Information Warfare, Cyber Attacks, Sabotage: How the "Operation Plan Germany" Changes Switzerland's Security Policy
The German Armed Forces are developing a plan on how to repel an attack below the threshold of war – a likely scenario. An analysis from a Swiss perspective.
A group of armed individuals swiftly occupies the Swift data center in Diessenhofen in the canton of Thurgau: This is where global payment flows converge. The fighters, wearing combat uniforms without any national insignia, use massive force. They are equipped with a mortar and state-of-the-art anti-tank guided weapons. This private army thus possesses far more firepower than the Thurgau cantonal police.
Simultaneously, there has been an ongoing deployment of American NATO troops through the hub of Ramstein near Frankfurt for days, intended to deter Russia from attacking Latvia. The partial failure of payment transactions completely disrupts the situation. A disinformation campaign warning against the influence of the USA – particularly on the international financial system – has been ongoing for months.
The attack on the data center is a fictional scenario – and the likelihood of such an event decreases significantly if authorities and societies in Western countries consistently prepare for such an escalation. That's why, since March 2023, the German Armed Forces have been developing an "Operation Plan Germany," abbreviated "OPLAN DEU," involving especially their civilian partners.
The Territorial Command of the German Armed Forces introduced "OPLAN DEU" on their website in November of the previous year. German media reported on the countermeasures against a hybrid attack on Germany over the weekend, including Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (MDR). Repeated warnings of an escalation of the war have reached public discussion.
Central to the planning are NATO's demands on Germany, arising from the country's geostrategic location in the heart of Europe, the German Armed Forces write. In this context, the task of the Territorial Command is to ensure, among other things, the deployment of allies on the "hub Germany": the actual basis for deterrence and defense in the frontline states.
In "OPLAN DEU," four forms of hybrid threat are in focus:
- Information Warfare: The enemy tries to undermine the decisions of the authorities and divide the population through disinformation. These attacks are already part of everyday life, but could be intensified in the event of a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. With its direct democracy and closer relationship between authorities and population, Switzerland is better protected against this threat.
- Cyber Attacks: Critical infrastructures such as telecommunications companies or the energy industry are particularly at risk. This German assessment is also applicable to Switzerland – data networks and the financial industry must also be taken into account.
- Enemy Reconnaissance: The German Armed Forces talk about "targeted espionage". This includes, among other things, actions of enemy intelligence services gathering information on the net and directly in the field: from personal data of soldiers to the material condition of the deployment units.
- Sabotage: Depending on the situation, enemy special forces or military companies like the former Wagner private army could damage or even occupy ports, bridges, energy supplies, or railway facilities. An attack on the Swift data center in Diessenhofen, as initially described, would be an extreme form of sabotage but must be considered a particularly dangerous possibility.
These four threats have long been part of the "active measures" ("aktiwnije meroprijatija") repertoire of the Soviet intelligence service (KGB), but were further developed and digitalized by its Russian successor organizations. Social networks act as accelerators here. Fundamentally, it's about actions below the threshold of war with the goal of undermining and weakening the enemy without a direct military attack.
Since the Cold War, there has been no concrete planning for a military attack in Germany. However, unlike back then, the focus is not on repelling a direct offensive but on protecting the rear area, the German Armed Forces explain. Germany is no longer the immediate frontline area but the "rear area," as it is called in NATO jargon.
Similar considerations were made in Switzerland as early as 1995. In a publication on "Army deployments below the threshold of war," Swiss intelligence officers discussed the effects of "indirect warfare and the then 'new security-political risks'" on military doctrine and training. Essentially, it was about supporting civil authorities internally.
The Swiss Army later specialized in support and protection missions, neglecting core defense competencies. The four territorial divisions with their infantry and rescue battalions are thus well-prepared for tasks as outlined in the "OPLAN DEU." Since the beginning of the year, there has been a separate military cyber command. The civilian Federal Office for Cyber Security is also located within the Defense Department (VBS).
For historical reasons, Germany hesitated for a long time to concretely plan the deployment of the Bundeswehr domestically beyond unarmed tasks. The Territorial Command was only created in 2022 after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On its website, the planning chief of the Command, the J5, is quoted as saying that internal and external security are hardly separable anymore.
"We will only be able to fulfill our tasks with the support of the states, authorities, and the economy," the planning chief further explains. The German Armed Forces describe their contribution to "OPLAN DEU" as the "military part of the overall defense." The term is well-known in Switzerland.
During the Cold War, the army under this banner combined contributions from civil defense, health services, or the private sector up to nuclear strikes. In 1969, the Federal Council even published a civil defense booklet intended to strengthen the population's will to defend. However, the description of dissenters by the authors at the time went far beyond the mark and caused a distancing of the intellectual scene from the idea of a spiritual national defense.
The remnants of the overall defense still exist in Switzerland, though no longer consistently oriented towards a war scenario. What never succeeded even during the Cold War is still missing today: effective, well-coordinated coordination of the various elements. Following experiences in the pandemic, a reform of crisis management was initiated but has not yet been consistently completed.
Despite structural advantages, Switzerland has hardly dealt with the possibility of an escalation of the war. The Cold War and the Fichenaffäre (file scandal) continue to have an impact. In fact, such mental preparation for the authorities of a democratic country is still a hot topic today: False enemy images and scaremongering do not belong in an open society, but an open discussion about threats does.
"OPLAN DEU" is supposed to be completed by March this year and then continuously adjusted. Lieutenant General André Bodemann, commander of the Territorial Command, said on MDR that defense planning is primarily aimed at deterrence: "We are doing something so that no conflict, no war arises in the first place."
The Bundeswehr's main contribution to conventional deterrence on the ground is the establishment of a tank brigade in Lithuania. In a joint effort, NATO is capable of establishing a credible defense line against Russia in northeastern Europe. The reinforcement of forces with combat units from the USA will be trained in the coming weeks as part of the exercise "Steadfast Defender 2024."
However, if Ukraine loses the war against Russia, there is a risk that Switzerland's eastern flank will be completely open: Hungary and Slovakia could completely side with the Kremlin, and Austria practically has no units that could seriously resist. Switzerland, therefore, relies on a comprehensive military system.
Even in the event of an attack by an armed group on critical infrastructure like Swift, the police would depend on the heavy forces of the army: tanks capable of breaking through barriers and protected against grenade fire. In rebuilding the actual combat units, Switzerland faces a major effort.