Military expert Franz-Stefan Gady regularly travels to the front. In an interview, he discusses the partial failure of the Ukrainian offensive and the prospects for 2024.
Mr. Gady, you have visited Ukraine regularly since the beginning of the Russian invasion, most recently in November. How did you experience the mood at the front?
The fighting spirit and morale among the soldiers remain relatively high. However, there is also criticism of the political and military leadership. This is normal after the partially unsuccessful counter-offensive. It did not achieve its geographical goals, the cities of Tokmak and Melitopol, as well as the Azov Sea.
What were the reasons?
The delay at the beginning and the many axes of attack were important factors. But it seems to me that the decisive factor was that the soldiers in the newly created brigades for the offensive were thrown into battle without combat experience. They had to operate weapon systems they barely knew. In the West, they would have been trained for several years, but here it was compressed into a few months. The result was what one might expect.
Why didn't it work better?
Part of the blame lies with the USA and Europe. We realized too late what Ukraine needed and did not increase our production capacity for artillery and air defense systems early enough. We could also have better coordinated the training of individual units. We saw in the field that one battalion had been trained in Great Britain, one in Germany, and one in Poland. All came back with different levels of knowledge. This is no way to coordinate large-scale operations.
The Ukrainians also complain that they received too little material.
The decisive factor was not that there was a lack of equipment, ammunition, and armored vehicles. The Ukrainians planned and carried out the offensive. Due to a lack of coordination mechanisms, there was not one large counter-offensive, but multiple small offensives along the axes of attack. Due to a lack of leadership structures and insufficient training, brigades could only send individual companies into battle. This led to a dispersion of forces. Moreover, there were deficiencies in the combat of combined arms, in the integration of various systems, and in coordination.
Did we underestimate the Russians?
They knew where the main axes would be, and they fought more vigorously than we had expected. Contrary to their military doctrine, the Russian soldiers also energetically defended the forward positions and often went on the counter-offensive. This was very costly for them and a reason why their losses were very high. By the way, this is a good sign in terms of the war of attrition: our data indicates that the Ukrainians suffered only slightly greater losses during their offensive. Normally, the attacker's losses are several times higher.
Unlike Russia, Ukraine cannot send thousands of soldiers to their deaths. Was that also a reason why the offensive was not more successful?
No, I don't think so. The Ukrainians attacked very energetically. But large formations with armored vehicles were too visible to Russian combat helicopters and drones. Therefore, after the heavy losses of the first days, they switched to smaller groups of 10 to 16 men, with 2 or 3 armored vehicles for transport and fire support. The infantry was dropped directly over the Russian trenches and then had to conquer and hold them. Reinforcements can usually only be brought in at night.
The combat style you describe hardly allows for significant territorial gains. Is there a military stalemate at the front?
I am not a fan of this word. Yes, there is currently trench warfare. But that does not mean that the front is frozen forever. The attrition on both sides means that the battlefield may become fluid again in the future.
Do you already see signs of this? For example, in Avdiivka, where the Russians have regained the initiative?
The situation is difficult, also in the Kharkiv region. The Ukrainians must now entrench themselves. We may also see front-line straightening in the coming weeks. But this does not mean a collapse of the Ukrainian lines, but a retreat to more favorable positions without major implications for strategic developments. The situation in Avdiivka shows that the Russians must not be given a breather. They use every opportunity for attacks. However, one of the best scenarios for the Ukrainians would be a hasty offensive by Moscow.
What do you mean?
When Valery Gerasimov again took command of the Russian troops in Ukraine in January 2023, he immediately went on the offensive. This wore down his troops heavily; February and March were the low point of the war for the Russians. A repetition of this mistake would create potential for Ukrainian operations. However, this does not change the fact that Moscow has a quantitative advantage in critical areas in the coming months.
You are probably referring to artillery ammunition. Where else?
Yes, it's a war dominated by artillery, and the Russians have much greater capabilities than the Ukrainians in this regard. The other key areas are FPV or kamikaze drones, whose production the defense industry is now ramping up. And of course, the Russian armed forces have always been leaders in ground-based electronic warfare, jamming the enemy with jammers. However, they also have disadvantages, in terms of leadership structure, motivation, and training of soldiers.
For the Ukrainians, expanding their own weapons production under enemy fire is significantly more difficult.
The "Ukrainian way of war" relies on decentralized, non-state structures. This is very creative, but much less scalable than Russian production. Even the FPV drones are not industrially manufactured, but are assembled in workshops and even apartments. They hand-assemble each grenade. This is very dangerous. But the main problem is that even for this, ammunition is often lacking.
Here, Kyiv is almost completely dependent on the West.
The West could do significantly more. Even in defense, Ukraine will need hundreds of thousands of shells and FPV drones. The production capacities for this are not currently available in the West. By the end of 2024, this could look different, provided production is ramped up. But there is also other equipment that would be very helpful to Ukraine, such as armored personnel carriers. The M113, for example, has proven itself very effective, although many Western armies consider it outdated.
Nevertheless, a difficult situation. Also, because the political will to support Ukraine in the West is diminishing.
The Ukrainians are, of course, following the discussions in the USA and Europe with concern. Therefore, they are ramping up domestic ammunition production. But Kyiv remains dependent on the West for greater military success.
How long can Ukraine continue to fight with the material it has received so far?
The shortage of ammunition was already noticeable during our front visit in November. But the Ukrainians will continue to fight even if the West does not deliver a single piece of ammunition. This would mean that they would have to partially retreat and move the war to the larger cities. In urban combat, the Russians have a huge deficit. Thus, the Ukrainian army would try to bleed the enemy dry. The consequences would be even higher civilian casualties and even greater destruction.
The aid from the West is unlikely to dry up completely. But it is likely to be reduced.
To paraphrase Karl Kraus: The situation is serious, but not hopeless. Ukraine must find a middle way between regenerating its own combat power and maintaining pressure on Russia. It should go on the defensive, focus on training, and simplify its logistics chains. Then things might look better at the end of 2024. The question is how great the pressure will be to go back on the offensive more quickly. I would like to tell European politicians that this is the last thing Ukraine needs. It must sovereignly decide how to continue this war.