Vishchun Analysis Of Russian Artillery Stocks

artillery_stocks_analysis.md

Vishchun military analysis on the state of Russian artillery (figures omitted)

Original Source

Translated by Claude

The state of enemy artillery and its prospects. Overview of storage bases

This time, our collaboration of channels Resurgam, Military Seer, and Mortis Aeterna was joined by colleague "Bulgarian", and together we prepared for you a study on the state of enemy tube and rocket artillery based on satellite images as of mid-2024.

First, we want to thank Covert Cabal and Highmarsed for their previous research and work, which now allows us to conduct a comparative analysis.

Our calculations have differences due to the question of criteria for assessing "what to consider suitable". The classification problem lies in the quality of the images - but, as the study showed, the discrepancies are ultimately not significant - and, most importantly, the result of the study allows us to track trends.

In our opinion, the desire to trace trends is the main goal of this study, apart from, of course, trying to count "enemy barrels".

Our calculations were "conservative" according to the same criteria we applied in the previous study of the enemy's tank fleet available at storage bases and BTRZs: if we had doubts, we always took the most negative calculation option as the main one.

We tried to provide visual confirmations to the maximum extent, but we do not have the right to publish all images in the public space.

In the study, we covered the following points:

1. Calculation of self-propelled and towed artillery as of mid-2024. Classification of self-propelled artillery (SPG) by types. Depletion rates. General trends.
2. Calculation of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Classification by types. Depletion rates. The state of systems at the main restoration sites (factories).
3. Analysis of the potential for artillery production "from scratch". Figures from other studies. General trends.
4. The potential of DPRK and Iran arsenals that can be involved in the war in Ukraine.

SPG

Our calculation showed that at storage bases and arsenals, as of May 2024, there were between 3,047 and 3,337 units of self-propelled artillery systems that could potentially be suitable for restoration.

This is less than in 2021, when the number of SPGs suitable for restoration was recorded at almost 4,400 units, but it is more than Covert Cabal and Highmarsed counted in 2023, obtaining a figure of 2,876 units.

Why in 2024 compared to 2023 did SPGs at arsenals and storage bases become more, not less? The answer lies in two aspects:

• We wanted to make the count as conservative as possible (counting "not in our favor" when there were doubts), so we even counted an artillery unit with a removed barrel as "suitable for restoration".
• Secondly, there is another interesting detail that provides an answer to "why did it become more?" and it can probably be interpreted as "positive". But more details on this are in the main text.

Towed artillery

Our calculation showed that towed artillery continued its path to depletion. We counted 5,453 or 5,139 units of towed artillery* at all major bases and arsenals as of mid-2024.

We provide two figures because the first is the number of towed/trailer artillery units we counted in total, and the second is a figure adjusted to account for the difference in systems that we identified as "with removed barrels".

In any case, this is significantly less than in 2021, when towed artillery numbered only by a very optimistic count (towards a smaller number) 14,111 units. And this is less than in 2023 when Covert Cabal and Highmarsed counted, obtaining a result of 6,786 units. But the result of our calculation also has several features, which are discussed further in the text.

MLRS

Our calculation showed that in the largest storage locations for this type of weaponry, there remained approximately 112 systems of 122 mm caliber and 132 systems of 220 mm caliber, which is 17.7% and 31% respectively of the number of these systems as of 2021.

Main conclusion: One should look not at the number of artillery systems that remain, but at their quality. Why? Despite the phenomenal depletion of the world's largest artillery reserves, they will still remain "significant" for waging war over the next 3 years, although the "point of no return" for the enemy's artillery capabilities due to their reduction should begin to be felt at the end of 2025. But this is a process, not a date of "final state".

Given the possibility of activating the "worst-case" scenario of supplies from third countries, Russia's artillery arsenal with the currently available resources should not experience critical depletion in the coming years. But this is purely about "quantity".

But quantity does not mean quality. The degradation of the enemy's artillery component should become - and is gradually becoming - the result of long-term and painstaking work of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In fact, we are talking about the fact that the mass transition of the occupation army to less effective artillery produced in the 1930-50s is a relatively foreseeable prospect for the next year. Further reduction of the "self-propelled" component in the artillery component, decrease in the quality of barrels, age of systems that are beginning to be deconserved, as a result, will bring "degradation" closer.

Degradation should lead to:

• Loss of maneuverability (when the percentage of SPGs in the occupation army continues to decrease);
• Decrease in the quality of counter-battery combat (range/accuracy);
• Increase in enemy losses among artillerymen due to higher risk of losing counter-battery duels due to the reasons mentioned above;
• Increase in ammunition consumption for target engagement due to the type/condition/quality of artillery. Increase in ammunition consumption decreases barrel resource.
• If the probability that Iran or North Korea will supply artillery to Russia is subjectively mediocre, then the probability that these countries will supply precisely "newest" artillery is extremely low due to a number of factors. Therefore, the supply of artillery from these countries can affect the indicator of "quantity", not "quality".

We cannot agree with the opinion that we will see 100% depletion of artillery stocks from storage bases in the enemy within at least the next 3 years. But we can assert that the quality of this artillery will steadily decrease to the practical realization of the thesis "grandfathers fought".

For example: among 5,139 units of towed artillery that still remain in arsenals and storage bases, about 2,000 units are samples of systems produced in the 1940-50s (M-30 and D-1).

Self-propelled artillery (SPG)

The most interesting moment may be the following: why did more equipment appear at storage bases and arsenals compared to 2023? The answer may lie both in the methodology of our calculation and in the fact that satellite images do not allow us to look into garages and hangars.

But as the primary reason, our collaboration identified the following: the Russians began to massively pull damaged and destroyed artillery systems to large storage bases and arsenals. That is, now the calculation takes into account not only "what was in storage", but also what was in line units, but after damage or destruction was pulled to bases for restoration or cannibalization.

This indicates that the existing factory restoration capabilities are not coping with the needs, and therefore the enemy is forced to resort to faster, but also more extensive means of restoration, namely: to pull damaged equipment to an arsenal thousands of kilometers from the front line, assess the condition and decide on the spot "whether to restore this unit at the expense of cannibalizing others or dismantle it for spare parts for future such "clients". Zones with dismantled SPGs for spare parts (barrels, engines stored in the open air) have significantly increased.

Here are a few photos for example: damaged SPGs in winter camouflage on spring images, burned and dismantled hulls.

Small and medium arsenals are actually depleted and, most likely, all suitable equipment is being moved to large bases, which now serve as large centers for the restoration and repair of damaged SPGs. At such bases, additional hangars/workshops are being built and space is being cleared for settling tanks and storage of spare parts obtained through cannibalization.

Equipment is being moved to large bases both from the front and from smaller bases. For example, 12 units of 2S7 "Pion" and 27 units of 2S4 "Tyulpan" were brought to the 80th arsenal, which were not previously stored there. Probably, some of them were pulled back for repair from the front, and the other part - from other bases as candidates for "donation".

1. At almost all bases, the zones of accumulation of "waste from cannibalization" have significantly increased.

   Determining the approximate number of damaged/destroyed self-propelled artillery at storage bases and arsenals in the future will become extremely problematic due to the fact that equipment from the front and equipment in storage bases have undergone relocations. If in 2023 this practice had not yet become widespread, now the influx of damaged equipment from the front to arsenals has begun to have a systemic nature in the context of almost all large bases.

   Another aspect is that the Russians are feeling the gradual depletion of reserves, so they are removing everything they can even from damaged and destroyed SPGs. For example, at the 120th arsenal, the cannibalization of 2S1 "Gvozdika" and 2S3 "Akatsiya" has become a mass phenomenon.

2. The highest percentage of cannibalization in relation to the number of systems in service is felt in the context of 2S7 "Pion" SPGs. Probably, all systems that remain in storage will be used as "donors", not to saturate new units or replace losses, since the hundred units that remain are quickly being dismantled for spare parts, which are stored in the open air.

   It's quite difficult to determine the terms of depletion. Regarding self-propelled artillery - it will be possible to speak more accurately in 2025, since the "bottleneck" lies not in the number of systems, but in the speed of their restoration. The accumulation and increase in the percentage of systems that were withdrawn from the front in unusual places like arsenals will be evidence that the restoration capabilities at factories are not keeping up with the rate of losses - even with the transformation of large arsenals into repair and restoration workshops. This, in turn, will reinforce the trends of replacing the lack of self-propelled artillery with more primitive artillery means - such as towed artillery, which is much faster to restore. In fact, this is gradually happening.

   For example: in one permanent deployment point of tank regiment X, towed howitzers were noticed, although according to the staffing table, the tank regiment should be equipped with 2 batteries of SPGs. That is, units that should be equipped with self-propelled artillery are being equipped with towed artillery, which is faster to restore, but has lower indicators of efficiency and quality.

As of now, we are inclined to believe that systems such as "Pion", "Msta-S", "Tyulpan", "Giatsint-S" should feel a critical lack of restoration capabilities in about 1.5-2 years depending on the intensity of hostilities - but this is a rather relative assessment, not an exact date to mark on the calendar, as the potential of such forecasts is influenced by too many factors. Instead, the simpler and more primitive "Gvozdika" and "Akatsiya" are in significant numbers in arsenals and therefore theoretically available for replenishing losses. These systems make up almost 2/3 of all stocks in storage.

Therefore, in the context of SPGs, we will see "depletion to zero" to the extent that high-quality and long-range components closer to the end of 2025 will be massively replaced by more primitive models such as "Gvozdika" and "Akatsiya", which will provide quantity, not quality. And even this "quantity" will be limited not by the availability of these SPGs in storage, but by Russia's ability to restore them. Therefore, with a higher probability, the percentage of available self-propelled artillery will decrease not only in terms of quality but will also be replaced by simpler towed artillery.

Towed artillery

*Probably, this many artillery systems have undergone cannibalization, but we cannot state this with certainty due to the image quality. Therefore, we conservatively count these systems as "available", because there may be an error in the assessment, or by another criterion, under certain possibilities (supply of barrels), this unit can be restored, even if it is currently without a barrel.

1. It's worth noting that the image of the largest storage location for towed artillery "Shchuchye" is dated December 2023, so the real quantity as of now may be even smaller.

2. Towed artillery is the main type of artillery for compensating losses and saturating new artillery units with equipment. Out of 14,111 units that were counted in 2021, as of mid-2024, 5,453 units remain, or 5,139 identified as "with barrels present", which is approximately 1/3 of the fleet available at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The difference between 2023 and 2024 was 1,333 units removed from storage and 314 units cannibalized with barrels removed.

3. Small and medium arsenals are experiencing critical depletion "to zero": for example, the most suitable artillery was taken out of the large 94th arsenal. Also, the storage locations of towed artillery "Karabash" and the arsenal of the "37th separate railway brigade" have experienced maximum depletion. The 216th and 209th arsenals and the 7021st storage base are very close to depletion.

4. There are 4 main bases left where towed artillery is stored: Shchuchye, 80th arsenal, "Lesnoy Gorodok" and 120th arsenal - these bases store 90% of all towed artillery. More than a dozen small and medium bases are completely depleted or close to it already in 2024.

5. At the 120th arsenal and "Lesnoy Gorodok", towed artillery is not so much being removed from storage to replace losses or saturate new units, as it is being dismantled on site, probably to provide field repairs and barrel replacements.

6. Despite the fact that Russia has only 36-38% of the towed artillery stocks available in 2021 left - this is still a lot, which will allow replenishing losses and restoring the resource of artillery already in regular units. But for a better understanding of the situation, it's worth referring to "quality": out of 5,139 units that remain with barrels, about 2,000 are artillery from the late 1930s-50s (M-30 and D-1 and others).

7. Taking into account the risk of supplying barrels and artillery from Iran or North Korea, it doesn't make sense to predict the terms of exhaustion of the towed artillery resource. But Iran and North Korea are unlikely to transfer "newest samples" of towed trailer artillery, not to mention self-propelled ones. Therefore, if the risk of artillery transfer from the "axis of evil" is realized - most likely, these will be the same old modifications of howitzers from the 1930s-50s. So it's better to focus on the trend: in 2022-2023, there was a degradation of the artillery component, when losses were replaced not by self-propelled, but by towed artillery. As of the end of 2023, various researchers, including us, agree that 70% of the artillery in the line units of the occupation forces is now towed, and 30% is self-propelled, which is a mirror image of the state of affairs before the full-scale invasion. And in 2024-2025, there should be a degradation of towed artillery in the composition of the occupation forces, when newer, higher quality samples such as "Msta-B", "Giatsint-B", D-30/20 will be replaced by M-30 and D-1. The problem of ammunition supply for M-30 seems to have been solved thanks to supplies from North Korea.

Therefore, we are unlikely to see the deployment of "trebuchets" in Russian artillery units - but their artillery will be much less mobile, accurate, with higher ammunition consumption per unit of target, with less barrel resource due to their age, with a shorter service life and longer restoration time. All this will affect the ability of the occupation forces to conduct counter-battery combat, which, with a proper number of modern mobile means of destruction in the armament of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, should give a higher percentage of success in counter-battery duels and a better ability to suppress enemy cover means on specific sections of the front as needed.

Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS)

According to Military Balance, Russia should have 1500 units of BM-21 "Grad" and 550 units of BM-27 "Uragan" in reserve. Since we identified 433 units of "Uragan" through satellite images in 2021, the difference of 100 units from MB can be attributed to storage in closed premises, non-coverage (a few units) of BM-27 at small bases, or simply MB data often don't take into account "historical cannibalization" of machines.

But where exactly Military Balance counted 1500 units of BM-21 "Grad" at storage bases remains a mystery to us. Covering both large and small bases, main production, modernization and repair plants, as of 2021 we identified 889 units of BM-21, of which over 200 units are purely chassis from former BM-21 "Grad". Where the other 600+ units went – we don't know. Even if we assume storage of a certain number of machines at smaller bases or in covered hangars - this figure was still clearly inflated compared to the actual one, and storage of simple BM-21s in precious places in covered hangars as of 2024 is unlikely, as machines that have been in the open air for decades without signs of maintenance are undergoing mass cannibalization.

Figures on the scoreboard – more precisely, in the table. The mass disappearance and cannibalization of MLRS at storage bases are due to several factors:

1. MLRS, especially BM-21 "Grad" - is a fairly simple design, and therefore they could be quickly restored to fill significant losses incurred in 2022. Similarly, due to the difficulty of restoring SPGs, newly created units were equipped with multiple launch rocket systems and towed artillery to ensure the presence of an appropriate artillery component in case it was impossible to provide self-propelled artillery according to the staff list.

2. Many units of MLRS, especially "Grads", are being cannibalized for spare parts "for the future", when the available resource of "Grads" already in the army will be depleted. Probably, a large number of removed guide rails (tubes) were transferred to storage in more suitable places (hangars/warehouses). The chassis themselves are not of great value, so they continue to remain in the "garden of rusty Soviet tin cans".

3. "Grads" that were in storage in the best condition were transferred for modernization to "Tornado-G". In fact, even before February 24, 2022, "Tornado-G" entered the Russian army not through production "from scratch", but through modernization using the method "make 1 from 3". This can explain the difference in our calculations of BM-21 with the calculations of Military Balance, which, it seems, had too high expectations regarding the number of units of this type of MLRS in storage.

Although the volumes of MLRS available in storage are actually approaching exhaustion, 17.7% of the initial stocks of "Grads" and 31% of the initial stocks of "Uragans" is still quite a significant figure – accordingly, the presence of these systems in warehouses does not mean the depletion of the reactive component of artillery. Due to the range of the "Uragan" system, its defeat is not a frequent phenomenon: during 2.5 years of full-scale war, according to Oryx, the destruction of 85 units has been visually confirmed (which allows rounding the number of actually lost MLRS of this type to a hundred). The second aspect is Russia's ability to maintain the operational aspects of these machines for a long time. Part of the "Uragans" was cannibalized for future restoration needs, and the launch/guide tubes themselves are not too complex "products". In a critical case, Russia will be able to try to discreetly purchase and transport guide elements from North Korea.

Quantity is another matter. At the current rate of destruction, 100+ "Uragans" in reserve may be enough to compensate for losses over 12-18 months - but this is without taking into account that losses in war are non-linear and there may be either a sharp increase in the intensity of their destruction, or vice versa. Therefore, such forecasts in numbers are quite "floating".

The same applies to BM-21. These are simple structures, components for which are quite sufficient due to cannibalization. The remains of BM-21 are a reserve of spare parts for those MLRS units that are already in service with the enemy army. Perhaps, a certain number is still stored for modernization to the "Tornado-G" modification, losses of which are occasionally recorded in the enemy's state.

What about artillery production in Moscow?

We come to a very interesting topic, namely the answer to the question: "Why is the main potential of Moscow's artillery component modernization and restoration through cannibalization", and not production "from scratch". Very often, enemy media report about the production of equipment "from scratch", which in reality is the deconservation or modernization of artillery units already in storage.

1. Where and what are the artillery productions in Moscow?

   Tube artillery in Moscow is produced at "Uraltransmash", MLRS - at "Motovilikha Plants", towed artillery and mortars - also at "Motovilikha Plants". In addition, there were plans to supply components for the "Grad" MLRS from Belarus (from the subcontractor "Volatavto"), which were not implemented. Nevertheless, Moscow will receive component elements of production from subcontractors that do not have the appropriate licenses.

   Theoretically, Moscow can count on the production potential of "Polonez-M" MLRS in Belarus, however, the decision to supply them to Russia has not been made - nevertheless, this probability should not be discounted, although it is complicated by the need to obtain permission from China for the export and use of these systems, since these MLRS use Chinese technologies.

2. What artillery does Moscow produce "from scratch" and how large is the potential for establishing/expanding artillery production?

   Moscow produces both SPGs ("Coalition-SV", "Malva", "Floks") and MLRS ("Tornado-S", "Zemledelie", "TOS-1", "TOS-2", "Uragan-1M") from scratch. The expansion of SPG production is limited both by barrels (the "Coalition" and "Malva" are armed with different non-interchangeable guns - 2A88 and 2A64 respectively) and by the base (the "Coalition" is produced on the T-90 base, the stocks of which in storage were exhausted (according to the study by Covert Cabal and High_marsed). Meanwhile, the production rates of new hulls are limited. Therefore, most of the tube artillery - both self-propelled and towed - is reactivated through cannibalization (for example, removing the barrel from the 2S1 "Gvozdika" SPG and installing it on the carriage of the D-20 towed howitzer, as well as reactivating D-30).

   As for MLRS, on the one hand, they are simpler because they do not require complex technologies for the production of guide (launch) tubes, and generally have a wheeled base (at NPO "Splav", according to Russian reports, both modernized "Grads" and "Tornado-G" are manufactured, however, the last report of their delivery dates back to November 16, 2022). On the other hand, TOS-1 has the T-72 tank as its base, and the stocks of tanks suitable for restoration are rapidly decreasing (although, most likely, this issue is being resolved by switching to the production of TOS-2 on a wheeled base). The biggest problem in the production of tube artillery is not even the limited production sites and equipment (radial forging machines produced by GFM Steyr), but insufficient production of specialized steel that could withstand the pressure during shots.

3. What are the features of artillery restoration/production?

   It's quite difficult to estimate the rates of restoration of SPGs and towed artillery. The key indicator is the production of new artillery barrels, which is estimated at 50-80 units per year (data from Pavel Luzin). In general, we are talking more about restoration rather than production of new equipment as such, with the restoration of towed equipment possibly occurring even in field conditions, or as we confirmed, directly at storage bases. Meanwhile, the restoration and modernization of SPGs takes place at limited production sites, the overload of which has led to the fact that damaged and destroyed self-propelled artillery began to be pulled not to factories, but to workshops at storage bases.

4. Where and how many barrels does Moscow produce for existing artillery or new production?

   Artillery barrels are produced at the "Motovilikha" plants (Perm) and "Titan-Barricades" (Volgograd), tank barrels - at plant No. 9 (Yekaterinburg) - but, according to estimates, in very small quantities. Pavel Luzin, in a private comment, reported that, in his opinion, production is limited to 50-80 artillery barrels (for rifled guns) and several dozen tank barrels (on the other hand, an article in The Economist, also referring to Mr. Luzin, states that the upper limit of large-caliber artillery barrel production can reach 200 units - which, nevertheless, does not fundamentally change the overall situation, given the rate of barrel "burning"). Moreover, "Titan-Barricades", at best, plays an auxiliary role, since, despite the presence of an artillery design bureau in its structure, the plant itself has been part of the "Roscosmos" structure for over 10 years. Therefore, the status and condition of artillery production in Volgograd raises if not doubts, then questions about the scale.

According to estimates by various researchers, Russia is incapable of and does not mass-produce large-caliber artillery barrels. Moreover, even such a limited amount of artillery barrel production has an extremely narrow bottleneck. And this bottleneck is not even the Austrian company GFM Steyr, on which virtually all equipment, maintenance, and modernization of machines for barrel production depends, but specialized "clean" metallurgy and alloy production technology, which in Russia itself has been recognized as "dead".

But even with GFM Steyr behind them, to maintain the level of combat readiness of artillery units, the Russians must rely primarily on:

1. Deconservation and cannibalization of increasingly older artillery from storage bases;
2. Increasing the share of MLRS in the artillery component, as it can be quickly put on wheels and used;
3. Working on the prospect of supplying artillery barrels and systems from North Korea and Iran.

Artillery in North Korea and Iran.

"Will North Korea and Iran go for supplying artillery to the Russians?" is an open and debatable question. To work out the most negative scenarios for us - in order to prepare for them - we suggest considering that in the future, North Korea and Iran will take such a step. Of course, if the state of Russia's artillery reaches absolutely critical indicators and, as a result, Moscow will be ready to pay a lot (not just money).

Regarding what artillery Iran and North Korea will be ready to supply to the Russians, there are two limitations, which, undoubtedly, are positive for us:

1. Neither North Korea nor Iran are countries where modern artillery is rapidly developing and available in commercial quantities. The North Koreans are probably the closest in the world to the Russians in terms of artillery quantity - but clearly not in quality. Most of the artillery in North Korea consists of systems produced in the 1940-50s and even from World War I times.

2. North Korea and Iran have their own reasons to keep the balance of military power with their neighbors at least at the current level, so this will also affect both the decision "to provide or not to provide artillery to Russia" and how much and what quality of artillery can be provided.

Artillery is one of the main components in the North Korean army and probably one of the most difficult to assess, especially after the start of artillery ammunition supplies to Russia.

The Soviet heritage, Chinese and local production allowed North Korea to accumulate an extremely large amount of artillery, which in volume is catching up with that available to the Russian army as of early 2022. There are different estimates of this quantity: CovertCabal, without reference to any source, provides a figure of 14,000 artillery units (towed artillery, SPGs, MLRS). Military Balance 2024 provides a figure of 21,600 artillery units of all types, including mortars. Such an extremely large discrepancy in the amount of artillery can be explained by the fact that Military Balance added mortars to its calculations.

One of the key reasons for the difficulty in assessment is the landscape and the approach of the North Korean army to placing its equipment. Most of North Korea's territory is covered with mountains one way or another - which North Korea uses by building entire systems of underground storage bases, production, and firing points that could be used for a possible war with South Korea. About 2/3 of the artillery is stored in such underground facilities, which have completely autonomous infrastructure, with logistics, firing positions, ventilation, power plants, headquarters, etc.

In addition, there are at least 17 factories for the production of firearms and artillery in North Korea, according to information posted on North Korean forums (yes, such exist).

However, the main goal of the study is to determine what Russia can get from all this. Most of the artillery that North Korea has is old Soviet artillery from World War II times.

8,600 towed artillery/SPGs:

• 122mm: M-1977; M-1981; M-1985; M-1991;
• 130mm: M1975; M-1981; M-1991;
• 152mm: M-1974; M-1977; M-2018;
• 170mm: M-1978; M-1989

Towed artillery:

• 122mm: D-30; D-74; M-1931/37;
• 130mm: M-46;
• 152mm M-1937; M-1938; M-1943

5,500 MLRS:

• 107mm Type-63; VTT-323 107mm;
• 122mm: BM-11; M-1977 (BM-21); M-1985; M-1992; M-1993; VTT-323 122mm;
• 200mm: BMD-20;
• 240mm: BM-24; M-1985; M-1989; M-1991;
• 300mm: a certain number of M-2015 (KN-SS-X-09) (tests are being conducted);
• 600mm: a certain number of M-2019 (tests are being conducted)

7,500 units of mortars in calibers from 82 to 160 mm.

What of this could theoretically fall into the hands of the Russians? It needs to be understood that potentially any of these systems could end up in Russia. It's impossible to objectively assess the stocks of artillery and its condition, and North Korean propaganda is not a very reliable source for assessment. Added to this is North Korea's ability to produce new artillery. Of course, with China's help, they can produce it, moreover - we can be sure that they produce it, because the 170mm SPG ("Koksan" in popular parlance) is exactly the artillery that was manufactured directly in North Korea.

However, regarding the quality of this artillery, certain questions may arise, since barrel production requires a certain technological level so that the barrel doesn't burst after firing (this applies to new systems). As for old systems, which make up the majority, questions remain about restoration and ensuring resource.

We already know that the quality of ammunition supplied to Russia from North Korea is unsatisfactory, or at least has a number of problems. Artillerymen of the occupation forces complain about the poor accuracy of shells and their quality. Therefore, obviously, questions also arise about the condition of systems in service in North Korea.

But what exactly can North Korea transfer to the Russians? First of all, Russia needs replacement barrels for its artillery - this can be solved either by providing barrels directly from the conveyor, or by transferring barrels removed from artillery in North Korea (or together with artillery units). Of all the listed systems, Russia will primarily be interested in barrels for D-20/30 guns, as these are some of the main systems they use.

There is currently no need for the transfer of barrels for M-46, the Russians still have enough systems of this type and the need for barrel replacement has not yet increased, since 130 mm is not the main caliber for Russian troops, although supplies of 130mm shells have been noticed from Iran and North Korea. Other systems are either too old for use by the Russians, or use different shells, such as D-1, which uses single-belt 152.4 mm shells that are not produced by Russia directly - otherwise we would have seen more massive use of D-1.

The issue of supplying SPGs is also debatable. New weapon samples are too valuable for Pyongyang due to their limited quantity, and the expediency of supplying old conserved models for restoration is questionable. Another factor is that Russia still has its own large stocks of SPGs, but due to the overload of its own production capabilities, technical condition and rate of losses, it relies primarily on replacing the fire component with towed artillery and MLRS, which could be quickly reactivated.

As for MLRS, of all the listed equipment, the Russians can only use M-1977, which are analogous to BM-21. However, the Russians still have enough systems of this type for at least the next year and a half. Plus, this type of weapon would hardly be the main one in Russia's attempts to gain access to North Korean stocks.

Most likely, the Russians will make do with only ammunition supplies, the need for which is constant. As for systems of other calibers - none of them are used by Russia.

So, as we can see, the situation with artillery in North Korea is extremely uncertain. We know that there's a lot of it, but it's outdated, even relative to what the occupation forces are now forced to use. There are also questions about the condition of this artillery in storage, because it's unlikely that such a zoo of equipment can be maintained in a suitable condition with a military budget of $2-3 billion and the need to feed an army of 1.2 million.

Potential of Iranian artillery

Unlike North Korea and Russia, Iran relies much less on its artillery component. Iran's climatic conditions, namely dry air and hot climate, allow us to assume that the condition of artillery in Iran may be slightly better than in North Korea or Russia - provided that this artillery is stored in the open air.

A feature of the artillery in service with Iran is that it consists of samples of both Western and Soviet artillery. In total, Iran has more than 6,798 artillery units in service (according to Military Balance 2024) - but less than 300 of them are self-propelled.

292+ units of SPGs:

• 122 mm: 60 units of 2S1 "Gvozdika"; Raad-1 (Iranian version of 2S1);
• 155 mm: 150 units of M109A1; Raad-2 (Iranian version of M109);
• 170 mm: 30 units of M-1978;
• 175 mm: 22 units of M-107;
• 203 mm: 30 units of M110;

2,030+ units of towed artillery:

• 105 mm: 130 units of M101A1; 20 units of M-56;
• 122 mm: 540 units of D-30; 100 units of Type-54 (M-30);
• 130 mm: 985 units of M-46;
• 152 mm: 30 units of D-20;
• 155 mm: 120 units of GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 units of Type-88 WAC-21;
• 203 mm: 20 units of M11

1,476 units of MLRS:

• 107 mm: 700 units of Type-63; 600 units of HASEB Fadjr 1;
• 122 mm: 7 units of BM-11; 100 units of BM-21 "Grad"; 50 units of Arash/Hadid/ Noor;
• 240 mm: 19+: ε10 Fadjr 3; 9 M-1985;
• 330 mm: Fadjr 5.

*Note: 700 units of Type-63 and 600 units of HASEB Fadjr 1 are unlikely to be used by Russia under any circumstances, given the antiquity of this weaponry, tactical characteristics, and ammunition caliber.

3,000 mortars in calibers from 81 to 120 mm.

Iran has a much smaller number of Soviet systems that it could share with Russia than North Korea. Instead, Iran is involved in a much larger number of active proxy conflicts, for which it is forced to have the necessary arsenal of reserves to protect both borders and to support its terrorist formations.

The only thing Russia could realistically turn to Iran for to compensate for its needs, and, most importantly, what Iran could hypothetically agree to - are barrels for D-30. Hypothetically, in the future, Russia could buy some part of M-46 guns if the deficit of 130mm shells is resolved.

So, if we draw conclusions based on the state of artillery in Iran and North Korea, we can assume that Russia may first turn to these countries to compensate for the lack of barrels for systems that are actively used (we're talking about Soviet calibers). However, despite the total amount of artillery on paper in these two countries from the "axis of evil", the number of these particular systems in both Iran and North Korea is limited, and hardly such that could cover long-term needs.

All other systems in service in these two countries, Russia may start using either in case of a total lack of barrels and artillery systems in general (which is unlikely at this stage), or with a desire to expand its capabilities for long-range and precise strikes (to request MLRS systems of 240+ mm caliber), but this rests on the political will and capabilities of North Korea and Iran, which, in our view, are unlikely to be ready to transfer the latest weapon samples.