules |
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$IPT -F |
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$IPT -t nat -F |
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$IPT -t mangle -F |
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# Erase all non-default chains |
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$IPT -X |
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$IPT -t nat -X |
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$IPT -t mangle -X |
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if [ "$1" = "stop" ] |
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then |
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echo "Firewall completely flushed! Now running with no firewall." |
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exit 0 |
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fi |
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############################################################################### |
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# |
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# Rules Configuration |
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# |
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############################################################################### |
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# |
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# Filter Table |
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# |
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############################################################################### |
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# Set Policies |
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$IPT -P INPUT DROP |
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$IPT -P OUTPUT DROP |
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$IPT -P FORWARD DROP |
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############################################################################### |
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# |
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# User-Specified Chains |
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# |
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# Create user chains to reduce the number of rules each packet |
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# must traverse. |
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echo "Create and populate custom rule chains ..." |
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# Create a chain to filter INVALID packets |
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$IPT -N bad_packets |
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# Create another chain to filter bad tcp packets |
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$IPT -N bad_tcp_packets |
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# Create separate chains for icmp, tcp (incoming and outgoing), |
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# and incoming udp packets. |
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$IPT -N icmp_packets |
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# Used for UDP packets inbound from the Internet |
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$IPT -N udp_inbound |
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# Used to block outbound UDP services from internal network |
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# Default to allow all |
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$IPT -N udp_outbound |
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# Used to allow inbound services if desired |
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# Default fail except for established sessions |
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$IPT -N tcp_inbound |
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# Used to block outbound services from internal network |
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# Default to allow all |
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$IPT -N tcp_outbound |
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############################################################################### |
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# |
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# Populate User Chains |
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# |
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# bad_packets chain |
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# |
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# Drop packets received on the external interface |
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# claiming a source of the local network |
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$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -s $LOCAL_NET -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "Illegal source: " |
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$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -s $LOCAL_NET -j DROP |
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# Drop INVALID packets immediately |
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$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -m state --state INVALID -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "Invalid packet: " |
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$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -m state --state INVALID -j DROP |
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# Then check the tcp packets for additional problems |
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$IPT -A bad_packets -p tcp -j bad_tcp_packets |
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# All good, so return |
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$IPT -A bad_packets -p ALL -j RETURN |
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# bad_tcp_packets chain |
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# |
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# All tcp packets will traverse this chain. |
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# Every new connection attempt should begin with |
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# a syn packet. If it doesn't, it is likely a |
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# port scan. This drops packets in state |
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# NEW that are not flagged as syn packets. |
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# Return to the calling chain if the bad packets originate |
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# from the local interface. This maintains the approach |
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# throughout this firewall of a largely trusted internal |
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# network. |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j RETURN |
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# However, I originally did apply this filter to the forward chain |
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# for packets originating from the internal network. While I have |
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# not conclusively determined its effect, it appears to have the |
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# interesting side effect of blocking some of the ad systems. |
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# Apparently some ad systems have the browser initiate a NEW |
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# connection that is not flagged as a syn packet to retrieve |
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# the ad image. If you wish to experiment further comment the |
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# rule above. If you try it, you may also wish to uncomment the |
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# rule below. It will keep those packets from being logged. |
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# There are a lot of them. |
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# $IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp -i $LOCAL_IFACE ! --syn -m state \ |
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# --state NEW -j DROP |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! --syn -m state --state NEW -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "New not syn: " |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp ! --syn -m state --state NEW -j DROP |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "Stealth scan: " |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j DROP |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL ALL -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "Stealth scan: " |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL ALL -j DROP |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL FIN,URG,PSH -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "Stealth scan: " |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL FIN,URG,PSH -j DROP |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL SYN,RST,ACK,FIN,URG -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "Stealth scan: " |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL SYN,RST,ACK,FIN,URG -j DROP |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "Stealth scan: " |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j DROP |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,FIN SYN,FIN -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "Stealth scan: " |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,FIN SYN,FIN -j DROP |
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# All good, so return |
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$IPT -A bad_tcp_packets -p tcp -j RETURN |
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# icmp_packets chain |
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# |
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# This chain is for inbound (from the Internet) icmp packets only. |
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# Type 8 (Echo Request) is not accepted by default |
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# Enable it if you want remote hosts to be able to reach you. |
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# 11 (Time Exceeded) is the only one accepted |
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# that would not already be covered by the established |
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# connection rule. Applied to INPUT on the external interface. |
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# |
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# See: http://www.ee.siue.edu/~rwalden/networking/icmp.html |
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# for more info on ICMP types. |
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# |
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# Note that the stateful settings allow replies to ICMP packets. |
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# These rules allow new packets of the specified types. |
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# ICMP packets should fit in a Layer 2 frame, thus they should |
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# never be fragmented. Fragmented ICMP packets are a typical sign |
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# of a denial of service attack. |
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$IPT -A icmp_packets --fragment -p ICMP -j LOG \ |
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--log-prefix "ICMP Fragment: " |
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$IPT -A icmp_packets --fragment -p ICMP -j DROP |
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# Echo - uncomment to allow your system to be pinged. |
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# Uncomment the LOG command if you also want to log PING attempts |
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# |
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# $IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 8 -j LOG \ |
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# --log-prefix "Ping detected: " |
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# $IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 8 -j ACCEPT |
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# By default, however, drop pings without logging. Blaster |
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# and other worms have infected systems blasting pings. |
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# Comment the line below if you want pings logged, but it |
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# will likely fill your logs. |
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$IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 8 -j DROP |
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# Time Exceeded |
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$IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -s 0/0 --icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT |
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# Not matched, so return so it will be logged |
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$IPT -A icmp_packets -p ICMP -j RETURN |
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# TCP & UDP |
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# Identify ports at: |
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# http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/~rakerman/port-table.html |
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# http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers |
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# udp_inbound chain |
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# |
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# This chain describes the inbound UDP packets it will accept. |
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# It's applied to INPUT on the external or Internet interface. |
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# Note that the stateful settings allow replies. |
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# These rules are for new requests. |
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# It drops netbios packets (windows) immediately without logging. |
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# Drop netbios calls |
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# Please note that these rules do not really change the way the firewall |
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# treats netbios connections. Connections from the localhost and |
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# internal interface (if one exists) are accepted by default. |
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# Responses from the Internet to requests initiated by or through |
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# the firewall are also accepted by default. To get here, the |
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# packets would have to be part of a new request received by the |
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# Internet interface. You would have to manually add rules to |
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# accept these. I added these rules because some network connections, |
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# such as those via cable modems, tend to be filled with noise from |
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# unprotected Windows machines. These rules drop those packets |
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# quickly and without logging them. This prevents them from traversing |
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# the whole chain and keeps the log from getting cluttered with |
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# chatter from Windows systems. |
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$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 137 -j DROP |
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$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -s 0/0 --destination-port 138 -j DROP |
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# Not matched, so return for logging |
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$IPT -A udp_inbound -p UDP -j RETURN |
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# udp_outbound chain |
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# |
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# This chain is used with a private network to prevent forwarding for |
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# UDP requests on specific protocols. Applied to the FORWARD rule from |
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# the internal network. Ends with an ACCEPT |
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# No match, so ACCEPT |
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$IPT -A udp_outbound -p UDP -s 0/0 -j ACCEPT |
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# tcp_inbound chain |
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# |
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# This chain is used to allow inbound connections to the |
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# system/gateway. Use with care. It defaults to none. |
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# It's applied on INPUT from the external or Internet interface. |
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# sshd |
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$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -s 0/0 --destination-port 22 -j ACCEPT |
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# Not matched, so return so it will be logged |
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$IPT -A tcp_inbound -p TCP -j RETURN |
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# tcp_outbound chain |
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# |
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# This chain is used with a private network to prevent forwarding for |
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# requests on specific protocols. Applied to the FORWARD rule from |
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# the internal network. Ends with an ACCEPT |
|
|
|
|
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# No match, so ACCEPT |
|
$IPT -A tcp_outbound -p TCP -s 0/0 -j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
############################################################################### |
|
# |
|
# INPUT Chain |
|
# |
|
|
|
echo "Process INPUT chain ..." |
|
|
|
# Allow all on localhost interface |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LO_IFACE -j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
# Drop bad packets |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -j bad_packets |
|
|
|
# DOCSIS compliant cable modems |
|
# Some DOCSIS compliant cable modems send IGMP multicasts to find |
|
# connected PCs. The multicast packets have the destination address |
|
# 224.0.0.1. You can accept them. If you choose to do so, |
|
# Uncomment the rule to ACCEPT them and comment the rule to DROP |
|
# them The firewall will drop them here by default to avoid |
|
# cluttering the log. The firewall will drop all multicasts |
|
# to the entire subnet (224.0.0.1) by default. To only affect |
|
# IGMP multicasts, change '-p ALL' to '-p 2'. Of course, |
|
# if they aren't accepted elsewhere, it will only ensure that |
|
# multicasts on other protocols are logged. |
|
# Drop them without logging. |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -d 224.0.0.1 -j DROP |
|
# The rule to accept the packets. |
|
# $IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -d 224.0.0.1 -j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
# Rules for the private network (accessing gateway system itself) |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LOCAL_IFACE -s $LOCAL_NET -j ACCEPT |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $LOCAL_IFACE -d $LOCAL_BCAST -j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
|
|
# Inbound Internet Packet Rules |
|
|
|
# Accept Established Connections |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -p ALL -i $INET_IFACE -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ |
|
-j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
# Route the rest to the appropriate user chain |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -p TCP -i $INET_IFACE -j tcp_inbound |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -p UDP -i $INET_IFACE -j udp_inbound |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -p ICMP -i $INET_IFACE -j icmp_packets |
|
|
|
# Drop without logging broadcasts that get this far. |
|
# Cuts down on log clutter. |
|
# Comment this line if testing new rules that impact |
|
# broadcast protocols. |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -m pkttype --pkt-type broadcast -j DROP |
|
|
|
# Log packets that still don't match |
|
$IPT -A INPUT -m limit --limit 3/minute --limit-burst 3 -j LOG \ |
|
--log-prefix "INPUT packet died: " |
|
|
|
############################################################################### |
|
# |
|
# FORWARD Chain |
|
# |
|
|
|
echo "Process FORWARD chain ..." |
|
|
|
# Used if forwarding for a private network |
|
|
|
# Drop bad packets |
|
$IPT -A FORWARD -p ALL -j bad_packets |
|
|
|
# Accept TCP packets we want to forward from internal sources |
|
$IPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j tcp_outbound |
|
|
|
# Accept UDP packets we want to forward from internal sources |
|
$IPT -A FORWARD -p udp -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j udp_outbound |
|
|
|
# If not blocked, accept any other packets from the internal interface |
|
$IPT -A FORWARD -p ALL -i $LOCAL_IFACE -j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
# Deal with responses from the internet |
|
$IPT -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ |
|
-j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
# Port Forwarding is enabled, so accept forwarded traffic |
|
$IPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 34200 \ |
|
--destination 172.29.100.198 -j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
# Log packets that still don't match |
|
$IPT -A FORWARD -m limit --limit 3/minute --limit-burst 3 -j LOG \ |
|
--log-prefix "FORWARD packet died: " |
|
|
|
############################################################################### |
|
# |
|
# OUTPUT Chain |
|
# |
|
|
|
echo "Process OUTPUT chain ..." |
|
|
|
# Generally trust the firewall on output |
|
|
|
# However, invalid icmp packets need to be dropped |
|
# to prevent a possible exploit. |
|
$IPT -A OUTPUT -m state -p icmp --state INVALID -j DROP |
|
|
|
# Localhost |
|
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LO_IP -j ACCEPT |
|
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -o $LO_IFACE -j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
# To internal network |
|
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -s $LOCAL_IP -j ACCEPT |
|
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -o $LOCAL_IFACE -j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
# To internet |
|
$IPT -A OUTPUT -p ALL -o $INET_IFACE -j ACCEPT |
|
|
|
# Log packets that still don't match |
|
$IPT -A OUTPUT -m limit --limit 3/minute --limit-burst 3 -j LOG \ |
|
--log-prefix "OUTPUT packet died: " |
|
|
|
############################################################################### |
|
# |
|
# nat table |
|
# |
|
############################################################################### |
|
|
|
# The nat table is where network address translation occurs if there |
|
# is a private network. If the gateway is connected to the Internet |
|
# with a static IP, snat is used. If the gateway has a dynamic address, |
|
# masquerade must be used instead. There is more overhead associated |
|
# with masquerade, so snat is better when it can be used. |
|
# The nat table has a builtin chain, PREROUTING, for dnat and redirects. |
|
# Another, POSTROUTING, handles snat and masquerade. |
|
|
|
echo "Load rules for nat table ..." |
|
|
|
############################################################################### |
|
# |
|
# PREROUTING chain |
|
# |
|
|
|
# Port Forwarding |
|
# |
|
# Port forwarding forwards all traffic on a port or ports from |
|
# the firewall to a computer on the internal LAN. This can |
|
# be required to support special situations. For instance, |
|
# this is the only way to support file transfers with an ICQ |
|
# client on an internal computer. It's also required if an internal |
|
# system hosts a service such as a web server. However, it's also |
|
# a dangerous option. It allows Internet computers access to |
|
# your internal network. Use it carefully and only if you're |
|
# certain you know what you're doing. |
|
|
|
$IPT -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -i $INET_IFACE --destination-port 34200 \ |
|
-j DNAT --to-destination 172.29.100.198 |
|
|
|
|
|
############################################################################### |
|
# |
|
# POSTROUTING chain |
|
# |
|
|
|
$IPT -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o $INET_IFACE \ |
|
-j SNAT --to-source $INET_ADDRESS |
|
|
|
############################################################################### |
|
# |
|
# mangle table |
|
# |
|
############################################################################### |
|
|
|
# The mangle table is used to alter packets. It can alter or mangle them in |
|
# several ways. For the purposes of this generator, we only use its ability |
|
# to alter the TTL in packets. However, it can be used to set netfilter |
|
# mark values on specific packets. Those marks could then be used in another |
|
# table like filter, to limit activities associated with a specific host, for |
|
# instance. The TOS target can be used to set the Type of Service field in |
|
# the IP header. Note that the TTL target might not be included in the |
|
# distribution on your system. If it is not and you require it, you will |
|
# have to add it. That may require that you build from source. |
|
|
|
echo "Load rules for mangle table ..." |
|
|
|
exit |