Placing "the concept of economic law in Capital" at the center of one's research is obviously a large-scale task, which one would like to be able to approach progressively, element by element, before beginning a necessary effort of synthesis. However, if there are researches that can be divided up as the researcher wishes, to present their multiple facets in turn, we will agree that ours is not one of them. To deal with the concept of economic law is to evoke a certain number of themes that support each other, that are indispensable to each other. Confronted with the necessity of making a choice within such a wide-ranging subject, we had to face the impossibility of restricting the field of our research, which would take as its starting point the selection of a certain number of specific themes. Could we have dealt with one type of law, for example, in order to exclude a second type from our study? The attempts we made in this direction proved the contrary. It was therefore necessary to attempt the synthesis or to abstain.
Within the framework of a research that is necessarily limited in its ambitions, we had to find the pretext of an inevitable restriction of the field of investigation. Capital has provided us with the opportunity. When we speak of the "concept of economic law in Capital", the mention of the work must be understood in its most rigorous sense. The raw material for this study is, with a few unavoidable exceptions, supplied entirely by Capital, as Engels has proposed it to us, in its three books. We wanted to give this research a particularly intensive character, which required us to examine the text with extreme thoroughness. It is therefore easy to understand the extent of what we have neglected here, notably the texts of the Grundrisse and the Theorien whose interest is obvious to all. The reader will perhaps notice however, that the preoccupations that arise from the reading of these two sets of manuscripts are not alien to the object of our research. Reading Capital, one easily arrives at the notion of a "maturation" of Marxist economic theory, almost permanent in its most subtle prolongations. While it is possible to relegate this problem to the background in a study based on the three books of Capital, such a question constitutes the inevitable prerequisite of any research that would claim to make all the contributions of Marx's work its own without going back to the manuscripts of 1844 or even to the Misery of Philosophy. Curiously, the text of the Critique of Political Economy (of which we possess only the first two chapters), despite its date of publication (1859), remains extremely close to the first section of Capital; this is why we will make a very broad appeal to this text, which we will call Critique by abbreviation. If the analysis of commodities had already taken its almost definitive form in 1859, the same cannot be said of the analysis of the concept of capital. Even within Capital, we must note in manuscripts (of Book 2 and Book 3) that were not intended for publication the trace of very clear evolutions on points that are not always secondary. However, by limiting ourselves to the three books of Capital and to the Critique, it seemed possible to dispense with these preliminary clarifications, the complexity of which one can imagine.
Another field of investigation, itself practically unlimited, was offered to us by the work of the great Marxist thinkers, particularly the work of Engels. We entered this field only to quickly retreat. If these texts have often served as our starting point, we have had to forget them in order to focus our research on the surprisingly rich developments of Capital itself. The innumerable ambiguities that such a study raises seemed to us overwhelming and alien to the very goal we had set ourselves.
This research does indeed respond to an extremely precise purpose. One does not, it seems to us, question in a gratuitous and disinterested way the concept of economic law as it emerges from a reading of Capital. The primary concern of our approach is to highlight the explanatory value of Marxist concepts and laws with respect to economic reality, especially contemporary reality. From this point of view, we will ask ourselves whether it would not have been preferable to to deal in a direct and unequivocal way with these economic laws themselves. A few words about our starting point are therefore necessary here. One will notice, in reading this study, the perhaps excessive importance we attach to a large-scale "disappointment": the so-called Marxist political economy hardly seems to us to have been up to its task, and especially up to its task. Without seeking to conduct a systematic study, we will sometimes make a few more precise allusions whose sole purpose is to remind us from time to time that we are not fighting against windmills. Beyond this very general perspective, we started from an awareness of the importance of the mechanisms of scientific knowledge as the intellectual foundation of this failure of the political economy that claims to be based on Marx. In addition to the economic-political factors, and on a purely intellectual level, certain difficulties relating to the very nature of scientific knowledge, to what we will call the analysis of the cognitive process, to what we should perhaps not fear to call the theory of knowledge, are undoubtedly revealed.
At the threshold of such a study, one will naturally ask the question: did Marx himself ever define what he meant when he used the formula "economic law"? In other words, one will ask oneself whether from a complete and careful reading of the work one can retain a series of definitions that relate to the very object of our research.
Strictly speaking, there is no definition of the economic law in Capital; there is, however, an extremely brief and relatively frequently used formula, by which Marx seems to want to clarify his use of the expression.
In Book 3, for example, we read:
Just as all phenomena present themselves in reverse in competition and thus in the consciousness of the agents who participate in them, so this law - I mean this internal and necessary connection between two things which apparently contradict each other ¹.
The author designates here the law as "internal and necessary connection" - innere und notwendige Zusammenhang - as he does from time to time in the course of the work we are studying. (The significance of this inversion in the competition and the scope of this apparent contradiction will later on get our attention 2.)
What importance should we attach to such a formula? Does it provide us with a sufficient definition in itself? Only the analysis of the laws actually developed in Capital can enable us to answer these questions.
Of the three terms in the expression "internal and necessary connection", it is undoubtedly the second, relating to the interiority of the connection, that may seem the most overt. The law is identified with a connection - in other words, a relationship - qualified as necessary. Marx would thus define the law here as a "necessary relation", a formula that is in itself rather banal and that would hardly deserve to stop us at length. He specifies however internal connection, and the stipulation of this interiority poses a delicate problem. What interior and, therefore, what exterior are we talking about here? A first hypothesis immediately comes to mind. Doesn't this way of expressing oneself reflect, at least at the level of the vocabulary itself, an empiricist conception of knowledge which could be in contradiction with a "factual" perspective to which such a vocabulary would remain totally inadequate? The mention of this interiority would then lose all interest. This first impression is considerably reinforced by the context in which the formula has been proposed. Doesn't this interior seem to be opposed here to "appearances", with particular vigor moreover, since the two terms that the internal law brings together are at the origin of an apparent contradiction. Inside, we find the law; outside, the contradiction. Does the only explicit formula in Capital represent anything more than an old way of expressing himself, from which Marx did not know how to completely disengage himself, even though he was laying the foundations of a political economy that for the first time truly escaped this con ception? It seems to us that no. In our view, interiority constitutes the fundamental property of law, provided that the object within which it is defined, which has nothing in common with reality, has been specified. We will start from the simplest, if not the most convincing, illustration that can be provided in this respect: the law of value.
The "law of value", in which Marx recognizes the "rational basis of the economy" ¹, is probably the best known law of the Marxist system of economic categories. It is the 'standard' example to which economists like to refer most often. Perhaps only the so-called law of pauperization and the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall are of comparable interest. We shall take it as the starting point of our research, and all the more willingly since Capital opens with its analysis.
First of all, we shall ask ourselves the question of the use of the expression itself: does Marx frequently use the expression "law of value" in Capital? To this preliminary question, we must answer in the negative. One will be struck by the scarcity of such uses, especially in Book 1. In the eight sections of this book, Marx uses the formula only three times. He also uses it only three times in Book 2. However, the author makes relatively more extensive use of it in Book Three. What is really surprising in this obvious reluctance to write the law of value in full, is the fact that this expression is totally absent from the text of section I of Capital ("Commodity and Money"), as well as from that of the Critique dealing with the same problems. Such an observation deserves, to say the least, to be qualified as paradoxical when one knows that both of these texts undoubtedly contain the exposition of this law and that, on the other hand, the formula is sometimes used in other circumstances. Nevertheless, the text of the Critique, in which we do not find the expression "law of value", unambiguously designates it as a law, on several occasions, after the statement has been provided.
We find, in Capital, the formula 'law of simple relative value' and, in the Critique, 'law of exchange value', two uses which could be considered as exceptions to the observation of total absence that we made just now. We shall see, in fact, that the 'law of value' can in no way be identified with that of relative value or exchange value.
It is, in fact, first of all, a terminological difficulty that we come up against, when we undertake such a study. What is to be understood by "value", "relative value" and "exchange value"?
The last two expressions must, when used in the strict sense, be confused; but the third can be identified with the first in a use that sacrifices to custom. Most of the problems of terminology are indicative of deeper difficulties relating to the signified itself. The case that interests us for the moment does not escape this rule.
The three formulas always refer to one of the following two logical totalities 1
-
the value (the concept of value that has caused so much ink and spit to flow...);
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exchange value or relative value, the 'form' of value.
The risk of confusion stems from certain language habits that Marx insisted on respecting:
If, therefore, at the beginning of this chapter, in order to follow the ordinary way of speaking, we said: the commodity is use value and exchange value, taken literally, it was wrong. The commodity is value of use or object of utility, and value. It presents itself for what it is, a double thing, as soon as its value possesses its own phenomenal form, distinct from its natural form, that of exchange value; and it never possesses this form if we consider it in isolation. As soon as we know this, the old expression has no more malice and is used as an abbreviation. 2
It will be remembered, then, that the expression "exchange value" should serve, strictly speaking, only to designate the form of value that is expressed in exchange, but that it is often used by Marx in place of the term "value" itself.3
As far as the law of value is concerned, we will refer to the text of the Critique, which is particularly explicit on this subject. In the first of the two extracts below, Marx uses the expression "exchange value"; "value" should be understood in accordance with the clarifications we have just made.
The first conscious analysis, so clear that it seems almost trivial, "which reduces exchange value to labor time" is found in a man of the new world [...]. It was Benjamin Franklin who, in his first early work, written in 1719 and published in 1721, formulated the "fundamental law of modern political economy. He asserted the necessity of looking for another measure of value than precious metals, and he found it in labor 4
We note also a little further down:
Ricardo analyzes in a very clear way how the value of commodities is determined by labor time and that this law governs even bourgeois relations of production5
These two extracts, which have no equivalent in Capital, have the sole advantage of being the occasion for an explicit use of the term "law"; they are by no means the best expositions of the law of value.
We shall not reproduce here the author's analysis, which is obviously sufficient in itself. Let us only recall that the substance of value is labor and its measure is labor time, knowing that we are dealing here with socially necessary abstract labor. The law of value, as an "internal and necessary connection", designates the determination of value by labor time. In this determination, the quantitative dimension is the easiest to grasp. When one restores the law to its integrity, one realizes, however, that the simple stipulation that labor represents the substance of value already constitutes one of the determinations of the law, its qualitative dimension, precisely. As we progress in the study of Marx's system, we quickly see that what we have called the two "dimensions" of the law are inseparable in his eyes: the law of value postulates both the nature and the measure of value in labor. It should be noted, from a strictly quantitative point of view, that the law of value does not carry the necessity of the exchange of goods at their value. This necessity is characteristic of the laws of exchange, which we will discuss in another section.
As far as the law of value alone is concerned, the question that immediately arises is this: what difference should we maintain, in our minds, between the concept of value and the law of value? This difference seems, at first sight, to be very small. The paradox that initially caught our attention - the absence of the term law of value in section I of Capital - thus finds a beginning of explanation. To expound the concept of value is to state its laws (or the law). This is expressed trivially by the fact that the formulas "value is such and such a thing..." or "the law of value implies such and such a thing..." can be considered, in a first approximation, as equivalent6. The close relationship between the concept and the law is undoubtedly one of the main articulations of the logical system we are studying. However, this first characteristic conceals its fundamental ambiguity.
To the "kinship" grasped at the level of the simple reading, we have already given a name: interiority, at least as far as one of its most obvious aspects is concerned. *The interiority of the law would be defined thus in relation to the concept.
The theory of value, which has served as our starting point in this research, provides us with an excellent analysis of the productive force of labor, which is likely to introduce us to the idea of "exteriority". It will allow us, in turn, to clarify, to a certain extent, our vision of interiority itself.
It is easy to draw up an exhaustive list of the laws developed in Capital by relying on the explicit use of the term "law" itself, but such a superficial approach can in no way be considered sufficient. If one were to limit oneself to explicit expressions of a proposition that is specifically presented as a law, one would be forced to exclude from section I the discussion of the "law of value", since the formula itself is not found there.
When Marx envisages the relations linking not labor time to value, but the productive force of labor to value, does he not seem to develop in this way a new law without resorting to the term itself? He writes in particular:
In general, the greater the productive force of labor, the shorter the time necessary for the production of an article, and the smaller the mass of labor crystallized in it, the smaller its value. Conversely, the smaller the productive force of labor, the longer the time needed to produce an article, the greater its value. The quantity of value of a commodity varies, therefore, in direct proportion to the quantum and in inverse proportion to the productive force of the labor which is realized in it.7
Reading these lines, and especially the last sentence, the reader is led to wonder whether value would not also be linked to the productive force of labor by a relation that deserves to be designated as a law, despite its visibly extra-conceptual value scope.
Let us consider more closely the nature of the relation thus established At its two poles, we find :
-
the value
-
the productive force of labor.
But it should be noted at the outset that this connection is asserted through an intermediate term: the "necessary working time" and, at this level of investigation, it would be extremely difficult for us to answer the question raised above. Fortunately, the problem of the deep meaning of this relationship is posed by Marx himself with the greatest rigor:
The efficiency, in a given time, of useful labor depends on its productive force. Useful labor thus becomes a more or less abundant source of products as a direct result of the increase or decrease of its productive force. On the other hand, a variation in the latter force never directly affects the labor represented in the value. As the productive force belongs to concrete and useful labor, it can no longer affect labor as soon as its useful force is disregarded. Whatever the variations in its productive force, the same labor, working during the same time, always fixes itself in the same value. But it supplies in a given time more use value if its productive force increases, less if it decreases.8
Marx is not afraid to write :
A variation of the latter force never directly reaches the labor represented in the value.
Yet he has just affirmed a few pages earlier:
In general, the greater the productive force of labor, the shorter the time of production of an article.
The content of this second remark reveals to us, in fact, that Marx is no longer at the same "level" of analysis as in the previous case, in order to use a term that is too easy to handle to be satisfactory. In this second formulation, the study is conducted by explicit reference to the logical system itself:
As productive force belongs to concrete and useful labor, it can no longer touch labor as soon as its useful form is abstracted.
The theory of value abstracts from the material determinations characteristic of use value: concrete labor, productive force of labor... These determinations are completely foreign to the logic of the conceptual system within which value is defined. Its intimate relation (relation of identification) with labor (which is its substance, labor time being its measure) is established, in fact, only with a concept of labor adequate to this logical universe in which any material determination has no place. Labor can only enter it, we mean can only be thought, if it is abstracted from all its material determinations.
The proper universe of the concepts of use value, of concrete labor, of productive force, supposes, on the contrary, the totality of material determinations. This obviously does not allow us to confuse it with reality itself; what we can affirm is that, insofar as we concede it the totality of determinations, this spiritual universe becomes more a world of "representation" than of "conception".9 In any case, its own logic remains completely external to that of political economy. This is what the author indicates unambiguously in the Critique, about use value, when he writes:
In this state of indifference to any formal economic determination, use-value as such is outside the domain of investigation of political economy 10
Thus Marx can write: "Productive force belongs to concrete and useful labor"; but the "labor" of the theory of value is thought of in abstraction of all the determinations of this concrete labor: "It [productive force-G.DJ.] can no longer touch labor as soon as one abstracts from its useful form." It is thus clear that "a variation of this last force never directly affects the labor represented in the value."
We are now in a position to understand the true meaning of the mediation that Marx had posed in the passage quoted above. Between value and productive force, he interposed the logical intermediate term "abstract labor time". In the second excerpt to which we had recourse above, it is the precise meaning of this mediation that was exposed to us: the productive force is reflected within the concept, in the necessary labor time, but its own logic is that of concrete labor. The conceptual incompatibility of the elements of the two totalities is thus preserved with the greatest care, according to a procedure that constitutes one of the essential characteristics of Marxist knowledge.
If we can conclude, then, that we cannot speak strictly speaking of a "law" -- at least in the sense that the law of value is a law -- concerning the nature of the relation between value and the productive force of labor, we must ask ourselves what the true nature of this relation is. For the moment, it has manifested itself to us only from the point of view of its exteriority, which is why, assuming in spite of ourselves the legacy of an empiricist conception of knowledge, we will henceforth designate possible relations of fundamentally the same nature with the expression "external relations". On the other hand, we will speak of "internal" or "conceptual" relations in relation to relations that can be assimilated, from the point of view of the analysis of the cognitive process, to the one uniting value and abstract work within the theory of value -- "concept" is then seized in its most rigorous sense, the one that it possesses in the expression "concept of value", but does not possess in the expression "concept of use-value", according to a distinction that we will have the opportunity to specify. These internal relations differ from the external ones insofar as they are inseparable from -- or, better, "express" -- the very nature of the object of the concept within which they are established.
These internal or conceptual relations possess, moreover, a character of absolute necessity, contrary to the external relations. Value is work, this internal relation is part of its concept, it is inseparable from its nature; hence its absolute necessity, as opposed to any external determination, whose action is only asserted through that of a multitude of other factors and which therefore has a contingent character. When I write: value is labor and its measure is provided by that of labor time, I am positing a determination, that of value by labor time, but this determination turns out to differ in no way from the statement of the very concept of value. This is expressed very simply by the fact that value is not "more or less" the necessary labor time, by virtue of other determinations; value is identically, but not tautologically, the necessary labor.
Conversely, the productive force of labor determines value only insofar as it expresses nothing more than necessary labor. If it asserts itself richer in content, it cannot penetrate the concept and is rejected as an external factor, just as labor, in order to penetrate the Holy of Holies of the conceptual temple, must strip itself of all its material determinations. In other words, if, in writing "productive force of labor", I think of nothing more than "necessary abstract labor time", the relation "value productive force of labor" has force of law, but it expresses nothing more than the law of value. In the opposite hypothesis, insofar as the concept of productive force of labor remains the representative of its own complexity, of infinite richness, as a union of the most diverse determinations,11 it has no place in the "conceptual core" in a thought totality such as the "concept of value."
In the study of the phenomenon, the economist would thus have a double tool at his disposal, the conceptual internal relationship, the law of the first kind, and the external relationship, contingent, not theorizable perhaps, but effective12. A new example always borrowed from the theory of value introduces us to the notion of the compatibility of these two types of determinations.
c) Internal and external determinations (value of labor power)
Chapter VI of Section II of Book 1 of Capital contains the analysis of a particular commodity, "labor power". As a commodity, it represents the unity of use-value and exchange-value. In this, it is no different from any of its objective commodity sisters.13 As an exchange value, the commodity "labor power" remains subject to the "market" laws of section I of Book 1, in their entirety, and in particular to the "law of value".
Commodities are differentiated from each other only as "use value"; labor power is no exception to this rule. This second aspect of the question will not hold our attention for the moment. We shall limit our study to that of the nature of identity which we have just mentioned. In what sense and how does the law of value apply to the commodity "labor power"?
In section II of Book 1, Marx reaffirms this subordination in the following terms:
We must now take a closer look at labor power. This commodity has a value. How is it determined? By the labor time necessary for its production. [...] the labor time necessary for the production of labor-power resolves itself into the labor time necessary for the production of its means of subsistence; or else labor-power has just the value of the means of subsistence necessary to the one who puts it into play.14
However, the author feels that this subordination is not self-evident. In the case of labor power, a social or historical element appears within the determination, which seems to blur the rigor of the necessary relation postulated by the law:
Labor-power thus contains, from the point of view of value, a moral and historical element, which distinguishes it from other commodities. But, for a given country and a given time, the necessary measure of the means of subsistence is also given.15
Similarly, we find a little above:
On the other hand, the very number of so-called natural needs, as well as the mode of satisfying them, is a historical product, and also depends to a great extent on the degree of civilization reached.16
A formula such as "for a given country and a given epoch, the necessary measure of the means of subsistence is also given" is dangerous in the sense that this fundamental determination of value by labor time takes on a tautological character: the value of labor power depends on a multitude of factors, historical, social, corresponding to a certain degree of civilization17, but, in a given place, at a given epoch, it is also given. Certainly, and who would claim the contrary? Such are the risks of an insufficiently rigorous formulation. We note, in fact, that this problem is not unknown to us and that it corresponds in all respects to the one we have just encountered concerning the productive force.
The value of a commodity is determined by the amount of labor socially necessary for its production, and this is within the concept of value; but the question that remains unanswered is: to what do we attribute the fact that at such and such a time, in such and such a place, in order to produce such and such a use value, it takes precisely so many hours of social labor? It is a fact that results from determinations external to the concept, from a heterogeneous crowd of external causes, alien to each other, which only relate to each other through contingent relationships. It is a question of technical progress, of the skill of the workers, of the social division of production... Why are these determinations excluded from the concept? For the simple reason that their relationship to value is beyond theorizing, beyond what is necessary18. Why is it that in 1970 it takes half as much labor time to produce such and such an article as in 1920, for example? No economic law can answer such a question. This decrease corresponds to the increase in the productive forces of labor, that is all that can be said about it, which only amounts to generalizing the problem and solves nothing. *However, whatever this progress of the productive forces of labor may be, the value of the good remains determined by the time of labor; this is the necessary relation, this is the "law" in the strong sense of the term.
Because it is mainly technical, the external relation of determination of the labor time involved in the production of a use value (which is not labor power) is admitted without even raising the problem that exists. On the other hand, in the case of labor power, this external determination of labor time is hardly accepted by the mind, because of the preponderance of non-material factors. Labor-power is only a particular commodity and, from this point of view, it differs little from all other commodities, except in the nature and hierarchy of the contingent factors that determine the labor-time socially necessary for the production of use values. The quantitative determination of value is no more approximate or tautological in the case of the commodity labor power than in the case of other commodities. The chain of determinations could be schematized in the following way:
-
inside the concept
-
value of the commodity
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socially necessary labor time
-
-
outside the concept
-
concrete work time
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external factors
-
The labor time involved in the production of a given use value is determined by objective factors19 (especially technical progress, but also many other things, e.g. natural wealth), subjective factors (workers' skill), social factors (social organization of production, social division of labor, etc.). In the case of the value of labor power, the general nature of the determinations is not essentially changed, but independently of the technical factors, the factors having to do with the social and economic conditions are of particular importance. *In the determination of the value of labor power, the class struggle as an "external factor" does not alter the rigor of the law any more than, for example, the discovery of the steam engine. Such a discovery had the effect of reducing the socially necessary labor time for the production of an important part of the commodities, whose values remained determined by the labor time -- considerably reduced -- as the law of value postulates. The class struggle counteracts the ruthless exploitation of workers by capital, but, however beneficial its effects, the value of labor power remains determined by the labor time necessary for the production of the subsistence that falls to the working class. In either case, these external determinations operate:
-
in a contingent way;
-
without changing the content of the law one iota.
On the contrary, the law asserts itself in all its rigor through such upheavals attributable to external causes, by maintaining the necessary relationship between abstract labor and value. The action of these external factors only highlights the rigidity of the link, through the upheavals that these factors imply. Relationships of this type can be analyzed in the following way: the action of a conceptual law expresses what is necessary in the process, and the influence of multiple and varied external causes, independent of each other, accounts for what is contingent - a contingency that can be partially questioned, as we shall see in the second part of this work.
The theory of value, by serving as a starting point in our research, has allowed us to become aware of this close relationship that unites the law to the concept - by giving each of these terms a first type of meaning. The law appeared to us in its interiority in relation to the concept.
The study of the laws of capital only confirms this first characteristic; it also introduces us to a primordial notion, that of the structure of the concept. The internal relations that constitute the very structure of the concept correspond, precisely, to the stipulations of the law. The simplicity of the relation between value and labor time obviously does not imply recourse to the notion of structure; the same is not true in the case of capital. The study of the process of valorization, while providing us with valuable confirmations and clarifications concerning the conceptual nature of the law, confronts us with this new vision of interiority: the law conceived as the "articulation" of a conceptual structure.
The study of the concept of surplus-value represents the first step in the analysis of the concept of capital that Marx will carry out progressively throughout his work. It is in section III of Book 1 that this study is really approached; with the exposition of the concept of surplus-value, Marx enters into the heart of his subject.
When he first introduces the concept, it is to give us a first definition:
The production of surplus-value is therefore nothing other than the production of value, extended beyond a certain point where the value of labor power paid for by capital is replaced by a new equivalent, there is simple production of value; when it exceeds this limit, there is production of surplus-value20
We will note the precise scope of this definition, which operates by reference to a system which is not, precisely, that of capital, but that of the commodity. In this form, the definition of surplus-value seems quite anodyne, the process seems to preserve its commodity nature; the production of value is "simply" prolonged beyond a certain time, a process that could be perfectly conceived in a purely commodity logic. The laws proper to this are not modified in the least, exchange remains subject to its immanent laws, qualitatively and quantitatively, and in particular -- from this last point of view -- exchange continues to take place on the basis of equivalence. This definition implies, however, its overcoming, this overcoming postulates the necessity of taking into account the concept of capital; because, at the same time, in this prolongation of work, value has revealed itself as the motor of itself: from a precious but passive substance, it is thus animated and becomes value-capital. The concept of commodity does not lose its explanatory value for all that, but this explanatory value turns out to be limited in its scope; such a concept only allows thought to appropriate a small part of the rationality of the phenomenon. Thought thus forges a new instrument of analysis in the concept of capital.
From the study of the process of capital valorization follows the consideration of the concepts of constant capital and variable capital. Was it essential in itself, in order to conceive this process, to have recourse to these two categories? It turns out, in fact, that this process of valorization does not apply equally to the various fractions of capital-value - which reminds us that, no matter how easily concepts are linked to concepts in the system, there is no spontaneity in this process, and the real remains what Marx calls the "true presupposition". The real basis of this distinction poses a difficult problem that will be discussed later; but, the process of capital valorization being what it is -- that is, applying only to one fraction of the advance -- conceiving of the increase of capital presupposes that one considers both fractions. The importance we attach to the quantitative dimension of the laws of surplus-value alone is undoubtedly responsible for the fact that, while accepting the distinction, we fail to link it to the concept of surplus-value itself, to its laws, of which it constitutes the "qualitative dimension". Thus, within the concept of capital valorization, a qualitative structure of the simplest, but also of the most important, is organized. Capital is divided into its two fractions, constant capital and variable capital, and the relation of "generation" of value is specified as the property of one of the two fractions: variable capital.
It would be tempting to say that the analysis of the strictly quantitative internal determinations of surplus-value seems much easier to carry out. It is not, in fact, the mathematical tool to which Marx had recourse that makes this study difficult. It remains no less delicate. Marx knew enough higher mathematics to envisage, at least, a more extensive application to economic science.
There is a step here that he did not see fit to take. The analysis of the quantitative dimensions of the laws of surplus-value calls for a derisory mathematical tool. Surplus-value is in fact completely described by two parameters, its mass and its rate, and the mathematical structure into whose folds Marx leads us does not go further than the relation
- surplus-value = variable capital * rate of surplus-value.
Needless to say, this exploration is of economic, not mathematical, interest? Each of the cases considered evokes one of the fundamental problems of economic science; only the caution with which Marx refrained from anticipating prevented him from saying more, although this study is heavy with innuendo and contains strong explicit warnings.
The exposition of these laws opens with the definition of a restriction:
In this chapter, as in the preceding ones, the daily value of labor power, and consequently the part of the day when the laborer merely reproduces or maintains this power, are supposed to be constant magnitudes21.
We shall specify later on what the true scope of this hypothesis may be. For the moment, let us take note of the law in its quantitative dimension. Marx writes:
We thus obtain this law: the sum of the surplus-value produced by a variable capital is equal to the value of this advanced capital, multiplied by the rate of surplus-value, or it is equal to the value of a labor-power, multiplied by the degree of its exploitation, multiplied by the number of labor-powers jointly employed22.
This first formula having been established, the author will engage in what we have called an "exploration" of this simplest of mathematical structures. Now this exploration will demonstrate the extraordinary economic richness of the relation. It is curious to note that, as is usually the case, the author's attention is focused on the way in which this or that variation is likely to compensate for the effects of another acting in the opposite direction:
Thus, a decrease in the rate of surplus-value does not affect the mass produced if the variable capital or the number of workers employed grow proportionately.23
Or again:
On the other hand the sum of the surplus value remains the same when the variable capital decreases, while the rate of the surplus value increases in inverse proportion 24
The simplicity of these analyses is commensurate with their importance. Marx, fortunately, allows us to glimpse the inestimable consequences of their implications, and this from three points of view.
In the first place:
A decrease in variable capital can thus be com pensed by a proportional rise in the rate of surplus value, or a decrease in employed laborers by a proportional extension of their working day. Up to a certain point, the quantity of labor exploitable by capital thus becomes independent of the number of laborers.25
The note which follows this extract lifts the veil on the author's true intentions:
This elementary law seems to be unknown to the vulgar economists who, as new Archimedes, but in reverse, believe that they have found in the determination of the prices of the labor market by supply and demand the point of support by means of which they will not raise the world, but will maintain it at rest.
The number of workers or the development of the working population is therefore not the final word in the determination of wages. It will be noted that the remark has not aged. Why doesn't Marx say more, what scruples prevented him from saying more? It is because the concept of surplus value alone does not allow us to conceive this process in its complexity. This concept already implies, in spite of the extremely fragmentary light it throws on this phenomenon, the refutation of an erroneous relationship, a much more vigorous critique of which is presented to us in section VII of Book 1, but the positive exposition of the question has no place here. Having made these remarks, Marx hastens to make the following restriction:
However, this kind of compensation meets an impassable limit. The natural day of twenty-four hours is always greater than the average working day.26
An expression such as this kind of compensation > cannot arouse the attention of the reader who is reading for the first time the text of Capital - a text that cannot be read but must be studied. In fact, we know that this compensation, limited in an absolute way, is far from being the only one; in order to take into account only the main aspects of the question, we will point out two others: one, internal to the concept of surplus-value, the relative surplus-value, whose study is for the moment discarded; the other, internal to the concept of accumulation, which is not, a fortiori, taken into account in this exposé.
Thus we learn to recognize the quite original character of the process of development of the Marxist knowledge. The "concreteness of thought" is constructed before our eyes element by element, in the form of a systematic exploration of different strictly limited theoretical fields, in this case the concept of surplus-value, or even, more precisely, a part of the structure of the concept. The "abstract" determinations are absolutely absent, simply because they have not yet been taken into account; only on rare occasions are they removed from the reasoning by name.
Secondly:
A decrease in variable capital can only be compensated for by an increase in the rate of surplus-value, or, what amounts to the same thing, a reduction in the number of workers employed, by an increase in the degree of exploitation, within the physiological limits of the working day and, consequently, of the surplus-labor it contains.
This law, which is absolutely obvious, is important for the understanding of complicated phenomena. We already know that capital strives to produce the maximum possible surplus value, and we shall see that it tries at the same time to reduce to a minimum, in comparison with the dimensions of the enterprise, its variable part or the number of workers it exploits. These tenets become contradictory as soon as the decrease in one of the factors that determine the sum of the surplus value can no longer be compensated for by the increase in the other. can no longer be compensated by the increase of the other.27
We shall deal later with the significance of these contradictory tendencies, leaving aside for the moment the question of the intimate nature of the process to which Marx alludes (which can be read in Book 3). Let us note, for the moment, the formula: this law of absolute evidence is important for the understanding of complicated phenomena. The concept of surplus-value and what is important to us here -- its laws -- while allowing us to conceive the process of valorization of capital, that is to say, capital in its movement of self-generation, provide us with the first elements of understanding of infinitely more complex phenomena, but the concept of surplus-value and above all the fragmentary system of its articulations which is taken into account here are by no means sufficient to provide us with a satisfactory understanding. The phenomenal development of capitalist production cannot be analyzed in the light of the concept of surplus-value alone, just as it cannot be analyzed in the light of the concept of capital, of which surplus-value is only one category. Nevertheless, the explanatory value of the structure of thought whose necessary determinations are postulated by the laws of surplus-value is already considerable.
Thirdly:
But, given both the value of labor-power and the rate of surplus-value - in other words, the limits of the day and its division into necessary labor and surplus-labor - the total mass of value, including surplus-value, that a capitalist realizes is determined exclusively by the number of workers he exploits, and this number itself depends on the size of the variable capital he advances. 28
This third version, which from the quantitative point of view still rests only on the single elementary relation stated above, is full of particularly interesting developments, which classical economics, while sticking to it, had been unable to make explicit:29
If we apply the above law to the various branches of industry, whatever the proportional division of the capital advanced into constant and variable parts may be, we arrive at the following law: the value of the average labor power and the average degree of its exploitation being assumed to be equal in different industries, the masses of surplus value produced are in direct proportion to the magnitude of the variable parts of the capital employed, i.e., in direct proportion to their parts converted into labor power.30
This question will also find its final solution in Book 3. Given our subject of research, it is not so much its economic content that is important to us here as its significance from a logical point of view.
On reading these developments, the conceptual nature of the law appears from a double point of view, at least in the sense that one should give to the term "concept" in the formulas "concept of value" or "concept of capital":
1) The concept of surplus value is analyzed here in itself, despite this pressing call of the economic facts which constantly invite the author to go beyond the limits of this field. There is no place here for any determination external to the sole process of capital valorization; if Marx anticipates - with what reluctance, moreover - it is because he yields for a moment to the desire to let the reader catch a glimpse of the explanatory value of this exposé. The study of the quantitative structure, in particular, never goes beyond the expression product of two terms that we mentioned above. Before closing these developments concerning absolute surplus value, Marx will reaffirm, by way of introduction to the next section, the fundamentally limited character of his theoretical field, which contains only - let us pass the expression - the exposition of a half-concept:
The work that is set in motion, one day bearing the other, by all the capital of a society can be considered as a single day's work. [...] The length of this day being given, whether its limits are fixed physically or socially, the mass of surplus value can only be increased by the increase in the number of workers, i.e., of the laboring population. The increase of the population forms the mathematical limit of the production of surplus value by social capital. Conversely, given the size of the population, this limit is formed by the possible extension of the working day. It will be seen in the next chapter that this law is valid only for the form of surplus-value treated so far31.
2) The exposition of the quantitative necessities of the law is marked by the imprint of its conceptual nature. If we consider the exploration of which we have reproduced the essence, we will see that these laws postulate no sense of evolution, no oriented movement. In this they are fundamentally different from laws such as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, the fall in the value of utility objects, or even from a law such as that of the rise in the rate of surplus-value, which we shall discuss when the time comes and which is obviously related to the laws of absolute surplus-value.
Qualitatively and quantitatively, these laws of absolute surplus-value present themselves to us as articulations of a structure that corresponds to the concept of capital valorization. The concept of this type, a thought totality which as such already appears as complex, reveals itself to the analysis as structured. The articulations of this totality, in their unity which constitutes precisely the structure of the concept, represent what we should call laws of valorization. The analysis of the concept implies the identification of these laws, and the analysis of the laws takes the form of the exposition of a system of logical articulations: the very structure of the concept. The analysis of the articulations and that of the "articulated members" being, in this case, inseparable, the study of the laws - more precisely, of all the laws - tends to be confused with the analysis of the concept. This is not the case with the study of a law, such as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, which concerns a logical articulation of a much larger conceptual system. It goes without saying that if, in order to be described, such an articulation must be abstract, in order to be understood and notably studied in the phenomenon, it must be reintegrated into the system. *The analysis of the concept could thus be defined as the exposition of the whole of the laws, and the study of the law as the exposition of one of the articulations of the structure of the concept.
The frequent use of the term law in relation to the qualitative dimension of the structure leaves no room for ambiguity. Marx obviously regarded such relations as laws. In Section III, which contains these analyses, the author never uses the term for a qualitative relation, but he sometimes uses the term in other contexts. As regards the relation of "generation" of surplus-value, we read, for example, in section IV of book 1:
"Thus is verified the law according to which surplus-value comes not from the labor forces which the capitalist replaces by the machine, but on the contrary from those which he occupies in it 32
The problem that we posed with respect to value in terms of the interiority of the relation arises in the case of the structure of capital valorization in a quite comparable way. The conceptual structure, which has become relatively complex from one illustration to the next, retains all its autonomy here. its autonomy. The distinction between constant capital and variable capital provides us with an extremely interesting analysis on this subject.
b) The autonomy of structure (surplus-value and material determinations, surplus-value and the wealth of nature)
The third section of Book 1 of Capital, which deals with absolute surplus-value, begins with an analysis of the labor process, that is, with the study of a system of material determinations that is not at all characteristic of capitalist production itself. Marx describes the worker transforming an object of labor with the help of a means of labor. Did the analysis of labor in general have a place in a study of capital, when this labor process is conceived independently of any capitalist determination? In what way did this study condition the study of valorization? Do the laws of surplus-value rest, in the final analysis, on a material structure, alien to the concept of capital itself?
Let us take up the approach of these first sections of Capital in its broad lines.
The exposition of the concept of capital, which was defined in section II as the driving value of itself, is now begun in section III. As in the whole of Book 1, capital is here mainly considered as value-creating value, apart from the process of its formal mutations. This self-generation of value is analyzed in Book 1 in two stages. First, Marx examines the modalities of the development of the "new growth": surplus-value. Second, he considers the modalities of the resulting increase of capital: accumulation. In section 3, we are confronted with the first stage of this exposition of the concept of capital, whose structure develops before our eyes. The analysis of the budding of capital-value, surplus-value, gives rise to the elementary conceptual categories of "constant capital" and "variable capital". The taking into account of this structure of thought is implied by the analysis of the concept of surplus-value, first step of the exposition of the concept of capital. A first effect of overlap between economic determinations of capital and material determinations is manifested here. To this structure and to the laws which express its necessary articulations (the laws of surplus-value), it turns out that certain material determinations "correspond":
In the course of production, the part of capital that is transformed into the means of production, that is, into raw materials, auxiliary materials and instruments of labor, does not change the magnitude of its value. This is why we call it the constant part of capital or, more briefly, constant capital.
The part of capital that is transformed into labor power, on the other hand, changes its value in the course of production. It reproduces its own equivalent and, moreover, a surplus, a surplus value, which can itself vary and be more or less great. This part of the capital is constantly transformed from constant to variable magnitude. This is why we call it the variable part of capital or, more briefly, variable capital. The same elements of capital which, from the point of view of the production of use values, are distinguished from each other as objective and subjective factors, as means of production and labor power, are distinguished from the point of view of the formation of value as constant capital and variable capital 33.
The close relationship between the two types of determinations is perfectly summarized in the following proposition, which precedes by a few pages the extract we have just reproduced :
The different factors of the labor process take a different part in the formation of the value of products34.
We also note:
In setting forth the different roles played in the formation of product value by the various factors of labor, we have characterized in effect the functions of the various elements of capital in the formation of surplus value35.
The "correspondence" of the two structures has been the cause of a great deal of confusion. The difficulty we are analyzing is, in fact, further increased by the distinction of the two categories that result from the analysis of the process of circulation of capital: fixed capital and circulating capital. Marx claims the paternity of this discovery, we mean of the clear and definitive separation of the two oppositions: that of constant and variable capital, on the one hand, and that of fixed and circulating capital, on the other. He did not substitute one structure for the other.
To confine ourselves to this question of the categories of constant and variable capital, let us note that the existence of this "correspondence" poses certain problems: do the material determinations induce a structure of their own in the conceptual system of which Capital is the exposition? In other words, are such material determinations at the origin of certain immanent laws of capital? We have underlined the total autonomy of the two structures; should we qualify this assertion here? It seems to us that we should not.
Let us take up the terms of the two distinctions and of the "correspondence":
-
Internal determinations of the concept of capital
- variable capital
- constant capital
-
Material determinations
- subjective factors36: labor power
- objective factors: means of production
(The concept of "means of production", which Marx uses in his analysis of the labor process to group together means of labor and objects of labor, is an anticipation of determinations proper to the concept of capital; this distinction means/objects, which imposes itself on the mind in the study of the material process, is overcome by anticipation of the correspondence which is now the focus of our attention. (It would imply, to remain at this level of material determinations, that we consider this process from the point of view of its result.)
If one examines carefully the meaning of the categories mentioned in the above table, one cannot fail to be struck by the relative character of the correspondence. The laws of surplus-value are not, from the logical point of view, the imprint of a structure induced by material determinations; they are the necessary articulations of the process of capital valorization which stipulate, on the other hand, a certain type of organization of material determinations. It is not, purely and simply, because it is a subjective factor that the activity of the workers generates surplus value. The activity of the agents of commercialization, for example, although a subjective factor, is not a generator of surplus-value, it is even denied as "productive labor" in the economic sense of the term, since it produces neither object of utility, nor value, nor, "directly", surplus-value. Similarly, the constancy of value crystallized in the body of the means of production is not a physical property of the object; in this hypothesis, it would remain "attached" to its materiality as its physical property: its mass for example. Marx himself remarks:
The notion of constant capital in no way excludes a change in the value of its constituent parts.37
The constancy that we are studying for the moment is only thought of within a certain conceptual system, a certain theoretical field, that which is illuminated by the analysis of the process of valorization of capital, of the laws of surplus value, of the concept of surplus value; *but the material determination of the thing as a means of production does not imply the intangible character of the crystallized work of which it is the support. * The system of material determinations is taken into account here only insofar as it "overlaps" with the analysis of the internal process of capital which is the object of this research. In the economic system itself, material determinations are of great help, but their definition remains subordinated to the process of capital. Thus multiple distinctions arising from the analysis of the labor process are finally abandoned: we have already mentioned the opposition "means of labor" / "object of labor", what about the concepts of "auxiliary material", "raw material", etc.? The scientific character of Marx's system is manifested here in the primacy of the "formal economic determinations" that he maintains in front of the material determinations that are those of use value38.
The subordination of material structures to the necessary articulations of the concept of capital itself takes on a tautological character when the material distinction is completely absent: labor, the working day, is thus divided into necessary and surplus labor, necessary and extra labor time; similarly, the total product is understood as gross product, while the fraction of the product corresponding to surplus value is defined as net product. The two fractions of labor time, of the labor day or of the product, are not distinguished here, materially, in any way; the separation is entirely induced by the determinations of the process of valorization of capital.
The introduction into the exposition of distinctions completely foreign to the concept of capital, and thus to that of its process of valorization, does not in any way call into question the conceptual nature of the structure of valorization of capital. If the taking into account of such determinations were to prove indispensable to the exposition of valorization, the structure thus elaborated would see itself fundamentally changed in nature, and the problem of the meaning of the laws could in no case be posed in the same terms. The occasions of interference between determinations foreign to the structure of the concept and internal determinations are innumerable. We have shown above how the very structure of valorization, in its integrity, intersected with the articulations of a system that was completely foreign to it. This work of elaboration that leads the economist from the seizure of the totality of the determinations of the phenomenon to the concept represents what we should call "abstraction", in the active sense of the term.
A second illustration of this process, which is particularly important for the evolution of economic thought, is provided by a brief analysis by Marx concerning natural wealth.
The concept of productive labor - creator of surplus value, according to Book 1 of Capital represents one of the key concepts of political economy. The process of its elaboration by economists betrays a permanent difficulty to distinguish without ambiguity the two systems of exchange value and use value. Is it nature, and in particular mother earth - giving the worker more than the bare necessities of life - that is at the origin of surplus value? Is surplus-value a free "gift" of nature to the capitalist? In this case, wouldn't the fertility of the earth, the whole of natural wealth, have a place in the theory of surplus-value? We would then obtain a system of laws similar to this one: surplus value is a direct result of natural wealth... We already know that such laws cannot have a place in the structure of capital; natural wealth, like the material determinations considered above, occupies vis-à-vis this concept the position of an external factor, it is an integral part of the concept of productive force whose extraordinary richness we have already underlined39.
Marx writes on this subject:
Nevertheless, whatever the duration of labor, it will not yield surplus-value without possessing that minimum of productivity which puts the worker in a position to consume only part of his day for his own maintenance. We are therefore led to ask ourselves whether there is not, as we have already said, a "natural basis" for surplus-value. Supposing that the work necessary for the maintenance of the producer and his family absorbed all his available time, where would he find the means to work for free for others? Without a certain degree of labor productivity, there is no time available; without this surplus time, there is no surplus-labor and, consequently, no surplus-value, no net product... 40
A little further on, the author goes as far as to recognize the relationship and formulates a proposition comparable to the one we put forward above:
Capitalist production once established, the magnitude of surplus labor will vary, all other circumstances remaining the same, according to the natural conditions of labor and especially according to the fertility of the soil.41
However, he then hastens to refute this effect of determination:
Labor must therefore possess a certain degree of productivity before it can be prolonged beyond the time necessary for the producer to procure its maintenance, but it is never this productivity, whatever its degree, that is the cause of surplus value. That cause is always surplus-labor, no matter how it is extracted. 42
The "cause" of surplus value is thus surplus labor; yet did not Marx note above: "The magnitude of surplus labor will vary, all other circumstances remaining the same, according to the fertility of the soil"! Is fertility not, therefore, the "cause" of surplus-value?
The difficulty of this analysis revolves around the ambiguity of the notion of determination: internal and external determinations, more precisely, determinations internal or external to the structure of the concept. There is indeed a relation between "natural wealth" and surplus-value*, just as there is a relation between "productive force of labor" and value* - but this relation is established outside the concept of capital. The exposition of the laws of surplus-value and the exposition of the law of value both disregard it.
After having defined the "internal" law as an articulation of the conceptual structure, we are able to grasp what the scope of an expression such as: the laws of surplus-value can be. The concept of surplus-value, a category of the valorization of capital, is not the occasion for the definition of a law, of a relation, uniting two very precise terms. The process of valorization is conceived through a conceptual structure whose laws of surplus-value express the necessary articulations. From the structural nature of the concept follows the multiplicity of laws. It would be futile to try to count the laws of surplus-value, and the very idea of defining each of these laws, all of them, is fundamentally opposed to the very nature of the totality within which they are defined. The laws of valorization, or of surplus-value, are extremely numerous, and when Marx alludes to them in the rest of his developments, it is generally to a certain "relation", often secondary from the point of view of the structure considered in itself, that he alludes. The study of the process of overall circulation that we are now going to approach manifests the same property to an even higher degree. It is that this new structure reveals itself much more complex than the previous one. Its presentation, such as it is presented to us in Capital, cannot, moreover, be considered as complete.
The study of the overall circulation of capital as the author presents it to us remains unfinished; it undoubtedly contains certain errors of detail in the area explored. However, these imperfections in no way detract from the value of the edifice, since the absences appear in the structure as blanks, recognized as such, because of the structural nature of the totality, of the "self-organization" of diversity. The scientific contribution of the author lies only secondarily in the exploration of the main articulations of the structure of the concept; this fundamental scientific contribution lies in the "localization" of the elements of the structure and in the abstraction of the extra-conceptual. The configuration of the structure being defined, the nature of its elements being specified, the field of the analysis is delimited, and this only definition founds the scientific character of the exploration, whatever its gaps. This is a point to which we will return frequently, in which we see what definitively separates Marx from the classics.
The study of the laws of relative surplus-value, which follows in Capital the exposition of absolute surplus-value, will hold our attention for another purpose, and we will temporarily abandon the process of the valorization of capital, in order to look at the problem of its "process of overall circulation" or its cycle".
The title of section I of Book 2, retained by Engels, and which does not appear in any of the manuscripts 43: "The metamorphoses of capital and their cycle", confronts us directly with the problem of the meaning of this concept of "cycle" of capital (Kreislauf). Marx's vocabulary retains most of its rigor in this respect, although Book 2, as Engels delivered it to us, represents a conglomeration of diverse manuscripts composed at substantially different times. These terminological difficulties overlap with the needs of translation, and the result is often a "blurring" of vocabulary that does not facilitate understanding44. It is therefore necessary to distinguish clearly the two concepts around which these ambiguities are emerging:
-
the cyclical process: Kreislaufprozess45,
-
the circulation process (in the narrow sense): Zirkulationsprozess.
The first refers to the movement of capital as a whole and thus includes its form P (productive capital). The second accounts for the M-A-M mutation which has the sphere of circulation as its field.
It is the concept of the "cycle" of capital that will first attract our attention. Nowhere in this section I does Marx speak of the "laws" of the cyclical process of capital. He does, however, undertake here the exposition of this concept. This analysis is carried out in itself, without the slightest trace of external determination. It must be admitted that, as far as fidelity to the method of abstraction is concerned, Book 2, as a whole, represents an unequalled masterpiece. This characteristic is probably not unrelated to the fact that it was written after Books 3 and 1. However, this book draws much of its difficulty and, let us say, its aridity from them. The concept of cycle can be analyzed as the unity of the three cycles considered in turn in this first section of Book 2:
-
A-M...P...M'-A
-
P...M-A-M'...P
-
M'-A-M...P...M'
We read in particular:
That is why the effective cycle of industrial capital in its continuity is not only the unity of the processes of circulation and production, but the unity of these three cycles without exception. But it can only constitute this unity on the condition that the different parts of capital pass in turn through the successive phases of the cycle, can pass from one phase, from one functional form, to another, that is, that industrial capital, as a whole of these fractions, is engaged simultaneously in the three cycles. The succession of these fractions is conditioned here by their juxtaposition, that is, by the division of labor. Thus, in the articulated structure of the factory, the product is just as continuously in the different stages of its process of formation as it is in the process of passing from one phase of production to another.46
The study of section I of Book 2, which deals with the qualitative determinations of the cycle of capital, prepares the study of rotation, that is, the study of this same cycle considered in its repetition. The concept of the cycle in all its determinations is one of the most difficult in the book, but also one of the most important.
The conceptual nature of the laws of the cycle is both more obvious and less striking than that of the laws of surplus value. It is obvious because, once the problem has been raised, it is easy to grasp the characteristics of the structure presented by the author; only the determinations on which the ultimate rationality of the process rests are considered here. Any element which is not in itself absolutely necessary to the "conception" in the narrow sense of the term has been excluded from the presentation. The cycle is apprehended only in its concept. This property is, however, less "striking" than in the case of the laws of surplus value, because none of the determinations external to the concept of the cycle is even "mentioned" in the course of these developments: when studying the laws of surplus value, Marx kept mentioning certain relationships that are foreign to the concept, which he refused to take into account.
Let us note that all the determinations of the cycle concerning durations and, more generally, quantities are absent from this presentation. They have been left out to be treated especially in section II, whose object is the study of rotation. Now these quantitative determinations are not at all secondary, and we would be tempted to say that, if the exposition of the concept implies such abstractions, the reader's understanding suffers terribly. This is why a work such as Capital is not to be read but studied, as we have already pointed out, for the sequel sheds considerable light on what has gone before. In particular, it reveals to the reader what had been abstracted and whose absence he had often not felt.
The study of the laws of rotation is the occasion for the definition of two new categories of great importance: fixed capital and circulating capital. The means of production are of two types. Both are consumed productively in the process of labor, but the substance of one disappears in production or is incorporated into the product; the other seems to retain all of its material qualities, although in fact a part of its use value is constantly destroyed by its use in production:
This part of the constant capital yields value to the product insofar as it loses, along with its own use value, its own exchange value.47
These categories are not those of the "cycle" of capital, but those of its "rotation", for, as Marx notes: "this part of the capital value fixed in the means of labor circulates like any other part."48
Only the concept of rotation, therefore, makes this difference clear.
Marx was the first to clarify the opposition between fixed and circulating capital, and above all he was the first to distinguish rigorously these two new categories from those of the process of capital valorization, which had been confused by economists until then. In Book 2, Marx describes this confusion as a "fundamental error":
Leaving aside the fundamental error of mixing the categories of fixed and circulating capital with the categories of constant and variable capital, the confusion hitherto committed by the economists... 49
The consideration of the cycle in its repetition will lead Marx to the definition of a certain number of other categories of rotation that reflect the complexity of the structure of this concept. Let us mention the following concepts:
-
work period (Arbeitsperiode)
-
working time (Arbeitszeit)
-
production time (Produktionszeit)
-
circulation time (Umlaufszeit)
-
rotation period (Umschlagsperiode)
This is the cycle studied in section I, this time considered as a temporal process. We will not repeat these analyses here, since the difficulty seems to us to be essentially terminological.
The definition of the two categories of capital rotation (fixed capital and circulating capital) poses -- logically -- an important problem which will not fail to remind us of the study we were making of "mise en valeur". The determinations proper to the system of capital, which enjoy here, as usual, an absolute primacy, are inextricably linked to the material determinations of the object, the "support" of capital value.
The autonomy of the two structures, system of capital/system of material determinations, has now become familiar to us. Any risk of confusion would easily disappear if such difficulties did not in fact have any objective basis. The two systems, of total exteriority to each other, nevertheless project onto the reality they serve to conceive structures that overlap, partially and without any rigor, at certain points of view.
What is interesting in the precise case that stops us is the insistence with which Marx returns to the risk of confusion. Let us continue for a moment the reading of the extract discussed above:
... the confusion committed so far by economists in the definition of concepts derives from the following points:
From certain properties which belong materially to the means of labor, one makes immediate qualities of fixed capital; thus the physical immobility, say, of a house. It is always easy, after that, to demonstrate that other means of labor, which are also fixed capital, have opposite qualities: the physical mobility, of a boat for example.
In other words, one confuses the determined economic form that comes from the circulation of value with a real quality [dinglichen Eigenschaft] of the object: as if objects, which are in no way capital by themselves, but only become so in determined social relations, could be, in themselves, and by nature, capital in a determined form, fixed or circulating capital50.
We spoke above of the "objective basis" of confusion. It is understandable, in fact, that a very important part of fixed capital is represented by buildings, machines, etc., by nature solid, durable, and that it is easy not to make a clear distinction. Marx, on this question, writes:
All things being equal, the degree of fixity of the means of labor increases with its durability51
We shall add that this does not make every durable good a fixed capital. Durability" appears here as a factor external to the concept of capital and its circulation structure. It intervenes, certainly, but in a non-essential way, as an external factor, precisely. This confusion, which poisons a large part of classical economics, was systematized and amplified by the marginalists; it still dominates contemporary professorial political economy and has repercussions, in particular, on national accounting techniques.
Beyond these confusions, the circulation of fixed capital raises a most interesting problem. By going deeper into the question of the relationship between the nature of the structure and the nature of the law, we shall see that the concept of "commodity" is a contradictory concept that unites within itself the determinations of two perfectly irreconcilable systems from a logical point of view: use value and exchange value. United in the same concept, one would try in vain to reduce them to a rational unity. We know, however, that the commodity cannot have a "value" without first being an "object of utility", that the exchange value is, as it were, subject to the existence of the use value as its own condition, without the autonomy of the two systems being broken in the least. With the circulation of fixed capital, the progressive extinction of use value is accompanied by a simultaneous loss of value. The marginalist, no longer interested, would draw a curve whose perfectly indeterminable profile would translate nothing more than the above sentence. Use value and exchange value vanish simultaneously.
To what extent does this process not partially call into question the theoretical autonomy of the two structures?
The problem is posed and resolved, it seems to us, in the following terms: within the commodity, utility is indispensable to value, but value does not originate in the more or less of utility, which does not prevent the disappearance of value when utility disappears, whether this disappearance is sudden or progressive. From the contradictory nature of the structure results the fact that there is no theory of this "loss", that it is not subject to any law. As for the quantitative determinations of this process of loss, which everyone thinks of, they too are absolutely non-theorizable. To take fixed is a result", and the most advanced capitalist practice a formula of Marx, the depletion of the value of capital has never found anything superior to a calculation of averages, based on experience.52
The laws of the capital cycle, the laws of its rotation, thus retain the fullness of their conceptual nature. As they are explained in Book 2, they remain totally alien to the material determinations set aside above.
c) The structural articulation - the "blank" of the structure (rotation and decomposition of the advance - liberation of money capital)
From a strictly quantitative point of view, the necessities postulated by the rotation prove to be most difficult. The author's presentation of this subject cannot be considered as a finished work intended for the public. However, the object of the research is defined with relative clarity, especially at the beginning of section III of book 2. Marx briefly summarizes the approach of the first two sections. First, he returns to the relationship between the presentation of the rotation and that of the cycle:
In fact, if in the first section we examined mainly the successive forms that capital constantly assumes and strips in its cycle, in the second we saw how in this flow and succession of forms a capital of a given magnitude is divided simultaneously, but in varying proportions, into productive capital, money-capital and commodity-capital53
The author then specifies more clearly than ever the transformation effected by taking into account the concept of rotation. Capital becomes here "a capital", an advance which, at a given moment, is divided into these different fractions corresponding to its various forms of existence:
And this in such a way that not only do these various forms alternate with each other, but that ceaselessly different fractions of the total capital-value exist in parallel and function in these different states.54
Finally, Marx will emphasize the point to which he devoted a very important part of his research: one of the fractions of the advance, the "money" form, is of particular interest, since it practically justifies the development of the credit system on its own. Note the use of the term "law", a formula that one would like to see included in section II where these laws are exposed:
We have found precise laws by virtue of which elements of unequal size of a given capital must, according to the conditions of rotation, be advanced and renewed unceasingly in the form of money-capital, in order to maintain always in operation a productive capital of given volume.55
The author is referring here to the process which he designates with the expression "liberation of capital".
The conceptual nature of totality implied, as in the case of valorization, an exploration of the main articulations of this quantitative structure. Only the laws of the fraction in the form of money will be considered by the author; the analysis thus remains partial. It can, however, be so and retain its scientific character for a double reason:
-
It is carried out in the field of structure, within the concept "in all its purity", as Marx sometimes writes.
-
It concerns one of the articulations of the structure, the bringing out of which would suppose the production of the concept in its integrity.
This analysis is thus localized at a double point of view: by its conceptual interiority and its structural position.
The uncertain results of these difficult calculations have led Marx to attribute an undeserved weight to a circumstance which, in my opinion, is really less important. I refer to what he calls "the liberation of money-capital"56.
So says Engels about these analyses, the essence of which he has grouped together in chapter 15. The study of this "cir constancy" prompts us, however, to pay particular attention to it, as to the whole of this section II, whose analyses seem to us to have been considerably neglected by Marxist economists.
Completely abstracted from section III of Book 2, very partially addressed in Book 3, the processes described in section II of Book 2 seem to us likely to contribute to the resolution of many difficulties. This is one of the dimensions of Marx's system that leaves the most to be desired, given its unfinished character. In reading Book 3, it becomes clear quite quickly that these problems had not yet been solved by the author at the time he wrote the manuscript that served as the basis for the publication.
Let us, however, concentrate our interest for the moment on this concept of the "liberation (Freizetzung) of capital" and its laws. From the study of the cycle in its repetition - the rotation - arose the great idea of the division of the advance into various parts corresponding to the fractions of the capital assuming in turn the forms A, M or P. These analyses constitute the theory of what "commercial accounting" is the practice of. As Marx noted in a letter to Engels, capitalist practices are always infinitely superior to bourgeois theories of capital.
Marx will go on to show in Section II that a significant part of the advance must necessarily take the money form. Marx's interest in this analysis is not only revealed by the number of dry pages he devotes to this research in his manuscripts, but also by some explicit warnings:
The economists, who teach us nothing clear about the mechanism of rotation, always let slip this main point that in reality only a part of the industrial capital can be engaged in the production process if production is not to be interrupted. [...] By letting this point slip, one lets slip the importance and the role of money-capital.57
"The importance and role of money-capital" is, among other things, the nature of the problem to which these analyses are likely to give us the key.
Of the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the various - and very numerous - laws that we find in Marx's economic system, it is generally the qualitative necessities that seem to us the most difficult to grasp. The main risk is represented by the temptation to omit them in favor of strictly quantitative determinations. From this last point of view, the quantitative structures that we encounter are generally very simple. The complexity of the quantitative is a problem of the phenomenal and has its source in the qualitative ambiguities themselves, as we shall show later. This is by no means the case with "liberation". This exception will therefore retain our attention. The quantitative system that Marx elaborates in chapter 15 quickly reveals itself to be quite complex; the author approaches it with all the meticulousness that is proper to him. This thoroughness may irritate the reader; Engels admits that he does not feel the need for it and offers us a very interesting synthesis of the results.
In a few words, we will recall here that Marx studies in this chapter the variations of one of the three simultaneous forms of the advance: the money form. He considers a given rotation period and its division into work period and circulation time. He assumes weekly disbursements of a constant value and observes the periodic receipts resulting from the sale of the product. The way Engels summarizes the problem quantitatively seems to us to be quite accurate. He notes the periodicity of the "receipts" (this period is equal to the duration of the work period). Thus, from a strictly quantitative point of view, it is a question of combining two periodicities : the regular weekly expenditure and the "returns", the first of which occurs at the end of the first rotation period and the following ones follow one another with the periodicity described above. But this is not the real difficulty. The essential point disappears in the synthesis: the relationship between the duration of the work period and the circulation time. Engels then writes:
It does not matter what the ratio of magnitude between the period of labor and the period of circulation, consequently between capital I and capital II.58
It seems to us, on the contrary, that this aspect of the question is particularly important, as is proved by the original title of the chapter: "Effects of differences in rotation on the development of capital."59
These differences concern the decomposition of the rotation period into its two sections. They constitute the very object of the author's research. Through his careful analysis, Marx obtains the following two results:
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A capital is periodically "released" and takes the form of potential money-capital. It can only partially be reconverted into productive provision because of the wage (except for the fact that the capitalist may have no interest in making this advance purchase).
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Any extension -- relative, of course -- of circulation time has as its effect a correlative reduction of this liberation.
Marx takes up his conclusions in three points: A, B, C. In A and B, he summarizes the results of his calculations, considered in themselves: a part of the capital is periodically liberated, except when the period of labor is equal to the period of circulation or "when the period of circulation is longer than the period of labor, but constitutes a simple multiple thereof". Note the difficulty of these quantitative observations: even if the period of circulation were to become longer and longer, if it were a simple multiple of the period of labor, the capital would no longer be released. The "committed" advance -- as opposed to "released" -- would then be equal to the capital going through its circulation process (in the narrow sense of M-A-M), increased by the successive and periodic monthly advances of capital required by the unfolding of the labor process. *In order to consider the quantitative ambiguities of this process, let the reader imagine an ever-increasing period of circulation within a period of constant rotation. What does he see? An always lesser liberation of the capital implied by the period of circulation, provided that this period is not an exact multiple of the production process. Thus the absolute necessity of C, which follows the two previous points, is affirmed:
C. It follows that, for the total social capital considered in its circulating part, the release of capital must be the rule, the simple alternation of the fractions of capital functioning successively in the production process must be the exception. Indeed, the equality of the period of work and the period of circulation, or the equality of the period of circulation and a simple multiple of the period of work, this regular proportionality of the two elements of the period of rotation is totally foreign to the nature of things and can therefore only occur on the whole as an exception.
A very considerable part of the circulating social capital that completes several rotations per year will thus be found periodically, during the annual cycle of rotation, in the form of released capital. 60
Marx was obviously aware of the "artificial" character of the quantitative structure thus elaborated, but the scrupulous theorist proceeds to a careful exploration of this structural articulation considered in itself, before undertaking the confrontation of the conclusions with the "matter". These quantitative ambiguities of the thought structure will finally be discarded in the name of the "nature of things"61.
The author finally formulates the following law:
The capital made available in the form of money must therefore be at least equal to the part of the capital which is variable, disbursed for the wage; it can, at the most, comprise the totality of the capital released. In reality, it constantly oscillates between this minimum and this maximum.62
From the point of view of rotation, release is only a special case. In the excerpt we reported at the beginning of this reflection on liberation, Marx stated that he had expounded the laws of the fraction of capital in the form of money: the three fractions A, M and P could have given rise, as we have noted, to such analyses; only in this way would the concept of rotation have been the object of a complete quantitative exposition. Marx alludes to the laws of the fraction in the form of P when he writes, for example:
One is always dealing with the law that determines the mass of productive capital continuously as a function of the ratio between the time of circulation and the time of rotation.63
Of the laws of "rotation", Marx therefore really only considers a first group relating to the fraction in the form of capital-money. The exploration we are witnessing thus has as its field only a complex articulation - a group of such articulations - of the structure of the concept. This fundamental structure, however, delimits the logical space of investigation and, among the set of abstract processes, laws of the forms P and M perpetually claim their absence.
The study of the different structures we have considered so far has led us, in all cases, to take into consideration a distinction of primary importance: the qualitative/quantitative opposition.
We have even referred, most often, to two structures, a qualitative structure and a quantitative structure. The union of the two types of determinations is characteristic of the conceptual nature of the totality. Within the concept, they are inseparable, but the existence of the quantitative determination does not presuppose the existence of the qualitative determination.
The "division" of profit into interest and corporate profit provides an excellent illustration of this; it constitutes a kind of "counterexample" that we will oppose to the concepts studied above. What is really characteristic of this division is that it is, strictly speaking, not subject to any law, and what gives these developments their interest from the logical point of view is that Marx explicitly addresses the problem of this absence and justifies it with particular clarity.
First, by refuting the action of competition, the author presents us with this characteristic. Most often, competition accounts for deviations from the fundamental law. In the case of profit sharing, it acts alone:
Competition does not determine deviations from the law; moreover, there is no law of sharing except that dictated by competition, because there is no "natural" rate of interest, as we shall see later.64
To better emphasize the particular character of the division thus achieved, Marx compares it to the oppositions of surplus-value/value of labor power and rent/profit:
In the division between surplus-value and wages, on which the fixing of the rate of profit essentially rests, two very different elements act in a determining way: labor-power and capital; they are functions of two independent variables, which limit each other reciprocally; from their qualitative difference results the quantitative division of the value produced. We shall see later that the same phenomenon occurs in the division of surplus value between rent and profit. As far as interest is concerned, nothing of the sort happens. On the contrary, as we shall see below, the qualitative difference here arises from the purely quantitative sharing of the same quantity of surplus-value.65
In the case of interest, the qualitative division is directly the expression of the quantitative division and, above all, it expresses nothing more than this quantitative division itself. Until then, quantitative and qualitative determinations had appeared to us indissolubly linked within the structure of the determinations of the concept. We discover here, however, the trace of a subordination whose absence had escaped us until then. Marx had written a few lines earlier, still about the same problem:
If one asks why the limits of the average rate of interest cannot be deduced from general laws, the answer to this question lies simply in the very nature of interest, which constitutes only a part of the average profit. In the process of production itself, the character of capital, as loan capital, plays no role. The manner in which the two persons claiming this profit divide it up is, in fact, an act as purely empirical, as fortuitous, as the distribution among its different members of the shares of the common profit of a commercial company.66
This second excerpt makes very clear the lack of qualitative content of this sharing. It is purely fortuitous or, if one prefers, more rigorously subject to a multitude of external factors of all kinds combining their actions and producing, in the end, a purely contingent effect of determination - not "theorizable" though "analyzable".
In this presentation, Marx thus underlines in the qualitative/quantitative opposition a certain "primacy of the qualitative, at least, with regard to the type of relation of which the term law is used to account. One cannot speak of a "law" of profit sharing because the qualitative distinction follows from the quantitative division. The author returns to this point with the greatest insistence. We read for example:
The following question then arises: how is it that this purely quantitative division of profit into net profit and interest is changed into a qualitative division?67
The autonomous form that the quantitative division of gross profit takes profit gives rise to qualitative sharing.68
The purely quantitative division of profit between two persons having different rights to it has been transformed into a qualitative division, which seems to arise from the very nature of capital and profit.69
In any case, the quantitative sharing of the gross product is here changed into a qualitative sharing; and this all the more so since the quantitative sharing itself is a function of what there is to share, of the way in which the active capitalist uses the capital, and, finally, of the gross profit which it yields him as capital in function, when he acts as an active capitalist.70
Do the qualitative determinations of a concept like that of surplus value, for example, enjoy a perfect identity of status with respect to the quantitative determinations of the same concept? Should we think, on the contrary, that, the relation of subordination being established this time in the other direction, the qualitative determination now founds the quantitative determination? We would willingly lean towards the first interpretation; the determinations of the two types seem to us to translate, each in its own way, the articulations of the structure of the concept: their unity reveals the conceptual nature of the law, their separation challenges it.
What is striking in the case of the sharing of profit is that the structure of profit -- very complex in itself, since it translates the necessities of the two dimensions of the concept of capital (valorization/circulation) -- does not imply the existence of this sharing. These two "fractions" do not "connect" qualitatively at any point with the structure of profit itself. This "de facto" division, perfectly external to the theory of capital considered in its integrity as it appears in profit, thus originates in processes that are completely foreign, from a conceptual point of view, to the theory of capital. However, in the end, profit is shared, and this sharing "seems" to translate the very necessities of capital. The crucial point in this process is the complete autonomy of the determinations of the two fractions, one with respect to the other, and of both with respect to the theory of capital. Marx remarks, in this regard, explicitly using the term law:
The profit of any capital, even the average profit based on the equalization of capitals among themselves, is divided or rather is divided into two parts, qualitatively different, independent of each other, or interest and business profit, both determined by particular laws.71
The existence of this non-conceptual relationship reveals, on the other hand, the significance and importance of the "conceptual" nature of scientific knowledge. The "totality" of the conception manifests here its essential autonomy with respect to the totality of the phenomenal variety that it serves to apprehend. To escape from the phenomenal totality of the observable and to reach the concept, it is, indeed, to pass from the empirical to the scientific. The division of profit into its two fractions is perfectly foreign to his concept. It is, however, one of the main phenomenal characteristics of this same profit.
If we had to designate the dominant feature, the fundamental property, of scientific knowledge as we read it in Marx, we would say that it proceeds by concept even before presenting its dialectical nature, because in our eyes the refusal of dialectics is equivalent, first and foremost, to a limitation of the potentialities of conceptualization -- in other words, it seems to us that a truly consequential knowledge by concept can only be dialectical. This problem will soon hold our attention.
To limit ourselves to the problem we are considering at the moment, let us note that there cannot be quantitative necessities within the concept that would not have as their foundation the qualitative articulation of the structure. We have just mentioned an example of a purely quantitative relation, the one -- very complex in fact -- which presides over the sharing of profit, but we shall see that, in all cases, relations of this type necessarily have an extra-conceptual scope. In any case, mathematical expression cannot in any way substitute for the needs of conception. A certain political economy which claims to be based on the so-called "exact" sciences as if there were inexact sciences! bases its pseudo-conceptualization on mathematical structures devoid of any explanatory value, of any conceptual scope. Confessing in broad daylight and deliberately proclaiming its incapacity to assume any function of conception, it can, in the best cases, declare itself "theory of models", which does not change its scientific value. A short analysis of book 3 provides us with a very simple example. Section V contains a humorous remark concerning the mathematical expression of the progress of accumulation (reduced here to the capitalization of interest):
Price was simply dazzled by the enormity of the number derived from a geometric progression. Considering capital without taking into account the conditions of reproduction and labor, as an automaton, as a simple number increasing by itself (just as Malthus considers man in his geometric progression), he could imagine that he had found the law of its increase in the formula: s = c (1+i)^n, where s is the sum of capital + compound interest, c = the capital advanced, i = the rate of interest (expressed in aliquot shares of 100), and n = the number of years in which the process takes place72.
No theoretically elaborated quantitative structure can account for a process such as the progress of accumulation, even if we include the geometric progression in a system of equally quantitative conditions borrowed from the economic work of Marx. Playing this game, which also occupies a prominent place in the history of Marxist economic thought since Marx, one can arrive at two kinds of results:
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the system functions with docility according to the nature of the hypotheses, and one finds one's own starting point in the conclusion: exponential growth for example;
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one of the variables shows an absurd evolution; a new crisis theory is then discovered!
These methods are absolutely incompatible with the fundamental principles of scientific knowledge. No scientific law will come into being in this way.
The example borrowed from Malthus, which Marx mentions above, much more famous and more interesting, remains fundamentally of the same nature. It corresponds to a theoretical failure of great magnitude which the public still welcomes, even today.
As for the concept of capital accumulation, it will be understood that it does not imply in itself any quantitative necessity comparable to that presented by Price; it does not conceal any law expressing the existence of any rhythm of growth. The expression "laws of accumulation" is usually used to designate a law of capitalist production, the general law of capitalist accumulation of chapter 25. For the moment, we are referring to the laws of "capital" accumulation, that is to say, to the same process apprehended with the help of the sole concept of capital. We shall see, in fact, that the exposition of the law of capitalist accumulation is carried out within a much wider theoretical field than the one and only concept of capital.
The exposition of these laws of capital accumulation turns out to be rather disappointing and will not be tackled "head on" by Marx. If we distinguish between the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of these laws, these two dimensions remain as indeterminate as each other. The observation of this double indeterminacy is, however, of considerable importance.
Qualitatively, Marx will show that, contrary to what the classics thought, this process does not presuppose the definition of any category (such as constant capital/variable capital for the process of valorization or fixed capital/circulating capital for the process of circulation) and does not overlap with the two categories of the laws of surplus-value (constant and variable capital). The capitalized surplus value is not only advanced in wages, but also in means of production. The exposition of the qualitative content of these laws has therefore essentially the value of a demystification. However, their study leads to a distinction that we will compare with that of necessary work and surplus work, for example, to maintain the parallel with the laws of surplus value, between the part of surplus value reinvested or savings and that devoted to the individual consumption of the capitalist or income73:
Of the aliquot of the tribute taken by him, which he accumulates, he is said to save it, because he does not eat it, that is, because he fulfills his function as a capitalist, which is to enrich himself74.
From the quantitative point of view, the laws of accumulation do not postulate the least necessary articulation, apart from the division of surplus-value into two fractions:
Given the mass of surplus-value, one of the parts will be all the greater as the other will be smaller. All other circumstances remaining the same, the proportion in which this division is made will determine the size of the accumulation.75
In particular, these laws do not imply anything about any "rhythm" of accumulation. To take into account such a process would presuppose the existence of a temporal continuity, the trace of which will be sought here in vain. Marx will, however, enumerate certain factors on which the magnitude of accumulation might depend; these factors are all extra-conceptual; the effect of the determinations they operate remains contingent.76
Footnotes
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This use of the term "totality" is borrowed from the "Introduction of 1857". We specify with the help of the qualifier "logic", whereas Marx speaks of "totality of thought", in order to avoid the ambiguities of this last term and the heaviness of the turn in French. This thought is the one that builds the scientific system and uses it in the phenomenal analysis. ↩
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P., vol. I, p. 591; S., 1. 1, vol. I, p. 74; W., vol. XXIII, p. 75. The terminology "use value" and "exchange value" is all the more pernicious since it could lead one to suppose that these two terms designate aspects of a contradiction internal to value itself and not to the commodity. Use value and exchange value are opposed within the commodity and not within value. Marx has in fact considered this idea in a long note in the Foundations: Shouldn't value be conceived as the unity of use-value and exchange-value? In itself and for itself, is not value as such the general in relation to use-value and exchange-value, which would be its particular forms?" (A., vol. I, p. 215; E., p. 178.) ↩
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This distinction, which is obvious from a simple reading of the text, is confirmed in a particularly clear way in the following note: "If the partisans of Ricardo have only been able to reply to Bailey in a crude and not at all conclusive manner, it is simply because they have found in Ricardo himself nothing that would enlighten them on the intimate relation that exists between value and its form, that is, exchange value." (P., vol. I, p. 619; S., 1. 1, vol. I, p. 94; W., vol. XXIII, p. 98.) This theme will be taken up again in the same terms in Book 2. The continuity of the vocabulary is thus assured on this point from 1867 to 1877 (S., I. 2, vol. I, p. 98; W., vol. XXIV, p. 110). ↩
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P., t. 1, p. 309; S., p. 32; W., t. XIII, p. 41. ↩
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P., vol. I, p. 314; S., p. 36; W., vol. XIII, p. 45. ↩
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The expression "concept of value" is rare in Marx's work; in section 1, we meet it on only one occasion in connection with Aristotle's "concept of value" (P., t. 1, p. 590; S., p. 73). ↩
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P., t. 1, p. 568; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 56; W., t. XXIII, p. 55. ↩
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P., t. 1, p. 574; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 61; W., t. XXIII, p. 60. ↩
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This does not prevent us from referring to the "concepts" of use-value, concrete labor... ↩
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P., t. I, p. 278; S., p. 8; W., t. XIII, p. 16. ↩
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Concerning the diversity of the elements that a concept like that of productive force apprehends, we note in the same developments: "[...] the productive force of labor, which in turn depends on the most diverse circumstances, among others on the average skill of the workers, on the development of science and the degree of its technological application, on the social combinations of production, on the extent and efficiency of the means of production and on purely natural conditions" (P., t. I, p. 567; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 55; W., t. XXIII, p 54) ↩
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Non-theorizable in the sense that the law of value "theorizes" the relation between value and labor time. ↩
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In the sense that objective is opposed to subjective in the opposition sachlich/ persönlich. ↩
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P., vol. 1, p. 719; S., 1. 1, vol. I, p. 173; W., vol. XXIII, p. 184. ↩
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P., 1. 1, p. 720; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 174; W., t. XXIII, p. 185. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 720; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 174; W., t. XXIII, p. 185. ↩
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This way of expressing itself is modelled on commonly used formulas which are quite approximate from a logical point of view. ↩
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This reveals that the concept of value does not provide the theory. ↩
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Always in the same sense. ↩
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text ↩
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P., t. I, p. 838; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 297; W., t. XXIII, p. 321. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 839; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 297; W., t. XXIII, p. 321.met ↩
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P., t. I, p. 839; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 298; W., t. XXIII, p. 322. ↩
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P., t. 1, p. 840; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 298; W., t. XXIII, p. 322. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 840; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 299; W., t. XXIII, p. 323. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 840; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 299; W., t. XXIII, p. 323. ↩
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P., vol. I, p. 841; S., 1. 1, vol. I, p. 299; W., vol. XXIII, p. 324.5 ↩
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P., t. I, p. 842; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 300; W., t. XXIII, p. 325. ↩
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"Although classical economics has never formulated this law, it holds to it instinctively, because it follows from the very nature of value. We shall see later how Ricardo's school came up against this stumbling block. As for vulgar economics, it boasts here as everywhere of appearances in order to deny the law of phenomena" (P., vol. 1, p. 843; S., I. 1, vol. I, p. 301; W., vol. XXIII, p. 325). ↩
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P., vol. 1, p. 842; S. 1. 1, vol. I, p. 300; W., vol. XXIII, p. 325. ↩
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P., 1. 1, p. 843; S., 1. 1, vol. I, p. 301; W., vol. XXIII, p. 325. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 947; S., 1. 1, t. II, p. 89; W., t. XXIII, p. 429. ↩
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P., vol. I, p. 762; S., 1. 1, vol. I, p. 207; W., vol. XXIII, p. 223. ↩
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P., t. 1, p. 751; S., I. 1, t. I, p. 198; W., t. XXIII, p. 214. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 762; S., 1. 1, t. I, p. 197; W., t. XXIII, p. 223. ↩
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Sachlich / persönlich. ↩
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P., vol. 1, p. 762; S., 1. 1, vol. I, p. 197; W., vol. XXIII, p. 223. ↩
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The comparison with the categories of the vulgar economy is instructive. Since the time before Marx, when capitalist rationality no longer works in the direction of history, bourgeois economics has deprived itself of any rational basis by refusing to recognize the true nature of surplus-value, and therefore, for greater security, of value itself. The analysis of the process of production has therefore been the object of the most surprising fantasies when it has not been simply discarded. Bourgeois economic science thus puts itself in absolute opposition to its own practices, which are manifested in its techniques. Some of the material determinations of the labor process are thus pinned down and retained as economic determinations of the production process. In the general confusion of the system, a "detail" passes unnoticed the extraction of the surplus value. ↩
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The diversity of the phenomenal determinations that it serves to apprehend its heterogeneity. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 1003; S., 1. 1, t. II, p. 184; W., t. XXIII, p. 533. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 1005; S., 1. 1, t. II, p. 187; W., t. XXIII, p. 536. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 1009; S., I. 1, t. II, p. 189; W., t. XXIII, p. 538. ↩
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According to M. Rubel (P., t. II, p. 1685, note p. 509). ↩
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Thus, at the beginning of section III, Rubel will not be afraid to propose to the French reader the following sentence: "As we have seen, the total duration of the circulation of a given capital is equal to the sum of its circulation time and its production time" (P., t. II, p. 585; S., I. 2, t. I, p. 141; W., t. XXIV, p. 154). Erna Cogniot translates, on the other hand, in the Editions sociales: "We have seen that the total duration of the cycle of a capital is equal to the sum of its periods of circulation and production." Let us say, however, that in this case, and contrary to the general rule, the German text conceals certain ambiguities on this subject. ↩
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Gesamtzirkulation. ↩
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P., vol. II [...]; S., L. 2, vol. I, p. 95; W., vol. XXIV, p. 107. The dots between brackets indicate that the passage is not translated in this edition. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 589; S., 1. 1, vol. I, p. 145; W., vol. XXIV, p. 158. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 590; S., 1. 1, vol. 1, p. 145; W., vol. XXIV, p. 159. ↩
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P., t. II, p. 593; S., I, 2, 1. 1, p. 148; W., t. XXIV, p. 162. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 593; S., 1. 2, vol. 1, p. 148; W., vol. XXIV, p. 162. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 592; S., 1. 2, vol. I, p. 148; W., vol. XXIV, p. 161. ↩
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The concrete study of these depreciation practices implies determinations that go far beyond the framework of the simple theory of fixed capital. The bourgeois division of surplus-value at the national level, which is realized by the tax system, diverts these practices from their primary purpose. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 507; S., I. 2, vol. II, p. 9: W., vol. XXIV, p. 353. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 507; S., L. 2, vol. II, p. 9; W., vol. XXIV, p. 353. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 507; S., I. 2, vol. II, p. 9; W., vol. XXIV, p. 353. ↩
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P., t. II, p. 675; S., I. 2, t. I, p. 263; W., t. XXIV, p. 286. ↩
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P., vol. II [...]; S., I. 2, vol. I, p. 246; W., vol. XXIV, p. 269. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 675; S., 1. 2, vol. I, p. 264; W., vol. XXIV, p. 286. ↩
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According to Rubel (P., vol. II, p. 1711, note p. 664). The title retained by Engels is: "Effects of the turnover time on the amount of capital advanced (Vorschuss)". We would have preferred "Effect of Turnover on the Amount of Paid-Up Capital." Leaving aside the credit, the paid-up capital remains "advanced", because this "release" remains all transient. Secondly, it is not so much the duration of the rotation that is at issue here as its decomposition into work period and circulation time. As far as the research in chapter 15 is concerned, the duration of the period of rotation only changes the scale of the process; the fact that one writes "month" where Marx writes week obviously does not change anything. What then is to be understood by "Effects of differences in rotation". It does not seem to us, as Engels' title suggests, that it is a question of differences in the overall duration of the period of rotation, but rather of its decomposition into two sections and their relative importance. Let us read, for example, the following sentence in which Marx specifies his objectives with the same formula: "Wir haben jetzt zu untersuchen, welche Verschiedenheit im Umschlag sich herausstellt, je nachdem die beiden Abschnitte der Umschlagsperiode - Arbeitsperiode und Zirkula tionsperiode einander gleich sind, oder die Arbeitsperiode grösser oder kleiner als die Zirkulations periode ist, und ferner, wie dies auf die Bindung von Kapital in der Form Geldkapital wirkt" (W. , vol. XXIV, p. 269). "It remains for us to investigate what difference arises in the rotation, according to whether the two sections of the rotation period - the period of work and the period of circulation - are equal or unequal, and then to determine what results from this for the fixation of capital in the form of money-capital" (P., vol. II [...]; S., 1. 2, vol. 1, p. 246). ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 671; S., I. 2, vol. I, p. 260; W., vol. XXIV, p. 282. ↩
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Are we to infer from this that they have no explanatory value? It seems to us that they do not. The quantitative ambiguities involved in the theoretical elaboration manifest themselves, of course, in the phenomenon itself, of which they explain certain characteristics. The liberation of capital is extremely variable from one branch to another, from one enterprise to another, and especially, shall we say, from one moment to another. Apart from the instantaneous slowing down of the circulation processes which Marx discusses in the course of the section, the always changing modalities of realizing the financial equilibrium of the enterprise, resulting from the periods of production and circulation of its various productions, are likely to create considerable untimely fluctuations, quite unexpected (always disregarding credit). ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 673; S., L. 2, vol. I, p. 261; W., vol. XXIV, p. 284. ↩
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P., t. II [...]; S., I. 2, t. 1, p. 249; W., t. XXIV, p. 271. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 1120; S., 1. 3, vol. XI, p. 24; W., vol. XXV, p. 369. ↩
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P., t. II, p. 1126; S., I. 3, t. II, p. 30; W., t. XXV, p. 376. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 1126; S., l. 3, vol. II, p. 30; W., vol. XXV, p. 376. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 1133; S., I. 3, vol. II, p. 38; W., vol. XXV, p. 385. ↩
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P., t. II, p. 1138; S., I. 3, t. II, p. 42; W., t. XXV, p. 390. ↩
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P., vol. II [...]; S., L. 3, vol. II, p. 43; W., vol. XXV, p. 391. ↩
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P., t. II, p. 1135; S., L. 3, t. II, p. 39; W., t. XXV, p. 387. ↩
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P., vol. II [...]; S., I. 3, vol. II, p. 40; W., vol. XXV, p. 388. ↩
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P., vol. II, p. 1154; S., L. 3, L. II, p. 59; W., vol. XXV, p. 408. ↩
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These distinctions do not correspond to those that Keynesian theory has made familiar to economists. ↩
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P., vol. I, p. 1095; S., 1. 1, vol. III, p. 32; W., vol. XXIII, p. 618. ↩
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P., t. I, p. 1095; S., 1. 1, t. III, p. 32; W., t. XXIII, p. 618. ↩
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-- The size of surplus value: "Given the proportion in which surplus value is divided into capital and income; the size of the accumulated capital obviously depends on the absolute size of the surplus value" (P., vol. 1, p. 1104; S., 1. 1, vol. III, p. 40; W., vol. XXIII, p. 625). -- The impact of certain technical conditions or natural riches on the organic composition (P., t. I, p. 1109; S., I. 1, t. III, p. 44: W., t. XXIII, p. 630). -- The productive force of labor which allows the bourgeoisie to satisfy its desires to a greater extent, while consuming a smaller share of the surplus-value, following a process which will be compared to that of relative surplus-value. "Another important factor of accumulation is the degree of productivity of social labor." "Given surplus value, the abundance of the net product, of which it is the value, corresponds to the productivity of the labor put to work. As labor develops its productive powers, therefore, the net product includes more means of enjoyment and accumulation. Then the part of the surplus-value that is capitalized can even increase at the expense of the other part that constitutes the income, without the capitalist's consumption being narrowed, because henceforth a lesser value is realized in a greater sum of utilities." (P., vol. I, p. 1110; S., 1. 1, vol. III, p. 45; W., vol. XXIII, p. 631.) ↩